Category Archives: Uncategorized

What if the SEC investigated Banks the way it is investigating Mutual Funds?

By William K. Black 

The Wall Street Journal ran a story today (12/27/11) entitled “SEC Ups Its Game to Identify Rogue Firms.”

“Rogue” is an interesting word with a range of definitions. When it is used as an adjective its meaning is: “a playfully mischievous person; scamp.” The trivialization of the most destructive elite frauds is one of the most common forms of what criminologists call “neutralization” of the moral content of wrong doing. Neutralization increases crime.

The actual story makes it clear that the criminals that the SEC was identifying were not “rogues.” They were the CEOs of seemingly legitimate firms. The SEC is identifying “accounting control frauds” – the frauds that cause greater financial losses than all other forms of property crime combined. The SEC is not identifying a few rotten apples, but roughly 100 hedge funds likely to have engaged in accounting fraud. The WSJ describes the SEC’s identification system:

“The list is the low-tech product of a high-tech effort by the SEC to crack down on fraud at hedge funds and other investment firms. After the agency failed to detect the $17.3 billion Ponzi scheme by Bernard L. Madoff, who wowed investors with steady returns over several decades, SEC officials decided they needed a way to trawl through performance data and look for red flags that might signal a possible fraud.

In 2009, the SEC began developing a computer-powered system that now analyzes monthly returns from thousands of hedge funds. Officials won’t say exactly how it works or how much it cost to build, but the agency has announced four civil-fraud lawsuits filed as a result of what it calls the “aberrational performance initiative.””The SEC should be applauded for finally understanding that “if it’s too good to be true; it probably isn’t true.” Our agency put a similar system in place in 1984 to identify the S&L accounting control frauds that were driving that crisis. A quarter-century later, the SEC began to follow our well-trodden trail – but only with regard to felons inhabiting the middle of the fraud food chain (hedge funds). 

The SEC has, inevitably, discovered that accounting fraud is common among hedge funds. It is unlikely that the SEC system is really “high-tech” in information science terms. Low-tech information systems have been capable of identifying “aberrational performance” for at least thirty years. We did not have to create any pioneering software in 1984 in order to identify aberrational performance. The cost and time to create our “red flags” was trivial (a few hours of programming time by an agency staffer). (We were collecting the data and computing the necessary ratios anyway. One simply decides the level of a few key variables worthy of being flagged. There’s nothing magic about a “flag.” All it means is that suspicious levels are highlighted on the computer screen and on physical copies of the periodic reports so that they capture the reader’s attention.)

The SEC took two years to create its “aberrational performance” system and is embarrassed enough about the cost that it wants to keep it secret. The two year development process allowed the SEC to make a major advance relative to our system – they invented a title consisting of two words and eight syllables. Devising a title that recondite doubtless accounts for six months of the time it took the SEC to develop its flags.

The most interesting aspects of the WSJ story, however, are two unexamined topics that should have been central to the story. First, there is not a word in the article about criminal prosecutions for the frauds the SEC has identified. The frauds, as described in the article, are so blatant that they would make relatively simple to prosecute. There is no indication that the SEC wanted the WSJ to know that they had made well over a hundred criminal referrals against hedge fund CEOs and senior officers. There is no indication that the WSJ reporters were interested in whether the SEC had made criminal referrals against these moderately elite felons. As a result, we have no information on whether the SEC has in fact made hundreds of criminal referrals against the senior officers at the hedge funds that they have identified as having engaged in likely fraud. Indeed, we have no evidence that they have made any criminal referrals. Neither the SEC nor the WSJ reporters indicated that any prosecutions, or even Department of Justice investigations, resulted from the SEC hedge fund investigations.

Second, why isn’t the SEC’s top priority the systemically dangerous institutions (SDIs)? The SDIs are the financial institutions that are so large that the administration fears that their failure will cause a new global crisis. The SDIs pose by far the greatest risk to the economy and investors of any entity. Their frauds reached “epidemic” proportions and drove our ongoing crisis and the Great Recession. The SEC, however, applied its “aberrational performance” system to its smallest entities and is now expanding it to mutual funds. There is no indication that the SEC intends to use the system to spot fraudulent SDIs. There is no indication that the SEC has even contemplated using the system to spot fraudulent SDIs. There is no indication that the WSJ reporters asked why the SEC was failing to use its system where it was most needed.

Applying the SEC system to the SDIs would have led the SEC to develop a more sophisticated analytical approach to identifying fraud. There is no indication that the SEC has any familiarity with the criminology, economics, and regulatory literature about how to identify accounting fraud. Admittedly, the SEC (finally) has taken seriously the warning that generations of parents have impressed upon their children – “if it’s too good to be true; it probably isn’t true.” The Achilles’ heel of the SEC analytics is that it assumes fraud must be aberrational and its flags are (at least as described in the story) all tied to identifying aberrations premised on the implicit assumption that fraud cannot be endemic. The SEC official told the WSJ reporter that they looked for “outliers.” Accounting control fraud, however, can become endemic, particularly in a product line, because it produces a “Gresham’s dynamic” in which bad ethics drives good ethics out of the market. Accounting control frauds report results that are too good to be true, but they all report extraordinary results because accounting fraud is a “sure thing” (George Akerlof and Paul Romer, “Looting: the Economic Underworld of Bankruptcy for Profit, 1993). Accounting control fraud was far more common among the SDIs than the SEC system has identified among hedge funds.

Public Money for Public Purpose: Toward the End of Plutocracy and the Triumph of Democracy – Part Three

By Dan Kervick


Consequences of Monetary Sovereignty

Now so far, I have described the operations of the monetarysovereign as though money were the only thing in the world.   But this is clearly not thecase.   The model of themonetary sovereign I have developed is intended to be a model of agovernment.   And whilegovernments might have nearly unlimited and very easily deployed power in thecreation and destruction of money, a government also participates in theexchange of real goods and services.   And these goods and services are clearly finite.    So there is something veryspecial about money which is yet to be considered.

Let’s remember that government spending – insertions ofmoney – can come in different varieties: there are purchases, in which money is inserted into a private sector accountin exchange for some good or service delivered to the sovereign; and there arestraight transfers, in which somemoney is inserted into a private sector account without condition, with thegovernment receiving nothing in return.    Similarly,we need to recall that government receipts – removals of money –  can come also in different varieties: there are sales, in which money is removed from aprivate sector account in exchange for some good or service delivered by thegovernment to the owner of that account – as when someone buys a carton from thepostal service, for example – and there are taxes,in which some money is removed from a private sector account without condition,with the owner of that account receiving nothing in return.


In a democratic society, we should think of the owner of themonetary sovereign’s account as the entire public, representing a significantportion of the economy usually called the publicsector.   The publiccannot create valuable goods out of nothing at will, or receive the benefits ofvaluable services at will.  Thesethings come in finite amounts, and it is a very big deal to the public whetheror not it possesses some good – like a bridge, a park, or a work of publicsculpture, or a dam, or a rocket engine.    It is also a very big deal to the public whetherit is performing some service for a private sector individual or firm, orwhether that individual or firm is providing a service to the public.  So, while it might make littledifference whether we think of the monetary sovereign’s monetary possessions accordingto the infinite account model, the empty account model or the quotidien accountmodel, we have no such freedom when considering the public’s possession andexchanges of real goods, or its receipts and provisions of the benefits of realservices.   When it comes tothe exchange of real goods and services, what the public possesses matters.  As democratic citizens, decisions over the public sectorprovision or acquisition of real goods and service are among the most frequentand important decisions we have to make.

And herein lies an important difference between theproduction of money and the production of other goods.  Traditionally, the difference in costbetween producing some unit of money, and the value that can be fetched by thatmoney in the market when it is used to purchase something, is called“seignorage”.    Inearlier times, when the public’s money was fashioned from material resourceslike gold, which had to be mined from the ground, refined and shipped at a substantialcost, seignorage was still important, but less significant than today.   But in the world of modern money,when money in colossal denominations can be created at very low cost, simply bymoving a few electrons around on some hard drives by virtue of a few keystrokeson a computer keyboard, the value that is derived from seignorage is even moresignificant.

A democratic public that possesses seignorage power shouldbe very hesitant to give it up, as it would for example, by ceding monetarypower to private sector corporations with their relatively small collections ofself-seeking owners and their hierarchical, non-democratic forms of government.   If the creation of the variousforms of money were permitted to be strictly a private sector endeavor in themodern world, we might reasonably suspect it would all end up in the hands of afew financial sector oligarchs – Goldman Sachs, Barclay’s, Chase, etc. – justas these oligarchs have come to dominate other forms of financial power.   Nor should the public take acasual attitude toward free-styling monetary entrepreneurs who might seek toemploy innovative technologies to invent forms of money that have the potentialto succeed in supplanting the public’s money.  They would thereby reap seignorage profit for their ownprivate benefit, while at the same time diminishing public control over thepublic’s monetary system, and robbing a democratic public of its monetary power.    And the romantic andentrepreneurial monetary rebel of today could easily become the monopolizingmonetary kingpin of tomorrow without the restraint of democratic governance.

So let’s turn away from these anti-democratic nightmarescenarios of the public’s monetary powers falling into private hands, andreturn now to our simple model of the monetary sovereign, which we will regardas a democratic government connected to a public sector, wielding its monetaryand other powers on behalf of public purposes.

It is important to recognize that a monetary sovereign hasno operational need, strictlyspeaking, to borrow or tax in orderto spend.  By an operational need Imean something that the government must do in order to carry out someoperation, and without which that operation simply cannot occur.   Because the monetary sovereign canalways create any money it needs in order to carry out a spending operation,there is no operational need for it first to acquire that money from some othersource.   In the end, recall,the monetary sovereign is responsible for all of the money that exists in themonetary system which it governs. It is the producer of the currency in that system, not a mere user ofthe currency.  It is just flatwrong to view a monetary sovereign as an enterprise like any other enterprise –such as a household, a small business, a corporation – mere users of the monetary sovereign’s moneywhose monetary power is limited to the making of exchanges, and whose monetaryscorecard is subject to ordinary budget constraints.

So the monetary sovereign has no operational need to tax orborrow in order to spend.   However,the monetarily sovereign government may have a policy need to tax or borrow. That is, the government may have reasonable policy goals – such as themaintenance of price stability, the encouragement of private sector productionand commerce, the promotion of economic equality or other goals- that are bestcarried out with the aid of taxing or borrowing.  The economist Abba Lerner encouraged us to view allgovernment financial operations functionally– that is in terms of their effects. Whether a monetarily sovereign government should engage in some particularmonetary or financial operation depends entirely on the government’s policygoals, and the degree to which the operation helps advance those policy goals.  Lerner thus called this approach togovernment financial operations “functional finance”, and contrasted it withthe ideal of “sound finance” – an ideal based on misconstruing monetarilysovereign governments as mere currency users subject to ordinary budget constraints.

Now this idea of a monetary sovereign might seemfrightening.   Surely thediscretionary power to create and destroy the money that is in common use is anawesome and potentially threatening power indeed.   The trepidation experienced here is not at allmisplaced.   But it is alsoimportant to realize that the existence of such power, or at least thepotential existence of such power, is inherent in the very idea of governmentalsovereignty, and that much therefore depends on the specific form of governmentthat possesses this sovereign power, and the wisdom of those who determine theactions of that government.  A democratic public – in which sovereignty is distributed equally among itsentire people, which endeavors to subject itself and its own governmentaloperations to the rule of law and appropriate checks and balances, underdurable and vigilantly maintained democratic institutions – can employ itsmonetary sovereignty wisely and on behalf of enlightened public purposes andthe general good.

The idea of monetary sovereign can also inspire a differentkind of emotional reaction in people: not fear, but disapproval.   The public sector under amonetarily sovereign government, if such a thing exists, seems to receive somethingfor nothing by virtue of a seignorage power.  The employment of that power effectively delivers benefitsto the public that are not received inexchange for something else.    All the rest of us private individuals, on theother hand, are generally required to produce something of value in exchangefor the benefits we received.  This asymmetry might not seem fair or appropriate, since the monetarilysovereign government has an unfair advantage over private sector economicactors.   Various inhospitable terms might come to mind here todescribe the monetary sovereign’s advantage:  “free lunch”, “ill-gotten gains”, “theft over honest toil”, “counterfeiting”etc.

This emotional reaction can be hard for people to shake, andis even in some sense natural, but it is grounded in a profoundly wrongheaded andfalse analogy between the sovereign role of a self-governing people under ademocracy, on the one hand, and the role of private individuals, households andcompanies on the other.   First of all, The United States government and its people have made asubstantial investment – of work and sweat and tears, and even including aninvestment of many lives – in order to secure something approaching monetarysovereignty for their society.  So if they exercise this monetary sovereignty in the pursuit of publicpurposes and the general good they are hardly receiving something fornothing.   They have investeda whole lot of something in the pastin order to control a monetary system they can use to accomplish these public goals.

Second, a democratic government like the government of theUnited States is not just one enterprise among others in a competitive economicgame of rising and falling fortunes, a game in which the government musttherefore “play by the same rules” as every private sector individual,household or firm.   TheUnited States government is the instrument by which we the people are supposedto organize and direct our common efforts toward the fulfillment of our mostimportant national goals and aspirations, including such things as “promotingthe general welfare” and “establishing justice.”   It is absurd to suggest that because a corporationlike Goldman Sachs, for example, does not possess the seignorage power thatcomes from monetary sovereignty, then the American people must decline toemploy that power themselves, in the spirit of fairness to Goldman Sachs and thedesire for a level playing field.   Goldman Sachs is not entitled to a levelplaying field with the sovereign American people.   We’re the constitutionally recognized boss in oursociety.   If the people ofthe United States have been strong enough, and diligent enough, and havesacrificed enough to deny seignorage power to Goldman Sachs but preserve it forthemselves and their democratic government, then tough for Goldman Sachs.   But good for us.

Finally, it is absurd to claim, as some monetarycommentators across the generations sometimes have, that government money printingor its modern electronic equivalents represent something analogous tocounterfeiting, as though the money used by a sovereign government were theproperty and creature of some mysterious third party or extra- governmentalpower or entity that the government then fraudulently manufactures foritself.  In modern economies moneyis the creature of a government, and its creation and regulation subject to thelaws of that government.  Under ademocratic government, the power to create and regulate money belongs to thepublic.   The public, workingthrough its government, can’t be the counterfeiter of its own legally ordainedmoney.  It might make foolishdecisions from time to time in the way it deploys its money-creating power, butthese decisions do not encompass the counterfeiting of its own money.  It is impossible for the rightfulissuer of a currency to counterfeit that currency.

So the emotional aversion some feel to the exercise ofmonetary power by a democratic government is misguided.  Much political energy, however, hasgone into perpetuating these irrational reactions.   The owners and servants of concentrated privatefinancial power sometimes seek to shield the US public from a clear awarenessand understanding of its own monetary powers, and from recognizing that it candeploy its inherent monetary sovereignty for public purposes so long as itorganizes itself to lay hold of these powers and command them.   They would like the American people to believe that thepeople themselves, and their democratic government, are mere users of amysterious currency they do not control, and are thus dependent on the will ofothers in exercising whatever monetary power the people are permitted to wieldby those mysterious powers.   Theplutocrats promote these myths and taboos of monetary superstition because aninformed public with a clear-eyed appreciation of monetary matters wouldobviously work to prevent the further usurpation of their powers by plutocrats.

This is Part Three ofa six-part series.

Public Money for Public Purpose: Toward the End of Plutocracy and the Triumph of Democracy – Part Two

By Dan Kervick


Reflections on Modern Money

Before considering what it would mean to make our monetarysystem more democratic, let’s begin by calling to mind a few familiar featuresof money and modern monetary systems in general, features we all intuitivelyunderstand as users of money in a modern monetary economy.

First, money obviously comes in very different forms.   Not only are there different currencysystems – the dollar system, the euro system, the renminbi system, etc. – buteven within a single system, money can take significantly different forms.   There is all of that familiarpaper and metal currency, consisting of tangible objects that can be physicallytransported from one hand to another, and that are denominated with differentface values.  But money might alsoexist simply as “points” electronically credited to someone’s digital monetaryscorecard at a bank.  These pointsare debited from and credited to various accounts, and need never be exchangedfor physical currency.   We can already see a near future inwhich the traditional material currency of metal coins and paper notes will nolonger be used.   In thinkingabout our modern monetary system, then, it is useful to think of it as anetwork of such monetary scorecards.   And we can think of the exchange of physical paper andmetal currency as just one among several ways of adding and subtracting pointsfrom the monetary scorecards of those who exchange the money.   Each individual possess such ascorecard, but so do businesses, governments and other organizations.

Conceiving of our monetary transactions in this way iscompatible with the intellectual framework developed by Hyman Minsky, who said,“A capitalist economy can be described by a set of interrelated balance sheetsand income statements.”  However, the world of balance sheets Minsky asked us to describe containsmore than just money.  Thesebalance sheets record the ownership of other financial assets – that is,promises or commitments of money rather than money itself.   And they also contain accounts ofreal assets – items of positive valueto their owners, like cars or buildings or a book collection – that are notfinancial assets.  Finally, thebalance sheets are also accounts of liabilities– things that represent negative value to their owners, such as debts thatlegally commit the owner of the debt to an outflow of wealth over time.

A second thing to note about modern monetary systems is thatthe market value of these exchangeable monetary points lies, for all of their users,purely in their exchange value.   That is, the only value that attaches tothe acquisition and possession of money comes from the knowledge that money canbe exchanged for other things.  It is true that people also seek to acquire money as a “store of value”that they save for indefinite periods and have no definite plans to spend.   But the only reason one can besuccessful in storing value when onesaves money is that other things continue to happen out in society that preservethe use of that money as a medium of exchange.   If at any time people became unwilling to accept thatform of money in exchange, the saver would no longer be storing value when theysaved their money, but valueless points on a meaningless scorecard.

The fact that the value of modern money is purely based onits acceptance in exchange makes money different from all of the non-monetaryitems that we accumulate and exchange.  Non-monetary items of valuealways have a direct practical utility, for at least some significant number ofpeople, a utility that is not dependent on the prior exchange of those itemsfor something else.   Theutility might be realized in consumption, as it is with a bar of chocolate, or inthe production of some other product or service, as with a block of iron.   It is true that for some specificpeople, the entire value of some non-monetary object might derive from theprospect of exchanging that object for something else.   So, for example, I might be aphilistine art collector who buys paintings only to store value over time andperhaps exchange them later for the things I really want.   For me, paintings function as something like money.   But I can use paintings in thispurely mercenary way, as merely something to exchange for something else, onlybecause there are other people wholove paintings for their own sake.   Similarly, I might be a prisonerwho trades goods for cigarettes, even though I don’t smoke, but only becausesome other prisoners do smoke, and are willing to give something up for thecigarettes.   But money isdifferent altogether.  What makes acertain good a form of money is that its value for pretty much everyone lies entirely in the fact that others willaccept it in exchange.  There is nonon-monetary, non-instrumental foundation for the exchange value of money.   There might be a few dementedmisers with a perverse love for paper bills and metal coins themselves, and afew numismatic hobbyists who collect these bits of money as culturalcuriosities and works of art in themselves.  But the exchange value of money does not depend in anysignificant way of the existence of this relatively small number of people.

Thirdly and finally, it is clear that governments play avery important role in the regulation of contemporary monetary systems, and inthe creation and destruction of the monetary units in that system.  The monies we use have an official,legally institutionalized role in our economies, an official status that isadvertized to us by the markings and declarations on the physical currencyitself.  Almost all money in actualwidespread use is some government’s money.   The government is central in preserving the value andstability of the government’s money over time.   And we know that while we all have a great deal ofliberty to exchange the money we personally possess for other good andservices, and to exchange goods and services for money, the legal authority tocreate and destroy the official government money is tightly regulated andprotected.   It is to suchofficial, government administered monetary systems – at least when they existin democratic societies – that I refer when I describe a monetary system suchas the dollar system as “the public’s money.”

But how do those governmental monetary processeshappen?   How is the monetarysystem stabilized over time?  How is money actually created and destroyed in a modern monetary economy?    The full answer to these questions is not simple.   Governments are complex entities,consisting of many separate branches, divisions, departments and agencies, eachwith its own assigned powers and authorities, and many distinct operationalcenters have their hands on different aspects of the monetary system.   The private sector plays a key role as well.    My focus will primarily beon the processes that create and destroy money.  We can put off the precise details of government monetaryoperations for now, and start instead with a simplified model.   I will call the government in this simple model a “monetarilysovereign government”, or just a “monetary sovereign”.   

Monetary sovereigns can come in different forms, but in ademocracy the people as a whole are supposed to be the ultimate seat and sourceof the government’s sovereignty, including its sovereignty over monetaryoperations.   Think of the monetarysovereign, no matter what individual or group of individuals constitute andexercise that sovereignty, as possessing a single monetary account of its own -a single unified monetary scorecard.  Initially, the monetarysovereign’s scorecard can be thought of as very much like anyone else’smonetary scorecard.  When themonetary sovereign spends, and either buys something from someone in theprivate sector or transfers money outright to the private sector, some monetarypoints are deducted from the monetary sovereign’s scorecard and an equal numberof points are added to that private sector scorecard.   And going in the other direction, when the monetarysovereign taxes, or when someone purchases some good or service from agovernment agency, some monetary points are deducted from the private sectorscorecard and an equal number of points are added to the monetary sovereign’s scorecard.

But there are two wrinkles, two special circumstances thatmake the monetary sovereign’s scorecard very different from private sector scorecards.

First, the monetary sovereign is the seat of government, andhence the ultimate administrator of its own scorecard.   If you and I exchange money, andthe exchange takes place via our bank accounts, the banks that oversee theseaccounts administer the adjustment of the monetary points on ourscorecards.  And if two banks exchangemoney, the government, which operates a central bank that serves as a sort ofbank for bankers, administers the adjustment of monetary points between the twobank scorecards.   But when amonetary exchange takes place between the monetary sovereign and any other personor entity in the private sector, the monetary sovereign is the ultimateadministrator or arbiter of the monetary adjustment.  The monetary sovereign’s scorecard is not administered bysome third party, but by the monetary sovereign itself.

It is true that the scorecard of some agency within the government might beadministered by some other agency of the government.  In the US system, for example, the Treasury Department’smonetary transactions are administered by the Federal Reserve System, whichholds the Treasury Department’s accounts. But the Fed is ultimately part of the government, which means that theUS government as a whole is the ultimate administrator of the government’s ownaccounts.

The other way in which the monetary sovereign’s monetaryscorecard is different from a private sector scorecard is connected with thefirst difference:  A monetarilysovereign government reserves for itself the power of adding or deleting monetarypoints on its own scorecard or any other scorecard, at its own discretion, withoutany requirement that an equal number of monetary points are debited from anyother scorecard or credited to any other scorecard.  And the monetary sovereign uses its power to guarantee thatit is the sole entity in the monetarysystem that possesses such power.  The monetary sovereign, in other words, wields the exclusive power tocreate and destroy money in the monetary system it controls.   Currency users in the private sector, on the other hand, canonly exchange monetary points in waysthat make the books balance.  Tothe extent that agents other than the monetary sovereign are permitted toengage in money-creating and money-destroying operations, these operations takeplace only with the permission of the monetary sovereign, and under theguidance or supervision of the monetary sovereign.

There might appear to be one partial exception to the aboverestriction, however.   Privatesector banks are also permitted, within certain limits, to create new monetarypoints in the monetary system.  When a bank decides to give a loan to some new borrower, it creates adeposit account for that borrower and credits the loaned amount of dollars tothat account.  In effect, itcreates a new monetary scorecard for the borrower and puts some monetary pointson it.   As the economistsBasil Moore, Scott Fullwiler, Marc Lavoie and many others have emphasized, thosepoints need not come from anywhere.  They need not be the result of a transfer of points from some otheraccount to the borrower’s account. Although the bank might be subject to central bank reserve requirementsthat mandate the bank hold a certain percentage of money against its deposits,in its reserve account at the central bank, the bank typically has severalweeks to meet these requirements, and can acquire the reserves after making the initial loan, eitherfrom other banks or from the central bank itself.

So bank lending can in some sense create additionalmoney.   However, in a verystrict sense, what the bank borrower receives is not monetary points, but a promise of monetary points to bedelivered in the future.  Thatpromise is a liability of the bank – something it now owes the borrower and thatthe borrower can convert into money on demand.  If the borrower decides to withdraw the promised money inthe form of material currency, the bank must take cash from its vault and giveit to the borrower.   At thispoint, we can see an actual transfer of money from the bank to theborrower.  But the bank’s vaultcash has to be acquired from the monetary sovereign, and it has to pay for thatcash.

Now since bank deposits can be exchanged just about asfreely as money in any form, they can be legitimately defined as one form ofmoney itself.  There is perhaps nostrict line that can be drawn between liabilities for money or promises ofmoney, on the one hand, and money itself, on the other hand.   But ultimately, however we define“money”, all of these banking operations are administered and regulated by themonetary sovereign, and so the monetary sovereign’s decisions are ultimatelyresponsible for which lending operations a bank is permitted to conduct, and whetherthe bank’s lending results in a net increase in money in the monetary system.   The monetary system is under theultimate control of the monetary sovereign, even if the sovereign chooses not to be very assertive inexercising that control, and passively allows banks to create money as they seefit.

So let’s return to the operations of the monetary sovereignitself.    In order tobring the nature and ultimate capacities of monetary sovereignty into sharperrelief, let’s consider three distinct models or mental pictures of the monetarysovereign’s monetary operations.    These mental pictures are designed only toprovide a more vivid imaginative understanding of monetary sovereignty.   And initially at least, theymight appear to be dramatically different pictures.   But we will see that in the end the pictures are,somewhat surprisingly, fully equivalent in everything that is really essentialand important about the monetary sovereign’s operations.

The first picture can be called the infinite account model. Think of the monetary sovereign as possessing an account or monetaryscorecard that holds an infinite quantity of dollars.  When it spends in its unit of currency, it credits someamount of units X to some private sector account, but debits X units from itsown account.   When it taxes,it debits X units from some private sector account, but credits X units fromits own account.   But sinceit possesses infinitely many units of the currency in the first place, theseoperations have no effect on its own balances.   Currency units come in and go out, but the addition orsubtraction of a finite number of units from an infinite stock of units nevermakes any difference.  The sameinfinite number of units exists on the monetary sovereign’s scorecard at alltimes.

A second picture is the emptyaccount model.  In this case, thinkof the monetarily sovereign government as possessing an account that containsno money whatsoever.   Its scorecard always stands atzero.  When it spends, it credits Xunits to some private sector account, but makes no change at all in its ownaccount.   When it taxes, itdebits X units from some private sector account, but again makes no changes atall to its own account.  Since it never possesses any money on its books, the monetarysovereign’s basic monetary operations of taxing and spending can be viewed as simplycreating private sector monetary points out of thin air and destroying privatesector money, not transferring that money back and forth between the privatesector and the government.  On the empty account model, only private sector monetary scorecards aremarked up with monetary balances, and the monetary sovereign never possessesmoney of its own.

Finally, there is the quotidienaccount model.  The monetarilysovereign government is seen on this model as always possessing a finite amountof currency units – just like a private sector entity.  At all times, some finite number of monetaryunits are on its monetary scorecard, and the monetary sovereign running a quotidienaccount is scrupulous about balancing the books on its monetaryoperations.   When it spends,it credits X units to some private sector scorecard, but scrupulously debits X unitsfrom its own scorecard.   Whenit taxes, it debits X units from some private sector scorecard, but againcarefully credits X units to its own account.   Since it possesses only finitely many units in thefirst place, these operations do have an effect on its balances.  However, there is one added wrinkle:the monetary sovereign is, as before, legally entitled to create or destroycurrency units on its scorecard as a separate operation.   So in the end, while there arealways some finite number of units on its scorecard, the monetarily sovereign governmentultimately chooses exactly how many unitsthat is, since it can add or subtract units from its own scorecard at any time.   Even though the sovereign’sbookkeepers are scrupulously balancing the books when it comes to recordingexchanges to and from the private sector, the fact that the government can atany time credit or debit some additional amount makes the bookkeeper’s caresomewhat absurd or meaningless, at least with regard to the monetarysovereign’s own account.

Recognizing that degree of meaninglessness in the quotidien accountmodel is the key to grasping a very fundamental fact about monetary sovereignty.  When it comes to understanding the realeconomic effects of the monetarysovereign’s operations, it really makes no difference whatsoever which picture oneemploys.   The three picturesare all equivalent.   If themonetary sovereign is entitled to create or destroy currency units at will, it reallydoesn’t matter whether we imagine the sovereign as possessing infinitely many units,zero units or some finite number of units of its own choosing.   All that matters is what happensto the accounts in the non-governmental sector.    The monetary sovereign administers the monetary systemof the real economy, and that real economy consists of the sphere of goods andservices that are produced and exchanged by the world outside of thegovernment, a world in which the government’s money plays the role offacilitating exchange, accounting for value in a standard unit of measure andmaking payments.   Since thosepeople and entities in the private sector economy are not permitted to create currencyunits at will, unless such power has been delegated to them by the monetarysovereign, their spending and savings decisions are constrained at any time bythe number of units they possess at that time.   And the rate at which money is exchanged for goods andservices depends ultimately on the amount and distribution of money that existsout in the private sector.   Whatultimately matters, then, is whether some government operation has the effectof adding monetary points to some private, non-governmental sector scorecard,or deleting monetary points from some private, non-governmental sectorscorecard.   What happens tothe sovereign’s own scorecard is insignificant with regard to the creation anddestruction of value in the real economy, that is, with regard to all of thethings we really care about.

Going forward, then, it will be good to use neutral terms todescribe the effects of the fundamental monetary operations of the monetarysovereign, terms which do not depend on which of the three models we use toconceive of these operations.  We will say, then, that taxes “remove” money from the non-governmentalsector, and that government spending “inserts” money into the non-governmentalsector.  The monetary sovereign possessesthe power of a government to make these things happen, and the insertion andremoval of money from various places in the private sector can have profoundeffects.  But what happens behindthe accounting wall separating the monetary sovereign’s scorecard for all ofthe other scorecards makes no real difference to anybody.  Whether one chooses to regard theinsertion of money into the economy as a transferof money – in accordance with either the infinite account model or the quotidianaccount model – or as the creation ofmoney from nothing – in accordance with the empty account model – really makesno difference to the effects of these operations in the private sector economy.

So far, I have discussed only two main kinds of governmentmonetary operations: taxing and spending. But I have neglected to discuss borrowing, another significantgovernment financial operation. How should we understand the borrowing operations of a monetarilysovereign government?

To answer this question, we should begin by asking what wemean by “borrowing” and “lending”, in the financial senses of those words.   What does it mean to say someone has borrowed money from somebank lender?   Well it isclear that we don’t mean quite thesame thing that we mean when we talk about other non-monetary acts of borrowing and lending in the everyday world.   If my neighbor borrows mylawnmower from me, and I lend it to him, I simply hand over my lawnmower to himfor some more-or-less agreed amount of time.   He uses it for a while, and then gives it back tome.  End of story.   The value of the lawnmower hasprobably depreciated just a tiny bit as a result of the use, and my neighborhas derived some value from the lawnmower for which he did not pay me.   But if, instead of agreeing to lend him the lawnmower, I amonly willing to hand over the lawnmower for some more-or-less agreed paymentfrom my neighbor, we would probably say that my neighbor has then rented by lawnmower from me, notborrowed it.   So in essence,my act of lending constitutes a modest neighborly gift on my part.   I give the gift and my neighborreceives it.  That’s all.

But clearly, that is not at all the way we are using theterms “borrowing” and “lending” when we apply these terms in the usual way tothe borrowing and lending of money.   As we all know, abank loan is no gift!    In the case of money, we are talkingabout an exchange or trade.    When people borrow money, they acquire somemoney in exchange for a promise, a promise to pay some other amount of money inthe future – almost always a greater amount.  The promise then represents a financial asset for thelender, and a financial liability to the borrower: it represents something thelender is slated to gain and the borrower is slated to lose.   The financial instrument, thepromise, represents a cash flow.  From the point of view of the lender, it represents an inflow ofmonetary payments, generally associated with a fixed payment schedule.  From the point of view of the borroweron the other hand, the financial instrument represents an outflow of money onthe same more-or-less fixed payment schedule.   A bond – suchas the bonds sold by businesses and governments – are essentially financialinstruments formalizing promises of this kind.   In terms of a monetary scorecard, we can think of afinancial asset like a bond as something like some marks on the scorecard correspondingto a schedule of pre-determined point increases.  The lender’s scorecard contains the bond as well as anypreviously existing monetary points the lender possessed.   As any one of the various timesindicated on the schedule transpire, some marks indicating a scheduled paymentof currency units at that time are erased, and the appropriate numbers of actualcurrency units are added to the scorecard.   Gradually what begins as a mere schedule of monetarypoints to be received in the future is transformed into some quantity of actualmonetary points.

People can also sell bonds that they have already purchasedfrom some other party.  Suppose A has purchased a bond – a schedule of monetary payments – fromB.   But suppose A no longerwants to wait for the promised money to be credited to her scorecard onschedule, and prefers some money now.   Then A might be able to find somethird party C who is willing to buy the remaining schedule of payments fromA.   A receives some moneyfrom C – that is, A’s monetary scorecard is credited by some amount and C’smonetary scorecard is debited by some amount.   Now B still owes the remaining schedule of monetarypoints, but B now owes them to C.  In accordance with the remaining schedule of payments, C’s scorecardwill be marked up with additional monetary points and B’s schedule will bedebited by that amount of points concurrently.

So, borrowing and lending money in financial markets doesnot involve any kind of gift.  Itis an exchange in which each party gives something up and each party receivessomething in return.  The borrowerreceives present money and in return gives up money in the future.   The lender gives up present moneyand in return receives money in the future.  Generally, people are only willing to make such an exchangeif it is mutually beneficial.  It is important to keep the mutually beneficial nature of creditrelationships in mind.  There is anunfortunate tendency in contemporary discourse about credit to regard thelender as a person who has bestowed some favor, gift or act of grace on theborrower.   But that is notthe case.   Rather, two peoplehave made a simple mutually beneficial exchange.  One party to the exchange receives from the other some moneyin the present; the other party to the exchange receives from the other somemoney in the future.

But let’s return now to the case of a monetary sovereign,and look at these borrowing and lending processes from the perspective of amonetary sovereign’s operations, in line with any one of the three models wedescribed before.   Start with borrowing.  What are the effects of governmentborrowing from the non-government sector, at positive interest?   Well, first, the private sector lender buys a bond from the monetarysovereign.   At the time ofthe purchase, some monetary points are removed from the lender’s monetary scorecard,and a schedule of pre-determined monetary points is added to that scorecard.   Then over time, some of the marksrepresenting pre-scheduled monetary points are removed and the appropriate numberof monetary points are added.  These operations are likely to be very important to the private sectorlender.   But remember that fromthe standpoint of the monetary sovereign it makes no difference what happens tothe monetary sovereign’s own scorecard. All that is important is what happens to the private sector scorecard:some money is first subtracted from the scorecard, and then some greater amountof money is added to the scorecard over time.   And since that lender is part of the private sector, thegovernment in this case first removes money from the private sector and theninserts money into the private sector over time, on a pre-determined schedule.

Now what if, instead of borrowing from the private sector,the monetary sovereign lends to theprivate sector?  We can understandthe effects of this operation by just reversing the time order and direction ofthe previously described borrowing operation.   When the government lends to a private sector entity, somemoney is first added to that entity’s scorecard, and then some greater amountof money is subtracted from the scorecard over time.   The government in this case first inserts money intothe private sector and then removes money from the private sector over time, ona pre-determined schedule.     But remember again that from thestandpoint of the monetary sovereign it makes no difference what happens to themonetary sovereign’s own scorecard. All that is important is what happens to the private sector scorecard:some money is in this case first added to the scorecard, and then some greateramount of money is subtracted from the scorecard over time.

Now consider the monetary effects of several of thesemonetary operations together: taxing, transfer spending, borrowing andlending.   Both money andofficial promises of money represent assets to the party that hold them.  So the effect of these governmentmonetary operations is the swapping around of government-issued financial assetson private sector balance sheets.  In each case, the monetary sovereign is mainly adjusting the scheduleson which it will insert and remove money from the private sector, and theaccounts on which it will make these changes.  In some cases it adjusts a schedule of money removals andmoney insertions forward in time toward the present; in some cases it adjusts aschedule further off in time toward the future.   It is likely engaging in a large and complexcombination of such adjustment operations at any time.    All of these adjustments helpregulate the flow of additional money into and out of the private sector.

Think of it this way: The private sector can be imagined as a collection of wells, and eachwell is outfitted with a collection of nozzles to which one can attachhoses.  Each hose either drawswater out of a well and into the monetary sovereign’s well, or draws water outof the monetary sovereign’s well and into the private sector well.  Some of the hoses carry a steady flowwhenever they are hooked up.  Otherhoses are outfitted with valves that deliver their water flow in bursts, on aset time schedule.  The monetarysovereign’s various monetary operations can then be seen to consist indetaching some hoses and attaching others, sometimes swapping out one hose foranother.

But just as before, remember that it doesn’t really matterwhat happens to the monetary sovereign’s own well.  This is perhaps easiest to imagine if we think of themonetary sovereign’s well as infinitely deep – as in the infinite accountmodel.   Water flows into andout of the monetary sovereign’s well.   But these flows make no difference from the standpoint ofthe monetary sovereign itself, since the sovereign’s well is always infinitelydeep and filled with an infinite amount of water.   But the flows of water make quite a bit of differenceindeed to the owners of the many ordinary wells out in the private sector.
This is Part Two of asix-part series.  Part One is here.

MMP Blog #29: What about a country that adopts a foreign currency? Part Two

By L. Randall Wray

Yet another rescue plan for the EMU is making its waythrough central Europe—with the ECB acting as lender of last resort toEuro-banks. It is trying the tried-and-failed Fed method of rescue. As we nowknow the Fed lent and spent over $29 TRILLION trying to rescue (mostly) USbanks. It did not work. The biggest banks are still insolvent, and havecontinued their massive frauds trying to cover up their insolvencies. Youcannot paper-over insolvency through massive lending by the central bank. Andthe Euroland problems are compounded by the insolvencies of virtually all theirmember states.

To be sure, we also have probable insolvencies of some ofour US states—but we’ve got a sovereign government that will eventually do theright thing (as Mr. Churchill famously said, Americans get around to that,after trying everything else first). But the Euro states do not have anysovereign backing them up. And note that the ECB remains unwilling to do thejob. A disastrous financial collapse and possible Great Depression 2.0 remainsthe most likely scenario.

How Did Euroland Get Into Such A Mess? PartOne: Private Debt

We all knowthe favourite story told: profligate-spending Mediterranean governments blew uptheir budgets, causing the crisis. If only they had followed the example ofGermany—as they were supposed to do once they joined the Euro—the EMU wouldhave worked just fine.

While thestory of fiscal excess is a stretch even in the case of the Greeks, it doesn’teasily apply to Ireland and Iceland—or even to Spain—all of which had lowbudget deficits (or even surpluses) until the crisis hit. In truth, there weretwo problems.

First, likemost Western countries, private sector debts blew up in many Euroland countriesafter the financial system was de-regulated and de-supervised. To label this asovereign debt problem is quite misleading. The dynamics are surely complex butit is clear that there is something that is driving debt growth in thedeveloped world that cannot be reduced to runaway government budget deficits.Nor does it make sense to point fingers at Mediterraneans since it is (largely)the English-speaking world of the US, UK, Canada and Australia that has seensome of the biggest increases of household debt—the total US debt ratio reached500%, of which household debt alone is 100%, and financial institution debt isanother 125% of GDP.

Take a lookat this graph, which shows the debt-to-GDP ratios for the private andgovernment sectors:
Clearly, upto 2007 the really big debt ratios were in the private sector. The story isvery similar to that of the US. But note that the problem tends to be worse in those countries with smallergovernment debts—there is an inverse relation between private debt ratios andgovernment debt ratios. Now why is that?

And as weknow from previous MMP sections, the sectoral balance identity shows thedomestic private balance equals the sum of the domestic government balance lessthe external balance. To put it succinctly, if a nation (say, the US) runs acurrent account deficit, then its domestic private balance (households plusfirms) equals its government balance less that current account deficit. To makethis concrete, when the US runs a current account deficit of 5% of GDP and abudget deficit of 10% of GDP its domestic sector has a surplus of 5%; or if itscurrent account deficit is 8% of GDP and its budget deficit is 3% then theprivate sector must have a deficit of 5%–running up its debt.

{An aside: Abig reason why much of the developed world has had a growth of its outstandingprivate and public sector debts relative to GDP is because we have witnessedthe rise of BRIC (and others—especially in Asia) current account surpluses—matchedby current account deficits in the developed Western nations taken as a whole.Hence, developed country budget deficits have widened even as their privatesector debts have grown. By itself, this is neither good nor bad. But overtime, the debt ratios and hence debt service commitments of Western domesticprivate sectors got too large. This was a major contributing factor to the GFC.}

Our Austerianssee the solution in belt-tightening, especially by Western governments. Butthat tends to slow growth, increase unemployment, and hence increase the burdenof private sector debt. The idea is that this will reduce government debt anddeficit ratios but in practice that does not work due to impacts on thedomestic private sector. Tightening the fiscal stance can occur in conjunctionwith reduction of private sector debts and deficits only if somehow thisreduces current account deficits. Yet many nations around the world rely oncurrent account surpluses to fuel domestic growth and to keep domesticgovernment and private sector balance sheets strong. They therefor react tofiscal tightening by trading partners—either by depreciating their exchangerates or by lowering their costs. In the end, this sets off a sort of modernMercantilist dynamic that leads to race to the bottom policies that few Westernnations can win.

Germany,however has specialized in such dynamics and has played its cards well. It hasheld the line on nominal wages while greatly increasing productivity. As aresult, in spite of reasonably high living standards it has become a low costproducer in Europe. Given productivity advantages it can go toe-to-toe againstnon-Euro countries in spite of what looks like an overvalued currency. ForGermany however, the euro is significantly undervalued—even though most euronations find it overvalued. The result is that Germany has operated with acurrent account surplus that allowed its domestic private sector and governmentto run deficits that were relatively small. Germany’s overall debt ratio is at200% of GDP, approximately 50% of GDP lower than the Euro zone average.

Notsurprisingly, the sectoral balances identity hit the periphery nationsparticularly hard as they suffer from what is for them an overvalued euro, and lowerproductivity than Germany enjoys. With current accounts biased toward deficitsit is not a surprise to find that the Mediterraneans have bigger government andprivate sector debt loads.

Now, if Europe’s center understood balance sheets, it wouldbe obvious that Germany’s relatively “better” balances rely on the periphery’srelatively “worse” balances. If each had separate currencies, the solutionwould be to adjust exchange rates so that our debtors would have depreciationand Germany would have an appreciating currency. Since within the euro this isnot possible, the only price adjustment that can work would be either risingwages and prices in Germany or falling wages and prices on the periphery. But ECB,Bundesbank and EU policy more generally will not allow significant wage andprice inflation in the center. Hence the only solution is persistent deflationarypressures on the periphery. Those dynamics lead to slow growth and hencecompound the debt burden problems.

How Did Euroland Get Into Such A Mess? PartTwo: Government Debt

To be sure, the private debt problem—related to the internalEuropean dynamics of a strong mercantilist Germany in the center—would be veryhard to resolve. But Euroland has an even more fatal problem: the Euro, itself.So let us turn to that second problem.

The fundamentalfault with the set-up of the EMU was the separation of nations from theircurrencies. It was a system designed to fail. It would be like a USA with noWashington—with each state fully responsible not only for state spending, butalso for social security, health care, natural disasters, and bail-outs offinancial institutions within its borders.  In the US, all of those responsibilities fall under thepurview of the issuers of the national currency—the Fed and the Treasury. Intruth, the Fed must play a subsidiary role because like the ECB it isprohibited from directly buying Treasury debt. It can only lend to financialinstitutions, and purchase government debt in the open market. It can help tostabilize the financial system, but can only lend, not spend, dollars intoexistence. The Treasury spends them into existence. When Congress is notpreoccupied with Kindergarten-level spats over debt ceilings that arrangement worksalmost tolerably well—a hurricane in the Gulf leads to Treasury spending torelieve the pain. A national economic disaster generates a Federal budgetdeficit of 5 or 10 percent of GDP to relieve pain.

That cannothappen in Euroland, where the Euro Parliament’s budget is less than one percentof GDP. The first serious Euro-wide financial crisis would expose the flaws.And it did.

Member states became much like US states, but with two keydifferences. First, while US states can and do rely on fiscal transfers fromWashington—which controls a budget equal to more than a fifth of US GDP—EMUmember states got an underfunded European Parliament with a total budget ofless than 1% of Europe’s GDP. (To make it even worse, the Parliament’s fundingcomes from the member states!)

This meant that member states were responsible for dealingnot only with the routine expenditures on social welfare (health care,retirement, poverty relief) but also had to rise to the challenge of economicand financial crises.

The second difference is that Maastricht criteria were fartoo lax—permitting outrageously high budget deficits and government debtratios.  Most of the critics hadalways (wrongly) argued that the Maastricht criteria were too tight—prohibitingmember states from adding enough aggregate demand to keep their economieshumming along at full employment. It is true that government spending was chronicallytoo low across Europe as evidenced by chronically high unemployment and rottengrowth in most places. But since these states were essentially spending and borrowinga foreign currency—the Euro—the Maastricht criteria permitted deficits anddebts that were inappropriate.

Let us take a look at US states. All but two have balancedbudget requirements—written into state constitutions—and all of them aredisciplined by markets to submit balanced budgets. When a state finishes theyear with a deficit, it faces a credit downgrade by our good friends the creditratings agencies. (Yes, the same folks who thought that bundles of trashmortgages ought to be rated AAA—but that is not the topic today.) That wouldcause interest rates paid by states on their bonds to rise, raising budgetdeficits and fueling a vicious cycle of downgrades, rate hikes and burgeoningdeficits. So a mixture of austerity, default on debt, and Federal governmentfiscal transfers keeps US state budget deficits low.

(Yes, I know that right now many states are facingArmageddon—especially California—as the global crisis has crashed revenues andcaused deficits to explode. This is not an exception but rather demonstrates myargument.)

The following table shows the debt ratios of a selection ofUS states. Note that none of them even reaches 20% of GDP, less than a third ofthe Maastricht criteria.
Alaska
15.7
Montana
12.2
Connecticut
12.1
New Hampshire
13.0
Hawaii
12.2
New York
10.5
Maine
11.0
Rhode Island
16.9
Massachusetts
16.5
Vermont
12.6
By contrast, Euro states had much higher debt ratios—withonly Ireland coming close to the low ratios we find among US states (the redline is drawn at the Maastricht criterion of 60%).












To be clear, none of these debt ratios would be too high fora sovereign government that issues its own currency. Remember that Japan’sgovernment debt ratio is 200%–and its interest rate has been close to zero fortwo decades. But they are too high for nonsovereign nations that use a foreigncurrency.


Those who follow Modern Money Theory believed that market“discipline” would eventually impose debt and deficit limits far belowMaastricht criteria—to ratios closer to those imposed on US states. And with nofiscal authority in the center to match the US Treasury, the first seriouseconomic or financial crisis would expose the flaws of the design of the euro. Becausethe crisis would cause member state deficits and debts to grow. At the sametime markets would begin to realize that these member states are much like USstates but without the backstop of a European Treasury.
And that is precisely what has happened.

To be sure markets have not reacted simultaneously againstall member states. If you think about it, this makes sense. There is a desireto hold euro-denominated debt—the euro is a strong currency and much of theworld wants to buy European exports. So markets run out of Greece and Irelandand now Italy but need to get into other euro debt. Since Germany is thestrongest member and by far the biggest exporter, it benefits the most from arun against the periphery.

Yet as Germany is a net exporter with a relatively smallbudget deficit, it is hard to get German debt. The biggest issuer of debt wasItaly, and there was a strong belief in markets that because Italy’s debt is solarge, it is like a Bank of America—too big to fail. And ditto for France andSpain. So spreads widened for Greece and Ireland and Portugal, but have onlyrecently increased for Spain and Italy.

But after the agreement to accept a “voluntary” haircut of50% on Greek debt, no prudent investor can any longer pretend that Italy, Spainor even France and Germany is a safe bet. Faith based investing in Euro debt isover. And note that if the stronger nations really do bail-out a Spain or anItaly, our friendly credit rating agencies will quickly downgrade the strongnations (they are now threatening France) for contributing funds to rescuetheir neighbors. Even Germany will not be safe if it participates in a bailoutof Italy by committing funds.

There is thus a damned-if-you-do and damned-if-you-don’tdilemma. A bail-out by member states threatens the EMU by burdening andeventually bringing down the strong states; and allowing too-big-to-fail Italyto default would prove to markets that no member state is safe.

And this is why it does not matter how much the ECB lends toEurobanks—the banks would be crazy to buy up government debt. And it is hard tobelieve that any US money managers can make a case that it is still prudent toinvest in euro debt.

Many critics of the EMU have long blamed the ECB forsluggish growth, especially on the periphery. The argument is that it keptinterest rates too high for full employment to be achieved. I have alwaysthought that was wrong—not because I do not agree that lower interest rates aredesirable, but because even with the best-run central bank, the real problem inthe set-up was fiscal policy constraints. Indeed, several years ago, Claudio Sardoniand I demonstrated that the ECB’s policy was not significantly tighter than theFed’s—but US economic performance was consistently better. The difference wasfiscal policy—with Washington commanding a budget that was more than 20% ofGDP, and usually running a budget deficit of several percent of GDP. By contrast,the EU Parliament’s budget could never run deficits like that. Individualnations tried to fill the gap with deficits by their own governments, thesecreated the problems we see today—as the chickens came home to roost, so tospeak.

Is There Any Solution?

Once the EMU weakness is understood, it is not hard to seethe solutions. These include ramping up fiscal policy space of the EUparliament—say, increasing its budget to 15% of GDP with a capacity to issuedebt. Whether the spending decisions should be centralized is a politicalmatter—funds could simply be transferred to individual states on a per capitabasis.

It can also be done by the ECB: change the rules so that theECB can buy, say, an amount equal to 6% of Euroland GDP each year in the formof government debt issued by EMU members. As buyer it can set the interestrate—might be best to mandate that at the ECB’s overnight interest rate targetor some mark-up above that. Again, the allocation would be on a percapita basisacross the members. Note that this is similar to the blue bond, red bondproposal discussed above. Individual members could continue to also issue bondsto markets, so they could exceed the debt issue that is bought by the ECB—muchas US states do issue bonds.

One can conceive of variations on this theme, such ascreation of some EMU-wide funding authority backed by the ECB that issues debtto buy government debt from individual nations—again, along the lines of theblue bond proposal. What is essential, however, is that the backing comes fromthe center—the ECB or the EU stands behind the debt.

No amount of faith in the European integration is going tohide the flaws any longer. A comprehensive rescue by the ECB—which must standready to buy ALL member state debt at a price to ensure debt service costsbelow 3%–plus the creation of a central fiscal mechanism of a size appropriateto the needs of the European Union is the only way out. If these actions arenot taken—and soon—the only option left is to dissolve the Union.



So, finally, returning to the “one nation-one currency” rule would alloweach nation to recapture domestic policy space by returning to its owncurrency. There was never a strong argument for adopting the Euro, and theweaknesses have been exposed. Currency union without fiscal union was amistake.

Public Money for Public Purpose: Toward the End of Plutocracy and the Triumph of Democracy – Part One

By Dan Kervick

A new year is upon us.  And even before its first hour has been rung in, 2012 is already takingshape before us as a pivotal year in global politics.  We canall feel the awakening under way.   Arevived longing for equality, shared prosperity and democratic solidarity isinspiring a vibrant new politics around the world.   Thisnew activist spirit is quickened by the keen apprehension of young people onevery continent that something is very, very wrong with the present economicand political order.   The risinggeneration, heirs to sick and damaged societies that have been unbalanced bydecades of plutocratic rule and antisocial cupidity, have now begun to rouse themselves- and in the process they have rallied the moral outrage of their fellowcitizens.

In the face of so much hope and energy, cynicism fallsincreasingly mute. The young occupiersof the public squares are giving new heart to all of those older, beleaguered reformerswho worried that they might never see real change in their countries duringtheir own lifetimes. Young people almost everywhere – from the defiantstreet vendor Mohamed Boazizi in Tunisia to the indignados in Spain to the participants in the Occupy movementacross the United States and elsewhere – are rejecting the destruction wrought ontheir societies by a debased system of economic predation, environmental recklessness,elite privilege, corporate fraud and sheer inhuman greed.   The youthful protestors are determined to restoredemocratic society and human decency, and redeem the dimming promise of their commonfuture, and they have set their sights on the global dictatorship of big money.  The 1%, once complacent in their impregnablefortresses of cash, can be heard to speak in worried tones of late.  They lean pensively from their tower windows,no longer quite so comfortably aloof, and hear the rebel footfalls down on thestreets in the dark.

The task the new activists have set themselves isformidable, because the economic disorders in need of repair are so numerous.  The maladies here in the United States areparticularly acute: Real unemployment iswell up into the double digits – despite standard government habits of cookingthe official unemployment books by not counting various classes of peoplewithout jobs. Unemployment rates amongthe young are especially appalling.  Income disparities and polarization arestaggering:  For example, CEO pay in theUS is now many hundreds of times higher than average worker pay, and the shareof national income going to workers is now at its lowest level since thecountry began measuring that share almost 60 years ago.  The share of income going toward corporateprofits, on the other hand, is at the highest level since 1950, and yet many ofthese profits have been harvested by firing workers and cutting costs, not fromnew production.  And by some recent measures, the proportion ofAmericans who count as either “poor” or “lower income” is close to 50%.  As always, political power follows wealth,and that ineluctable social fact poses a large part of the challenge forreform.  The greater the gap between therich and the not-rich, the greater the capacity of the rich to buy the kinds ofpolitical influence they need to prevent change.

So the problems are not small, and they will not be easy toaddress and fix.  We therefore need tobattle for social and economic changes along many fronts.  But as the new generation of activists pointour societies toward these necessary reforms, so many of which pertain to theoppressive and unjust power derived from the control of concentrated money, theywould be well advised to focus significant attention on the monetary system itself.  The monetary systems that currently exist aredeeply flawed:  they are antiquated; theyare socially inefficient; they are undemocratic; they lack openness andaccountability; and they privilege elite financial interests over the interestsof ordinary citizens and the public interest.  Citizens in every country must begin to work together to reassert publiccontrol over their monetary systems, and assure that those systems are subjectto democratic governance.  And they mustresist calls to expand the rule of private sector wealth over our monetarysystems, and to reduce the public’s control over money even further below thelevel at which it currently stands.  Thepublic’s money must remain in public hands, so it can be mobilized for publicpurposes.

The aim of this essay is to assist the bourgeoning newmovement for a more just and democratic world by contributing some ideas towarddemocratic reform of our monetary systems. These ideas do not primarily take the form of detailed policyinitiatives or specific legislative proposals, although some specificsuggestions along these lines are offered at the end of the essay.   Instead, the focus is on providing a generalframework for understanding the role of money and monetary institutions in themodern world – a framework that helps to clarify what money is, and also pointsclearly toward what money could be.  Themonetary system we actually have is an instrument of the plutocratic order ofneoliberal money manager capitalism.  Buta monetary system fit for a democratic society lies within our grasp.

Few of the ideas in this essay are original.  A good part of my thinking on the subject ofmoney and monetary theory has been inspired by the work of a school of contemporarypost-Keynesian economists and independent writers and researchers whose viewsoften go under the name “Modern Monetary Theory” – or “MMT” for short.    Some prominent thinkers in this field areL. Randall Wray, Scott Fullwiler, Stephanie Kelton, Warren Mosler, Marshall Auerback and William Mitchell.  And like many of these thinkers, my thinking has also been stronglyinfluenced by the 20th-century economists Hyman Minsky and Abba Lerner.   But I hasten to add that there are severalplaces in what follows in which I defend or suggest views that either divergefrom, or go beyond the views that have been defended by the aforementionedauthors.
1.     The Public’s Money

I have claimed that the public’s money must remain in publichands.  But what do I mean when I call amonetary system – such as the US dollar system – “the public’s money”?
I don’t mean that each and every dollar literally belongs tothe public as public property.   TheUnited States government is ultimately responsible for the oversight of themonetary system and the ongoing creation of new dollars.  But as dollars are created they are exchangedfor goods and services, and thereby become the property of the individuals whoproduce those goods and services.

Nor do I mean that each and every dollar that is created comesinto existence as a direct consequence of some act of public or governmentalchoice.  Clearly this is not thecase.  The main force driving the creation of dollarsis the banking system.  Banks bring newdollars into existence by making loans that support the economic activity ofbusinesses and individuals in the real economy. These loans expand the total sum of bank deposits, and bank deposits areproperly regarded as one form of money.   Money in a more restricted sense – physical currency and bank reserves –primarily comes into existence only after the fact in conformity with centralbank policies that accommodate the desires of ordinary banks and their customersto expand bank deposits.

But the dollar is the public’s money because the dollarsystem is the monetary system that US citizens, by right, control.   Constitutionally,the people of the United States are sovereign over their government, and the powerover the US money supply is vested in Congress, the political branch closest tothe people.  The bureaucratic engine ofdollar control – the Federal Reserve System – was created by an act of Congressand possesses all of its monetary powers by delegation of Congressionalauthority.    Congress and the Fed set the rules for thebanking system, and thus govern the processes through which new dollars arecreated and existing dollars are destroyed.  The US government can thus be viewed as a monopoly producer of thedollar, even though it has delegated operational responsibility for thosemonopoly powers to the Fed.   And privatesector banking plays the large role it does only because some of thegovernment’s monopoly power has been chartered out to the banks, presumably tofulfill a public purpose.

And yet, there is good reason to believe that the public’s monetarysystem is broken, and that the public purposes for which it is supposed toexist are being thwarted.  As we can now clearly see, banks and otherfinancial institutions blew up a vast speculative bubble of financial products leadingup to the crash in 2008, a bubble filled with airy, foolish and fraudulentpromises leveraged and re-packaged many times over.   The Fed did nothing to prevent thisinternational-scale Ponzi scheme from unfolding, and we are all now dealingwith the financial carnage that resulted.  And, as I will argue, the powerful monetary tools that could now bedeployed to restore full employment and prosperity are locked up in an outdatedand elitist system designed more to protect the reckless financial institutionsthat caused the disaster than to serve the public that is paying the price ofthe disaster.  This deeply undemocraticmonetary system is still directly supervised by the Fed.

But it would be a mistake to focus too single-mindedly onthe Fed and its failures.  The keymonetary malefactors in the current crisis are a derelict and increasinglymalevolent US Congress, a Congress which appears actively hostile to the verypeople it was elected to represent, and which works daily to serve theplutocratic masters who fund Congressional campaigns and sit atop our society’sfinancial hierarchies.   It doesn’t haveto be this way.   The Fed is a creatureof the US Congress; it was created by the US Congress; and it continues to playits role in the formation of monetary policy at the pleasure of the USCongress.   Congress has all the powerand capacity it needs to seize control of our monetary system on behalf of thebroad public it represents, and to steer latent and untapped US financial powertoward full employment and broad prosperity.  But it refuses to make use of its inherent Constitutional powers toanswer these pressing national needs, and works instead to protect the vestedfinancial interests of the very few.  The Congress that currently exists has beenbought by the plutocracy.  So it will beup to the American people to lead the charge on behalf of monetary democracy.
This is Part One of asix-part series.

Government Spending with Self-Imposed Constraints: Responses to MMP #28

Comments are thankfully few and I already dealt with some ofthem. I doubt there will be many readers this week, but here we go:
Q1: Is it possible to show these transactions simply from anominal perspective?
A: Look if you buy a stick ofgum we need to show the “real”–you exchange a demand deposit forgum, your store gets the demand deposit and you get the gum. We can stick topurely “nominal” only if it is a financial transaction only. But youdo pay “money” (the gum you buy was denominated in dollars) so it is valuedin nominal terms: $1.45. If you did not think it was worth that you would notbuy it. So that is the nominal value we put on it. Kenneth Boulding had a verynice way of looking at it. You exchange your liquid savings (deposit) forilliquid assets (gum); then you dissave over time as you consume them. AsBoulding said, consumption is destruction of your assets–you chew your assetsaway. He said you get no satisfaction from consumption=destruction of assets.Tires on your car are a clearer example. You “consume” them over 5years as you wear them out. You’d rather that they do not wear out, but theywill. That is destruction of assets. It is a stock-flow consistent model.Boulding was among the most clever and greatest of economists.
AQ2 by WH: You wrote in Blog #24, referring to foreigner’saccumulation of reserves, such as China’s:
“Neither of these activities will force the hand of the issuinggovernment—there is no pressure on it to offer higher interest rates to try tofind buyers of its bonds…  Government can always “afford” larger  keystrokes, but markets cannot force thegovernment’s hand because it can simply stop selling bonds and thereby letmarkets  accumulate reservesinstead.” In world with self-imposed constraints like the US’s, it doesn’thave the option to stop selling bonds if it wants to deficit spend. However, like you mention, bonds are an interest-earning alternative toreserves.  So: 1) If bonds are an interest-earning alternative toreserves, is there an economic reason why the ultimate holder of reserves(whether it’s China or whoever China sells dollars to) would not place theirreserves into US debt and at an interest rate consistent with the future pathof FFRs?  In other words, it’s generally understood interest rates on USdebt follow the expected future path of FFRs.  Why would this change ifforeigners hold the debt (even a majority portion of the debt)? 2) Let’s assumeforeigners arbitrarily abstain from buying the debt.  Could the US and itsholding of reserves as well as credit creation abilities still fund the US debtat rates consistent with the path of expected FFRs?
A: First, sovereign governmentcan target any interest rate it wants—overnight, short-term, long-term. It canrefuse to offer long-term debt and instead stay at short end of market. Thus itcan offer Chinese 0.50% on 30 days, or 0% on overnight. Period. They’ll takethe 30 days, but if they decide not to, so what? And in any case, all themonetary ops undertaken to let the Treasury spend have nothing to do withChinese—it is the special banks in the US.
AQ3: wh10 1comment collapsed CollapseExpandIt seems if we take foreigners out of the picture, then there is a smalleramount of reser Q ves/treasury debt with which to buy/rollover into newdebt.  However, in sort of a reversal from my alien scenario, why couldn’tthe US just hold smaller but more frequent auctions to overcome any funding’ issues?
A: It is not a funding issueand yes, the US can do whatever it wants. The foreigners are never in the“funding” part—it is special domestic banks.
AQ4: Paul Krueger 1 comment collapsed CollapseExpandThanks, this is a nice exposition of the (at least partial) equivalence ofdifferent views of the process. To really prove a complete functionalequivalence it seems to me that you would need to show that the interest ratepaid on government bonds was the same in any of the cases. Is that a correctassumption or does that not matter for some reason?
Q5: wh10 1 comment collapsed CollapseExpandI believe at the end of Fullwiler’s paper, he also comments that bank primarydealers can take on the govt’s tsys in a manner similar to your case 3 (asopposed to non-bank primary dealers having to engage in repos to obtain thedeposits to purchase the tsy).  Is there a practical difference betweenthese two types of primary dealers?  Can bank primary dealers handle a greater
govt debt load or do it more easily?  What is the ratio of these bankprimary dealers to non-bank primary dealers? Secondly, Fullwiler has commentedto me that it is possible that a tsy auction could fail if the govt conducted atsy auction, say, 2-3x the size of what it normally does (or some conceivablesize).  This is because investors do have to secure financing toparticipate in the auction, and they might not be able to do it readily enoughwith such a large issuance.  Although, he says, the next time around,they’d likely have no problem getting things together.  Though thisdoesn’t present an issue to a
govt normally, I think it does underscore a real difference between a govt beingable to simply spend first whatever it pleases (e.g. if it had overdraftsfromthe Fed) and a govt needing to tax/sell debt to the private sector in order tospend.  That is, the private does have to secure financing for a govt debtauction to succeed.  So just because the final balance sheet position isthe same, the path to get there may be more obstructive in the realworld.  Usually, it is not an issue at all, but it seems it couldconceivably be.  I just think these types of qualifiers are worthmentioning when teaching MMT to others who may be skeptical about ‘govt spendsfirst,’ since it paints a more accurate picture
and clarifies why the real world doesn’t operate exactly like the general case ofa consolidated Fed/Tsy. 
Q6: ANeil Wilson 1 comment collapsed CollapseExpandS is there any benefit from all those extra transactions? Or is this, likeallegedly private pensions that ‘invest’  in Treasuries, simply a Job Guaranteescheme for financial sector workers?

LRWray Answers: 

Paul: A treasury that understands what bonds are would only sell bills and sowould have no impact on interest rates; that said, there might be an impact iftreasury tries to sell too many long term bonds into mkts. Solution: don’t selllong term bonds.

WH: Scott is the expert and I won’t disagree. And aliens might explode asupernova at some distant place in the universe precidely when the treasurytries to auction, causing a temporary hiccup. We cannot possibly deal withevery unlikely event. Treas and Fed converse every morning to go over plans.They aren’t going to try to auction of 3x what the mkt can handle. In any case,the primary dealers are “banks” so not sure what you are getting at. While thepath could be more difficult in practice it is not. Except when Congressrefuses to raise debt limit!

And that leads to Neil: NO, obviously all the intermediate transactions justintroduce the possibility that something could possibly go wrong. You can be amuch better boxer if you do not tie your hands behind your back and your shoestogether. These constraints arise because Congress doesn’t understand monetaryoperations.

Solvency Starts with the ECB

Watch the latest video at <a href=”http://video.foxbusiness.com”>video.foxbusiness.com</a>

President Obama’s view of fraud “from 40,000 feet” (without an oxygen mask)

By William K. Black
(Cross-posted from Benzinga)


Sixty Minutes’ December 11, 2011interview of President Obama included the following gem:

KROFT: One of the things that surprised me the mostabout this poll is that 42%, when asked who your policies favor the most, 42%said Wall Street. Only 35% said average Americans. My suspicion is some of thatmay have to do with the fact that there’s not been any prosecutions, criminalprosecutions, of people on Wall Street. And that the civil charges that havebeen brought have often resulted in what many people think have been slap onthe wrists, fines. “Cost of doing business,” I think you called it inthe Kansas speech. Are you disappointed by that?

PRESIDENT OBAMA: Well, I think you’re absolutelyright in your interpretation. And, you know, I can’t, as President of theUnited States, comment on the decisions about particular prosecutions. That’sthe job of the Justice Department. And we keep those things separate, so that there’sno political influence on decisions made by professional prosecutors. I cantell you, just from 40,000 feet, that some of the most damaging behavior onWall Street, in some cases, some of the least ethical behavior on Wall Street,wasn’t illegal.

That’s exactly why we had to change the laws. Andthat’s why we put in place the toughest financial reform package since F.D.R.and the Great Depression. And that law is not yet fully implemented, butalready what we’re doing is we’ve said to banks, “You know what? You can’ttake wild risks with other people’s money. You can’t expect a taxpayer bailout.

Hallucinations occur at high altitude when you become oxygen deprived.  Let’s review the bidding on theBush/Obama record in prosecuting the elite control frauds that drove theongoing crisis.  There are noconvictions of the Wall Street elites that made, purchased, packaged, and soldmillions of fraudulent liar’s loans. There are no federal prosecutions of the major banks that committed over100,000 fraudulent foreclosures. There are a few settlements that sound like large dollar amounts, butare merely what even Obama concedes to be the (deeply inadequate) “cost ofdoing (fraudulent) business.” Fraud pays – it pays enormously and our elites now commit it withimpunity as a means of becoming wealthy. We have just witnessed the travesty of Wachovia admitting to criminalconduct in their (grotesquely weak) settlement with the Department of Justice(which has a policy of no longer prosecuting large corporations that commitcrimes) – and having the SEC refuse to require Wachovia to make similaradmissions in its settlement.  Allthis, the President implicitly or even explicitly concedes.



But the President asserts:  “Ican tell you, just from 40,000 feet, that some of the most damaging behavior onWall Street, in some cases, some of the least ethical behavior on Wall Street,wasn’t illegal.”  Kroft, sadly, didnot follow up on this incredible and, if true, extraordinarily importantassertion.  Obama’s statementsabout fraud and ethics are inaccurate on multiple levels. 
Obama’s factual assertions about the failure to prosecute fraud areunresponsive to the question, false, and logically inconsistent.  Note the artful manner in which Obamaevaded answering Kroft’s question. Kroft asks why there are no prosecutions of the Wall Street frauds thatdrove the crisis.  Obama answersthat “some” unethical Wall Street actions were not illegal.  Obama’s answer implicitly admitted thatmost Wall Street actions that causedthe crisis were criminal.  Hesimply argues that some highlyunethical behavior by Wall Street that was not illegal contributed to thatcrisis.  As David Cay Johnstonemphasized in his column about Obama’s response to Kroft’s question, Obama’s answeris a non-answer.  Why has he failedto prosecute any of the criminal conduct by Wall Street that drove thefinancial crisis?  The (alleged)fact that “some” destructive Wall Street conduct was highly unethical, but notillegal, obviously provides no basis for not prosecuting what Obama concedeswas primarily criminal conduct.   


Obama claims that the purported legality of Wall Street’s (unspecified)“least ethical behavior” is “exactly why we had to change the laws.”  He then describes the two specificchanges in the Dodd-Frank law that he asserts make illegal that “least ethical behavior” for the firsttime.  Obama claims that Dodd-Frankmakes it illegal to “take wild riskswith other people’s money” and for bankers to “expect a taxpayer bailout.”  Obama is a lawyer and former lawprofessor, so these are matters as to which he is capable of precision.   Dodd-Frank does not make it illegal for bankers to take “wildrisks.”  Banks inherently takerisks “with other people’s money” so that bit of rhetoric issuperfluous. 
Dodd-Frank does not make it illegal for a banker to “expect a taxpayerbailout.”  Dodd-Frank does not makeit illegal (and could not constitutionally do so) for bankers to lobby for abailout.  We have all seen thesuccess of such lobbying with the Bush and Obama administrations.  Both administrations have refused toorder an end to the “systemically dangerous institutions” (SDIs) (inaccuratelyreferred to as “too big to fail”). Both administrations asserted that when the next SDI failed it was likelyto cause a global systemic crisis. (It is a matter of “when”, not “if” they will fail, or more precisely,when we will admit that they failed.) 


The SDIs are also too big to manage – they are inefficiently large.  We can increase efficiency,dramatically reduce global systemic risk, and reduce the SDI’s exceptionalpolitical dominance by ordering them to shrink over the next five years to apoint that they no longer pose a systemic risk.  Instead, the Obama administration continues the Bushpractice of referring to the SDIs as “systemically important” (as if theydeserved a gold star for putting the world’s economy at risk).  The Bush and Obama administrations haveallowed, even encouraged, the SDIs to grow larger.  That policy is insane. It poses a clear and present danger to the U.S. and global economy andto our democracy.  The SDIs will be“bailed out” when they fail. Indeed, they are being bailed out continuously by policies the Fed andTreasury follow that are designed to provide massive governmental subsidiesprimarily for the benefit of the zombie SDIs that have already failed in realeconomic terms, e.g., Bank of America and Citi.

“Wild risks” are not remotely Wall Street’s “least ethicalbehavior.”  It is impossible, givenObama’s generalities and Kroft’s failure to probe to know what “wild risks”Obama is talking about, but none of the (supposed) risky loans banks made evenapproach lenders’ “least ethical behavior.”  The riskiest loans that banks made were liar’s loans toborrowers with bad credit histories. Credit Suisse reported in early 2007 that, by 2006, 49 percent of loansthat lenders called “subprime” (because they were made to borrowers with known,serious credit defects) were also liar’s loans (loans made without prudentunderwriting).  I agree with Obamathat making a subprime liar’s loan is exceptionally “damaging.”  Such loans damaged the lender, theborrower, the purchaser of such loans, and the purchaser of the collateralizeddebt obligations (CDOs) that were backed by subprime liar’s loans.  (Of course, “backed” deserves to be inquotation marks.)  Such loans wouldbe dumb, but they wouldn’t be among the banks’ “least ethical” actions if theloans were lawful.  Indeed, ifmaking subprime liar’s loans were merely risky, one could argue morepersuasively that the banks were acting altruistically when they made suchloans. 

What Obama missed, and Kroft failed to call him on, is that “wildrisk” by banks are typically frauds. I have explained these matters at length in previous posts, so I willprovide the ultra short version here. Honest home lenders do not make liar’s loans.  In particular, honest lenders do not make subprime liar’sloans.  Honest home lenders do notmake such loans because they create intense “adverse selection” and create a“negative expected value” (in plain English, they will lose money).  No government (here or abroad),required any lender or other entity (i.e., Fannie and Freddie) to make oracquire liar’s loans.  In fact, thegovernment repeatedly criticized liar’s loans.  The FBI warned of an “epidemic” of mortgage fraud inSeptember 2004.  The mortgagelending industry’s own anti-fraud body (MARI) warned every member of theMortgage Bankers Association (MBA) in writing in the 2006 that “stated income”loans were “an open invitation to fraudsters,” had a fraud incidence of 90percent, and deserved the term the industry used behind closed doors todescribe them – “liar’s” loans. Despite these warnings, lenders massively increased the number of liar’sloans they made. 

Home lenders made subprime liar’s loans because they were“accounting control frauds.”  Subprimeliar’s loans were ideal “ammunition” for accounting fraud.  They reduced the paper trailestablishing that the lender knew the loan was fraudulent and they optimizedthe four-ingredient “recipe” for a lender engaged in accounting controlfraud.  (Grow rapidly by making badloans at a premium yield, while employing extreme leverage and providing onlygrossly inadequate allowances for loan and lease losses (ALLL)).  The CEOs of lenders that made subprimeliar’s loans as part of this recipe were not taking risks in the conventionalmanner we discuss in finance (uncertainty).  As George Akerlof and Paul Romer explained in their famous1993 article (“Looting: the Economic Underworld of Bankruptcy for Profit”),accounting control fraud is a “sure thing.”  The lender is guaranteed to report record (albeit fictional)profits in the near term, which makes the CEO wealthy when he uses modernexecutive compensation to loot the lender.  Unfortunately, the same recipe that creates extremefictional income produces massive real losses.

Making liar’s home loans inherently requires lenders tocreate perverse incentives for widespread mortgage fraud.  It was lenders and their agents thatoverwhelmingly put the lies in liar’s loans.  The CEOs of the lenders who made subprime liar’s loanscompounded their initial mortgage origination fraud by making fraudulent repsand warranties to sell the endemically fraudulent mortgages.  The growth in liar’s loans (roughlyhalf of them were also subprime loans) was so extreme – over 500% from 2003 to2006 – that it caused the bubble to hyper-inflate).  Making fraudulent loans that placed millions of workingclass borrowers in loans that they frequently could not afford to repay andwere deeply underwater caused them a massive loss of wealth and wasdistressingly unethical.  Theofficers controlling the lenders that made fraudulent liar’s loans were evenmore unethical because they caused this devastation in order to become exceptionallywealthy.  The most morally depravedof the CEOs running accounting control frauds sought out the least financiallysophisticated borrowers, often minorities, as their victims.    

Obama has unintentionallyproved the accuracy of the plurality of survey responders who concluded that heserves Wall Street’s interests at the expense of the public.  He cynically evaded responding to theprimary reason why the public “gets it” – the abject failure of his administrationto prosecute the elite financial frauds that drove the financial crisis and theGreat Recession.  Obama offered thepathetic (and factually inaccurate) non-excuse that “some” unethical conductmight be legal.  It is time forObama (and Attorney General Holder) to “man up.”  If they refuse to do so and are going to continue to be lapdogs for the elite financial frauds they should at least change the name of theJustice Department. 


Bill Black is the author of The Best Way to Rob a Bank is to Own One and an associate professor of economics and law at the University of Missouri-Kansas City. He spent years working on regulatory policy and fraud prevention as Executive Director of the Institute for Fraud Prevention, Litigation Director of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and Deputy Director of the National Commission on Financial Institution Reform, Recovery and Enforcement, among other positions.


Bill writes a column for Benzinga every Monday. His other academic articles, congressional testimony, and musings about the financial crisis can be found at his Social Science Research Network author page and at the blog New Economic Perspectives. 


Follow him on Twitter: @WilliamKBlack

MMP Blog #28: Government Spending with Self-Imposed Constraints

By L. Randall Wray

               
In the Primer we discussed the general case of governmentspending, taxing, and bond sales. To briefly summarize, we saw that when agovernment spends, there is a simultaneous credit to someone’s bank deposit andto the bank’s reserve deposit at the central bank; taxes are simply the reverseof that operation: a debit to a bank account and to bank reserves. Bond salesare accomplished by debiting a bank’s reserves. For the purposes of thesimplest explication, it is convenient to consolidate the treasury and centralbank accounts into a “government account”.
To be sure, the real world is more complicated: there is acentral bank and a treasury, and there are specific operational proceduresadopted. In addition there are constraints imposed on those operations. Twocommon and important constraints are a) the treasury keeps a deposit account atthe central bank, and must draw upon that in order to spend, and b) the centralbank is prohibited from buying bonds directly from the treasury and fromlending to the treasury (which would directly increase the treasury’s depositat the central bank). The US is an example of a country that has both of theseconstraints. In this blog we will go through the complex operating proceduresused by the Fed and US Treasury. Scott Fullwiler is perhaps the mostknowledgeable economist on these matters, and this discussion draws veryheavily on his paper. Readers who want even more detail should go to his paper,which uses a stock-flow consistent approach to explicitly show results.
First, however, let us do the simple case, beginning with aconsolidated government (central bank plus treasury) and look at theconsequences of its spending. Then we will look at the real world example ofthe US today. Readers have asked for some balance sheet examples, so I am usingsome simple T-accounts here. It might take some readers a bit of patience towork through this if they have not seen T-accounts before. (Note: these arepartial balance sheets—I am only entering the minimum number of entries to showwhat is going on.)
Let us assume government buys a bomb and imposes a taxliability. This is shown as Case 1a:
The government gets the bomb, the private seller gets ademand deposit. Note that the tax liability reduces the seller’s net worth and increasesthe government’s (after all, that is the purpose of taxes—to move resources tothe government). The private bank gets a reserve deposit at the government.
Now the tax is paid by debiting the taxpayer’s deposit andthe bank’s reserves:

 And so the final position is:
The implication of “balanced budget” spending and taxing bythe government is to move the bomb to the government sector—reducing theprivate sector’s net worth. Government uses the monetary system to accomplishthe “public purpose”: to get resources such as bombs.
Now let us see what happens when government deficit spends.(Don’t get confused—we are not arguing that taxes are not needed; remember“taxes drive money” so there is a tax system in place but government decidesthat this week it will buy a bomb without imposing an additional tax).

Here, the bomb is moved to the government, but the deficitspending allows net financial assets to be created in the private sector (theseller has a demand deposit equal to the government’s financialliability—reserves). However, the bank is holding more reserves than desired.It would like to earn more interest, so government responds by selling a bond(remember: bonds are sold as part of monetary policy, to allow the governmentto hit its overnight interest rate target):

And the end result is:

The net financial asset remains, but in the form of atreasury rather than reserves. Compared with Case 1a, the private sector ismuch happier! It’s total wealth is not changed, but the wealth was convertedfrom a real asset (bomb) to a financial asset (claim on government).

Ah, but that was too easy. Government decides to tie itshands behind its back by requiring it sell the bond before it deficit spends.Here’s the first balance sheet, with the bank buying the bond and crediting thegovernment’s deposit account:

Now government writes a check on its deposit account, to buythe bomb:

The bank debits the government’s deposit and credits theseller’s. The final position is as follows:

Note it is exactly the same as case 1b: selling the bondbefore deficit spending has no impact on the result, so long as the privatebank is able to buy the bond and the government can write a check on itsdeposit account.

That, too, is too simple. Let’s tie the government’s shoestogether: it can only write checks on its account at the central bank. So inthe first step it sells a bond to get a deposit at a private bank.

Next it will move the deposit to the central bank, so thatit can write a check.

We have assumed the bank had no extra reserves to be debitedwhen the Treasury moved its deposit, hence, the central bank had to lendreserves to the private bank (temporarily, as we will see). Now the treasuryhas its deposit at the central bank, on which it can write a check to buy thebomb.

When the treasury spends, the private bank receives a creditof reserves, allowing it to retire its short term borrowing from the centralbank (looking to the private bank’s balance sheet, we could show a credit ofreserves to its asset side, and then that is debited simultaneously with itsborrowed reserves; I left out the intermediate step to keep the balance sheetsimpler). The private bank credits the bomb seller’s account. The finalposition is as follows:

What do you know, it is exactly the same as Case 2 and Case1b! Even if the government ties its hands behind its back and its shoestogether, it makes no difference.

OK, admittedly these are still overly simple thoughtexperiments. Let’s see how it is really done in the US—where the Treasuryreally does hold accounts in both private banks and the Fed, but can writechecks only on its account at the Fed. Further, the Fed is prohibited frombuying Treasuries directly from the Treasury (and is not supposed to allowoverdrafts on the Treasury’s account). The deposits in private banks come(mostly) from tax receipts, but Treasury cannot write checks on those deposits.So the Treasury needs to move those deposits from private banks and/or sellbonds to obtain deposits when tax receipts are too low. So let us go throughthe actual steps taken. Warning: it gets wonky.
*The following discussion is adapted from Treasury Debt Operations—An Analysis IntegratingSocial Fabric Matrix and Social Accounting Matrix Methodologies, by ScottT. Fullwiler, September 2010 (edited April 2011),http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1874795
The Federal Reserve Act now specifies that the Fed can onlypurchase Treasury debt in “the open market,” though this has not always beenthe case.  This necessitates that theTreasury have a positive balance in its account at the Fed (which, as set inthe Federal Reserve Act, is the fiscal agent for the Treasury and holds theTreasury’s balances as a liability on its balance sheet).  Therefore, prior to spending, the Treasurymust replenish its own account at the Fed either via balances collected fromtax (and other) revenues or debt issuance to “the open market”. 
Given that the Treasury’s deposit account is a liability forthe Fed, flows to/from this account affect the quantity of reserve balances.For example, Treasury spending will increase bank reserve balances while taxreceipts will lower reserve balances. Normally, increases or decreases to bankingsystem reserves impact overnight interest rates. Consequently, the Treasury’sdebt operations are inseparable from the Fed’s monetary policy operationsrelated to setting and maintaining its target rate.  Flows to/from the Treasury’s account must beoffset by other changes to the Fed’s balance sheet if they are not consistentwith the quantity of reserve balances required for the Fed to achieve itstarget rate on a given day.  As such, theTreasury uses transfers to and from thousands of private bank deposit (bothdemand and time) accounts—usually called tax and loan accounts—for thispurpose.  Prior to fall 2008, theTreasury would attempt to maintain its end-of-day account balance at the Fed at$5 around billion on most days, achieving this through “calls” from tax andloan accounts to its account at the Fed (if the latter’s balance were below $5billion) or “adds” to the tax and loan accounts from the account at the Fed (ifthe latter were above $5 billion). (The global financial crisis and the Fed’sresponse, especially “quantitative easing” has led to some rather abnormalsituations that we will mostly ignore here.)
In other words, timelinessin the Treasury’s debt operations requires consistency with both the Treasury’smanagement of its own spending/revenue time sequences and the time sequencesrelated to the Fed’s management of its interest rate target.  As such, under normal, “pre-global financialcrisis” conditions for the Fed’s operations in which its target rate was setabove the rate paid on banks’ reserve balances (which had been set at zeroprior to October 2008, but is now set above zero as the Fed pays interest onreserves), there were six financial transactions required for the Treasury toengage in deficit spending.  Since it isclear that current conditions for the Fed’s operations (in which the targetrate is set equal to the remuneration rate) are intended to be temporary and atsome point there is presumably a desire (by Fed policy makers) to return to themore “normal” “pre-crisis” conditions, these six transactions are the base caseanalyzed here (though the “post-crisis” operating procedures do notsignificantly impact conclusions reached). 
The six transactions for Treasury debt operations for thepurpose of deficit spending in the base case conditions are the following:

  1. The Fed undertakes repurchase agreement operations with primary dealers (in which the Fed purchases Treasury securities from primary dealers with a promise to buy them back on a specific date) to ensure sufficient reserve balances are circulating for settlement of the Treasury’s auction (which will debit reserve balances in bank accounts as the Treasury’s account is credited) while also achieving the Fed’s target rate.  It is well-known that settlement of Treasury auctions are “high payment flow days” that necessitate a larger quantity of reserve balances circulating than other days, and the Fed accommodates the demand.
  2. The Treasury’s auction settles as Treasury securities are exchanged for reserve balances, so bank reserve accounts are debited to credit the Treasury’s account, and dealer accounts at banks are debited. 
  3. The Treasury adds balances credited to its account from the auction settlement to tax and loan accounts.  This credits the reserve accounts of the banks holding the credited tax and loan accounts.
  4. (Transactions D and E are interchangeable; that is, in practice, transaction E might occur before transaction D.)  The Fed’s repurchase agreement is reversed, as the second leg of the repurchase agreement occurs in which a primary dealer purchases Treasury securities back from the Fed.  Transactions in A above are reversed.
  5. Prior to spending, the Treasury calls in balances from its tax and loan accounts at banks.  This reverses the transactions in C.
  6. The Treasury deficit spends by debiting its account at the Fed, resulting in a credit to bank reserve accounts at the Fed and the bank accounts of spending recipients.
Again, it is important to recall that all of thetransactions listed above settle via Fedwire (T2).  Also, the analysis is much the same in thecase of a deficit created by a tax cut instead of an increase in spending.  That is, with a tax cut the Treasury’sspending is greater than revenues just as it is with pro-active deficitspending.

Note, also that the end result is exactly as stated aboveusing the example of a consolidated government (treasury and central bank):government deficit spending leads to a credit to someone’s bank account and acredit of reserves to a bank which are then exchanged for a treasury toextinguish the excess reserves. However, with the procedures actually adopted,the transactions are more complex and the sequencing is different. But thefinal balance sheet position is the same: the government has the bomb, and theprivate sector has a treasury.