Author Archives: Devin Smith

The December Jobs Report: Disappointing But Not Surprising

By Robert E. Prasch
Middlebury College

We all know that predictions in economics can be fraught. This is for a variety of reasons, with the absence of controlled experiments high on the list. However, over the years we have learned a few things through the observation of regularities and by deducing from the things about which we are reasonably certain to formulate conjectures about things of which we are less certain.

With this in mind, let us consider the December jobs report.  By all accounts, it was a “disappointing” result with only 74,000 jobs created. The “headline” rate of unemployment did fall appreciably, but that was solely and completely due to an increase in the number of people who have entirely given up looking for paid work. While we can all agree that the result is disappointing, I would like to take issue with the almost ubiquitous report that it was “surprising.”

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Kansas, Where Science De-Evolves into Creation Myths

By William K. Black

This is the fourth article in my evolving series of pieces prompted by the Kansas Regents’ new policy that eviscerates academic freedom and tenure.  In my third installment I explained that the Regents’ action, while cowardly, unconstitutional, and self-destructive, was not taken on their initiative but in response to extortion by Kansas legislative leaders.

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The Greatest Myth Propagated About The FED: Central Bank Independence (Part 2)

By L. Randall Wray

Last time we took a historical perspective on supposed Fed independence. In this blog we look at the myth of Fed independence from its creator, the Congress and from the Treasury.

Independent from Congress: Discretion in Selecting Tools

The strongest case for Fed independence would be in its discretion to choose the tools and targets to pursue Congressional mandates. Congress has shown little interest in interfering with the details of monetary policy implementation, preferring only to mandate the ultimate goals. The period from 1979 to the mid 1980s was an exception as Congress had become enamored with Milton Friedman’s monetarist focus on growth of the money supply. Even after the Fed had dropped money growth targets from serious consideration, Congress still wanted the Fed to provide them. However, for the most part, Congress leaves these details to the Fed.

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The Greatest Myth Propagated About The FED: Central Bank Independence (Part 1)

By L. Randall Wray

It has been commonplace to speak of central bank independence—as if it were both a reality and a necessity. Discussions of the Fed invariably refer to legislated independence and often to the famous 1951 Accord that apparently settled the matter. [1] While everyone recognizes the Congressionally-imposed dual mandate, the Fed has substantial discretion in its interpretation of the vague call for high employment and low inflation. For a long time economists presumed those goals to be in conflict but in recent years Chairman Greenspan seemed to have successfully argued that pursuit of low inflation rather automatically supports sustainable growth with maximum feasible employment.

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What about Ecuador?

By William K. Black

The Wall Street Journal has written it’s latest “just so” article about how leftist Latin American leaders (Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela) are bad and rightist Latin American leaders (Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru) are wonderful.  It quotes favorably this dismissal of progressive leaders.

“’We set out to create the Pacific Alliance because we wanted to set ourselves apart from the populists,’ said Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, a former Peruvian finance minister. ‘We wanted a thinking man’s axis.’”

No thinking women, allowed, of course.  Dr. Michelle Bachelet just busted the “axis” by being re-elected President of Chile by a large margin.  No one intelligent, of course, could be a progressive, at least that is what the right claims.

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Christie’s Staff Reveals Why Christie will Never be President

By William K. Black

No one can know the strengths and weaknesses of an elected official as well as his close aides.  The official, unintentionally, reveals a great deal about himself when he chooses those aides.  It is also the relatively smaller things that are most telling about character.  How do the official and his aides react not to moments of crisis but to the routine disappointments inherent in life?  How does he routinely use power?  What level of empathy do the official and his aides demonstrate in day-to-day life?  Does he and do his aides care about all the citizens or only their political supporters?

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DIAGRAMS & DOLLARS: modern money illustrated (Part 2)

By J.D. Alt

5. TREASURY BONDS—Are they really what we think they are?

Recall that in the old diagram we started out with—the one Congress seems to be using as a guide for its budgeting process—Treasury Bonds appear to be the mechanism by which the Federal  Government “borrows” Dollars from the PS pot. Since we now understand that a Dollar is actually the Federal Government’s I.O.U. for tax credits, we can also see that it is illogical for the Federal Government to “borrow” these I.O.U.s. Why would it “borrow” its own I.O.U.—something it can instantly create any time it wants by simply saying, “I Owe You”? If that is the case, why does the FG “sell” Treasury Bonds?

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DIAGRAMS & DOLLARS: modern money illustrated (Part 1)

By J.D. Alt

1. The “unsolvable” riddle of our National Budget

Being an architect, I’m fascinated by diagrams visualizing things which otherwise are invisible. In designing a building we usually begin with diagrams to explore and understand the functional and spatial relationships—the flows and often unexpected interactions—the architecture needs to accommodate. Getting the diagrams right is important—if they’re wrong or incomplete, the building we design could turn out to be a dysfunctional disappointment for its owners and users.

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Essays in Monetary Theory and Policy: On the Nature of Money (10)

By Brian Hartley*

Modern banks are professional arbiters of financial IOUs secondary to that of the state or issuing authority. Central bank liabilities – reserves – form the most liquid and foundational instrument in the hierarchy of money, with intermediate obligations between banks ranking next, down finally to obligations issued by individuals. Banks facilitate the transfer of IOUs across and between various levels of the hierarchy, allowing transactions between individuals, extension of credit from the liquid to the illiquid, the transformation of maturities and transference of risk. Balance sheet expansion provides the liquidity necessary for increasing sophistication of the credit and payment system.

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The President and Republicans Are Both Wrong on Deficit Reduction

In early Summer 2013, Class Conscience interviewed Dr. Edward J. Nell, the Malcolm B. Smith Professor of Economics at the New School for Social Research in New York City. Both Drs. Stephanie Kelton and Mathew Forstater were students of Dr. Nell.