Category Archives: Policy and Reform

Warren Mosler’s Proposals for the Treasury, the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, and the Banking System

By Warren Mosler

The purpose of this paper is to present proposals for the Treasury, the Fed, and the banking system. Government begins with an assumption that it exists for public purpose, and I use that as the guiding assumption of my proposals. I begin with my proposals for the banking system, as banking operations influence both Fed and Treasury operations.

Proposals for the Banking System

U. S. banks are public/private partnerships, established for the public purpose of providing loans based on credit analysis. Supporting this type of lending on an ongoing, stable basis demands a source of funding that is not market dependent. Hence most of the world’s banking systems include some form of government deposit insurance, as well as a central bank standing by to loan to its member banks.

Under a gold standard or other fixed exchange rate regime, bank funding can’t be credibly guaranteed. In fact, fixed exchange rate regimes by design operate with an ongoing constraint on the supply side of the convertible currency. Banks are required to hold reserves of convertible currency, to be able to meet depositor’s demands for withdrawals. Confidence is critical for banks working under a gold standard. No bank can operate with 100% reserves. They depend on depositors not panicking and trying to cash in their deposits for convertible currency. The U.S. experienced a series of severe depressions in the late 1800’s, with the ‘panic’ of 1907 disturbing enough to result in the creation of the Federal Reserve in 1913. The Fed was to be the lender of last resort to insure the nation would never again go through another 1907. Unfortunately, that strategy failed. The depression of 1930 was even worse than the panic of 1907. The gold standard regime kept the Fed from being able to lend its banks the convertible currency they needed to meet withdrawal demands. After thousands of catastrophic bank failures, a bank holiday was declared and the remaining banks were closed by the government while the banking system was reorganized. When the banking system reopened in 1934, convertibility of the currency into gold was permanently suspended (domestically), and bank deposits were covered by federal deposit insurance. The Federal Reserve wasn’t able to stop depressions. It was going off the gold standard that did the trick.

It has been 80 years since the great depression. It would now take exceptionally poor policy responses for even the current severe recession to deteriorate into a depression, though misguided and overly tight fiscal policies have unfortunately prolonged the restoration of output and employment.

The hard lesson of banking history is that the liability side of banking is not the place for market discipline. Therefore, with banks funded without limit by government insured deposits and loans from the central bank, discipline is entirely on the asset side. This includes being limited to assets deemed ‘legal’ by the regulators and minimum capital requirements also set by the regulators.

Given that the public purpose of banking is to provide for a payments system and to fund loans based on credit analysis, additional proposals and restrictions are in order:

1. Banks should only be allowed to lend directly to borrowers, and then service and keep those loans on their own balance sheets. There is no further public purpose served by selling loans or other financial assets to third parties, but there are substantial real costs to government regarding the regulation and supervision of those activities. And there are severe consequences for failure to adequately regulate and supervise those secondary market activities as well. For that reason (no public purpose and geometrically growing regulatory
burdens with severe social costs in the case of regulatory and supervisory lapses), banks should be prohibited from engaging in any secondary market activity. The argument that these areas might be profitable for the banks is not a reason to extend government sponsored enterprises into those areas.

2. US banks should not be allowed to contract in LIBOR. LIBOR is an interest rate set in a foreign country (the UK) with a large, subjective component that is out of the hands of the US government. Part of the current crisis was the Federal Reserve’s inability to bring down the LIBOR settings to its target interest rate, as it tried to assist millions of US homeowners and other borrowers who had contacted with US banks to pay interest based on LIBOR settings. Desperate to bring $US interest rates down for domestic borrowers, the Federal Reserve resorted to a very high risk policy of advancing unlimited, functionally unsecured, $US lines of credit called ‘swap lines’ to several foreign central banks. These loans were advanced at the Fed’s low target rate, with the hope that the foreign central banks would lend these funds to their member banks at the low rates, and thereby bring down the LIBOR settings and the cost of borrowing $US for US households and businesses. The loans to the foreign central banks peaked at about $600 billion and did eventually work to bring down the LIBOR settings. But the risks were substantial. There is no way for the Fed to collect a loan from a foreign central bank that elects not to pay it back. If, instead of contracting based on LIBOR settings, US banks had been linking their loan rates and lines of credit to the US fed funds rate, this problem
would have been avoided. The rates paid by US borrowers, including homeowners and businesses, would have come down as the Fed intended when it cut the fed funds rate.

3. Banks should not be allowed to have subsidiaries of any kind. No public purpose is served by allowing bank to hold any assets ‘off balance sheet.’

4. Banks should not be allowed to accept financial assets as collateral for loans. No public purpose is served by financial leverage.

5. US Banks should not be allowed to lend off shore. No public purpose is served by allowing US banks to lend for foreign purposes.

6. Banks should not be allowed to buy (or sell) credit default insurance. The public purpose of banking as a public/private partnership is to allow the private sector to price risk, rather than have the public sector pricing risk through publicly owned banks. If a bank instead relies on credit default insurance it is transferring that pricing of risk to a third party, which is counter to the public purpose of the current public/private banking system.

7. Banks should not be allowed to engage in proprietary trading or any profit making ventures beyond basic lending. If the public sector wants to venture out of banking for some presumed public purpose it can be done through other outlets.

8. My last proposal for the banks in this draft is to utilize FDIC approved credit models for evaluation of bank assets. I would not allow mark to market of bank assets. In fact, if there is a valid argument to marking a particular bank asset to market prices, that likely means that asset should not be a permissible bank asset in the first place. The public purpose of banking is to facilitate loans based on credit analysis rather, than market valuation. And the accompanying provision of government insured funding allows those loans to be held to maturity without liquidity issues, in support of that same public purpose. Therefore, marking to market rather
than evaluation by credit analysis both serves no further public purpose and subverts the existing public purpose of providing a stable platform for lending.

Proposals for the FDIC (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation)

I have three proposals for the FDIC. The first is to remove the $250,000 cap on deposit insurance. The public purpose behind the cap is to help small banks attract deposits, under the theory that if there were no cap large depositors would gravitate towards the larger banks. However, once the Fed is directed to trade in the fed funds markets with all member banks, in unlimited size, the issue of available funding is moot.
The second is to not tax banks in order to recover funds lost on bank failures. The FDIC should be entirely funded by the US Treasury. Taxes on solvent banks should not be on the basis of the funding needs of the FDIC. Taxes on banks have ramifications that can either serve or conflict with the larger public purposes presumably served by government participation in the banking system. These include sustaining the payments system and lending based on credit analysis. Any tax on banks should be judged entirely by how that tax
serves or doesn’t serve public purpose.

My third proposal for the FDIC is to do its job without any assistance by Treasury (apart from funding any FDIC expenditures). The FDIC is charged with taking over any bank it deems insolvent, and then either selling that bank, selling the bank’s assets, reorganizing the bank, or any other similar action that serves the public purpose government participation in the banking system. The TARP program was at least partially established to allow the US Treasury to buy equity in specific banks to keep them from being declared insolvent by the FDIC, and to allow them to continue to have sufficient capital to continue to lend. What the
TARP did, however, was reveal the total failure of both the Bush and Obama administrations to comprehend the essence of the workings of the banking system. Once a bank incurs losses in excess of its private capital, further losses are covered by the FDIC, an arm of the US government. If the Treasury ‘injects capital’ into a bank, all that happens is that once losses exceed the same amount of private capital, the US Treasury, also an arm of the US government is next in line for any losses to the extent of its capital contribution, with the FDIC covering any losses beyond that. So what is changed by Treasury purchases of bank equity? After the private capital is lost, the losses are taken by the US Treasury instead of the FDIC, which also gets its funding from the US Treasury. It makes no difference for the US government and the ‘taxpayers’ whether the Treasury covers the loss indirectly when funding the FDIC, or directly after ‘injecting capital’ into a bank. All that was needed to accomplish the same end as the TARP program- to allow banks to continue to function and acquire FDIC insured deposits- was for the FDIC to directly reduce the private capital requirements. Instead, and as direct evidence of a costly ignorance of the dynamics of the banking model, both the Obama and Bush administrations burned through substantial quantities of political capital to get the legislative authority to allow the Treasury to buy equity positions in dozens of private banks. And, to make matters worse, it was all accounted for as additional federal deficit spending. While this would not matter if Congress and the administrations understood the monetary system, the fact is they don’t, and so the TARP has therefore restricted their inclination to make further fiscal adjustments to restore employment and output. Ironically, the overly tight fiscal policy continues to contribute to the rising delinquency and default rate for
bank loans, which continues to impede the desired growth of bank capital.

Proposals for the Federal Reserve

1. The fed should lend unsecured to member banks, and in unlimited quantities at its target fed funds rate, by simply trading in the fed funds market. There is no reason to do other wise. Currently the Fed will only loan to its banks on a fully collateralized basis. However, this is both redundant and disruptive. The Fed demanding collateral when it lends is redundant because all bank assets are already fully regulated by Federal regulators. It is the job of the regulators to make sure that all FDIC insured deposits are ‘safe’ and ‘taxpayer money’ is not at risk from losses that exceed the available private capital. Therefore, the FDIC has already determined that funds loaned by the Fed to a bank can only be invested in ‘legal’ assets and that the bank is adequately capitalized as required by law. There is no room for funding from the Fed to be ‘misused’ as banks already can obtain virtually unlimited funding by FDIC insured deposits. The only difference between banks funding with FDIC insured deposits and funding directly from the Fed might be the interest rate the bank may have to pay, however it’s the further purpose of the Fed’s monetary policy to target the fed funds rate. The Fed also tends to set quantity limits when it lends to its member banks, when there is every reason to instead lend in unlimited quantities. Bank lending is not reserve constrained, so constraining lending to the banks by quantity does not alter lending. What constraining reserves does is alter the fed funds rate, which is the rate banks pay for reserves as well as the Fed’s target rate. So the only way the Fed can fully stabilize the fed funds rate at its target rate is to simple offer to provide unlimited funds at that rate as well as offer to accept fed funds deposits at that same target rate. And with no monetary risk or adverse economic consequences for lending unlimited quantities at its target rate there is no reason not to do this. Another benefit of this policy would be to entirely eliminate the inter bank fed funds market. There is no public purpose served by banks trading fed funds with each other when they can do it with the Fed, and transactions costs are reduced as well. And to eliminate the inter bank markets entirely the Fed has the further option to provide funding with an entire term structure of rates to its banks to both target those rates and also eliminate the need for any inter bank trading.
2. I would limit the Fed to using banks as agents for monetary policy. I would not pursue the policy of attempting to establish additional public/private partnerships for the purpose of buying various financial assets. Instead, if I agreed with the need to purchase those assets, I would enable the banking system to do this along the same lines proposed for the new public/private partnerships. That might take the form of allowing banks to put these ‘qualifying assets’ in a segregated account, where losses to bank capital would be limited to, for example, 10% of the investment in those accounts. This would have the same result as the recently proposed public/private partnerships but within the existing highly regulated and supervised banking system. Banks are the appropriate instrument of monetary policy for targeting the risk adjusted term structure of interest rates. Why go to the expense and risk of creating new public/private partnerships when there are already approximately 8,000 member banks already set up for that purpose?
3. I would make the current zero interest rate policy permanent. This minimizes cost pressures on output, including investment, and thereby helps to stabilize prices. It also minimizes rentier incomes, thereby encouraging higher labor force participation and increased real output. Additionally, because the non government sectors are net savers of financial assets, this policy hurts savers more than it aids borrowers, so a fiscal adjustment such as a tax cut or spending increase would be appropriate to sustain output and employment.
4. I would instruct the Fed to offer credit default insurance on all Treasury securities through its banking system to any buyer. There is no default risk in US Treasury securities, but, if market participants do want to buy such credit default insurance, I would make it available through the Fed. This would keep the premiums and the perception of risk down to a level determined by the Fed. I would suggest they offer it freely at 5 basis points for any maturity.

Proposals for the Treasury

1. I would cease all issuance of Treasury securities. Instead any deficit spending would accumulate as excess reserve balances at the Fed. No public purpose is served by the issuance of Treasury securities with a non convertible currency and floating exchange rate policy. Issuing Treasury securities only serves to support the term structure of interest rates at higher levels than would be the case. And, as longer term rates are the realm of investment, higher term rates only serve to adversely distort the price structure of all goods and services.
2. I would not allow the Treasury to purchase financial assets. This should be done only by the Fed as has traditionally been the case. When the Treasury buys financial assets instead of the Fed all that changes is the reaction of the President, the Congress, the economists, and the media, as they misread the Treasury purchases of financial assets as federal ‘deficit spending’ that limits other fiscal options.

Conclusion

I conclude with my proposals to support aggregate demand and restore output and employment.

1. A full payroll tax holiday where the Treasury makes all the contributions for employees and employers. This immediately restores the purchasing power of those still working and enables them to make their mortgage payments which also stabilizes the banking system.
2. I would distribute $150 billion of revenue sharing to the State governments on a per capita basis. This would stabilize State governments currently cutting back on public services due to revenue short falls caused by the recession. Distribution on per capita basis makes it ‘fair’ and does not ‘reward bad behavior.
3. I would have the Federal government fund $8/hr full time jobs for anyone willing and able to work, that includes health care benefits. This provides an employed labor buffer stock that’s a superior price anchor to our current unemployed buffer stock. This helps support an expansion in private sector employment as the economy improves. It’s been demonstrated that the private sector prefers to hire those already working rather than those who are unemployed. These three proposals, along with above proposals for the Fed, the Treasury, the FDIC, and banking system, will quickly restore the US economy to positive growth, full employment, and establish a banking system that will promote the intended public purpose and require less regulation while substantially reducing the systemic risk inherent in our current institutional arrangements.

Warren Mosler
October 11, 2009
President, Valance Co.
www.moslereconomics.com
www.mosler2012.com

The Bernanke Reappointment: Be Afraid; Be Very Afraid

By Michael Hudson

If the economy deteriorates in the L-shaped “hockey-stick” rut that many economists forecast, what political price will President Obama and the Democrats pay for having returned the financial keys to the Bush Republican appointees who gave away the store in the first place? Reappointing Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke may end up injuring not only the economy but also the Democratic Party for years to come. Recognizing this, Republicans made populist points by opposing his reappointment during the Senate confirmation hearings last Thursday, January 27 – the day after Mr. Obama’s State of the Union address.

The hearings focused on the Fed’s role as Wall Street’s major lobbyist and deregulator. Despite the fact that its Charter starts off by directing it to promote full employment and stabilize prices, the Fed is anti-labor in practice. Alan Greenspan famously bragged that what has caused quiescence among labor union members when it comes to striking for higher wages – or even for better working conditions – is the fear of being fired and being unable to meet their mortgage and credit card payments. “One paycheck away from homelessness,” or a downgraded credit rating leading to soaring interest charges, has become a formula for labor management.

As for its designated task in promoting price stability, the Fed’s easy-credit bubble has made asset-price inflation the path to wealth, not tangible capital investment. This has brought joy to bank marketing departments as homeowners, consumers, corporate raiders, states and localities run further and further into debt in an attempt to improve their position by debt leveraging. But the economy has all but neglected its industrial base and the employment goes with manufacturing. The Fed’s motto from Bubblemeister Alan Greenspan to Ben Bernanke has been “Asset-price inflation, good; wage and commodity price inflation, bad.”

Here’s the problem with that policy. Rising prices for housing have increased the cost of living and doing business, widening the excess of market price over socially necessary costs. In times past the government would have collected the rising location rent created by increasing prosperity and public investment in transportation and other infrastructure making specific sites more valuable. But in recent years taxes have been rolled back. Land sites still cost as much as ever, because their price is set by the market. Land itself has no cost of production. Locational value is created by society, and should be the natural tax base because a land tax does not increase the price of real estate; it lowers it by leaving less “free” rent to be paid to the banks.

The problem is that what the tax collector relinquishes is now available to be paid to banks as interest. And prospective buyers bid against each other until the winner is whoever is first to pay the land’s location rent to the banks as interest.

This tax shift – to the benefit of the bankers, not homeowners – has made Mr. Obama’s hope of doubling U.S. exports during the next five years ring hollow. This is the upshot of “creating wealth” in the form of a debt-leveraged real estate and stock market bubble. Labor must pay more for debt-financed housing and education, not to mention payments to health insurance oligopoly and higher sales and income taxes shifted off the shoulders of financial and real estate.

Once the Republicans were certain which way the vote would go, they were able to voice some nice populist sound bites for the mid-term elections this November. Jeff Sessions of Alabama and Sam Brownback of Kansas voted against Mr. Bernanke’s confirmation. Jim deMint of South Carolina warned that reappointing him would be “The biggest mistake that we’re going to make for a long time.” He added: “Confirming Bernanke is a continuation of the policies that brought our economy down.”

Among Democrats running for re-election, Barbara Boxer of California pointed out that by spurring the asset-price inflation, the Fed’s pro-Bubble (that is, pro-debt policy) has crashed the economy, shrinking employment. The Fed is supposed to protect consumers, yet Mr. Bernanke is a vocal opponent of the Consumer Finance Products Agency, claiming that the deregulatory Fed alone should be the sole financial regulator – seemingly an oxymoron.

Mr. Obama supports Mr. Bernanke and his State of the Union address conspicuously avoided endorsing the Consumer Financial Products Agency that he earlier had claimed would be the centrepiece of financial reform. Wall Street lobbyists have turned him around. Their logic was the same mantra that Connecticut insurance industry’s Sen. Chris Dodd repeated at the confirmation hearings: Mr. Bernanke has “saved the economy.”

How can the Fed be said to do this when the volume of debt is growing exponentially beyond the ability to pay? “Saving the debt” by bailing out creditors – by adding bad private-sector debts to the public sector’s balance sheet – is burdening the economy, not saving it. The policy only postpones the crisis while making the ultimate volume of debt that must be written off higher – and therefore more traumatic to write off, annulling a corresponding volume of savings on the other side of the balance sheet (because one party’s savings are another’s debts).

What really is at issue is the economic philosophy that Mr. Bernanke will apply during the coming four years. Unfortunately, Mr. Bernanke’s questioners failed to ask relevant questions along these policy lines and the economic theory or rationale underlying his basic approach. What needed to be addressed was not just his deregulatory stance in the face of the Bubble Economy and exploding consumer fraud, or even the mistakes he has made. Republican Sen. Jim Bunning elicited only smirks and pained looked as Mr. Bernanke rested his chin on his hand, as if to say, “I’m going to be patient and let you rant.” The other Senators were almost apologetic.

One popular (and thoroughly misleading) description of Bernanke that has been cited ad nauseum to promote his reappointment is that he is an expert on the causes of the Great Depression. If you are going to create a new crash, it certainly helps to understand the last one. But economic historians who have compared Mr. Bernanke’s writings to actual history have found that it is precisely his misunderstanding of the Depression that is leading him tragically to repeat it.

As a trickle-down apologist for high finance, Prof. Bernanke has drawn systematically wrong conclusions as to the causes of the Great Depression. The ideological prejudice behind his view is of course what got him his job in the first place, for as numerous observers have quipped, a precondition for being hired as Fed Chairman is that one does not understand how the financial system actually works. Instead of recognizing that deepening debt, low wages and the siphoning up of wealth to the top of the economic pyramid were primary causes of the Depression, Prof. Bernanke attributes the main problem simply to a lack of liquidity, causing low prices.

As my Australian colleague Steve Keen recently has written in his Debtwatch No. 42, the case against Mr. Bernanke should focus on his neoclassical approach that misses the fact that money is debt. He sees the financial problem as being too low a price level for assets to be collateralized for bank loans. And to Mr. Bernanke, “wealth” is synonymous with what banks will lend, under existing credit terms.

In 1933, the economist Irving Fischer (mainly responsible for the “modern” monetarist tautology MV = PT) wrote a classic article, “The Debt-Deflation Theory of the Great Depression,” recanting the neoclassical view that had led him to lose his personal fortune in the 1929 stock market crash. He explained how the inability to pay debts was forcing bankruptcies, wiping out bank credit and spending power, shrinking markets and hence the incentive to invest and employ labor.

Mr. Bernanke rejects this idea, or at least the travesty he paraphrases in his Essays on the Great Depression (Princeton, 2000, p. 24), as Prof. Keen quotes:

Fisher’ s idea was less influential in academic circles, though, because of the counterargument that debt-deflation represented no more than a redistribution from one group (debtors) to another (creditors). Absent implausibly large differences in marginal spending propensities among the groups, it was suggested, pure redistributions should have no significant macroeconomic effects.
All that a debt overhead does is transfer purchasing power from debtors to creditors. Bernanke is reminiscent here of Thomas Robert Malthus, whose Principles of Political Economy argued that landlords (Malthus’s own class) were necessary to maintain economic equilibrium in a way akin to trickle-down theorists through the ages. Where would English employment be, Malthus argued, without landlords spending their revenue on coachmen, fine clothes, butlers and servants? It was landlords spending their rental income (protected by England’s agricultural tariffs, the Corn Laws, until 1846) that kept buggy-makers and other suppliers working. And by the same logic, this is what wealthy Wall Street financiers do today with the money they make by lending to enable homeowners and savers to get rich making capital gains off asset-price inflation.

The reality is that wealthy Wall Street financiers who make multi-million dollar salaries and bonuses spend their money on trophies: fine arts, luxury apartments or houses in gated communities, yachts, fancy handbags and high fashion, birthday parties with appearances by modish pop singers. (“I see the yachts of the stock brokers; but where are those of their clients?”) This is not the kind of spending that reflects the “real” economy’s production profile.

Mr. Bernanke sees no problem, unless rich people spend less of their gains on consumer goods and the products of labor than average wage earners. But of course this propensity to consume is precisely the point John Maynard Keynes made in his General Theory (1936). The wealthier people become, the lower a proportion of their income they consume – and the more they save.

This falling propensity to consume is what worried Keynes about the future. He imagined that as economies saved more as their income levels rose, they would spend less on goods and services. So output and employment would not be able to keep pace – unless the government stepped in to make up the gap.
Consumer spending is indeed falling, but not because economies are experiencing a higher net saving rate. The U.S. saving rate has fallen to zero – because despite the fact that gross savings remain high (about 18 percent), most is lent out to become other peoples’ debts. The effect is thus a wash on an economy-wide basis. (18 percent saving less 18 percent debt = zero net saving.)

The problem is that workers and consumers have gone deeper and deeper into debt, saving less and less. This is just the opposite of what Keynes forecast. Only the wealthiest 10 percent or so of the population save more and more – mainly in the form of loans to the “bottom 90 percent.” Saving less, however, goes hand in hand with consuming less, because of the revenue that the financial sector drains out of the “real” economy’s circular flow (wage-earners spending their income to buy the goods they produce) as debt service. The financial sector is wrapped around the production-and-consumption economy. So an inability to consume is part and parcel of the debt problem. The basis of monetary policy throughout the world today therefore should be how to save economies from shrinking as a result of their exponentially growing debt overhead.

Bernanke’s apologetics for finance capital: Economies seem to need more debt, not less

Bernanke finds “declines in aggregate demand” to be the dominant factor in the Great Depression (p. ix, as cited by Steve Keen). This is true in any economic downturn. In his reading, however, debt seems not to have anything to do with falling spending on what labor produces. Taking a banker’s-eye view, he finds the most serious problem to be the demand for stocks and real estate. Mr. Bernanke promises not to let falling asset demand (and hence, falling asset prices) happen again. His antidote is to flood the economy with credit as he is now doing, emulating Alan Greenspan’s Bubble policy.

The wealthiest 10 percent of the population do indeed save most of their money. They lend savings – and create new credit – to the bottom 90 percent, or gamble in derivatives or other zero-sum activities in which their gain (if indeed they make any) finds its counterpart in some other parties’ loss. The system is kept going not by government spending, Keynesian-style, but by new credit creation. That supports consumption, and indeed, lending against real estate, stocks and bonds enables borrowers to bid up their prices, enabling their owners to borrow yet more against these assets. The economy expands – until current revenue no longer covers the debt’s carrying charges.

That’s what brings the Bubble Economy down with a crash. Asset-price inflation gives way to crashing prices and negative equity for real estate and for much financial debt leveraging as well. It is in this sense that Prof. Bernanke’s blames the Depression on lower prices. When prices for real estate or other collateral plunge, it no longer can be pledged for more loans to keep the circular flow of lending and debt repayment in motion.
This circular financial flow is quite different from the circular flow that Keynes (and Say’s Law) discussed – the circulation where workers and their employers spent their wages and profits on consumer goods and investment goods. The financial circular flow is between the banks and their clients. And this circular flow swells as it diverts more and more spending from the “real” economy’s circular flow between income and spending. Finance capital expands relative to industrial capital*.

Higher prices in the “real” economy may help maintain the circular financial flow, by giving borrowers more current income to pay their mortgages, student loans and other debts. Mr. Bernanke accordingly sees FDR’s devaluation of the dollar as helping reflate prices.

Today, however, a declining dollar would make imports (including raw materials as well as key consumer goods) more costly. This would squeeze the budgets of most families, given America’s rising import dependency as its economy is post-industrialized and financialized. So Mr. Bernanke’s favored policy is to get banks lending again – not for the government to spend more on deficit spending on infrastructure, social services or other full employment projects. The government spending that Mr. Bernanke has endorsed is pure bailouts to the banks, insurance companies, real estate packagers and other Wall Street institutions so that they can support asset prices and thereby save the economy’s financial balance sheet, not its employment and living standards.

More debt thus is not the problem, in Chairman Bernanke’s view. It is the solution. This is what makes his re-appointment so dangerous.
Devaluation of the dollar FDR-style will make U.S. real estate, corporations and other assets cheaper to global investors. It thus will have the same “positive” effects (if you can call making homes and office buildings more costly to buyers a “positive” effect) as more credit – and without the debt service needing to be raked off from the economy. This policy is akin to the International Monetary Fund’s “stabilization” and austerity programs that have caused such havoc over the past few decades**. It is the policy being prepared for imposition on the United States. This too is what makes Bernanke’s re-appointment so dangerous.
The problem is a combination of Mr. Bernanke’s dangerous misreading of economic history, and the banker’s-eye perspective that underlies this view – which he now has been empowered to impose from his perch as central planner at the Federal Reserve Board. Pres. Obama’s support for his reappointment suggests that the recent economic rhetoric heard from the White House is a faux populism. The President promises that this time, it will be different. The former Bush appointees – Geithner, Bernanke and the Goldman Sachs managers on loan to the Treasury – will be willing to stand up to Goldman Sachs and the other bankers. And this time the Clinton-era Rubinomics boys will not do to the U.S. economy what they did to the Soviet Union.
With this stance, it is no wonder that the Obama Democrats are relinquishing the populist anti-Wall Street card to the Republicans!
The Bernanke albatross
Mr. Bernanke misses the problem that debts need to be repaid – or at least carried. This debt service deflates the non-financial “real” economy. But the Fed’s analysis stops just before the crash. It is a “good news” theory limited to the happy time while the bubble is expanding and homeowners borrow more and more from the banks to buy houses (or more accurately, their land sites) that are rising in price. This was the Greenspan-Bernanke bubble in a nutshell.
We need not look as far back as the Great Depression. Japan since 1990 is a good example. Its land prices declined every quarter for over 15 years after its bubble burst. The Bank of Japan did what the Federal Reserve is doing now: It lowered lending rates to banks below 1%. Banks “earned their way out of debt” by lending to global speculators who used the yen loans to convert into foreign currency and buy higher-yielding assets abroad – capped by Icelandic government bonds paying 15%, and pocketing the arbitrage difference.
This steady conversion of speculative money out of yen into foreign currency held down Japan’s exchange rate, helping its exporters. Likewise today, the Fed’s low-interest policy leads U.S. banks to borrow from it and lend to arbitrageurs buying higher-yielding bonds or other securities denominated in euros, sterling and other currencies.
The foreign-exchange problem develops when these loans are paid back. In Japan’s case, when global financial markets turned down and Japanese interest rates began to rise in 2008, arbitrageurs decided to unwind their positions. To pay back the yen they had borrowed from Japanese banks, they sold euro- and dollar-denominated bonds and bought the Japanese currency. This forced up the yen’s exchange rate – eroding its export competitiveness and throwing its economy into turmoil. The long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party was voted out of power as unemployment spread.
In the U.S. case today, Chairman Bernanke’s low interest-rate regime at the Fed has spurred a dollar-denominated carry trade estimated at $1.5 trillion. Speculators borrow low-interest dollars and buy high-interest foreign-currency bonds. This weakens the dollar’s exchange rate against foreign currencies (whose central banks are administering higher interest rates). The weakening dollar leads U.S. money managers to send more investment funds out of our economy to those promising stock market gains as well as a foreign-currency gain.
The prospect of undoing this credit creation threatens to lock the United States into a low-interest trap. The problem is that if and when the Fed begins to raise interest rates (for instance, to slow the new bubble that Mr. Bernanke is trying to inflate), global speculators will repay their dollar debts. As the U.S. carry trade is unwound, the dollar will soar in price. This threatens to make Mr. Obama’s promise to double U.S. exports within five years seem an impossible dream.
The prospect is for U.S. consumers to be hit by a triple whammy. They must pay higher prices for the goods they buy as the dollar declines, making imports more expensive. And the government will be spending less on the economy’s circular flow as a result of Pres. Obama’s three-year spending freeze to slow the budget deficits. Meanwhile, states and cities are raising taxes to balance their own budgets as tax receipts fall. Consumes and indeed the entire economy must run more deeply into debt simply to break even (or else see living standards eroded).
To Mr. Bernanke, economic recovery requires resuscitating the Goldman Sachs squid that Matt Taibbi so artfully has described as being affixed to the face of humanity, duly protected by the Fed. The banks will lend more to keep the debt pyramid growing to enable consumers, businesses and local government to avoid contraction.
All this will enrich the banks – as long as the debts can be paid. And if they can’t be paid, will the government bail them out all over again? Or will it “be different” this time around?
Will our economy flounder with Mr. Bernanke’s reappointment as the rich get richer and the American family comes under increasing financial pressure as incomes drop while debts grow exponentially? Or will Americans get rich off the new bubble as the Fed re-inflates asset prices?
The Road to Debt Peonage
Last week, Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts acknowledged many Americans’ anger about the bailouts of the big banks: “It’s understandable why there is debate, questioning and even anger” about Mr. Bernanke’s re-nomination. “Still,” he added, “out of this near calamity, I believe Chairman Bernanke provided leadership that was urgent, nimble, strong and vital in staving off greater disaster.”
Unfortunately, by “disaster” Sen. Kerry seems to mean losses for Wall Street. He shares with Chairman Bernanke the idea that gains in raising asset prices are good for the economy – for instance, by enabling pension funds to pay retirees and “build wealth” for America’s savers.
While the Bush-Obama team hopes to reflate the economy, the $13 trillion bailout money they have spent trying to fuel the destructive bubble takes the form of trickle-down economics. It has not run up public debt in the Keynesian way, by government spending such as in the modest “Stimulus” package to increase employment and income. And it is not providing better public services. It was designed simply to inflate asset prices – or more accurately, to prevent their decline.
This is what re-appointment of the Fed Chairman signifies. It means a policy intended to raise the price of housing on credit, with a corresponding rise in consumer income paid to bankers as mortgage debt service.
Meanwhile, rising stock and bond prices will increase the price of buying a retirement income. A higher stock price means a lower dividend yield. The same is true for bonds. Flooding the capital markets with credit to bid up asset prices thus holds down the yield of the assets of pension funds, pushing them into deficit. This enables corporate managers to threaten bankruptcy of their pension plans or entire companies, General Motors-style, if labor unions do not renegotiate their pension contracts downward. This “frees” yet more money for financial managers to pay creditors at the top of the economic pyramid.
Mr. Bernanke’s opposition to regulating Wall Street
How does one overcome this financial polarization? The seemingly obvious solution is to select Fed and Treasury administrators from outside the ranks of ideologues supported by – indeed, applauded by – Wall Street. Creation of a Consumer Financial Products Agency, for instance, would be largely meaningless if a deregulator such as Mr. Bernanke were to run it. But that is precisely what he is asking to do in testifying that his Federal Reserve should be the sole regulatory agency, nullifying the efforts of all others – just in case some state agency, some federal agency or some Congressional committee might move to protect consumers against fraudulent lending, extortionate fees and penalties and usurious interest rates.
Mr. Bernanke’s fight against proposals for such regulatory agencies to protect consumers from predatory lending is thus a second reason not to re-appoint him. How can Mr. Obama campaign for his reappointment as Chairmanship of the Fed and at the same time endorse the consumer protection agency? Without dumping Bernanke and Geithner, it doesn’t seem to matter what the law says. The Democrats have learned from the Bush and Reagan administrations that all you have to do is appoint deregulators in key positions, and legal teeth are irrelevant.
Independence of the Federal Reserve is a euphemism for financial oligarchy
This brings up the third premise that defenders of Mr. Bernanke cite: the much vaunted independence of the Federal Reserve. This is supposed to be safeguarding democracy. But the Fed should be subject to representative democracy, not independent of it! It rightly should be part of the Treasury representing the national interest rather than that of Wall Street.
This has emerged as a major problem within America’s two-party political system. Like the Republican team, the Obama administration also puts financial interests first, on the premise that wealth flows from its credit activities, the financial time frame tends to be short-run and economically corrosive. It supports growth in the debt overhead at the expense of the “real” economy, thereby taking an anti-labor, anti-consumer, anti-debtor policy stance.
Why on earth should the most important sector of modern economies – finance – be independent from the electoral process? This is as bad as making the judiciary “independent,” which turns out to be a euphemism for seriously right-wing.
Over and above the independence issue, to be sure, is the problem that the government itself if being taken over by the financial sector. The Treasury Secretary, Fed Chairman and other financial administrators are subject to Wall Street’s advice and consent first and foremost. Lobbying power makes it difficult to defend the public interest, as we have seen from the tenure of Mr. Paulson and Mr. Geithner. I don’t believe Mr. Obama or the Democrats (to say nothing of the Republicans) is anywhere near rising to the occasion of solving this problem. One can only deplore Mr. Obama’s repetition of his endorsements.
Allied to the “independence” issue is a fourth reason to reject Mr. Bernanke personally: the Fed’s secrecy from Congressional oversight, highlighted by its refusal to release the names of the recipients of tens of billions of Fed bailouts and cash-for-trash swaps.
Does it matter?
Now that the confirmation arguments against Mr. Bernanke’s reappointment have been rejected, what does it mean for the future?
On the political front, his reappointment is being cited as yet another proof that the Democrats care more for bankers than for American families and employees. As a result, it will do what seemed unfathomable a year ago: enable GOP candidates to strike the pose of FDR-type saviors of the embattled middle class. No doubt another decade of abject GOP economic failure would simply make the corporate Democrats appear once again to be the alternative. And so it goes … unless we do something about it.
The problem is not merely that Mr. Bernanke failed to do what the Fed’s charter directs it to do: promote employment in an environment of stable prices. The Republicans – and some Democrats – read out the litany of Bernanke abuses. The Fed could have raised interest rates to slow the bubble. It didn’t. It could have stopped wholesale mortgage fraud. It didn’t. It could have protected consumers by limiting credit card rates. It didn’t.
For Bernanke, the current financial system (or more to the point, the debt overhead) is to be saved so that the redistribution of wealth upward will continue. The Congressional Research Service has calculated that from 1979 to 2003 the income from wealth (rent, dividends, interest and capital gains) for the top 1 percent of the population soared from 37.8% to 57.5%. This revenue has been expropriated from American employees pushed onto debt treadmills in the face of stagnating wages.
Meanwhile, the government is permitting corporate tollbooth to be erected across our economy – and un-taxing this revenue so that it can be capitalized into financialized wealth paying only a 15% tax rate on capital gains. It pays these taxes not as these gains accrue, but and only when they realize them. And the tax does not even have to be paid if the sales proceeds of these assets is reinvested! Financial and fiscal policy thus reinforce each other in a way that polarizes the economy between the financial sector and the “real” economy.
Behind these bad policies is a disturbing body of junk economics – one that, alas, is taught in most universities today. (Not at the University of Missouri at Kansas City, and a few others, to be sure.) Mr. Bernanke views money simply as part of a supply and demand equation between money and prices – and he refers here only to consumer prices, not the asset prices which the Fed failed to address. That is a big part of the Fed’s blind spot: Messrs. Greenspan and Bernanke imagined that its charter referred only to stabilizing consumer prices and wages – while asset prices – the cost of obtaining housing, an education or a retirement income – have soared as a result of debt leveraging.
What Mr. Bernanke misses – along with his neoclassical colleagues – is that the money that is spent bidding up prices is also debt. This means that it leaves a debt legacy. When banks “provide credit” by writing loans, what they are selling is debt.
The question their marketing departments ask is, how large is the market for debt? When I went to work for Chase Manhattan in 1967 as its balance-of-payments analyst, for example, I liaised with the marketing department to calculate how large the international debt market was – and how large a share of this market the bank could reasonably expect to get.
The bank quantified the debt market by measuring how large a surplus borrowers could squeeze out over and above basic break-even needs. For personal loans, the analogy was how much could a wage earner afford to pay the bank after meeting basic essentials (rent, food, transportation, taxes, etc.). For the real estate department, how much net rental income could a landlord pay out, after meeting fuel and other operating costs and taxes? The anticipated surplus revenue was capitalized into a loan. From the marketing department’s vantage point, banks aimed at absorbing the entire surplus as debt service.
Financial debt service is not spent on consumer goods. It is recycled into new loans, after paying dividends to stockholders and salaries and bonuses to its managers. Stockholders spend their money on buying other investments – more stocks and bonds. Managers buy trophies – yachts, trophy paintings, trophy cars, trophy apartments (whose main value is their location – the neighborhood where their land is situated), foreign travel and other luxury. None of this spending has much effect on the consumer price index, but it does affect asset prices.
This idea is lacking in neoclassical and monetarist theory. Once “money” (that is, debt) is spent, it has an effect on prices via supply and demand, and that is that. There is no dynamic over time of debt or wealth. Ever since Marxism pushed classical political economy to its logical conclusion in the late 19th century, economic orthodoxy has been traumatized from dealing about wealth and debt. So balance-sheet relationships are missing from the academic economics curriculum. That is why I stopped teaching economics in 1972, until the UMKC developed an alternative curriculum to the University of Chicago monetarism by focusing on debt creation and the recognition that bank loans create deposits, inverting the usual “Austrian” and other individualistic parallel universe theories.
*I elaborate the logic in greater detail in “Saving, Asset-Price Inflation, and Debt-Induced Deflation,” in L. Randall Wray and Matthew Forstater, eds., Money, Financial Instability and Stabilization Policy (Edward Elgar, 2006):104-24. And I explain how the recent expansion of credit and easing of lending terms fueled the real estate bubble in “The New Road to Serfdom: An illustrated guide to the coming real estate collapse,” Harpers, Vol. 312 (No. 1872), May 2006):39-46.
**I explain the workings of these plans in greater detail in Super Imperialism: The Economic Strategy of American Empire (1972; new ed., 2002), “Trends that can’t go on forever, won’t: financial bubbles, trade and exchange rates,” in Eckhard Hein, Torsten Niechoj, Peter Spahn and Achim Truger (eds.), Finance-led Capitalism? (Marburg: Metropolis-Verlag, 2008), and Trade, Development and Foreign Debt: A History of Theories of Polarization v. Convergence in the World Economy (1992, new ed. 2009).

A Plea to the President: Tear Up That Speech

By Stephanie Kelton

My colleague and fellow blogger, Randy Wray, has just argued that President Obama should scrap the speech he’s planning to deliver tonight and surprise the American people with something entirely different. I couldn’t agree more. And while I agree that job creation must be JOB ONE in the months (and years) ahead, I would encourage the President to make massive tax relief the cornerstone of tonight’s speech.
Specifically, the President should call on Congress to support a full and immediate payroll tax holiday. Right now, the government takes away about 15% of our incomes in the form of payroll taxes. With a full payroll tax holiday, a married couple earning $60,000 a year would see their take-home pay increase by about $750 each month. In the aggregate, this will help millions of Americans pay their mortgages, student loans, credit card bills, and so on, while at the same time reducing business expenses (remember that employers contribute to the payroll tax too). All told, a full payroll tax holiday would allow Americans to keep about $1 trillion this year.
So stand before us, Mr. President, and tell us that you want to stop taking this income away from us until we, as a nation, have clawed back every job that has been lost since the start of the recession. Tell us that you intend to take bold steps to protect jobs, keep families intact and provide relief for millions of American businesses. Tell us that you have done all you intend to do to help the banks and the automakers and that you will not accept a jobless recovery — that an increase in economic activity is meaningless without rising employment in good jobs.
And, most importantly, tell us that you refuse to adopt a timeline for cutting the deficit. Tell us that you will not take one dime of payroll taxes away from us until your Administration can declare “Mission Accomplished” on the job front.
Finally, tell the American people that anyone who opposes a payroll tax holiday wants to keep taking hundreds, perhaps thousands, of dollars from them every month. Then watch what happens in 2012.

State of the Union Rhetoric, 2010: Part II Euphemisms, oxymorons and internal contradictions

Euphemisms, oxymorons and internal contradictions
By Michael Hudson

The State of the Union address is in danger of purveying the usual euphemisms. I expect Mr. Obama to brag that he has overseen a recovery. But can there be any such thing as a jobless recovery? What has recovered are stock market averages and Wall Street bonuses, not disposable personal income or discretionary spending after paying debt service.

There is a dream that what can be “recovered” is something so idyllic as to be mythical: a Bubble Economy enabling people to make money without actually working, by borrowing and riding the tide of asset-price inflation to make capital gains. Corporate Democrat Harold Ford Jr. writes nostalgically that Bill Clinton’s eight years in office created 22 million jobs, “balanced the budget and left his successor with a surplus. This can be done again,” if only Mr. Obama moves further to the right (which Mr. Ford calls the center, meaning the Bayhs and Republicans).

Well, no it can’t be done again. Pres. Clinton’s administration balanced the budget by “welfare reform” to cut back public spending. This would be lethal today. Meanwhile, his explosion of bank credit and the dot.com boom (rising stock prices and bonuses without any earnings) fueled the early stages of the Greenspan bubble. It was a debt-leveraged illusion. Instead of the government running budget deficits to expand domestic demand, Mr. Clinton left it to banks to extend interest-bearing credit – debt pollution that we are still struggling to clean up.

The danger is that when Mr. Obama speaks of “stabilizing the economy,” he means trying to sustain the rise in compound interest and debt. This mathematical financial dynamic is autonomous from the “real” industrial economy, overwhelming it economically. That is what makes the present economic road to debt peonage so self-defeating.

Debts that can’t be paid, won’t be. So defaults are rising. The question that Mr. Obama should be addressing is how to deal with the excess of debt above the ability to pay – and of negative equity for the one-quarter of U.S. real estate that has a higher mortgage debt than the market price is worth. If the hope is still to “borrow our way out of debt” by getting the banks to start lending again, then listeners on Wednesday will know that Mr. Obama’s second year in office will be worse for the economy than his first.

How realistic is it to expect the speech to make clear that “we can’t go home again”? Mr. Obama promised change. “We simply cannot return to business as usual,” he said on Jan. 21, introducing the “Volcker plan.” But how can there be meaningful structural change if the plan is to return to an idealized dynamic that enriched Wall Street but not the rest of the economy?

The word “recession” implies that economic trends will return to normal almost naturally

Any dream of “recovery” in today’s debt-leveraged economy is a false hope. Yet high financial circles expect Mr. Obama to insist that the economy cannot recover without first reimbursing and enriching Wall Street. To re-inflate asset prices, Mr. Obama’s team looks to Japan’s post-1990 model. A compliant Federal Reserve is to flood the credit markets to lower interest rates to revive bank lending –interest-bearing debt borrowed to buy real estate already in place (and stocks and bonds already issued), enabling banks to work out of their negative equity position by inflating asset prices relative to wages.

The promise is that re-inflating prices will help the “real” economy. But what will “recover” is the rising trend of consumer and homeowner debt responsible for stifling the economy with debt deflation in the first place. This end-result of the Clinton-Bush bubble economy is still being applauded as a model for recovery.

We are not really emerging from a “recession.” The word means literally a falling below a trend line. The economy cannot “recover” its past exponential growth, because it was not really normal. GDP is rising mainly for the FIRE sector – finance, insurance and real estate – not the “real economy.” Financial and corporate managers are paying themselves more for their success in paying their employees less.
This is the antithesis of recovery for Main Street. That is what makes the FIRE sector so self-destructive, and what has ended America’s great post-1945 upswing.

There are two economies – and the extractive FIRE sector dominates the “real” economy

When listening to the State of the Union speech, one should ask just which economy Mr. Obama means when he talks about recovery. Most wage earners and taxpayers will think of the “real” economy of production and consumption. But Mr. Obama believes that this “Economy #1” is dependent on that of Wall Street. His major campaign contributors and “wealth creators” in the FIRE sector – Economy #2, wrapped around the “real” Economy #1.

Economy #2 is the “balance sheet” economy of property and debt. The wealthiest 10% lend out their savings to become debts owed by the bottom 90%. A rising share of gains are made in extractive ways, by charging rent and interest, by financial speculation (“capital gains”), and by shifting taxes off itself onto the “real” Economy #1.

John Edwards talked about “the two economies,” but never explained what he meant operationally. Back in the 1960s when Michael Harrington wrote The Other America, the term meant affluent vs. poor America. For 19th-century novelists such as Charles Dickens and Benjamin Disraeli, it referred to property owners vs. renters. Today, it is finance vs. debtors. Any discussion of economic polarization betweens rich and poor must focus on the deepening indebtedness of most families, companies, real estate, cities and states to an emerging financial oligarchy.

Financial oligarchy is antithetical to democracy. That is what the political fight in Washington is all about today. The Corporate Democrats are trying to get democratically elected to bring about oligarchy. I hope that this is a political oxymoron, but I worry about how many people but into the idea that “wealth creation” requires debt creation. While wealth gushes upward through the Wall Street financial siphon, trickle-down economic ideology to fuel a Bubble Economy via debt-leveraged asset-price inflation.

The role of public spending – and hence budget deficits – no longer means taxing citizens to spend on improving their well-being within Economy #1. Since the 2008 financial meltdown the enormous rise in national debt has resulted from reimbursing Wall Street for its bad gambles on derivatives, collateralized debt obligations and credit default swaps that had little to do with the “real” economy. They could have been wiped out without bringing down the economy. That was an idle threat. A.I.G.’s swap insurance department could have collapsed (it was largely in London anyway) while keeping its normal insurance activities unscathed. But the government paid off the financial sector’s bad speculative debts by taking them onto the public balance sheet.

The economy is best viewed as the FIRE sector wrapped around the production and consumption core, extracting financial and rent charges that are not technologically or economically necessary costs.
Say’s Law of markets, taught to every economics student, states that workers and their employers use their wages and profits to buy what they produce (consumer goods and capital goods). Profits are earned by employing labor to produce goods and services to sell at a markup. (M – C – M’ to the initiated.)

The financial and property sector is wrapped around this core, siphoning off revenue from this circular flow. This FIRE sector is extractive. Its revenue takes the form of what classical economists called “economic rent,” a broad category that includes interest, monopoly super-profits (price gouging) and land rent, as well as “capital” gains. (These are mainly land-price gains and stock-market gains, not gains from industrial capital as such.) Economic rent and capital gains are income without a corresponding necessary cost of production (M – M’ to the initiated). “Banks have lent increasingly to buy up these rentier rights to extract interest, and less and less to promote industrial capital formation. Wealth creation” FIRE-style consists most easily of privatizing the public domain and erecting tollbooths to charge access fees for basic necessities such as health insurance, land sites, home ownership, the communication spectrum (cable and phone rights), patent medicine, water and electricity, and other public utilities, including the use of convenient money (credit cards), or the credit needed to get by. This kind of wealth is not what Adam Smith described in The Wealth of Nations. It is a form of overhead, not a means of production. The revenue it extracts is a zero-sum economic activity, meaning that one party’s gain (that of Wall Street usually) is another’s loss.

Debt deflation resulting from a distorted “financialized” economy

The problem that Mr. Obama faces is one that he cannot voice politically without offending his political constituency. The Bubble Economy has left families, companies, real estate and government so heavily indebted that they must use current income to pay banks and bondholders. The U.S. economy is in a debt deflation. The debt service they pay is not available for spending on goods and services. This is why sales are falling, shops are closing down and employment continues to be cut back.

Banks evidently do not believe that the debt problem can be solved. That is why they have taken the $13 trillion in bailout money and run – by it out in bonuses, or buying other banks and foreign affiliates. They see the domestic economy as being all loaned up. The game is over. Why would they make yet more loans against real estate already in negative equity, with mortgage debt in excess of the market price that can be recovered? Banks are not writing more “equity lines of credit” against homes or making second mortgages in today’s market, so consumers cannot use rising mortgage debt to fuel their spending.

Banks also are cutting back their credit card limits. They are “earning their way out of debt,” making up for the bad gambles they have taken with depositor funds, by raising interest rates, penalties and fees, by borrowing low-interest credit from the Federal Reserve and investing it abroad – preferably in currencies rising against the dollar. This is what Japan did in the “carry trade.” It kept the yen’s exchange rate down, and it is lowering the dollar’s exchange rate today. This threatens to raise prices for imports, on which domestic consumer prices are based. So easy credit for Wall Street means a cost squeeze for consumers.
The President needs a better set of advisors. But Wall Street has obtained veto power over just who they should be. Control over the President’s ear time has been part of the financial sector’s takeover of government. Wall Street has threatened that the stock market will plunge if oligarch-friendly Fed Chairman Bernanke is not reappointed. Mr. Obama insists on keeping him on board, in the belief that what’s good for Wall Street is good for the economy at large.

But what’s good for the banks is a larger market for their credit – more debt for the families and companies that are their customers, higher fees and penalties, no truth-in-lending laws, harsher bankruptcy terms, and further deregulation and bailouts.

This is the program that Mr. Bernanke has advised Washington to follow. Wall Street hopes that he will be kept on board. Mr. Bernanke’s advice has helped bolster that of Tim Geithner at Treasury and Larry Summers as chief advisor to convince Pres. Obama that “recovery” requires more credit.

Going down this road will make the debt overhead heavier, raising the cost of living and doing business. So we must beware of the President using the term “recovery” in his State of the Union speech to mean a recovery of debt and giving more money to Wall Street Jobs cannot revive without consumers having more to spend. And consumer demand (I don’t like this jargon word, because only Wall Street and the Pentagon’s military-industrial complex really make demands) cannot be revived without reducing the debt burden. Bankers are refusing to write down mortgages and other debts to reflect the ability to pay. That act of economic realism would mean taking a loss on their bad debts. So they have asked the government to lend new buyers enough credit to re-inflate housing prices. This is the aim of the housing subsidy to new homebuyers. It leaves more revenue to be capitalized into higher mortgage loans to support prices for real estate fallen into negative equity.

The pretense is that this is subsidizing the middle class, but homebuyers are only the intermediaries for government credit (debt to be paid off by taxpayers) to mortgage bankers. Nearly 90 percent of new home mortgages are being funded or guaranteed by the FHA, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – all providing a concealed subsidy to Wall Street.

Mr. Obama’s most dangerous belief is the myth that the economy needs the financial sector to lead its recovery by providing credit. Every economy needs a means of payment, which is why Wall Street has been able to threaten to wreck the economy if the government does not give in to its demands. But the monetary function should not be confused with predatory lending and casino gambling, not to mention Wall Street’s use of bailout funds on lobbying efforts to spread its gospel.

Deficit reduction

It seems absurd for politicians to worry that running a deficit from health care or Social Security can cause serious economic problems, after having given away $13 trillion to Wall Street and a blank check to the Pentagon. The “stimulus package” was only about 5 percent of this amount. But Mr. Obama has announced that he intends on Tuesday to close the barn door by proposing a bipartisan Senate Budget Commission to recommend how to limit future deficits – now that Congress is unwilling to give away any more money to Wall Street.

Republican approval would set the stage for Wednesday’s State of the Union message promising to press for “fiscal responsibility,” as if a lower deficit will help recovery. I suspect that Republicans will have little interest in joining. They see the aim as being to co-opt their criticism of Democratic spending plans. But in view of the rising and well-subsidized efforts of Harold Ford and his fellow Corporate Democrats, the actual “bipartisan” aim seems to be to provide political cover for cutting spending on labor and on social services. Mr. Obama already has sent up trial balloons about needing to address the Social Security and Medicare deficits, as if they should not be financed out of the general budget by taxpayers including the higher brackets (presently exempted from FICA paycheck withholding).

Traditionally, running deficits is supposed to help pull economies out of recession. But today, spending money on public services is deemed “bad,” because it may be “inflationary” – that is, threatening to raise wages. Talk of cutting deficits thus is class-war talk – on behalf of the FIRE sector.

The economy needs deficit spending to avoid unemployment and poverty, to increase social spending to deal with the present economic shrinkage, and to maintain their capital infrastructure. The federal government also needs to increase revenue sharing with states forced to slash their budgets in response to falling tax revenue and rising unemployment insurance.

But the deficits that the Bush-Obama administration have run are nothing like the familiar old Keynesian-style deficits to help the economy recover. Running up public debt to pay Wall Street in the hope that much of this credit will be lent out to inflate asset prices is deemed good. This belief will form the context for Wednesday’s State of the Union speech. So we are brought back to the idea of economic recovery and just what is to be recovered.

Financial lobbyists are hoping to get the government to fill the gap in domestic demand below full-employment levels by providing bank credit. When governments spend money to help increase economic activity, this does not help the banks sell more interest bearing debt. Wall Street’s golden age occurred under Bill Clinton, whose budget surplus was more than offset by an explosion of commercial bank lending.

The pro-financial mass media reiterate that deficits are inflationary and bankrupt economies. The reality is that Keynesian-style deficits raise wage levels relative to the price of property (the cost of obtaining housing, and of buying stocks and bonds to yield a retirement income). The aim of running a “Wall Street deficit” is just the reverse: It is to re-inflate property prices relative to wages.

A generation of financial “ideological engineering” has told people to welcome asset-price inflation (the Bubble Economy). People became accustomed to imagine that they were getting richer when the price of their homes rose. The problem is that real estate is worth what banks will lend – and mortgage loans are a form of debt, which needs to be repaid.

I worry that Wednesday’s address will celebrate this failed era.

State of the Union Junk Economics, 2010: How Much More “Debt Recovery” can the Economy Take?

By Michael Hudson

It’s make or break time for Democrats since last Tuesday’s defeat in Massachusetts. At stake is Mr. Obama’s credibility as an agent for change. Exit polls show that voters see his main change to be favoritism to Wall Street, to a degree that the “old Democrats” would not have let a Republican administration get away with. Rivalry over just what party is more Wall Street friendly prompted Jay Leno to joke that Mr. Obama has done the impossible: resurrected the seemingly dying Republican Party and given it the coveted label of the “Party of Change” running against Wall Street.

Some politicians are hoping that the effect of Massachusetts has been an oxymoron, a “fortuitous calamity” in the form of a wake-up call to Washington. The question is, will the party be able to drag Mr. Obama away from the Corporate Democrats? This is the setting for what must certainly be a hastily rewritten State of the Union message. Instead of celebrating a Republican- and Lieberman-approved health care bill, Mr. Obama finds himself obliged to respond to voters who celebrated his first anniversary in office by choosing a Republican as their designated voice for change. That was supposed to be his line.

My reading of last week’s election is that voters who felt duped by Mr. Obama’s promise as a reform candidate did not really turn Republican, but at least they could throw out the Democrats for failing to make a credible start fixing the debt-strapped economy. The President has begged the banks to start lending again. But this means loading the economy down with yet more debt. The $13 trillion bailout was supposed to help them do this, but they have simply taken the money and run, paying it out in bonuses and salaries, stepping up their lobbying efforts to buy Congress, and buying out other banks to grow larger and increase their monopoly power.

The contrast between Wall Street’s recovery and the failure of the “real” economy to recover its employment and consumption levels has enabled Republicans to depict Mr. Obama and his party as stalling against financial reform. Instead of fulfilling his election promise to become an agent of change, the past year has seen a continuity with the widely rejected Bush policies. Even the personnel remain the same. Over the weekend, Mr. Obama reiterated his endorsement for reappointing Helicopter Ben Bernanke as Federal Reserve Chairman.

As ex officio lobbyist for high finance, Mr. Bernanke’s money drop seemed to land only on Wall Street. Now that it has emptied out the government’s credit in an unparalleled deficit, Mr. Obama is saying, “No more. I’m drawing the line. No further deficit.” There goes any hope for stimulating the “real” economy. Treasury apparatchik Tim Geithner, backed with his armada of administrators on loan from Goldman Sachs, is unlikely to support indebted labor, consumers or their companies in any way that does not benefit Wall Street first.

Even worse has been Mr. Obama’s rehabilitation of Clinton Rubinomics deregulator Larry Summers as chief advisor, sidelining Paul Volcker until he was hurriedly flown back from political Siberia, as if to soften the leak by the Wall Street Journal on January 15 that Mr. Obama and the Democrats were not unhappy to see Elizabeth Warren’s Consumer Financial Products Agency die stillborn, despite Mr. Obama promise that the agency was “non-negotiable.”

Democrats insist that politics had nothing to do with the timing of Mr. Obama’s 180-degree turn and sudden infusion of passion for the “Volcker rule” to re-separate commercial banking from its casino capitalist outgrowth. The photo-op with Mr. Volcker was intended to provide at least a semblance of regulation of the sort that was normal before Mr. Summers and other Clinton-Gore era “Democratic Leadership Committee” operatives had backed Republicans to repeal Glass-Steagall. They are now back in the White House, and the Democrats have failed every litmus test involving finance, insurance and real estate – the FIRE sector, which remains the major campaign contributor and lobbyist for both parties.

Democrats up for re-election this November are jumping ship. On Friday, within just 72 hours of the Massachusetts vote, Barbara Boxer and other Democrats on the Senate Finance Committee came out against reappointing Mr. Bernanke. Republican leaders already had taken a head start on opposing him. Still, many Democrats have found enough born-again populism to sacrifice Mr. Bernanke, and perhaps Messrs. Summers and Geithner as well.

It is bad enough that Mr. Obama has not joined in the criticism of Mr. Bernanke for having refused to regulate mortgage fraud or slow the bubble economy even when the law required him to do so. And it is bad enough that Mr. Bernanke has been so willfully blind as to deny that the Fed was fueling the Bubble with low interest rates and a refusal to regulate fraud. What he calls the “free market” is what many consider to be consumer fraud.

The widening public perception of Mr. Obama’s first year as being a Great Continuity with the Bush Administration has enabled Republicans to position themselves for this year’s mid-term elections – and 2012 – by reminding voters how they opposed the bank bailout back in September 2008, when Mr. Obama supported it. Now that support for Wall Street has become the third rail in American politics, they may appoint a standard bearer who voted against the bailout.

This is ironic. George W. Bush ran for president saying: “I’m a uniter, not a divider,” and proceeded to divide the country (needing only 50 Senate votes plus the Vice Presidential tie-breaker to do it). Mr. Obama promised change, but then decided that he wants to be bipartisan (and insisting that he needs 60 votes; many are asking whether, if he had them, he then would say that he needed 90 votes to get the Baucuses and Bayhs, Liebermans and Boehners on board for his promised change). On Tuesday he is scheduled to invite Republicans to participate in a joint committee on the budget deficit – to get Republicans on board for tax increases to finance future giveaways to their mutual Wall Street constituency. They probably will say “no.” This should enable him to make a clean break. But then he would not be who he is.

For opportunists in both parties, the trick is how to wrap pro-Wall Street policies in enough populist rhetoric to win re-election, given that the FIRE sector remains the key source of funding for most political campaigns. The contrast between rhetoric and policy reality is the basic set of forces pulling Wednesday’s State of the Union address this Wednesday – and for the next two years. The real question is thus whether Mr. Obama’s promise to make an about-face and back financial reform will remain merely rhetorical, or actually be substantive?

Putting Mr. Obama’s speech in perspective

Spending a year hoping to get Republicans to sign onto health care almost seems to have been a tactic to give Mr. Obama a plausible excuse for stalling rather than to address what most voters are mainly concerned about: the economy. Subsidizing the debt overhead and the debt deflation that is shrinking markets and causing unemployment, home foreclosures and a capital flight out of the dollar has cost $13 trillion in just over a year – more than ten times the anticipated shortfall of any public health insurance reform or an entire decade of the anticipated Social Security shortfall.

Not only are voters angry, so are the community organizers and Mr. Obama’s former Harvard Law School colleagues with whom I have spoken. Instead of providing help in slowing the foreclosure process or pressuring banks to renegotiate, his solution is for the Fed to flood the banking system with enough money at low enough interest rates to re-inflate housing prices. What Mr. Obama seems to mean by “recovery” is that consumers once again will be extended Bubble-era levels of debt to afford housing at prices that will rescue bank balance sheets.

It is an impossible dream. American workers now pay about 40% of their take-home pay on housing, and another 15% on debt service – even before buying goods and services. No wonder our economy has lost its export markets! Debts that can’t be paid, won’t be.

The moral is that the solution to any given problem – in this case, how to make Wall Street richer by debt leveraging – creates a new problem, in this case bankruptcy for high-priced American industry. The cost of living and doing business is inflated by high financial charges, HMO and insurance charges, and debt-inflated real estate prices. This has made Mr. Obama’s Wall Street constituency richer, but as the Chinese proverb expresses the problem: “He who tries to go two roads at once will get a broken hip joint.”

Banks have not paid much attention to Mr. Obama’s urging them to renegotiate bad mortgages. Their profits lie in driving homeowners out of their homes if they do not stay and fight. What is needed is to help debtors fight against junk mortgages issued irresponsibly beyond their reasonable means to pay.

When homeowners do fight, they win. In Cambridge, Massachusetts, I spoke to community leaders who organized neighborhood protests blocking evictions from being carried out. I spoke to lawyers advising that victims of predatory mortgages insist that the foreclosing parties produce the physical mortgages in court. (They rarely are able to do this.) These people feel they are getting little help from Washington.

And last Friday, Nomi Prins, Bob Johnson and other financial insiders voiced fears that the “Volcker Rule” separating commercial banking from casino derivatives gambling will end up being gutted by so many loopholes (such as letting banks to write their contracts out of their London branches) that it will end up merely rhetorical, not substantive. Financial lobbyists have the upper hand in detoothing and disabling attempts to reduce their power or even to enact simple truth-in-lending laws.

Two opposing lines of advice to Mr. Obama

Over the weekend Sen. John McCain suggested that Mr. Obama should reach out to Republicans in his State of the Union address. Bush advisor Karl Rove advised him to move to “the center” – what most people used to call the right wing of the spectrum. The Republicans blame Mr. Obama’s deepening unpopularity on his alleged move to the left.

It is more realistic to say that he has been perceived as being too little for change, too centrist while the economy is polarizing. It certainly seems unlikely that he will now turn on his FIRE-sector backers. His plan is that real estate prices can be re-inflated on enough credit – that is, enough more mortgage debt – to enable the banks to work out of the negative equity position into which their loan portfolios and investments have fallen.

The inherent impossibility of this plan succeeding is the main problem that we may expect from this Wednesday’s State of the Union address. Mr. Obama will promise to cut taxes further for working Americans, but his financial policy aims to raise the cost of their housing, their debt service and the cost of buying pensions. Some trade-off!

America’s debt overhead exceeds the means to pay. Rhetoric alone cannot solve this problem, even when delivered with Mr. Obama’s rhetorical élan. Its solution requires a policy alternative more radical than his current advisors are willing to accept, because the inevitable solution must be to write down debts to reflect the capacity to pay under today’s market conditions. This means that some banks and creditors must take a loss.

In the 2008 election campaign, Rep. Dennis Kucinich kept spelling out precisely what law he had introduced to Congress to effect each change he proposed. Mr. Obama never descended to this concrete level. But after spending a year treading water, he now must be asked to do so.

For starters, the litmus test for commitment to change should be to rapidly push through the Consumer Finance Protection Agency while the Democrats still have their political Viagra fillip from last Tuesday – and before Wall Street lobbyists wield their bankrolls.

There is talk in the press about the Democrats not even pressing forward with the Consumer Financial Protection Agency. The argument is that if they can’t get their health care plan by the Senate in the face of HMO and drug company lobbyists, what chance do they have when it comes on to taking on predatory Wall Street lenders?

It is a false worry – or even worse, an excuse to continue doing nothing. Republicans were able to mobilize populist opposition to the health-care bill by representing it as adding to the cost of relatively healthy young adults forced into the arms of the HMO monopolies. But it is much harder for the Republicans to buck financial reform and still strike their pose as opposing Wall Street. Proposing strong legislation against Wall Street will force politicians of both parties to show their true colors. If they don’t jump on board the best and most popular law the Democrats can draw up, they will lose their ability to pose. And what is populist politics these days without such a pose?

If the Democrats do not force the debt reform issue, we must conclude that they don’t really want financial restructuring. This is what Celinda Lake, pollster for the losing Democratic senate candidate last Tuesday, found that most voters believed to be the case: “When six times more people think that the banks benefited from the stimulus than working families, you’ve got a problem. And it’s not just a problem with what Martha Coakley did in her campaign” she wrote in her day-after report. “Voters are still voting for the change they voted for in 2008, but they want to see it. And right now they think they’ve got economic policies for Washington that are delivering more for banks than Main Street.”

Mr. Obama needs to signal a change of heart by replacing his failed deregulatory-era trio of Summers, Bernanke and Geithner with advisors who will focus more on the “real” economy than on Wall Street’s shadow economy.

I don’t see him doing this. I will discuss how to pierce what I expect to be Wednesday evening’s rhetorical fog in Part II of this article tomorrow.

“Obama Takes a Baby Step in the Right Direction”

By L. Randall Wray*

Today, President Obama finally took meaningful action toward financial reform, apparently prodded by his disaster in Massachusetts. Heck, if the Democrats cannot retain Teddy’s seat, there is no safe refuge. The Republicans and Tea Partiers will take the next election in a landslide unless Obama changes course, and fast.

Briefly, here is what he announced. Government spent a huge bundle trying to rescue Wall Street, and while that was distasteful, it was necessary, for otherwise the economy would have slipped into a second great depression. The financial system is now stronger than it was when he took office, but Wall Street continues to engage in its antisocial practices, Hoovering all the nation’s profits, paying huge bonuses, and trading rather than lending.

According to Obama, the root of the problem is that these institutions take advantage of their government guarantees (deposit insurance and bail-outs when things go bad) to gamble with house money. He says the root of the crisis was that these government-protected institutions engaged in proprietary trading and created their own hedge funds and private equity firms. The access to insured deposits gave them low cost funds with which they took huge risks at taxpayer expense. Further, they have sent an army of lobbyists to Washington to prevent financial reform. Hence, he proposes a new “Volcker Rule” that would prohibit these regulated financial institutions from operating hedge funds, private equity funds, or proprietary trading. And the government will prevent further consolidation of the financial sector.

The reforms sound good. It is always too easy to criticize reform for not going far enough. However, the nature of this proposal seems to indicate that Obama still does not understand the scope of the problem. Let me provide what I believe to be more than mere quibbles:

1. The financial bail-out was not needed and would do nothing to prevent another great depression. We had a liquidity crisis that could have been resolved in the normal way, through lending by the Fed without limit, to all financial institutions, and without collateral. That is how you end a liquidity crisis. But that has nothing to do with the Paulson/Rubin/Geithner plans that variously bought bad assets, injected capital, and provided guarantees — in an amount estimated above $20 trillion. None of that was necessary and none of it prevented collapse of the economic system. Banks are still massively insolvent. If we wanted to leave insolvent institutions open, all we had to do was to use forbearance. And, in truth, that is the only reason they are still open for business.

2. And of course, none of that had any benefit at all for Main Street. Indeed, we could have closed down the top 20 banks (responsible for almost all of the mess) with no impact on the economy. The only thing that has helped was the fiscal stimulus package. That will soon run out, and although it helped it was far too small. Obama has zero chance of getting more money for Main Street unless he can convince Congress and the public that he has changed his ways. The reforms he has announced fall short.

3. The financial system is not healthier today. Indeed, it is much more dangerous. The Bush and Obama administrations reacted to the crisis by encouraging and subsidizing consolidation of the sector in the hands of gargantuan and dangerously insolvent institutions. The sector is essentially run by a handful of rapacious institutions that have made out like bandits because of the crisis: Goldman, JP Morgan, Citi, Chase and Bank of America. All of these are systemically dangerous. All should be closed. Today.

4. Yes, the lobbyists are a problem. What do you expect when you operate a revolving door between Wall Street and the administration? Goldman essentially runs the Treasury. The lobbyists are in Washington to meet with their former colleagues, and to oil that revolving door. There is only one solution: ban all former employees of the financial sector from government employment (including roles as advisors), and prohibit all government employees from ever working for a Wall Street firm.

5. It is not enough to subject banks to the requirements of the Volcker Rule. Any institution that has access to the Fed and to the FDIC should be prohibited from making ANY KINDS OF TRADES. They should make loans, and purchase securities, and then hold them. (An exception can be made for government debt.) They should perform underwriting and due diligence to ensure that the assets they hold meet appropriate standards of risk. And then they should bear all the risk through maturity of the assets. They should not be allowed to offload assets, much less to short assets that they sell, while knowing they are trash (Goldman’s favorite strategy). They should not be able to hedge risks through derivatives. They should not be allowed to purchase credit default “insurance” to protect themselves. They should not be allowed to move risk off balance sheet. They should not be involved in equities markets. Any behemoth that does not like these conditions can hand back its bank charter and become an unprotected financial institution. Those that retain their charters will be treated as public-private partnerships, which is what banks are. They put up $5 of their own money, then gamble with $95 of government (guaranteed) money. The only public purpose they serve is underwriting-and that only works if they hold all the risks.

6. Obama ignores fraud. It is rampant in the financial sector. Indeed, it has no doubt increased since the crisis. Where do you think all of those record profits come from? It is a massive control fraud, based on Ponzi (or Bernie Madoff) schemes. This must be investigated. Fraudulent institutions must be shut down. Management must be prosecuted and jailed. Only if Obama is willing to take on fraud will we know that he really is about hope and change. He has got to start with the Rubin, Geithner and Summers team. Fire them, then investigate them. That is change I can believe in-and an end to “business as usual”, as Obama put it.

*This post was first published on New Deal 2.0

Sheila Bair Exposes Wall Street’s Power Grab: Angelides Commission Hearings, days 1 and 2

By Michael Hudson*

You almost could hear the bankers heave a sigh of relief when Haiti’s earthquake knocked the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission hearings off the front pages and evening news broadcasts last week. At stake, after all, is Wall Street’s power grab seeking to centralize policy control firmly in its own hands by neutralizing the government’s regulatory agencies. The first day – Wednesday, January 15 – went innocuously enough. Four emperors of finance were called on to voice ceremonial platitudes and pro forma apologies without explaining what they might be apologizing for. Typical was the statement by Goldman Sachs chairman Lloyd C. Blankfein: “Whatever we did, it didn’t work out well. We regret the consequence that people have lost money.”

Their strategy certainly made money for themselves – and they made it off those for whom the financial crisis “didn’t work out well,” whose bad bets ended up paying Wall Street’s bonuses. So when Paul Krugman poked fun at the four leading “Bankers without a clue” in his New York Times column, he was giving credibility to their pretense at innocent gullibility.

Recipients of such enormous bonuses cannot be deemed all that clueless. They blamed the problem on natural cycles – what Mr. Blankfein called a “100-year storm.” Jamie Dimon of JPMorgan Chase trivialized the crisis as a normal and even unsurprising event that “happens every five to seven years,” as if the crash is just another business cycle downturn, not aggravated by any systemic financial flaws. If anything, Wall Street accuses liberal government planners of being too nice to poor people, by providing cheap mortgage credit to the uninitiated who could not quite handle the responsibility.

But the Wall Street executives were careful not to blame the government. This was not just an attempt to avoid antagonizing the Congressional panel. The last thing Wall Street wants is for the government to change its behavior.

I think the Wall Street boys are playing possum. Why should we expect them to explain their strategy to us? To understand their game plan, the Commissioners had to wait for the second day of the hearings, when Sheila Bair of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. (FDIC) spelled it out. Their first order of business is to make sure that the Federal Reserve Board is designated the sole financial regulator, knocking out any more activist regulators – above all the proposed Consumer Financial Products Agency that Harvard Professor Elizabeth Warren has helped design. Wall Street also is seeking to avert any thought of restoring the Glass-Steagall Act in an attempt to protect the economy from having merged retail commercial banking with wholesale investment banking, insurance, real estate brokerage and kindred arms of high finance.

Perception – and exposure – of this strategy is what made the second day’s hearing (on Thursday) so important. From Sheila Bair down to state officials, these administrators explained that the problem was structural. They blamed government and the financial sector’s short-run time frame.

The past few years have demonstrated just how thoroughly the commercial and investment-banking sector already has taken control of government. Having succeeded in disabling the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to such an extent that it refused to act even when warned about Bernie Madoff, deregulators did not raise a protest against the junk accounting that was burying the financial system in junk mortgages and kindred accounting fraud.

The Comptroller of the Currency blocked local prosecutors from moving against financial fraud, citing a small-print rule from the Civil War era National Bank Act giving federal agencies the right to override state agencies. Passed in the era of wildcat banking, the rule aimed to prevent elites from using crooked local courts to protect them. But in the early 2000s it was Washington that was protecting national banking elites from state prosecutors such as New York attorney general Eliot Spitzer and his counterparts in Massachusetts and other states. This prompted Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan to remind the Angelides Commission that the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Office of Thrift Supervision were “actively engaged in a campaign to thwart state efforts to avert the coming crisis.”*

By far the major enabler was the Federal Reserve Board (FRB). Acting as the banking system’s lobbying organization, its tandem of Alan Greenspan and Ben Bernanke fought as a free-market Taliban against attempts to introduce financial regulation. Working with the Goldman Sachs managers on loan to the Treasury, the Fed managed to block attempts to rein in debt pyramiding.

Mr. Bernanke ignored the very first lesson taught in business schools. This was the lesson taught by William Petty in the 17th century and used by economists ever since: The market price of land, a government bond or other security is calculated by dividing its expected income stream by the going rate of interest – that is, “capitalizing” its rent (or any other flow of income) into what a bank would lend. The lower the rate of interest, the higher a loan can be capitalized. At an interest rate of 10%, a $10,000 annual income is worth $100,000. At 5%, this income stream is worth $200,000; at 4%, $250,000. Mr. Bernanke thus rejected over three hundred years of economic orthodoxy in testifying recently that the Fed was blameless in fueling the real estate bubble by slashing interest rates after 2001. Financial fraud also was not to blame. Anointed with the reputation for being a “student of the Great Depression,” he showed himself to be clueless.

He is not really all that clueless, of course. His role is to play the “useful idiot” whom financial elites can blame to distract attention from how they have gamed the system. Wall Street’s first aim is to make sure that the Fed remains in control as the government’s central regulator – or in the present case, deregulator, able to disable any serious attempt to check Wall Street’s drive to load down the economy with yet more debt so as to “borrow its way out of the bubble.”

Public relations “think tanks” (spin centers adept in crafting blame-the-victim rhetoric) use simple Orwellian Doublethink 101 tactics to call this “free market” policy. Financial self-regulation is to be left to bankers, shifting economic planning out of the hands of elected representatives to those of planners drawn from the ranks of Wall Street. This centralization of authority in a public agency “independent” from control by elected representatives is dubbed “market efficiency,” with an “independent central bank” deemed to be the hallmark of democracy. The words “democracy,” “progress” and “reform,” are thus given meanings opposite from what they meant back in the Progressive Era a century ago. The pretense is that constraints on finance are anti-democratic, not public protection against today’s emerging financial oligarchy. And to distract attention from the road to debt peonage, financial lobbyists accuse governments strong enough to check the financial interest” of threatening to lead society down “the road to serfdom.”

Avoiding regulation by having the Fed “regulate,” with neoliberal deregulators in charge

All that is needed is to reduce the number of regulators to one – and to appoint a deregulator to that key position. The most dependable deregulator is the commercial banking system’s in-house lobbyist, the Federal Reserve. This requires knocking out potential rivals. But at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), Sheila Bair is not willing to relinquish this authority. Her testimony last Thursday was buried on the back pages of the press, and her most trenchant written arguments lost in the hubbub caused by the earthquake in Haiti. Not reported by the media-of-record, her testimony should have been welcomed as intellectual dynamite.

For Ms. Bair the task requires blocking three key battles that the financial sector is waging in its war to control and extract tribute from the “real” economy of production and consumption. Her first policy to get the economy back on track is to ward off any plans that politicians might harbor to keep Wall Street unregulated. “Over the past two decades, there was a world view that markets were, by their very nature, self-regulating and self-correcting – resulting in a period that was referred to as the ‘Great Moderation’ [Mr. Bernanke’s notorious euphemism]. However, we now know that this period was one of great excess.” **

Banks are using the ploy familiar to readers of the Uncle Remus stories about B’rer Rabbit. When the fox finally catches him, the rabbit begs, “Please don’t throw me in the briar batch.” The fox does just that, wanting to harm the rabbit – who gets up and laughs, “Born and bred in the briar patch!” and hops happily away, free. This is essentially what the financial scenario would be under Federal Reserve aegis. “Not only did market discipline fail to prevent the excesses of the last few years, but the regulatory system also failed in its responsibilities. There were critical shortcomings in our approach that permitted excessive risks to build in the system. Existing authorities were not always used, regulatory gaps within the financial system provided an environment in which regulatory arbitrage became rampant …”

No more damning reason could be given for Congress to reject Mr. Bernanke out of hand, if not indeed to set about restructuring the Fed to bring it back into the Treasury, from which it emerged in 1914 in one of the most unfortunate Caesarian births of the 20th century. In detail, she explained how the Fed had acted as an agent of the commercial banks perpetrating fraud, protecting their sale of toxic mortgage products against consumer interests and indeed, the solvency of the economy itself. Nobody can read her explanation without seeing what utter folly it would be to put Creditor Fox in charge of the Debtor Henhouse.

Blocking creation of a Consumer Protection Agency

Ms. Bair’s second aim was to counter Wall Street’s attempt to block enactment of the Consumer Protection Agency. Its lobbyists have had a year to disable any real reform, and Washington obviously believes that it can be safely jettisoned. But Ms. Bair spelled out just how willful and egregious the Fed’s refusal to use its regulatory powers – and indeed, its designated responsibilities – has been. “Federal consumer protections from predatory and abusive mortgage-lending practices are established principally under the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA), which is part of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA). TILA and HOEPA regulations are the responsibility of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB) and apply to both bank and non-bank lenders,” she explained. “Many of the toxic mortgage products that were originated to fund the housing boom … could have been regulated and restricted under another provision of HOEPA that requires the FRB to prohibit acts or practices in connection with any mortgage loan that it finds to be unfair or deceptive, or acts and practices associated with refinancing of mortgage loans that it finds abusive or not otherwise in the interest of the borrower.”

This was not done. It was actively thwarted by the Fed:

Problems in the subprime mortgage market were identified well before many of the abusive mortgage loans were made. A joint report issued in 2000 by HUD and the Department of the Treasury entitled Curbing Predatory Home Mortgage Lending … found that certain terms of subprime loans appear to be harmful or abusive in practically all cases. To address these issues, the report made a number of recommendations, including that the FRB use its HOEPA authority to prohibit certain unfair, deceptive and abusive practices by lenders and third parties. During hearings held in 2000, consumer groups urged the FRB to use its HOEPA rulemaking authority to address concerns about predatory lending. Both the House and Senate held hearings on predatory abuses in the subprime market in May 2000 and July 2001, respectively. In December 2001 the FRB issued a HOEPA rule that addressed a narrow range of predatory lending issues.

It was not until 2008 that the FRB issued a more extensive regulation using its broader HOEPA authority to restrict unfair, deceptive, or abusive practices in the mortgage market.

This was closing the barn door after the horses had fled, of course. “The rule imposes an ‘ability to repay’ standard in connection with higher-priced mortgage loans. For these loans, the rule underscores a fundamental rule of underwriting: that all lenders, banks and nonbanks, should only make loans where they have documented a reasonable ability on the part of the borrower to repay. The rule also restricts abusive prepayment penalties.”

Warning that “the consequences we have seen during this crisis will recur,” Ms. Bair reiterated a recommendation she had earlier made to the effect that “an ability to repay standard should be required for all mortgages, including interest-only and negative-amortization mortgages and home equity lines of credit (HELOCs). Interest-only and negative-amortization mortgages must be underwritten to qualify the borrower to pay a fully amortizing payment.” The Fed blocked this common-sense regulatory policy. And by doing so, it became an enabler of fraud.

As the private-label MBS [Mortgage-Backed Securities] market grew, issuances became increasingly driven by interest-only, hybrid adjustable-rate, second-lien, pay-option and Alt-A mortgage products. Many of these products had debt-service burdens that exceeded the homeowner’s payment capacity. For example, Alt-A mortgages typically included loans with high loan-to-value ratios or loans where borrowers provided little or no documentation regarding the magnitude or source of their income or assets. Unfortunately, this class of mortgage products was particularly susceptible to fraud, both from borrowers who intentionally overstated their financial resources and from the mortgage brokers who misrepresented borrower resources without the borrower’s knowledge.
As Paul Volcker recently suggested, financial “innovation” did not contribute much to production. Packaging junk mortgages and organizing CDO swaps made real estate more debt-leveraged, while adding higher debt balances to the economy’s homes and office properties. But “the regulatory capital requirements for holding these rated instruments were far lower than for directly holding these toxic loans,” Ms. Bair explained. “Many of the current problems affecting the safety and soundness of the financial system were caused by a lack of strong, comprehensive rules against abusive lending practices applying to both banks and non-banks.”
Improved consumer protections are in everyone’s best interest. It is important to understand that many of the current problems affecting the safety and soundness of the financial system were caused by a lack of strong, comprehensive rules against abusive practices in mortgage lending. If HOEPA regulations had been amended in 2001, instead of in 2008, a large number of the toxic mortgage loans could not have been originated and much of the crisis may have been prevented. The FDIC strongly supported the FRB’s promulgation of an “ability to repay” standard for high priced loans in 2008, and continues to urge the FRB to apply common sense, “ability to repay” requirements to all mortgages, including interest-only and option-ARM loans.
The absence of proper consumer protection was a major contributing factor to the present financial meltdown, for “it has now become clear that abrogating sound state laws, particularly regarding consumer protection, created opportunity for regulatory arbitrage that resulted in a regulatory ‘race-to-the-bottom.’” Mortgage fraud became rife as bank regulators failed to protect consumers or the economy at large. This is why an independent agency is needed rather than hoping that the Federal Reserve somehow can change its spots. “If the bank regulators are not performing this role properly, the consumer regulator should retain backup examination and enforcement authority to address any situation where it determines that a banking agency is providing insufficient supervision.”

Summarizing her 54-page written testimony orally, Ms. Bar commented that, “looking back, I think if we had had some good strong constraints at that time, just simple standards like … you’ve got to document income and make sure they can repay the loan . . . we could have avoided a lot of this.”*** But the same day on which her testimony was capsulized, the Wall Street Journal leaked the story that “Senate Banking Committee Chairman Christopher Dodd is considering scrapping the idea of creating a Consumer Financial Protection Agency … as a way to secure a bipartisan deal on the legislation,” that is, a deal with “Richard Shelby of Alabama, who has referred to the Consumer Financial Protection Agency as a ‘nanny state.’ … The banking industry has spent months lobbying aggressively to defeat the creation of the CFPA. ‘One of our principal objections all along is that you would have a terrible conflict on an ongoing basis between a separate consumer regulator and the safety and soundness regulator, with the bank constantly caught in the middle,’ said Ed Yingling, chief executive of the American Bankers Association trade group.”**** The idea is that a “conflict” between an institution seeking to protect consumers – and indeed, the economy – from an in-house banking lobbying institution (the Fed), backed by the Treasury safely in the hands of Goldman-Sachs caretakers on loan is “inefficient” rather than a necessary democratic safeguard! But the paper gave more space crowing over the likely defeat of the Consumer Financial Protection Agency than it did to Ms. Bair’s eloquent written testimony!

Avert any thought of re-enacting Glass-Steagall

On the institutional level, Wall Street’s managers want to ward off any threat that the Glass-Steagall legislation might be revived to separate consumer deposit banking and money management from today’s casino capitalism. This is what Paul Volcker has urged, but it is now obvious that Pres. Obama appointed him only for window dressing, much like that of Pres. Johnson said of J. Edgar Hoover: he would rather have him inside his tent pissing out than outside pissing in. Appointing Mr. Volcker as a nominal advisor effectively prevents the former Fed Chairman from making hostile criticisms. Pres. Obama simply ignores his advice to re-instate Glass-Steagall, having appointed as his senior advisor the major advocate of the repeal in the first place – Larry Summers, along with the rest of the old Rubinomics gang taken over from the Clinton administration.

Ms. Bair explained why Wall Street’s preferred “reforms” along the current line – maintaining the “too big to fail” financial oligopoly intact, along with the Bush-Obama deregulatory “free market” ideology – threatens to return the financial system to its bad old ways of crashing. To Wall Street, of course, this is the “good old way.” Wall Street is consolidating the finance, insurance and real estate (FIRE) sector across the board into oligopolistic conglomerates “too big to fail.”

But being realistic under the circumstances, Ms. Bair avoided taking on more of a battle than likely can be won at this time. “One way to address large interconnected institutions,” she proposed, “is to make it expensive to be one. Industry assessments could be risk-based. Firms engaging in higher risk activities, such as proprietary trading, complex structured finance, and other high-risk activities would pay more” for their deposit insurance, to reflect the higher systemic risks they are taking. This suggestion is along the lines of proposals (made for over half a century now) to set different reserve requirements or capital adequacy requirements for different categories of bank loans.

Alas, she acknowledged, the Basel agreements regarding capital adequacy standards are being loosened rather than tightened. “In 2004, the Basel Committee published a new international capital standard, the Basel II advanced internal ratings-based approach (as implemented in the United States, the Advanced Approaches), that allows banks to use their own internal risk assessments to compute their risk-based capital requirements. The overwhelming preponderance of evidence is that the Advanced Approaches will lower capital requirements significantly, to levels well below current requirements that are widely regarded as too low.” She criticized the new, euphemistically termed “Advanced Approach” as producing “capital requirements that are both too low and too subjective.” The result is to increase rather than mitigate financial risk.

The need for tax reform to accompany financial reform

Beyond the scope of the FDIC or other financial regulatory agencies is the symbiosis between financial and fiscal reform.

For example, federal tax policy has long favored investment in owner-occupied housing and the consumption of housing services. The government-sponsored housing enterprises have also used the implicit backing of the government to lower the cost of mortgage credit and stimulate demand for housing and housing-linked debt. In political terms, these policies have proven to be highly popular. Who will stand up to say they are against homeownership? Yet, we have failed to recognize that there are both opportunity costs and downside risks associated with these policies. Policies that channel capital towards housing necessarily divert capital from other investments, such as plant and equipment, technology, and education—investments that are also necessary for long-term economic growth and improved standards of living. *****
The problem is that U.S. financial and fiscal policy has institutionalized the financial sector’s short-term outlook,“distorting of decision-making away from long-term profitability and stability and toward short-term gains with insufficient regard for risk.” For example, money managers are graded every three months on their performance against the norm. Ms. Bair focused on how employee compensation in the form of stock options tended to promote short-termism. “Formula-driven compensation allows high short-term profits to be translated into generous bonus payments, without regard to any longer-term risks. Many derivative products are long-dated, while employees’ compensation was weighted toward near-term results. These short-term incentives magnified risk-taking.” In sum, “performance bonuses and equity-based compensation should have aligned the financial interests of shareholders and managers. Instead, we now see – especially in the financial sector – that they frequently had the effect of promoting short-term thinking and excessive risk-taking that bred instability in our financial system. Meaningful reform of these practices will be essential to promote better long-term decision-making in the U.S. corporate sector.”

Conclusion: Pushing the economy even deeper into debt beyond the ability to pay

The banking system’s marketing departments have set their eyes on the economy’s largest asset, real estate, as its prime customer. The major component of real estate is land. For years, banks lent against the cost of building, using land (tending to rise in value) as the borrower’s equity investment in case of downturn. This was the basic plan in lending 70%, then 80% and finally 100% or even more of the real estate price to mortgage borrowers. The effect is to make housing even more expensive.

Suppose that Wall Street succeeds in its strategy to re-inflate the Bubble Economy. Will this create even larger problems to come, by making the costs of living even higher as labor and industry become even more highly debt leveraged? That is the banking sector’s business plan, after all. The aim of bank marketing departments – backed by the Obama administration – is to steer credit to re-inflate the bubble and thus save financial balance sheets from their current negative equity position.

This policy cannot work. One constraint is the balance of payments. The competitive power of U.S. exports of the products of American labor is undercut by the fact that housing costs absorb some 40% of labor’s family budgets today, other debt 15%, FICA wage withholding 12%, and various taxes another 20%. U.S. labor is priced out of world markets by the economy’s FIRE sector overhead even before food and essential needs of life are bought. The “solution” to the financial sector’s negative equity squeeze thus threatens to create even larger problems for the “real” economy. Ms. Bair appropriately concluded her written testimony by commenting that the context for the present discussion of financial reform should be the fact that “our financial sector has grown disproportionately in relation to the rest of our economy,” from “less than 15 percent of total U.S. corporate profits in the 1950s and 1960s … to 25 percent in the 1990s and 34 percent in the most recent decade through 2008.” While financial services “are essential to our modern economy, the excesses of the last decade” represent “a costly diversion of resources from other sectors of the economy.”

This is the same criticism that John Maynard Keynes levied in his General Theory, citing all the money, effort and genius that went into making money from money in the stock market, without actually contributing to the production process or even to tangible capital formation. In effect, we are seeing finance capitalism autonomous from industrial capitalism. The problem is how to restore a more balanced economy and rescue society from the financial sector’s self-destructive short-term practices.

*Sewell Chan, “A Call for More Regulation at Fiscal Crisis Inquiry,” The New York Times, January 15, 2010. William Black provides the classic narrative in The Best Way to Rob a Bank is to Own One. He documents how the FBI’s anti-fraud teams and those of other agencies were reduced to merely skeleton levels, overseen by do-nothing deregulatory ideologues of the sort who served as enablers to Wall Street’s Bernie Madoffs.

**Statement of Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation on the Causes and Current State of the Financial Crisis before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission; Room 1100, Longworth House Office Building, January 14, 2010. http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/chairman/spjan1410.html.

***Tom Braithwaite, “Deposits regulator points finger of blame at Fed,” Financial Times, January 15, 2010.

****Damian Paletta, “Consumer Protection Agency in Doubt,” Wall Street Journal, January 15, 2010.

*****The Wall Street Journal cut this passage from the on-line version of Friday’s article by John D. McKinnon and Michael R. Crittenden, “Financial Inquiry Widens to Include Past Regulators,” January 15, 2010.
 
On-line transcripts of the hearings are available at
 http://www.fcic.gov/hearings/pdfs/2010

Prof. Hudson has just republished a new and expanded edition of his Trade, Development and Foreign Debt, a history of theories of international trade and finance. It is available from Amazon.com.

Anti-Regulators: the Federal Reserve’s War against Effective Regulation

By William K. Black

Introduction

The first decade of this century proved how essential effective regulators are to prevent economic catastrophe and epidemics of fraud. The most severe failure was at the Federal Reserve. The Fed’s failure was the most harmful because it had unique authority to prevent the fraud epidemic and the resulting economic crisis. The Fed refused to exercise that authority despite knowing of the fraud epidemic and potential for crisis.

The Fed’s failures were legion, but five are worthy of particular note.

  • Greenspan believed that the Fed should not regulate v. fraud
  • Bernanke believed that the Fed should rely on self-regulation by “the market”
  • (Former) Federal Reserve Bank of New York President Geithner testified that he had never been a regulator (a true statement, but not one he’s supposed to admit)
  • Bernanke gave the key support to the Chamber of Commerce’s effort to gimmick bank accounting rules to cover up their massive losses – allowing them to report fictional profits and “earn” tens of billions of dollars of bonuses
  • Bernanke recently appointed Dr. Parkinson as the Fed’s top supervisor. He is an economist that has never examined or supervised. He is known for claiming that credit default swaps (CDS) (the financial derivatives that destroyed AIG) should be unregulated because fraud was impossible among sophisticated parties.
Each error arises from the intersection of ideology and bad economics.

The Fed’s regulatory failures pose severe risks today. Three of the key failed anti-regulators occupy some of the most important regulatory positions in the World. Each was a serial failure as regulator. Each has failed to take accountability for their failures. Last week, Dr. Bernanke asserted that bad regulation caused the crisis – yet he was one of the most senior bad regulators that failed to respond to the fraud epidemic and prevent the crisis. As Dr. Bernanke’s appointment of Dr. Parkinson as the Fed’s top supervisor demonstrates, the Fed’s senior leadership has failed, despite the Great Recession, to learn from the crisis and abandon their faith in the theories and policies that caused the crisis. Worse, the Fed is an imperial anti-regulator, seeking vastly greater regulatory scope at the expense of (modestly) more effective sister regulatory agencies. The Fed’s failed leadership is setting us up for repeated, more severe financial crises.

Dr. Parkinson as Anti-Regulator

This essay focuses on Chairman Bernanke’s recent appointment of Dr. Parkinson to lead the Fed’s examination and supervision. My central point is that Dr. Bernanke appointed Dr. Parkinson because he shared Dr. Bernanke’s anti-regulatory ideology and has never changed those views even in the face of the Great Recession. The anti-regulator policies that Bernanke and Parkinson championed were the principal drivers of the fraud epidemic that have produced recurrent, intensifying crises.
Bernanke’s appointment as the Fed’s top supervisor of an individual that had no experience in regulation, in the midst of the greatest crisis of our lifetime, is irresponsible and dangerous on its face. No ideology has proven more disabling in this crisis than neoclassical economics. Dr. Parkinson is a neoclassical economist. The “skills” an economist would purportedly bring to supervision have proven to be disabilities in identifying and understanding fraud and risk.
We need not rely on generalities – Dr. Parkinson has a record relevant to supervision that we can evaluate. The most revealing aspects of that record fall into three categories. First, Dr. Parkinson was a leading proponent of the obscene (and successful) effort to prevent CFTC Chair Born from taking regulatory action to prevent destructive credit default swaps (CDS). Second, Dr. Parkinson, like Greenspan and Bernanke, subscribed to the naïve view that fraud was impossible in sophisticated financial markets and that credit rating agencies were reliable. Third, Dr. Parkinson endorsed the international “competition in regulatory laxity” that Dr. Bernanke (belatedly) warned has degraded regulation on a global basis. Here are the key passages from Dr. Parkinson’s congressional testimony:
Professional counterparties to privately negotiated contracts also have demonstrated their ability to protect themselves from losses from counterparty insolvencies and from fraud. In particular, they have insisted that dealers have financial strength sufficient to warrant a credit rating of A or higher. This, in turn, provides substantial protection against losses from fraud.
***
If this opportunity is lost, the Board is concerned that market participants will abandon hope for regulatory reform in the United States and take critical steps to shift their activity to jurisdictions that provide more appropriate legal and regulatory frameworks.
The “opportunity” Dr. Parkinson feared would be “lost” was to remove the CFTC’s ability to regulate CDS. Anti-regulation would “win” the international competition in laxity. His policies made possible the catastrophe that is AIG. Dr. Bernanke is aware of Dr. Parkinson’s record of anti-regulatory failure. He chose Dr. Parkinson because of that record in order to ensure that the Fed would not take regulatory actions that would upset the biggest banks, particularly the systemically dangerous institutions (SDIs) that are the real governors of the Fed’s anti-regulatory policies.

Timmy Geithner Must Go

SECRET EMAILS SHOW GEITHNER’S NYFED FORCED AIG TO HIDE DATA
By L. Randall Wray

Breaking News: As reported on Bloomberg here and in NYT here, secret emails show that the NYFed under Geithner’s command prohibited AIG from reporting that it was passing government bail-out funds directly to counterparties, including Goldman Sachs. AIG had been negotiating with the banks, asking them to take as little as 40 cents on the dollar against bad CDOs they held. AIG was the biggest insurer in the country and had provided $62 billion of credit default “insurance” to these banks. The CDOs went bad and AIG could not cover claims. It was forced into insolvency and the government came to the rescue, with $182 billion of bailout funds through last June. By all rights, its counterparties should have lost big on their bad bets. Apparently, Geithner arranged the bailout of AIG with full knowledge that it would pass the bailout funds directly to the banks. Whether or not some protection should have been provided to the banks, it clearly was not good public policy to provide dollar-for-dollar protection to them. If you are a favored Wall Street bank, no bet can go bad!

Note that Geithner worked with then Treasury Secretary Paulson to broker this deal. Paulson, of course, had been the CEO of Goldman. Geithner is the protégé of Clinton’s Treasury Secretary Rubin, also from Goldman.

According to Representative Darrell Issa, Republican of California, “It appears that the New York Fed deliberately pressured AIG to restrict and delay the disclosure of important information to the S.E.C.”. Not only did Geithner want to keep this information from the public, but also from fellow regulators. (Whoops, Geithner admitted he was never a regulator.) This smells fishy because it is. Geithner not only oversaw the operation but his office prohibited AIG from telling the truth about it. Remember, this is the same guy who “forgot” to pay his taxes (see here). He is ethically challenged. Should he be running the Treasury?

As Republican Congressman Brady of Texas put it, “Conservatives agree that, as point person, you’ve failed. Liberals are growing in that consensus as well. Poll after poll shows the public has lost confidence in this president’s ability to handle the economy. For the sake of our jobs, will you step down from your post?” (see here).

Let The Mea Culpas Begin, Part 2

BERNANKE’S APOLOGY FALLS FLAT
By L. Randall Wray

As discussed in Part 1 (see here), some of the policymakers responsible for this calamity have started to apologize. On January 3 Chairman Bernanke admitted that rather than using rate hikes back in 2004 to deflate the housing bubble, the Fed should have used “[s]tronger regulation and supervision aimed at problems with underwriting practices and lenders’ risk management” (see here).

There appear to be at least three reasons for Bernanke’s admission that the Fed did not do its job. First, and most obviously, Bernanke is up for reappointment (his term expires January 31)—and he will not sail through. The public is mad as hell, and politicians will have to put him through the wringer or face voter’s wrath in the next election. So Bernanke will have to appear contrite, and will apologize for his misdeeds many more times while Congress makes him sweat it out.

Second, Congress is actually considering whether it should strip the Fed of all regulatory and supervisory authority, given its miserable performance over the past decade—during which the Fed has consistently demonstrated that it has neither the competence nor the will to restrain Wall Street’s bankers. Since Greenspan took over the helm, the Fed has never seen a financial instrument or practice that it did not like—no matter how predatory or dangerous it was. Adjustable rate mortgages with teaser rates that would reset to levels guaranteed to produce defaults? Greenspan praised them (see here). Liar loans? Bring them on! NINJA loans (no income, no job, no assets)? No problem! Credit default swaps that let one gamble on the death of assets, firms, and countries? Prohibit government from regulating them! So Bernanke has to grovel and beg Congress to let the Fed retain at least some of its authority.

Third, many commentators blame the Fed for the crisis, arguing that it kept interest rates too low for too long, fueling the real estate bubble. Bernanke argues “When historical relationships are taken into account, it is difficult to ascribe the house price bubble either to monetary policy or to the broader macroeconomic environment”. If he can convince Congress that the problem was lack of oversight and regulation he can shift at least some of the blame to Treasury and Congress—since it was Treasury Secretary Rubin, and his protégé Summers, as well as Barney Frank, Christopher Dodd, and many others (significantly, Democrats who will now decide the Fed’s fate) who pushed through the deregulation bills in 1999 and 2000. He figures that if the Fed now supports re-regulation, he will be forgiven and the Democrats will be too embarrassed to admit their own misdeeds. (Significantly, Dodd has announced his retirement, in recognition of the role he played in creating the crisis. Another mea culpa on the way?)

While I do believe the Fed should be stripped of all such authority, I am sympathetic to his argument about monetary policy. Low interest rates do not cause bubbles. The Fed kept interest rates low after the NASDAQ crash because it feared deflation in the face of significant downward pressures on wages and prices globally (see here). The belief was that low interest rates would keep borrowing costs low for firms and households, helping to promote spending and recovery. In truth, spending is not very interest sensitive and the economy stumbled along in a “jobless recovery” in spite of the low rates. What was actually needed was a fiscal stimulus (if anything, low rates are counterproductive because they reduce government interest spending on its debt—as Japan’s experience taught us over the past couple of decades—but that is a point for another blog).

Still, the Fed was following conventional wisdom, and only began to gradually raise rates when job growth picked up in 2004. Over the following years, the Fed kept raising rates, and economic growth improved. (So much for conventional wisdom!) The worst excesses in real estate markets began only after the Fed had started raising rates, and lending standards continued their downward spiral the higher the Fed pushed its target interest rate. In other words, contrary to what many are arguing, the Fed DID raise rates but this had no impact in real estate markets.

Why not? Two main reasons. First, recall that Greenspan had promoted adjustable rate mortgages with teasers. No matter how high the Fed pushed rates, lenders could offer “option rate” deals in which borrowers would pay a rate of 1 or 2 percent for two to three years, after which there would be a huge reset. Lenders ensured the borrowers that there was no reason to worry about resets, since they would refinance into another option rate mortgage before the reset. That is the beauty of ARMs—they virtually eliminate the impact of monetary policy on real estate.

Second, and this was the key, house prices would only go up. At the time of refinance, the borrower would have far more equity in the home, thus obtain a better mortgage. Further, the borrower could flip the house and walk away with cash. While I will not go into this now, public policy actually encouraged homeowners to look at their houses as assets, rather than as homes (see here) (And now that many are walking away from underwater mortgages—treating houses as assets that became bad deals—policy makers and banksters are shocked, shocked!, that borrowers are treating their homes as nothing but bad assets.)

In truth, when speculation comes to dominate an asset class, there is no interest rate hike that can kill a bubble. If one expects asset prices to rise by 20%, 30%, or more per year, an interest rate of 10% will not dampen enthusiasm. To kill the housing boom, the Fed would have had to engage in a Volcker-like double-digit rate hike (in the early 1980s, he raised short-term interest rates above 20%). There was no political will in Washington (either at the Fed or the White House) for such drastic measures. Nor was there any reason to do this. Bernanke is quite correct: the Fed could have and should have killed the real estate boom with much less pain by directly clamping down on lenders, prohibiting the dangerous practices that were rampant.

Is there any reason to believe that Bernanke is the right Chairman, or that the Fed is the right institution, to lead the effort to re-regulate and re-supervise the financial sector? Quite simply, no.

The Bernanke-led Fed still does not understand monetary operations, as indicated by its recently announced plan to unwind its balance sheet. Over the course of the crisis, the Fed invented new procedures such as auctions through which it provided reserves. Throughout, it always was focused on quantities, rather than prices, using quantitative constraints on the size of the auctions. Further, Bernanke continually promoted “quantitative easing”, reflecting the view that quantities are what matter. Now, the Fed has begun to worry about the size of its balance sheet—and also the size of reserve holdings of the banking system (the other side of the balance sheet coin, because the Fed buys assets by issuing reserves). Still following the thoroughly discredited theory of Milton Friedman, too many bank reserves are supposed to promote too much lending which then causes too much spending and hence inflation. Thus, Bernanke and many outside the Fed fret about how the Fed can reduce outstanding reserves to prevent incipient inflation. The Fed proposes to create new bonds it will sell to reverse the “quantitative easing”.

Actually, the Fed’s tool is price, not quantity, of reserves. When the crisis hit, the Fed should have opened its discount window to lend reserves without limit, to all comers, and without collateral. That is how you stop a run. The Fed’s dallying and dillying about worsened the liquidity crisis, but it eventually provided the reserves that the financial institutions wanted to hold and its balance sheet eventually grew to $2 trillion. Banks are still worried about counterparty risk and possible runs, so they remain willing to hold massive amounts of reserves. When they decide risks have declined, they will begin to reduce reserve holdings. This will not require any special practices by the Fed. Banks will repay their loans from the Fed, using reserves. This automatically reduces reserves and the size of the Fed’s balance sheet. They will offer undesired reserves in the overnight, fed funds market. Since many banks will be trying to unload reserves at the same time, this will put downward pressure on the fed funds rate. The Fed will then offer to sell assets it is holding to mop up the excess reserves (banks will use reserves to buy assets the Fed offers). This will also reduce reserves and the size of the Fed’s balance sheet. All of this will happen automatically, following the same procedures the Fed has always followed. All it needs to do is to watch the fed funds rate, and when it falls below target the Fed will drain reserves to relieve the downward pressure on overnight rates.

Quantitative easing was a misguided notion, and reversal of quantitative easing is similarly misguided. It simply indicates that Bernanke still does not understand how the Fed operates. In truth, formulating and implementing monetary policy is extremely simple and can be reduced to the following:

1. Offer to lend reserves at the discount window at 50 basis points to all qualifying institutions;

2. Pay 25 basis points on reserve holdings;

3. Perform par clearing of checks between banks, and for the Treasury.

Surely President Obama can find a chair who can do that.

The Fed’s relationship with banks is too cozy to make it a good regulator. It is, after all, owned by private banks. The Fed’s district banks are often run by bankers, and district Fed presidents take turns sitting on the policy-making FOMC. There is a particularly incestuous relationship between the NYFed and Wall Street banks—with Timmy Geithner as a prime example of the dangers posed (“I’ve never been a regulator” proclaimed the former head of the NYFed). It does not have the proper culture to closely supervise financial institutions. Its top body, the Board of Governors, are political appointees often with no experience in regulation (many are academic economists, typically mainstream and with a free market orientation). While the FDIC was also mostly asleep at the wheel over the past decade, it does have the proper culture and experience to take over responsibility for regulating and supervising the financial sector. With some management changes, and hiring of a team of criminologists tasked to pursue fraud, the FDIC is the right institution for this job.