Category Archives: Policy and Reform

Systemically Dangerous Institutions

The Obama administration is continuing the Bush administration policy of refusing to comply with the Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) law (see here and here). Both administrations twisted a deeply flawed doctrine – “too big to fail” – into a policy enshrining crony capitalism.

Historically, “too big to fail” was a misnomer – large, insolvent banks and S&Ls were placed in receivership and their “risk capital” (shareholders and subordinated debtholders) received nothing. That treatment is fair, minimizes the costs to the taxpayers, and minimizes “moral hazard.” “Too big to fail” meant only that they were not placed in liquidating receiverships (akin to a Chapter 7 “liquidating” bankruptcy). In this crisis, however, regulators have twisted the term into immunity. Massive insolvent banks are not placed in receivership, their senior managers are left in place, and the taxpayers secretly subsidize their risk capital. This policy is indefensible. It is also unlawful. It violates the Prompt Corrective Action law. If it is continued it will cause future crises and recurrent scandals.


On October 16, 2006, Chairman Bernanke delivered a speech explaining why regulators must not allow banks with inadequate capital to remain open.

Capital regulation is the cornerstone of bank regulators’ efforts to maintain asafe and sound banking system, a critical element of overall financial stability. For example, supervisory policies regarding prompt corrective action are linked to a bank’s leverage and risk-based capital ratios. Moreover, a strong capital base significantly reduces the moral hazard risks associated with the extension of the federal safety net.

The Treasury has fundamentally mischaracterized the nature of institutions it deems “too big to fail.” These institutions are not massive because greater size brings efficiency. They are massive because size brings market and political power. Their size makes them inefficient and dangerous.

Under the current regulatory system banks that are too big to fail pose a clear and present danger to the economy. They are not national assets. A bank that is too big to fail is too big to operate safely and too big to regulate. It poses a systemic risk. These banks are not “systemically important”, they are “systemically dangerous.” They are ticking time bombs – except that many of them have already exploded.

We need to comply with the Prompt Corrective Action law. Any institution that the administration deems “too big to fail” should be placed on a public list of “systemically dangerous institutions” (SDIs). SDIs should be subject to regulatory and tax incentives to shrink to a size where they are no longer too big to fail, manage, and regulate. No single financial entity should be permitted to become, or remain, so large that it poses a systemic risk.

SDIs should:

1. Not be permitted to acquire other firms

2. Not be permitted to grow

3. Be subject to a premium federal corporate income tax rate that increases with asset size

4. Be subject to comprehensive federal and state regulation, including:

a. Annual, full-scope examinations by their primary federal regulator
b. Annual examination by the systemic risk regulator
c. Annual tax audits by the IRS
d. An annual forensic (anti-fraud) audit by a firm chosen by their primary federal regulator
e. An annual audit by a firm chosen by their primary federal regulator
f. SEC review of every securities filing

5. A prohibition on any stock buy-backs

6. Limits on dividends

7. A requirement to follow “best practices” on executive compensation as specified by their primary federal regulator

8. A prohibition against growth and a requirement for phased shrinkage

9. A ban (which becomes effective in 18 months) on having an equity interest in any affiliate that is headquartered in or doing business in any tax haven (designated by the IRS) or engaging in any transaction with an entity located in any tax haven

10. A ban on lobbying any governmental entity

11. Consolidation of all affiliates, including SIVs, so that the SDI could not evade leverage or capital requirements

12. Leverage limits

13. Increased capital requirements

14. A ban on the purchase, sale, or guarantee of any new OTC financial derivative

15. A ban on all new speculative investments

16. A ban on so-called “dynamic hedging”

17. A requirement to file criminal referrals meeting the standards set by the FBI

18. A requirement to establish “hot lines” encouraging whistleblowing

19. The appointment of public interest directors on the BPSR’s board of directors

20. The appointment by the primary federal regulator of an ombudsman as a senior officer of the SDI with the mission to function like an Inspector General

Healthcare Diversions Part 3: The Financialization of Health and Everything Else in the Universe

By L. Randall Wray

In the previous two blogs I have argued that extending healthcare insurance is neither desirable nor will it reduce healthcare costs. Indeed, healthcare insurance is a particularly bad way to provide funding of the provision of healthcare services. In this blog I argue that extension of healthcare insurance represents yet another unwelcome intrusion of finance into every part of our economy and our lives. In other words, the “reforms” envisioned would simply complete the financialization of healthcare that is already sucking money and resources into the same black hole that swallowed residential real estate. It is no coincidence that Senator Baucus, the Chair of the Senate Finance Committee, has been chosen to head the push on healthcare—not, say, someone who actually knows something about healthcare. The choice was obvious, similar to the choice of Goldman Sach’s flunky, Timmy Geithner to head the Treasury. (In truth, many of President Obama’s appointees have no more expertise in their assigned missions than did President Bush’s “heckuvajob” Brown chosen to oversee the response to Hurricane Katrina. The difference here is not really incompetence but rather inappropriate competence—as in foxes and henhouses.) When it comes to Washington, “Wall Street R Us”.

I have previously written about the financialization of houses and commodities (go to www.levy.org) and the plan to financialize death (earlier on this blog). In all of these cases, Wall Street packages assets (home mortgages, commodities futures, and life insurance policies) so that gamblers can speculate on outcomes. If you lose your home through a mortgage delinquency, if food prices rise high enough to cause starvation, or if you die an untimely death, Wall Streeters make out like bandits. Health insurance works out a bit differently: they sell you insurance and then the insurer denies your claim due to pre-existing conditions or simply because denial is more profitable and you probably don’t have sufficient funding to fight your way through the courts. You then go bankrupt (according to Steffie Woolhandler, two-thirds of US bankruptcies are due to healthcare bills) and Wall Street takes your assets and garnishes your wages.

Here’s the opportunity, Wall Street’s newest and bestest gamble: there is a huge untapped market of some 50 million people who are not paying insurance premiums—and the number grows every year because employers drop coverage and people can’t afford premiums. Solution? Health insurance “reform” that requires everyone to turn over their pay to Wall Street. Can’t afford the premiums? That is OK—Uncle Sam will kick in a few hundred billion to help out the insurers. Of course, do not expect more health care or better health outcomes because that has nothing to do with “reform”. “Heckuvajob” Baucus is more concerned about Wall Street’s insurers, who see a missed opportunity. They’ll collect the extra premiums and deny the claims. This is just another bailout of the financial system, because the tens of trillions of dollars already committed are not nearly enough.

You might wonder about the connection between insurance and Wall Street finance. They are two peas in a pod. Indeed, we threw out the Glass-Steagall Act that separated commercial banking from investment banking and insurance with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (note how easily that rolls off the tongue—sort of like a mixture of wool and superglue) that let Wall Street form Bank Holding Companies that integrate the full range of “financial services” such as loans and deposits, that sell toxic waste mortgage securities to your pension funds, that create commodity futures indexes for university endowments to drive up the price of your petrol, and that take bets on the deaths of firms, countries, and your loved ones.

Student loans, credit card debt, and auto leases? Financialized—packaged and sold to gamblers making bets on default. Even the weather can be financialized. You think I jest? The World Food Programme proposed to issue “catastrophe bonds” linked to low rainfall. The WFP would pay principal and interest when rainfall was sufficient; if there was no rainfall, the WFP would cease making payments on the bonds and would instead fund relief efforts. (Satyajit Das, Traders, Guns & Money, p. 32). As are earthquakes—Tokyo Disneyland issued bonds that did not have to be repaid in the event of an earthquake. (ibid) It is rumored that Wall Street will even take bets on assassination of world leaders (perhaps explaining the presence of armed protestors at President Obama’s speeches). Why not? Someone even set up a charitable trust called the “Sisters of Perpetual Ecstasy” as a special purpose vehicle to move risky assets off the books of its mother superior bank, to escape what passed for regulation in recent years. (Das, again) I once facetiously recommended the creation of a market in Martian ocean front condo futures to satisfy the cravings of Wall Street for new frontiers in risk. Obviously, I set my sights too low. The next bubble will probably be in carbon trading—financialization of pollution!—this time truly toxic waste will be packaged and sold off to global savers. According to Das (p. 320), traders talk about new frontiers “trading in rights to clean air, water and access to fishing grounds; basics of human life that I had always taken for granted”.

Is there an alternative? Frankly, I do not know. Leaving aside the political problems—once Wall Street has got its greedy hands on some aspect of our lives it is very difficult to wrest control from its grasp—health care is a very complex issue. It is clear (to me) that provision of routine care should not be left to insurance companies. Marshall Auerback believes that unforeseen and major expenses due to accidents might be insurable costs. I am sympathetic. Perhaps “single payer” (that is, the federal government) should provide basic coverage for all of life’s normal healthcare needs, with individuals purchasing additional coverage for accidents. Basic coverage can be de-insured—births, routine exams and screening, inoculations, hospice and elder care. On the other hand, a significant portion of healthcare expenses is due to chronic problems, some of which can be traced to birth. I have already argued that these are not really insurable—they are the existing conditions that insurers must exclude. Others can be traced to lifestyle “choices”. Some employers are already charging higher premiums to employees whose body mass index exceeds a chosen limit—with rebates provided to those who manage to lose weight. While I am skeptical that a monetary incentive will be effective in changing behavior that is certainly quite complex, this approach is probably better than excluding individuals from insurance simply because of their BMI.

Some have called for extending a Medicare-like program to all. Although sometimes called insurance, Medicare is not really an insurance program. Rather it pays for qualifying health care of qualified individuals. It is essentially a universal payer, paygo system. Its revenues come from taxes and “premiums” paid by covered individuals for a portion of the program. I will not go into the details, but “paygo” means it is not really advance funded. While many believe that its Trust Fund could be strengthened through higher taxes now so that more benefits could be paid later as America ages, actually, Medicare spending today is covered by today’s government spending—and tomorrow’s Medicare spending will be covered by tomorrow’s government spending. At the national level, it is not possible to transport today’s tax revenue to tomorrow to “pay for” future Medicare spending.

I realize this is a difficult concept. In real terms, however, it is simpler to understand: Medicare is paygo because the health care services are provided today, to today’s seniors; there is no way to stockpile medical services for future use (ok, yes, some medical machinery and hospitals can be built now to be used later). And the true purpose of taxes and premiums paid today is to reduce net personal income so that resources can be diverted to the health care sector. Many believe we already have too many resources directed to that sector. Hence, the solution cannot be to raise taxes or premiums today in order to build a bigger trust fund to reduce burdens tomorrow. If we find that 25 years from now we need more resources in the health care sector, the best way to do that will be to spend more on health care at that time, and to tax incomes at that time to reduce consumption in other areas so that resources can be shifted to health care at that time.

Our problem today is that we need to allocate more health care services to the currently underserved, which is comprised of two different sets of people: folks with no health insurance, and those with health insurance that is too limited in coverage to provide the care they need. A general proposed solution is to provide a subsidy to get private insurers to expand coverage. (According to Taibi, the current House Bill subsidies are projected to reach $773 billion by 2019.) If we take my example pursued in an earlier blog of a person with diabetes who is excluded because of the existing condition, the marginal subsidy required would have to equal the expected cost of care, plus a risk premium in case that estimate turns out to be too low, plus the costs of running the insurance business, plus normal profits. If on the other hand diabetes care were directly covered by a federal government payment to health care providers, the risk premium, insurance business costs, and profits on the insurance business would not be necessary. In other words, using the insurance system to pay for added costs of providing care to people with diabetes adds several layers of costs. That just makes no sense.

It will be clear by now that I really do not have any magic bullet. We face three serious and complex issues that can be separately analyzed. First, we need a system that provides health care services. Our current healthcare system does a tolerably good job for most people, although a large portion of the population does not receive adequate preventative and routine care, thus, is forced to rely on expensive emergency treatment. The solution to that is fairly obvious and easy to implement—if we leave payment to the side. As discussed in my first blog we must also recognize that a big part of America’s health expenses are due to chronic and avoidable conditions that result from the corporatization of food—a more difficult problem to resolve.

Second, our system might, on the other hand, provide in the aggregate too many resources toward the provision of healthcare (leaving other needs of our population unmet). Rational discussion and then rational allocation can deal with that. We don’t need “death panels” (which we already have—run by the insurance companies), but we do need rational allocation. I expect that healthcare professionals can do a far better job than Wall Street will ever do in deciding how much care and what type of care should be provided. Individuals who would like more care than professionals decide to be in the public interest can always pay out of pocket, or can purchase private insurance. Maybe the cost of botox treatments is an insurable expense? Obviously, what is deemed to be necessary healthcare will evolve over time—it, like human rights is “aspirational”—and some day might include nose jobs and tummy tucks for everyone.

Third, we need a way to pay for healthcare services. For routine healthcare and for pre-existing conditions it seems to me that the only logical conclusion is that the best risk pool is the population as a whole. It is in the public interest to see that the entire population receives routine care. It is also in the public interest to see that our little bundles of pre-existing conditions (otherwise known as infants) get the care they need. I cannot see any obvious advantage to involving private insurance in the payment system for this kind of care. If we decided to have more than one insurer, we would have to be sure that each had the same risks, hence, the same sort of insured pool. It is conceivable that competition among private insurers could drive down premiums, but it is more likely that competition would instead take the form of excluding as many claims as possible. We’d thus get high premiums and lots of exclusions—exactly what we’ve got now.

We could instead have a single national private insurer pursuing the normal monopoly pricing and poor service strategy (remember those good old days when you could choose from among one single telephone service provider?), but in that case we would have to regulate the premiums as well as the rejection of claims. Regulation of premiums cannot be undertaken without regulating the health care costs that the insurer(s) would have to cover. If we are going to go to all the trouble of regulating premiums, claim rejections, and healthcare prices we might as well go whole-hog and have the federal government pay the costs. Difficult and contentious, yes. Impossible? No—we can look to our fellow developed nations for examples, and to our own Medicare system.

Finally, there may still be a role for private insurers, albeit a substantially downsized one. Private insurance can be reserved for accidents, with individuals grouped according to similar risks: hang-gliders, smokers, and texting drivers can all be sorted into risk classes for insurance purposes. If it is any consolation to the downsized insurers, we also need to downsize the role played by the whole financial sector. Finance won’t like that because it has become accustomed to its outsized role. In recent years it has been taking 40% of corporate profits. It takes most of its share off the top—fees and premiums that it receives before anyone else gets paid. Rather than playing an auxiliary role, helping to ensure that goods and services get produced and distributed to those who need them, Wall Street has come to see its role as primary, with all aspects of our economy run by the Masters of the Universe. As John Kenneth Galbraith’s The Great Crash shows, that was exactly the situation our country faced in the late 1920s. It took the Great Depression to put Wall Street back into its proper place. The question is whether we can get it into the backseat without another great depression.

Healthcare Diversions, Part 1: The Elephant in the Room

By L. Randall Wray

I have tried to stay clear of the current healthcare debate because all sides appear to be so far from any sensible policy that I remain indifferent to the outcome. However a recent three-hour layover in a major airport in the “new South” brought into sharp focus—at least for me—the elephant in the room that no one wants to discuss.

I won’t belabor the obvious point that Americans are, to put it delicately, a bit on the hefty side. But what really struck me is that many have evolved to the point that they are barely bipedal. As passengers attempted to perambulate their way from one gate to the next, it appeared that most had forgotten how to walk. I saw the most ungainly gaits—peregrination with great effort but little forward progress, the zigzag, the toe-heel-toe, the Quasimodo, the sideways roll, the zombie, the stop-start-stop again, all whilst occasionally careening off walls and other passengers. Of course, in some cases the attire dictated the method. A few of the boys had their pants waist bands down around their knees, forcing a duck-like waddle, made even more difficult by the need to use one hand to hold onto the belt lest gravity complete its work and bring the pants down to the ankles. A lot of the girls wore PJs and flip-flops, making it impossible to do much more than shuffle along. Some forty-somethings had eight inch stilettos in which only flamingos could parade about with grace. Still, the vast majority of passengers wore shoes marketed as sporting equipment, designed presumably for activities involving two legs and an upright posture rather than for those of the aquatic or slithering or knuckle-dragging variety.

And here is an interesting factoid: the average American walks just the length of three football fields daily. (Sierra Magazine, Jan/Feb 2007, p. 25) It shows. Since that is the average, it is no doubt boosted by the still considerable number of aging yuppies who manage 3k runs before breakfast, as well as by children the soccer moms idolized by Sarah Palin drive to practice. I presume that most of the airport patrons typically manage little more than a few schlepps from couch to fridge each day, taking a momentary break from their average 1600 hours in front of the TV each year. (Uncle John’s Bathroom Reader, 2006 p. 115)

Like many other airlines, ours had provided a welcoming speech as the plane pulled up to the gate, helpfully reminding passengers that the most dangerous part of their journey would soon begin. I had always thought that they were alluding to the fact that we would shortly be behind the wheel of our autos, taking our lives into our own unprofessional hands as we attempted to pilot 2 tons of steel on a 65 mph freeway through an obstacle course of text-messaging drivers (which studies show are twice as impaired as a drunk driver). Actually, they were referring to our more immediate mission—to walk without major mishap to the baggage claim area before returning to the relative safety of a seated or prone position in a vehicle, like the humans in the Wall-E movie. A few centuries ago, our ancestors here in America were able to run down buffalo, or even mastodons, and kill them with spears. Today, most Americans can, with some effort, spear a French fry—providing it is not moving too quickly and that they are seated to steady the aim.

Don’t get me wrong. I am not one of the contrarians who reject the argument that lack of access to healthcare by the uninsured contributes to the US’s relatively poor ranking in terms of health outcome. Surely that explains some of our problem. But too little exercise, too much smoking, too much food, and especially too much bad food have got to be a huge factor. As Michael Pollan argues (In Defense of Food, 2008), unless we address the problem with American Food, Inc., we will not significantly improve our health no matter what we do with health care. According to Pollan, the cost to society of the American addiction to “fast food” (which is neither all that fast nor is it food) is already $250 billion per year in diet-related health care costs. One-third of Americans born in 2000 will develop diabetes in her lifetime; on average, diabetes subtracts 12 years from life expectancy, and raises annual medical costs from $2500 for a person without diabetes to $13,000. While it is true that life expectancy today is higher than it was in 1900, almost all of this is due to reduction of death rates of infants and young children—mostly not due to the high tech healthcare that we celebrate as the contribution of our innovative, profit seeking system, but rather to lower tech inoculations, sewage treatment, mosquito abatement, and cleaner water. The life expectancy of a 65 year old in 1900 was only about 6 years less than it is for a 65 year old today—and rates of chronic diseases like cancer and type 2 diabetes are much higher. (Pollan, p. 93)

Smoking causes 400,000 deaths yearly. Simply banning smoking from public places throughout our country could reduce deaths by 156,000 annually. (NPR 22 Sept) We incarcerate a far higher percentage of our population than any developed society on earth—and health care costs in prisons are exploding for the obvious reason that prisons are not healthy environments. Our relatively high poverty rates, and high percentage of the population left outside the labor market (especially young adult males without a high school degree) all contribute to very poor health outcomes. In a very important sense that I will explore thoroughly in the next blog, more health insurance coverage would no more resolve our health care problems than would provision of car insurance to chronic drunk drivers solve our DUI problem.

So, before ramping up health care insurance, how about an education program to teach people the mechanics of walking. It is not as simple as it sounds. I speak from experience because some years ago I tore a calf muscle and after a long and painful healing process, I developed a gait that was all kinds of ugly. A physical therapist helped me to redevelop a human stride. While we are at it, we can reintroduce Americans to food. I don’t mean the corporate offal that Pollan calls “food-like substances”—products derived from plants and animals, but generated by breaking the original foods into their most basic molecules and then reconstituting them in a manner that can be more profitably marketed. What I mean is real food, produced by farmers and consumed after as little processing as possible. Preferably it will be local, cooked at home, eaten at a table, and will consist mostly of vegetables, grains, and fruits. And let us provide decent jobs to anyone ready to work, as an alternative to locking them up in prison. Ban smoking from all public places and regulate tobacco like the highly addictive and dangerous drug that it is. Together these policies will do far more to improve American health and to reduce health care costs than anything that “reformers” are proposing.

To conclude this part of the analysis: the benefits of extending health insurance coverage are almost certainly overstated and are not likely to make a major dent in our two comparative gaps: we spend far more than any other nation but do not obtain better outcomes and in important areas actually get worse results. Nations that adopt diets closer to ours begin to suffer similar afflictions: obesity, diabetes, heart disease, hypertension, diverticulitis, malformed dental arches and tooth decay, varicose veins, ulcers, hemorrhoids, and cancer. (Pollan p. 91) Even universal health insurance is not going to lower the costs of such chronic afflictions that are largely due to the fact that we eat too much of the wrong kinds of food and get too little exercise. It makes more sense to attack the problem directly by increasing exercise, reducing caloric intake, and minimizing consumption of corporate food-like substances that make us sick, than to provide insurance so that those who suffer the consequences of our lifestyle can afford costly care.

Let me be as clear as possible: it is neither rational nor humane to deny health care to any US resident. Further, I accept the arguments contending that early treatment through primary care is far more cost effective than waiting for emergency care—and it is obviously more humane. However in the next blog I will explain why I believe that extending health insurance is the wrong way to go if the goal is to extend health care coverage.

Fed Profits From The Bailout? Don’t Count Those Chickens Before They Hatch

A flurry of reports appears to indicate simultaneously that the government’s bailout of Wall Street is working to bring banks back to life, and that the Fed is making profits on the deal: See for instance here, here and here. According to these reports, the Fed received $19 billion in interest on its emergency loans to troubled institutions, which was about $14 billion more than it would have received if it had instead bought Treasuries. In addition, it was reported that the Fed made $4 billion of profits from the eight largest banks that have repaid TARP funds. This is seen as good news in Congress: “The taxpayers want their money back and they want the government out of our banking system,” said Representative Jeb Hensarling.

There are three fundamental problems with these stories. The first is that it raises a question about the function of the Fed: should a branch of government seek profits at the expense of the private sector? As we all know, the Fed is normally profitable and returns earnings above 6% on equity back to the Treasury. When the Fed profits on its holdings of government debt, that is essentially the government paying itself and thus of no consequence. Profiting at the expense of private institutions—even if they are the hated “banksters” of Wall Street—doesn’t seem to be something to celebrate. Especially when we are in a deep recession or depression, with a long way to go before the financial system recovers. All else equal, I’d rather see the private sector accumulate some profits so that it can recover.

Don’t get me wrong. I want retribution, too. We need a “bank holiday”, to begin next Friday: close suspect banks including all of the biggest that were subjected to the wimpy “stress test”. Spend the weekend going through the books and then on Monday begin to resolve the insolvent, to prosecute the banksters for fraud, and to retrieve from them their outsized bonuses financed by the public purse. It is payback time. My only objection is to the notion that we should be celebrating because the Fed appears to have made a profit on (a small part of) the bailout.

Second, there is every reason to suspect that the banks that have repaid TARP money and those making payments on loans from the Fed are still massively insolvent at any true valuation of the toxic waste still on their balance sheets. Recent reported profit in the financial sector is window-dressing, designed to fuel the irrationally exuberant stock market bubble. This will allow traders and other employees to cash in their stock options to recover some of the losses they incurred last year, even as bonuses are boosted for this year. Indeed, the main reason for returning the borrowed funds is to escape controls on executive salaries and bonuses. And, finally, it provides some important PR to counteract the growing anger over the financial bailouts. Only the foolish or those with some dog in the hunt will believe that the banksters have really managed to restore health to the financial sector as they continue to do what they did to cause the crisis.

Last but not least, the Fed’s “profits” are based on an infinitesimally small fraction of its ramped-up operations—its liquidity facilities (that also include discount window loans and currency swaps with other central banks, purchases of commercial paper and financing for investors in asset-backed securities). It has also spent $1.75 trillion buying bad assets, with any losses on those excluded from the profits numbers. The government’s profits also exclude current and expected spending on the rest of its reported $23.7 trillion dollar commitment to the financial bailout and fiscal stimulus package. The failure of just one medium-sized bank could easily wipe out the entire $14 billion of profits that has attracted so much notice. (See also Dean Baker on the government’s “profits”)

It is ironic that Euroland’s regulators are calling for much more radical steps than Washington is willing to take. German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy are calling for more regulation and for limits on executive compensation even as the Obama administration continues to argue that such limits would constrain the financial sector’s ability to retain the “best and the brightest”. If the bozos that created this crisis are the best that Wall Street can find, it would be better to shut down the US financial system than to keep them in charge. It is doubly ironic that Nigeria (a country that normally would not come immediately to mind as a role model) has actually charged the leadership of five of its major banks with crimes. Each of these banks had received government money in a bailout, and the CEOs stand accused of “fraud, giving loans to fake companies, lending to businesses they had a personal interest in and conspiring with stockbrokers to drive up share prices.”

Isn’t that normal business practice for Wall Street banks favored by Ben Bernanke and Timothy Geithner? It is time to get the NY Fed out of Goldman’s back pocket, and to permanently downsize the role played by Wall Street and the Fed in our economic system.

Money as a Public Monopoly

By L. Randall Wray

What I want to do in this blog is to argue that the reason both theory and policy get money “wrong” is because economists and policymakers fail to recognize that money is a public monopoly*. Conventional wisdom holds that money is a private invention of some clever Robinson Crusoe who tired of the inconveniencies of bartering fish with a short shelf-life for desired coconuts hoarded by Friday. Self-seeking globules of desire continually reduced transactions costs, guided by an invisible hand that selected the commodity with the best characteristics to function as the most efficient medium of exchange. Self-regulating markets maintained a perpetually maximum state of bliss, producing an equilibrium vector of relative prices for all tradables, including the money commodity that serves as a veiling numeraire.

All was fine and dandy until the evil government interfered, first by reaping seigniorage from monopolized coinage, next by printing too much money to chase the too few goods extant, and finally by efficiency-killing regulation of private financial institutions. Especially in the US, misguided laws and regulations simultaneously led to far too many financial intermediaries but far too little financial intermediation. Chairman Volcker delivered the first blow to restore efficiency by throwing the entire Savings and Loan sector into insolvency, and then freeing thrifts to do anything they damn well pleased. Deregulation, which actually dates to the Nixon years and even before, morphed into a self-regulation movement in the 1990s on the unassailable logic that rational self-interest would restrain financial institutions from doing anything foolish. This was all codified in the Basle II agreement that spread Anglo-Saxon anything goes financial practices around the globe. The final nail in the government’s coffin would be to preserve the value of money by tying monetary policy-maker’s hands to inflation targeting, and fiscal policy-maker’s hands to balanced budgets. All of this would lead to the era of the “great moderation”, with financial stability and rising wealth to create the “ownership society” in which all worthy individuals could share in the bounty of self-regulated, small government, capitalism.

We know how that story turned out. In all important respects we managed to recreate the exact same conditions of 1929 and history repeated itself with the exact same results. Take John Kenneth Galbraith’s The Great Crash, change the dates and some of the names of the guilty and you’ve got the post mortem for our current calamity.

What is the Keynesian-institutionalist alternative? Money is not a commodity or a thing. It is an institution, perhaps the most important institution of the capitalist economy. The money of account is social, the unit in which social obligations are denominated. I won’t go into pre-history, but I trace money to the wergild tradition—that is to say, money came out of the penal system rather than from markets, which is why the words for monetary debts or liabilities are associated with transgressions against individuals and society. To conclude, money predates markets, and so does government. As Karl Polanyi argued, markets never sprang from the minds of higglers and hagglers, but rather were created by government.

The monetary system, itself, was invented to mobilize resources to serve what government perceived to be the public purpose. Of course, it is only in a democracy that the public’s purpose and the government’s purpose have much chance of alignment. In any case, the point is that we cannot imagine a separation of the economic from the political—and any attempt to separate money from politics is, itself, political. Adopting a gold standard, or a foreign currency standard (“dollarization”), or a Friedmanian money growth rule, or an inflation target is a political act that serves the interests of some privileged group. There is no “natural” separation of a government from its money. The gold standard was legislated, just as the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 legislated the separation of Treasury and Central Bank functions, and the Balanced Budget Act of 1987 legislated the ex ante matching of federal government spending and revenue over a period determined by the celestial movement of a heavenly object. Ditto the myth of the supposed independence of the modern central bank—this is but a smokescreen to protect policy-makers should they choose to operate monetary policy for the benefit of Wall Street rather than in the public interest (a charge often made and now with good reason).

So money was created to give government command over socially created resources. Skip forward ten thousand years to the present. We can think of money as the currency of taxation, with the money of account denominating one’s social liability. Often, it is the tax that monetizes an activity—that puts a money value on it for the purpose of determining the share to render unto Caesar. The sovereign government names what money-denominated thing can be delivered in redemption against one’s social obligation or duty to pay taxes. It can then issue the money thing in its own payments. That government money thing is, like all money things, a liability denominated in the state’s money of account. And like all money things, it must be redeemed, that is, accepted by its issuer. As Hyman Minsky always said, anyone can create money (things), the problem lies in getting them accepted. Only the sovereign can impose tax liabilities to ensure its money things will be accepted. But power is always a continuum and we should not imagine that acceptance of non-sovereign money things is necessarily voluntary. We are admonished to be neither a creditor nor a debtor, but try as we might all of us are always simultaneously both. Maybe that is what makes us Human—or at least Chimpanzees, who apparently keep careful mental records of liabilities, and refuse to cooperate with those who don’t pay off debts—what is called reciprocal altruism: if I help you to beat the stuffing out of Chimp A, you had better repay your debt when Chimp B attacks me.

OK I have used up two-thirds of my allotment and you all are wondering what this has to do with regulation of monopolies. The dollar is our state money of account and high powered money (HPM or coins, green paper money, and bank reserves) is our state monopolized currency. Let me make that just a bit broader because US Treasuries (bills and bonds) are just HPM that pays interest (indeed, Treasuries are effectively reserve deposits at the Fed that pay higher interest than regular reserves), so we will include HPM plus Treasuries as the government currency monopoly—and these are delivered in payment of federal taxes, which destroys currency. If government emits more in its payments than it redeems in taxes, currency is accumulated by the nongovernment sector as financial wealth. We need not go into all the reasons (rational, irrational, productive, fetishistic) that one would want to hoard currency, except to note that a lot of the nonsovereign dollar denominated liabilities are made convertible (on demand or under specified circumstances) to currency.

Since government is the only issuer of currency, like any monopoly government can set the terms on which it is willing to supply it. If you have something to sell that the government would like to have—an hour of labor, a bomb, a vote—government offers a price that you can accept or refuse. Your power to refuse, however, is not that great. When you are dying of thirst, the monopoly water supplier has substantial pricing power. The government that imposes a head tax can set the price of whatever it is you will sell to government to obtain the means of tax payment so that you can keep your head on your shoulders. Since government is the only source of the currency required to pay taxes, and at least some people do have to pay taxes, government has pricing power.

Of course, it usually does not recognize this, believing that it must pay “market determined” prices—whatever that might mean. Just as a water monopolist cannot let the market determine an equilibrium price for water, the money monopolist cannot really let the market determine the conditions on which money is supplied. Rather, the best way to operate a money monopoly is to set the “price” and let the “quantity” float—just like the water monopolist does. My favorite example is a universal employer of last resort program in which the federal government offers to pay a basic wage and benefit package (say $10 per hour plus usual benefits), and then hires all who are ready and willing to work for that compensation. The “price” (labor compensation) is fixed, and the “quantity” (number employed) floats in a countercyclical manner. With ELR, we achieve full employment (as normally defined) with greater stability of wages, and as government spending on the program moves countercyclically, we also get greater stability of income (and thus of consumption and production)—a truly great moderation.

I have said anyone can create money (things). I can issue IOUs denominated in the dollar, and perhaps I can make my IOUs acceptable by agreeing to redeem them on demand for US government currency. The conventional fear is that I will issue so much money that it will cause inflation, hence orthodox economists advocate a money growth rate rule. But it is far more likely that if I issue too many IOUs they will be presented for redemption. Soon I run out of currency and am forced to default on my promise, ruining my creditors. That is the nutshell history of most private money (things) creation.

But we have always anointed some institutions—called banks—with special public/private partnerships, allowing them to act as intermediaries between the government and the nongovernment. Most importantly, government makes and receives payments through them. Hence, when you receive your Social Security payment it takes the form of a credit to your bank account; you pay taxes through a debit to that account. Banks, in turn, clear accounts with the government and with each other using reserve accounts (currency) at the Fed, which was specifically created in 1913 to ensure such clearing at par. To strengthen that promise, we introduced deposit insurance so that for most purposes, bank money (deposits) functions like government currency.

Here’s the rub. Bank money is privately created when a bank buys an asset—which could be your mortgage IOU backed by your home, or a firm’s IOU backed by commercial real estate, or a local government’s IOU backed by prospective tax revenues. But it can also be one of those complex sliced and diced and securitized toxic waste assets you’ve been reading about. A clever and ethically challenged banker will buy completely fictitious “assets” and pay himself huge bonuses for nonexistent profits while making uncollectible “loans” to all of his deadbeat relatives. (I use a male example because I do not know of any female frauds, which is probably why the scales of justice are always held by a woman.) The bank money he creates while running the bank into the ground is as good as the government currency the Treasury creates serving the public interest. And he will happily pay outrageous prices for assets, or lend to his family, friends and fellow frauds so that they can pay outrageous prices, fueling asset price inflation. This generates nice virtuous cycles in the form of bubbles that attract more purchases until the inevitable bust. I won’t go into output price inflation except to note that asset price bubbles can fuel spending on consumption and investment goods, spilling-over into commodities prices, so on some conditions there can be a link between asset and output price inflations.

The amazing thing is that the free marketeers want to “free” the private financial institutions to licentious behavior, but advocate reigning-in government on the argument that excessive issue of money is inflationary. Yet we have effectively given banks the power to issue government money (in the form of government insured deposits), and if we do not constrain what they purchase they will fuel speculative bubbles. By removing government regulation and supervision, we invite private banks to use the public monetary system to pursue private interests. Again, we know how that story ends, and it ain’t pretty. Unfortunately, we now have what appears to be a government of Goldman, by Goldman, and for Goldman that is trying to resurrect the financial system as it existed in 2006—a self-regulated, self-rewarding, bubble-seeking, fraud-loving juggernaut.

To come to a conclusion: the primary purpose of the monetary monopoly is to mobilize resources for the public purpose. There is no reason why private, for-profit institutions cannot play a role in this endeavor. But there is also no reason to believe that self-regulated private undertakers will pursue the public purpose. Indeed, as institutionalists we probably would go farther and assert that both theory and experience tell us precisely the opposite: the best strategy for a profit-seeking firm with market power never coincides with the best policy from the public interest perspective. And in the case of money, it is even worse because private financial institutions compete with one another in a manner that is financially destabilizing: by increasing leverage, lowering underwriting standards, increasing risk, and driving asset price bubbles. Unlike my ELR example above, private spending and lending will be strongly pro-cyclical. All of that is in addition to the usual arguments about the characteristics of public goods that make it difficult for the profit-seeker to capture external benefits. For this reason, we need to analyze money and banking from the perspective of regulating a monopoly—and not just any monopoly but rather the monopoly of the most important institution of our society.

* Much confusion is generated by using the term “money” to indicate a money “thing” used to satisfy one of the functions of money. I will be careful to use the term “money” to refer to the unit of account or money as an institution, and “money thing” to refer to something denominated in the money of account—whether that is currency, a bank deposit, or other money-denominated liability

Job Guarantee

By L. Randal Wray

A job guarantee program is one in which government promises to make a job available to any qualifying individual who is ready and willing to work. Qualifications required of participants could include age range (i.e. teens), gender, family status (i.e. heads of households), family income (i.e. below poverty line), educational attainment (i.e. high school dropouts), residency (i.e. rural), and so on. The most general program would provide a universal job guarantee, sometimes also called an employer of last resort (ELR) program in which government promises to provide a job to anyone legally entitled to work.

Many job guarantee supporters see employment not only as an economic condition but also as a right. Wray and Forstater (2004) justify the right to work as a fundamental prerequisite for social justice in any society in which income from work is an important determinant of access to resources. Harvey (1989) and Burgess and Mitchell (1998) argue for the right to work on the basis that it is a fundamental human (or natural) right. Such treatments find support in modern legal proclamations such as the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the US Employment Act of 1946 and the Full Employment Act of 1978. Amartya Sen (1999) supports the right to work on the basis that the economic and social costs of unemployment are staggering with far-reaching consequences beyond the single dimension of a loss of income (see also Rawls 1971). William Vickrey (2004) identified unemployment with “cruel vandalism”,outlining the social and economic inequities of unemployment and devising strategies for its solution. A key proposition of such arguments is that no capitalist society has ever managed to operate at anything approaching true, full, employment on a consistent basis. Further, the burden of joblessness is borne unequally, concentrated among groups that already face other disadvantages: racial and ethnic minorities, immigrants, younger and older individuals, women, people with disabilities, and those with lower educational attainment. For these reasons, government should and must play a role in providing jobs to achieve social justice.

There are different versions of the job guarantee program. Harvey’s (1989) proposal seeks to provide a public sector job to anyone unable to find work, with the pay approximating a ‘market wage,’ whereby more highly skilled workers would receive higher pay. Argentina’s Jefes program (examined below) targets heads of households only and offers a uniform basic payment for what is essentially half-time work. In Hyman Minsky’s (1965) proposal, developed further at The Center for Full Employment and Price Stability, University of Missouri-Kansas City and independently at The Centre of Full Employment and Equity, University of Newcastle, Australia, the federal government provides funding for a job creation program that offers a uniform hourly wage with a package of benefits. (Wray 1998; Burgess and Mitchell 1998) The program could provide for part-time and seasonal work, as well as for other flexible working conditions as desired by the workers. The package of benefits would be subject to congressional approval, but could include health care, childcare, payment of social security taxes, and usual vacations and sick leave. The wage would also be set by congress and fixed until congress approved a rate increase—much as the minimum wage is currently legislated. The perceived advantage of the uniform basic wage is that it would limit competition with other employers as workers could be attracted out of the ELR program by paying a wage slightly above the program wage.

Proponents of a universal job guarantee program operated by the federal government argue that no other means exists to ensure that everyone who wants to work will be able to obtain a job. Benefits include poverty reduction, amelioration of many social ills associated with chronic unemployment (health problems, spousal abuse and family break-up, drug abuse, crime), and enhanced skills due to training on the job. Forstater (1999) has emphasized how ELR can be used to increase economic flexibility and to enhance the environment. The program would improve working conditions in the private sector as employees would have the option of moving into the ELR program. Hence, private sector employers would have to offer a wage and benefit package and working conditions at least as good as those offered by the ELR program. The informal sector would shrink as workers become integrated into formal employment, gaining access to protection provided by labor laws. There would be some reduction of racial or gender discrimination because unfairly treated workers would have the ELR option, however, ELR by itself cannot end discrimination. Still, it has long been recognized that full employment is an important tool in the fight for equality. (Darity 1999) Forstater (1999) has emphasized how ELR can be used to increase economic flexibility and to improve the environment as projects can be directed to mitigate ecological problems.

Finally, some supporters emphasize that an ELR program with a uniform basic wage also helps to promote economic and price stability. ELR will act as an automatic stabilizer as employment in the program grows in recession and shrinks in economic expansion, counteracting private sector employment fluctuations. The federal government budget will become more counter-cyclical because its spending on the ELR program will likewise grow in recession and fall in expansion. Furthermore, the uniform basic wage will reduce both inflationary pressure in a boom and deflationary pressure in a bust. In a boom, private employers can recruit from the ELR pool of workers, paying a mark-up over the ELR wage. The ELR pool acts like a “reserve army” of the employed, dampening wage pressures as private employment grows. In recession, workers down-sized by private employers can work at the ELR wage, which puts a floor to how low wages and income can go.

Critics argue that a job guarantee would be inflationary, using some version of a Phillips Curve approach according to which lower unemployment necessarily means higher inflation. (Sawyer 2003) Some argue that ELR would reduce the incentive to work, raising private sector costs because of increased shirking, since workers would no longer fear job loss. Workers might be emboldened to ask for greater wage increases. Some argue that an ELR program would be so big that it would be impossible to manage; some fear corruption; others argue that it would be impossible to find useful things for ELR workers to do; still others argue that it would be difficult to discipline ELR workers. It has been argued that a national job guarantee would be too expensive, causing the budget deficit to grow on an unsustainable path; and that higher employment would worsen trade deficits. (Aspromourgous 2000; King 2001; See Mitchell and Wray 2005 for responses to all of these critiques.)

There have been many job creation programs implemented around the world, some of which were narrowly targeted while others were broad-based. The 1930s American New Deal contained several moderately inclusive programs including the Civilian Conservation Corp and the Works Progress Administration. Sweden developed broad based employment programs that virtually guaranteed access to jobs, until government began to retrench in the 1970s. (Ginsburg 1983) In the aftermath of its economic crisis that came with the collapse of its currency board, Argentina created Plan Jefes y Jefas that guaranteed a job for poor heads of households. (Tcherneva and Wray 2005) The program successfully created 2 million new jobs that not only provided employment and income for poor families, but also provided needed services and free goods to poor neighborhoods. More recently, India passed the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (2005) that commits the government to providing employment in a public works project to any adult living in a rural area. The job must be provided within 15 days of registration, and must provide employment for a minimum of 100 days per year. (Hirway 2006) These real world experiments provide fertile ground for testing the claims on both sides of the job guarantee debate.

References

Aspromourgos, T. “Is an Employer-of-Last-Resort Policy Sustainable? A Review Article.” Review of Political Economy 12, no. 2 (2000): 141-155.

Burgess, J. and Mitchell, W.F. (1998), ‘Unemployment Human Rights and Full Employment Policy in Australia,’ in M. Jones and P. Kreisler (eds.), Globalization, Human Rights and Civil Society, Sydney, Australia: Prospect Press.

Darity, William Jr. “Who loses from Unemployment.” Journal of Economic Issues, 33, no. 2 (June 1999): 491.

Forstater, Mathew. “Full Employment and Economic Flexibility” Economic and Labour Relations Review, Volume 11, 1999.

Ginsburg, Helen (1983), Full Employment and Public Policy: The United States and Sweden, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.

Harvey, P. (1989), Securing the Right to Employment: Social Welfare Policy and the Unemployed in the United States, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Hirway, Indira (2006), “Enhancing Livelihood Security through the National Employment Guarantee Act: Toward effective implementation of the Act”, The Levy Economics Institute Working Paper No. 437, January, www.levy.org.

King, J.E. “The Last Resort? Some Critical Reflections on ELR..” Journal of Economic and Social Policy 5, no. 2 (2001): 72-76.

Minsky, H.P. (1965), ‘The Role of Employment Policy,’ in M.S. Gordon (ed.), Poverty in America, San Francisco, CA: Chandler Publishing Company.

Mitchell, W.F. and Wray, L.R. (2005), ‘In Defense of Employer of Last Resort: a response to Malcolm Sawyer,’ Journal of Economic Issues, 39(1), 235-245.

Rawls, J. (1971), Theory of Justice, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Sawyer, M. (2003), ‘Employer of last resort: could it deliver full employment and price stability?,’ Journal of Economic Issues, 37(4), 881-908.

Sen, A. (1999), Development as Freedom, New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf.

Tcherneva, Pavlina and L. Randall Wray (2005), “Gender and the Job Guarantee: The impact of Argentina’s Jefes program on female heads of poor households”, Center for Full Employment and Price Stability Working Paper No. 50, December, www.cfeps.org.

Vickrey, W.S. (2004), Full Employment and Price Stability, M. Forstater and P.R. Tcherneva (eds.), Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

Wray, L.R. and Forstater, M. (2004), ‘Full Employment and Economic Justice,’ in D. Champlin and J. Knoedler (eds.), The Institutionalist Tradition in labor Economics, Armonk: NY: M.E. Sharpe.

Wray, L.R. (1998), Understanding Modern Money: the key to full employment and price stability, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

Let’s Create a Real Job Czar for the Jobless

By L. Randal Wray [via CFEPS]

For an example of what can be done, we can look to the recent experience of Argentina. As everyone knows, Argentina had been the darling of the Washington Consensus and of the IMF structural adjustment approach. It opened its economy, freed its markets, privatized government operations, downsized government, adopted fiscal and monetary austerity, and—importantly—adopted a currency board based on the dollar. It did everything “right”, but the IMF/Washington Consensus approach was fundamentally flawed and put Argentina into an inherently unsustainable situation. When world financial markets began to doubt the nation’s ability to maintain the currency board arrangement, there was a run on the domestic currency. The IMF/Washington Consensus recommended more austerity—which caused unemployment and poverty to explode. Social unrest eventually led to rioting in the streets. Argentina wisely abandoned the dollar, floated the currency, defaulted on some of the debt, and rejected the IMF/Washington Consensus.


The rioting stopped when the government implemented a job creation program designed to provide a social safety net for poor households with children. The program evolved through several stages, with the final phase beginning in April 2002 with the implementation of the Jefes de Hogar (Heads of Household) program that provides a payment of 150 pesos per month to a head of household for a minimum of 4 hours of work daily. Participants work in community services and small construction or maintenance activities, or are directed to training programs (including finishing basic education). The household must contain children under age 18, persons with handicaps, or a pregnant woman. Households are generally limited to one participant in the Jefes program.

The program’s total spending is currently equal to about 1% of GDP, with nearly 2 million participants (about 1.7 million in Jefes and 300,000 in PEL). This is out of a population of only 37 million, or more than 5% of the population. However, it should be noted that the US spends 1% of GDP on social assistance, while France and the UK spend 3-4% of GDP on such programs. Given a national poverty rate above 50%, and with 9.6 million indigents and a child poverty rate approaching 75%, Argentina’s spending is small relative to needs.

According to the World Bank’s reviews, the program has been highly successful in achieving a number of goals. First, program spending is well-targeted to the intended population—poor households with children. Second, the program has provided needed services and small infrastructure projects in poor communities, with most projects successfully completed and operating. Third, the program has increased income of poor households. While there have been some problems associated with implementation and supervision of the program cases involving mismanagement or corruption appear to have been relatively rare. Still, there are reports of favoritism, and home country researchers have made serious critiques of program design. However, surveys show that program participants are overwhelmingly happy with the program.

On November 3, 2003, the Mayor of Istanbul, Turkey, announced his intention to create a similar program to fight the growing unemployment problem in that city. Unemployment imposes severe costs on society—both economic costs in terms of foregone output, but also intolerable social costs in terms of rising crime and disintegrating families and communities. The Mayor recognized that no other social program brings so many benefits as those that accompany a job creation program. It will be interesting to follow the developments in Turkey as a “heads of household” job creation program is implemented.

Any sovereign nation that issues its own floating rate currency can “afford” full employment. (Indeed, one might rightly question whether nations can truly “afford” unemployment.) This is because such a government spends by crediting bank accounts, and taxes by debiting them. There can be no question about the solvency of such a nation—even if a deficit results. Japan’s sovereign deficit reaches 8% of GDP; Turkey’s sovereign deficit exceeds 25% of GDP. But so long as these nations maintain floating exchange rates, they can always spend and “service” debt by crediting bank accounts. Hence, if there are unemployed resources, including labor, the sovereign government can put them to work.

The big fear, of course, is that full employment will necessarily generate inflation. If full employment is achieved by “pump priming”, that is, by trying to raise aggregate demand through tax cuts or general government spending, it can in some circumstances generate inflation. However, if full employment is generated through a job creation program designed like Argentina’s Jefes program, it cannot be inflationary. This is because such a program sets a fixed basic wage and then hires all who are ready and willing to work at that wage. This operates like a commodities buffer stock program that sets a floor price—it prevents prices from falling through the floor, but does not push up prices. If the private sector expands, workers are hired out of the labor “buffer stock”; when the private sector down-sizes, workers flow into the “buffer stock”. Hence, the Jefes-type program also provides a strong counter-cyclical stabilizing force. It should be noted that government spending on the program will also be strongly counter-cyclical.

A real Job Czar would be put in charge of a job creation program that would achieve full employment without generating inflationary pressures. Once full employment is achieved, then the pressures to use protectionist measures to fight imports will be diminished. Further, the wage-and-price stabilizing features of a buffer stock approach would reduce reliance on fiscal and monetary austerity to fight inflation.

How to Implement True, Full Employment

By L. Randall Wray

We will briefly describe a program that would generate true, full employment, price stability, and currency stability. We will show that this program can be adopted in any nation that issues its own currency. Our presentation consists of three sections. First, we briefly examine a pilot program at the University of Missouri—Kansas City (UMKC). This provides the basis for the analysis in the second section of the functioning of a national monetary system. Finally, we show how this knowledge can be used to construct a public service program (PSE) that guarantees true, full employment with price and currency stability.

The Buckaroo Program

In the United States, there is a growing movement on college campuses to increase student involvement in their communities, particularly through what is known as “service-learning” in which students participate in community service activities organized by local community groups. It should become obvious that a modern monetary economy that adopts the full employment program described here will operate much like our community service hours program.

We have chosen to design our program as a “monetary” system, creating paper notes, “buckaroos” (after the UMKC mascot, a kangaroo), with the inscription “this note represents one hour of community service by a UMKC student”, and denominated as “one roo hour”. Each student is required to pay B25 to the UMKC “Treasury” each semester. Approved community service providers (state and local government offices, university offices, public school districts, and not-for-profit agencies) submit bids for student service hours to the Treasury, which “awards” special drawing rights (SDRs) to the providers so long as basic health, safety, and liability standards are met. The providers then draw on their SDRs as needed pay students B1 per hour worked. This is equivalent to “spending” by the UMKC treasury. Students then pay their taxes with buckaroos, retiring Treasury liabilities.

Several implications are immediately obvious. First, the UMKC treasury cannot collect any buckaroo taxes until it has spent some buckaroos. Second, the Treasury cannot collect more buckaroos in payment of taxes than it has previously spent. This means that the “best” the Treasury can hope for is a “balanced budget”. Actually, it is almost certain that the Treasury will run a deficit as some buckaroos are “lost in the wash” or hoarded for future years. While it is possible that the Treasury could run a surplus in future years, this would be limited by the quantity of previously hoarded buckaroos that could be used to pay taxes. Third, and most important, it should be obvious that the Treasury faces no “financial constraints” on its ability to spend buckaroos. Indeed, the quantity of buckaroos provided is “market demand determined”, by the students who desire to work to obtain buckaroos and by the providers who need student labor. Furthermore, it should be obvious that the Treasury’s spending doesn’t depend on its tax receipts. To drive the point home, we can assume that the Treasury always burns every buckaroo received in payment of taxes. In other words, the Treasury does not impose taxes in order to ensure that buckaroos flow into its coffers, but rather to ensure that student labor flows into community service. More generally, the Treasury’s budget balance or imbalance doesn’t provide any useful information to UMKC regarding the program’s success or failure. A Treasury deficit, surplus, or balance provides useless accounting data.

Note that each student has to obtain a sufficient number of buckaroos to meet her tax liability. Obviously, an individual might choose to earn, say, B35 in one semester, holding B10 as a hoard after paying the B25 tax for that semester. The hoards, of course, are by definition equal to the Treasury’s deficit. UMKC has decided to encourage “thrift” by selling interest-earning buckaroo “bonds”, purchased by students with excess buckaroo hoards. This is usually described as government “borrowing”, thought to be necessitated by government deficits. Note however, that the Treasury does not “need” to borrow its own buckaroos in order to deficit spend—no matter how high the deficit, the Treasury can always issue new buckaroos. Indeed, the Treasury can only “borrow” buckaroos that it has already spent, in fact, that it has “deficit spent”. Finally, note that the Treasury can pay any interest rate it wishes, because it does not “need” to “borrow” from students. For this reason, Treasury bonds should be seen as an “interest rate maintenance account” designed to keep the base rate at the Treasury’s target interest rate. Without such an account, the “natural base interest rate” is zero for buckaroo hoards created through deficit spending. Note that no matter how much the Treasury spends the base rate would never rise above zero unless the Treasury offers positive interest rates; in other words, Treasury deficits do not place any pressure on interest rates.

What determines the value of buckaroos? From the perspective of the student, the “cost” of a buckaroo is the hour of labor that must be provided; from the perspective of the community service provider, a buckaroo buys an hour of student labor. So, on average, the buckaroo is worth an hour of labor—more specifically, an hour of average student labor. Note that we can determine the value of the buckaroo without reference to the quantity of buckaroos issued by the Treasury. Whether the Treasury spends a hundred thousand buckaroos a year, or a million a year, the value is determined by what students must do to obtain them.

The Treasury’s deficit each semester is equal to the “extra” demand for buckaroos coming from students; indeed, it is the “extra” demand that determines the size of the Treasury’s deficit. We might call this “net saving” of buckaroos, and it is equal—by definition—to the Treasury’s deficit over the same period. What if the Treasury decided it did not want to run deficits, and so proposed to limit the total number of buckaroos spent in order to balance the budget? In this case, it is almost certain that some students would be unable to meet their tax liability. Unlucky, procrastinating students would find it impossible to find a community service job, thus would find themselves “unemployed” and would be forced to borrow, beg, or steal buckaroos to meet their tax liabilities. Of course, any objective analysis would find the source of the unemployment in the Treasury’s policy, and not in the characteristics of the unemployed. Unemployment at the aggregate level is caused by insufficient Treasury spending.

Some of thisanalysis applies directly to our economic system as it actually operates, while some of it would apply to the operation of our system if it were to adopt a full employment program. Let us examine the operation of a modern money system.

Modern Monetary Systems

In all modern economies, money is a creature of the State. The State defines money as that which it accepts at public pay offices (mainly, in payment of taxes). Taxes create a demand for money, and government spending provides the supply, just as our buckaroo tax creates a demand for buckaroos, while spending by the Treasury provides the supply. The government does not “need” the public’s money in order to spend; rather, the public needs the government’s money in order to pay taxes. This means that the government can buy whatever is for sale in terms of its money merely by providing it.

Because the public will normally wish to hold some extra money, the government will normally have to spend more than it taxes; in other words, the normal requirement is for a government deficit, just as the UMKC Treasury always runs a deficit. Government deficits do not require “borrowing” by the government (bond sales), rather, the government provides bonds to allow the public to hold interest-bearing alternatives to non-interest-bearing government money. Further, markets cannot dictate to government the interest rate it must pay on its debt, rather, the government determines the interest rate it will pay as an alternative to non-interest-earning government money. This stands conventional analysis on its head: fiscal policy is the primary determinant of the quantity of money issued, while monetary policy primarily has to do with maintaining positive interest rates through bond sales—at the interest rate the government chooses.

In summary, governments issue money to buy what they need; they tax to generate a demand for that money; and then they accept the same money in payment of the tax. If a deficit results, that just lets the population hoard some of the money. If the government wants to, it can let the population trade the money for interest earning bonds, but the government never needs to borrow its own money from the public.

This does not mean that the deficit cannot be too big, that is, inflationary; it can also be too small, that is deflationary. When the deficit is too small, unemployment results (just as it results at UMKC when the Treasury’s spending of buckaroos is too small). The fear, of course, is that government deficits might generate inflation before full employment can be reached. In the next section we describe a proposal that can achieve full employment while actually enhancing price stability.

Public Service Employment and Full Employment with Price and Currency Stability

Very generally, the idea behind our proposal is that the national government provides funding for a program that guarantees a job offer for anyone who is ready, willing and able to work. We call this the Public Service Employment program, or PSE. What is the PSE program? What do we want to get out of it?

1. It should offer a job to anyone who is ready, willing and able to work; regardless of race or gender, regardless of education, regardless of work experience; regardless of immigration status; regardless of the performance of the economy. Just listing those conditions makes it clear why private firms cannot possibly offer an infinitely elastic demand for labor. The government must play a role. At a minimum, the national government must provide the wages and benefits for the program, although this does not actually mean that PSE must be a government-run program.


2. We want PSE to hire off the bottom. It is an employment safety net. We do not want it to compete with the private sector or even with non-PSE employment in the public sector. It is not a program that operates by “priming the pump”, that is, by raising aggregate demand. Trying to get to full employment simply by priming the pump with military spending could generate inflation. That is because military Keynesianism hires off the top. But by definition, PSE hires off the bottom; it is a bufferstock policy—and like any bufferstock program, it must stabilize the price of the bufferstock—in this case, wages at the bottom.

3. We want full employment, but with loose labor markets. This is virtually guaranteed if PSE hires off the bottom. With PSE, labor markets are loose because there is always a pool of labor available to be hired out of PSE and into private firms. Right now, loose labor markets can only be maintained by keeping people out of work—the old reserve army of the unemployed approach.

4. We want the PSE compensation package to provide a decent standard of living even as it helps to maintain wage and price stability. We have suggested that the wage ought to be set at $6.25/hr in the USA to start. A package of benefits could include healthcare, childcare, sick leave, vacations, and contributions to Social Security so that years spent in PSE would count toward retirement.
5. We want PSE experience to prepare workers for post-PSE work—whether in the private sector or in government. Thus, PSE workers should learn useful work habits and skills. Training and retraining will be an important component of every PSE job.

6. Finally, we want PSE workers to do something useful. For the U.S.A. we have proposed that they focus on provision of public services, however, a developing nation may have much greater need for public infrastructure; for roads, public utilities, health services, education. PSE workers should do something useful, but they should not do things that are already being done, and especially should not compete with the private sector.

These six features pretty well determine what a PSE program ought to look like. This still leaves a lot of issues to be examined. Who should administer the program? Who should do the hiring and supervision of workers? Who should decide exactly what workers will do? There are different models consistent with this general framework, and different nations might take different approaches. Elsewhere (Wray 1998, 1999) I have discussed the outlines of a program designed specifically for the USA. Very briefly, I suggest that given political realities in the USA, it is best to decentralize the program as much as possible. State and local governments, school districts, and non-profit organizations would be allowed to hire as many PSE workers as they could supervise. The federal government would provide the basic wage and benefit package, while the hiring agencies would provide supervision and capital required by workers (some federal subsidy of these expenses might be allowed). All created jobs would be expected to increase employability of the PSE workers (by providing training, experience, work records); PSE employers would compete for PSE workers, helping to achieve this goal. No PSE employer would be allowed to use PSE workers to substitute for existing employees (representatives of labor should sit on all administrative boards that make hiring decisions). Payments by the federal government would be made directly to PSE workers (using, for example, Social Security numbers) to reduce potential for fraud.

Note that some countries might choose a much higher level of centralization. In other words, program decentralization is dictated purely by pragmatic and political considerations. The only essential feature is that funding must come from the national government, that is, from the issuer of the currency.

Before concluding, let us quickly address some general questions. First, many people wonder about the cost—can we afford full employment? To answer this, we must distinguish between real costs and financial expenditures. Unemployment has a real cost—the output that is lost when some of the labor force is involuntarily unemployed, the burdens placed on workers who must produce output to be consumed by the unemployed, the suffering of the unemployed, and social ills generated by unemployment and poverty. From this perspective, providing jobs for the unemployed will reduce real costs and generate net real benefits for society. Indeed, it is best to argue that society cannot afford unemployment, rather than to suppose that it cannot afford employment!

On the other hand, most people are probably concerned with the financial cost of full employment, or, more specifically, with the impact on the government’s budget. How will the government pay for the program? It will write checks just as it does for any other program. (See Wray 1998.) This is why it is so important to understand how the modern money system works. Any nation that issues its own currency can financially afford to hire the unemployed. A deficit will result only if the population desires to save in the form of government-issued money. In other words, just as in UMKC’s buckaroo program, the size of the deficit will be “market demand” determined by the population’s desired net saving.

Economists usually fear that providing jobs to people who want to work will cause inflation. Thus, it is necessary to explain how our proposed program will actually contribute to wage stability, promoting price stability. The key is that our program is designed to operate like a “buffer stock” program, in which the buffer stock commodity is sold when there is upward pressure on its price, or bought when there are deflationary pressures. Our proposal is to use labor as the buffer stock commodity, and as is the case with any buffer stock commodity, the program will stabilize the commodity’s price. The government’s spending on the program is based on a “fixed price/floating quantity” model, hence, cannot contribute to inflation.

Note that the government’s spending on the full employment program will fluctuate countercyclically. When the private sector reduces spending, it lays-off workers who then flow into the bufferstock pool, working in the full employment program. This automatically increases total government spending, but not prices because the wage paid is fixed. As the quantity of workers hired at the fixed wage rises, this results in a budget deficit. On the other hand, when the private sector expands, it pulls workers out of the bufferstock pool, shrinking government spending and thus reducing deficits. This is a powerful automatic stabilizer that operates to ensure the government’s spending is at just the right level to maintain full employment without generating inflation.

REFERENCES

Wray, L. Randall. 1998. Understanding Modern Money: the key to full employment and price stability, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

—–. 1999. “Public Service Employment—Assured Jobs Program: further considerations“, Journal of Economic Issues, Vol. 33, no. 2, pp. 483-490.

Social Security: Truth or Useful Fictions?

By L. Randall Wray [via CFEPS]

I. SOCIAL SECURITY IS AN ASSURANCE , NOT A PENSION PLAN

Social Security is an intergenerational assurance plan. Working generations agree to take care of retirees, dependents, survivors, and persons with disabilities. Currently, spouses, children, or parents of eligible workers make up more than a quarter of beneficiaries on OASDI. A large proportion will always be people without “normal” work histories who could not have made sufficient contributions to entitle them to a decent pension. Still, as a society, we have decided they should receive benefits.

Further, the program is not means tested. One need only meet statutory requirements to receive benefits. Indeed, as the Bush Commission’s Report emphasizes, the Supreme Court has twice ruled Social Security does not make intergenerational promises to the dead, but, rather, only to their survivors. The Bush Commission sees that as a weakness; I see it as a strength.

II. TRUST FUNDS DO NOT INCREASE GOVERNMENT’S ABILITY TO MEET COMMITMENTS (Advance Funding is a Fiction)

The Greenspan Commission tried to change Social Security from paygo to advance funding in 1983. But that is impossible; it just demonstrated a misunderstanding of accounting. The existence of a Trust Fund does not in any way, shape, or form enhance government’s ability to meet Social Security commitments. This point is difficult to get across.

The Social Security Trust Fund is one of Uncle Sam’s cookie jars. He also has a defense cookie jar, a corporate welfare cookie jar, etc. (See Figure 1.) We count taxes as Uncle Sam’s income, and he can pretend he stuffs the various cookie jars with those tax receipts — the payroll tax goes into the Social Security cookie jar, and he pretends it pays for Social Security spending. Maybe he pretends capital gains taxes go into the corporate welfare cookie jar. And so on. That is all internal accounting.

Figure 1: Federal Government Internal Accounts

Say Uncle Sam spends more on corporate welfare than he pretends to have in that cookie jar. But he pretends the Social Security cookie jar is overflowing with tax receipts because he runs a huge surplus there. (See Figure 2.) So Uncle Sam writes some IOUs from the corporate welfare cookie jar to the Social Security cookie jar to remind himself. Over time, the Social Security cookie jar accumulates Trillions of dollars of IOUs from Uncle Sam’s other cookie jars.

Figure 2: Trust Fund

That is just the government owing itself, and has no effect on the external accounts. (See Figure 3.) The total spent on Social Security, corporate welfare, transportation and so on equals its total spending for the year. The total it collects from taxes, including payroll taxes, capital gains taxes, gas taxes, and so on, equals its total income for the year. If government spends more than its income, that is called deficit spending. If it spends less, it runs a budget surplus. The cookie jar IOUs cannot change that in any way.

Figure 3: Federal Government External Accounts

Note I’m not saying there is anything wrong with the Treasury Securities held by the Trust Fund-Social Security can count them as an asset. But they will not in any way change the external accounting in 2017 or 2027 or 2041 — when the government’s overall spending will be less than, equal to, or greater than its overall tax receipts. (See Figure 4.) When Social Security begins to run a deficit, the existence of the Trust Fund will not reduce the amount of Treasury Securities sold to the nongovernment sector.

Indeed, comparison of Figure 4a with 4b demonstrates that the external accounts are not changed by existence of a Trust Fund-the implications for the government are the same.

Figure 4a: Social Security Runs $10 Billion Deficit, With Rest of Federal Government Budget in Balance, WITH TRUST FUND

Figure 4b: Social Security Runs $10 Billion Deficit, With Rest of Federal Government Budget in Balance, WITHOUT TRUST FUND

III. TRUST FUNDS DO NOT PROVIDE POLITICAL PROTECTION (Proof: They Fuel Privatization Scams)

Many economists realize that from the perspective of Uncle Sam, the Trust Fund is just an internal accounting construction. But I’ve had top economic advisors of both Democrats and Unions tell me while that is true, the Trust Fund provides political protection. That is clearly false. It is only because Social Security runs surpluses accumulated in a Trust Fund that we have all these privatizat ion scams. Do you really believe Wall Street fund managers would have any interest in Social Security if it ran deficits?

IV. SOCIAL SECURITY CANNOT FACE A FINANCIAL CONSTRAINT (Except One Imposed By Congress)

Social Security is unusual because unlike most other government programs, we pretend a specific tax finances it. That makes it easy to mentally match payroll tax revenues and benefit payments, and to calculate whether the 75 year actuarial balance is positive or negative. No one knows or car es whether the defense program runs actuarial deficits — because we don’t pretend that a particular tax pays for defense. In reality, Social Security benefits are paid in exactly the same way that the government spends on anything else-by crediting somebody’s bank account. Social Security cannot be any more financially constrained than any other government program. Only Congress can establish a financial constraint.

V. SOCIAL SECURITY DOES NOT APPEAR TO FACE REAL CONSTRAINTS, (America Can Afford 7% of GDP for Social Security)

Today OASDI benefits equal 4.5% of GDP; that grows to 7% over the next 75 years. Does anyone doubt that we will be able to afford to devote 7% of our nation’s output to provide a social safety net for retirees, survivors, and disabled persons? That leaves 93% of GDP for everything else. We have easily achieved larger shifts of GDP in the past without lowering living standards of the working generations. I cannot imagine a future so horrible that we won’t be able support OASDI in real terms.

VI. PRIVATIZATION IS NOT NEEDED, NOR CAN IT HELP TO PROVIDE FOR FUTURE BENEFICIARIES (Any Future Problems Are Not Financial; Financial Fixes Cannot Help)

Future beneficiaries cannot eat stocks or bonds, and we can’t dig holes today to bury Winnebagos for future retirees. Whatever beneficiaries consume in 2050 will have to be produced for the most part in 2050. Financial Fixes cannot change that. Whether the stock market outperforms Treasury bonds is irrelevant. Whether future retirees have amassed $100,000 in personal accounts is irrelevant. All that matters is future productive capacity plus a method of distributing a portion of output to the elderly in 2050.

To accomplish that, all we have to do is credit the bank accounts of the elderly in 2050, and then let the market work its wonders. I am frankly shocked that the Cato Institute refuses to trust the market, backing what amounts to tax credits for playing in equity markets.

VII. PERSONAL ACCOUNTS ARE FINE, BUT ARE NOT RELEVANT TO DISCUSSION OF SOCIAL SECURITY (A Targeted $40 Billion Give-Away is Probably a Good Idea!)

I also find it ironic that the Bush Commission wants to increase government spending by $40 billion a year to give money away to encourage the poor to save. Hey, let’s give them $80 billion a year. I’d prefer that the poor spend it, but if they want to sock it away in personal accounts, that’s fine by me. But, please, let’s provide Big Brotherly advice that they keep it out of Telecom stocks. And leave Social Security out of it!

VIII. SOCIAL SECURITY IS, ALWAYS HAS BEEN, ALWAYS WILL BE, SUBJECT TO CONGRESSIONAL GOODWILL (Maintained At the Ballot Box)

Only Congress can decide who deserves support, and what level of support. Only Congress can decide how much of GDP ought to be devoted to support of the elderly. That’s Democracy and I’m willing to live with it. The Bush Commission says this generates insecurity, but I expect the elderly will continue to use the ballot box to hold the feet of Politicians to the fire of Social Security.

IX. HONESTY IS THE BEST POLICY (Convenient Fictions About Finances Cannot Help)

In spite of all the complex financial fictions, the truth is simple. In 2041, Social Security’s beneficiaries will have to rely on the working population, just as they do today. No financial scams can change that. Trust funds, actuarial balances, privatization, and relative rates of return don’t change it. There ain’t no crisis; there ain’t no urgency. We’ve got two generations to increase our capacity to produce.

X. TOWARD A PROGRESSIVE REFORM (Stop Taxing Work!)

In 1960 it might have made some kind of twisted logic to levy a tax on payrolls and to pretend this paid for Social Security benefits. There were few benefits to be paid, but lots of payrolls to tax, so the tax rate was low. Today, and increasingly in the future, there are more benefits to pay relative to taxable payrolls. In just a few years, only 1/3 of National Income will be subject to the payroll tax- hence ever-higher payroll tax rates will be required to maintain the delusion.

Let’s stop pretending. Payroll taxes simply discourage work-which is as perverse as policy can get. We need people to work to provide all the goods and services the elderly need. Abolish the payroll tax, abolish the Trust Fund, abolish actuarial gaps, and let’s recognize that Social Security is an intergenerational assurance program.

Subway Tokens and Social Security

There is a wide-spread belief that Social Security surpluses must be “saved” for future retirees. Most believe that this can be done by accumulating a Trust Fund and ensuring that the Treasury does not “spend” the surplus. The “saviors” of Social Security thus insist that the rest of the government’s budget must remain balanced, for otherwise the Treasury would be forced to “dip into” Social Security reserves.

Can a Trust Fund help to provide for future retirees? Suppose the New York Transit Authority (NYTA) decided to offer subway tokens as part of the retirement package provided to employees—say, 50 free tokens a month after retirement. Should the city therefore attempt to run an annual “surplus” of tokens (collecting more tokens per month than it pays out) today in order to accumulate a trust fund of tokens to be provided to tomorrow’s NYTA retirees? Of course not. When tokens are needed to pay future retirees, the City will simply issue more tokens at that time. Not only is accumulation of a hoard of tokens by the City unnecessary, it will not in any way ease the burden of providing subway rides for future retirees. Whether or not the City can meet its obligation to future retirees will depend on the ability of the transit system to carry the paying customers plus NYTA retirees.


Note, also, that the NYTA does not currently attempt to run a “balanced budget”, and, indeed, consistently runs a subway token deficit. That is, it consistently pays-out more tokens than it receives, as riders hoard tokens or lose them. Attempting to run a surplus of subway tokens would eventually result in a shortage of tokens, with customers unable to obtain them. A properly-run transit system would always run a deficit—issuing more tokens than it receives.

Accumulation of a Social Security Trust Fund is neither necessary nor useful. Just as a subway token surplus cannot help to provide subway rides for future retirees, neither can the Social Security Trust Fund help provide for babyboomer retirees. Whether the future burden of retirees will be excessive or not will depend on our society’s ability to produce real goods and services (including subway rides) at the time that they will be needed. Nor does it make any sense for our government to run a budget surplus—which simply reduces disposable income of the private sector. Just as a NYTA token surplus would generate lines of token-less people wanting rides, a federal budget surplus will generate jobless people desiring the necessities of life (including subway rides).