Tag Archives: MMT

Playing Monopolis Monopoly: An inquiry into why we are making ourselves so miserable

By J. D. Alt

Why does it seem like there isn’t enough money to pay for the things we really need? The headlines are filled with stories about our nation’s “debt problem” and dire warnings about our impending “bankruptcy.” As an architect who fills his waking hours thinking up all kinds of wonderful things we could be building, I’m alarmed by the idea there isn’t enough money to pay for any of them. Before wasting more time dreaming, I had to find out: Is it really true? Are we really too poor to put America back to work making and building the things we need to maintain a prosperous nation?

Searching for an answer, I discovered a small (but growing) group of economists (see here, here, here, here, here, here) who represent an emerging school of thought known as “modern monetary theory” (MMT). These men and women are valiantly trying to make us all understand a paradigm shift that occurred some forty years ago, when the world abandoned the gold standard. Their key insight shocked me: A sovereign government is never revenue constrained when it is the Monopoly issuer of its own pure fiat currency; it has all the money that’s needed to put its citizens to work building anything—and providing any service—that is desired by the public (provided the real resources are available). Even more remarkable, sovereign “deficits” in the fiat currency are just the accounting record of the surpluses that have been injected into the private economy. Eliminating the sovereign currency deficit by imposing austerity will not make the economy healthier; it will, in effect, bankrupt the citizens!

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Quantitative Easing and Commodity Prices: An MMT Approach

By Payam Sharifi
The author is currently pursuing his Ph.D. in Economics and Public Administration at the University of Missouri – Kansas City

One of the most common observations I make as I frequent the comments section of MMT blogs are the arguments in objection to it.  When one mentions “keystrokes”, these posters immediately think of Weimar Germany and machines printing money and throwing them out into the streets (via helicopter or otherwise).  After these commentators understand (through the help of other posters) that MMT notes that inflation is the only possible constraint to the issuer of a sovereign currency, they typically have their “gotcha” moment.  Quantitative Easing (QE), they note, has been responsible for higher commodity prices and hence, MMT’ers are a bunch of crazy fanatics who want to turn the nation and the world into Weimar (or Zimbabwe).  The even larger implication is that enacting goals for the public purpose is not something the government should be involved with.  The view that QE is responsible for higher commodity prices is not entirely without merit, but not for reasons typically ascribed to it.  By understanding the institutional aspects that MMT describes, one will understand not only the real transmission mechanism but also some other problems and solutions associated with higher energy prices.  This post makes an outline of these issues.

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Developing Nations

By Dan Kervick

Matt Yglesias has described three popular contemporary political approaches to the challenge of maintaining our national commitment to “providing health care services to the elderly, the disabled, and the poor and also to bolstering the general incomes of elderly people.”  One is Congressman Paul Ryan’s approach of reducing the level of the future commitment in order to bring it in line with “historic norms about the level of taxation.”  The second is the liberal approach of preserving our existing level of commitment into the future, even if that means raising taxes in the aggregate.  The third is “the hazy Obama/Simpson-Bowlesish center that wants to raise taxes and cut programs.”

Perhaps this short list characterizes the main political answers reasonably well, if the main political question is how to tame the budget, and shrink or control the deficit.  But I would like to point out that all three answers have something in common:  Not a single one of these approaches, as usually presented, contains any call for the national government to engage seriously in what one might call “investing in our future”.  All three of them reflect the defeatist mindsets of different camps of worn out oldsters, each promoting a different way of giving up, making do, or just hanging on.  They are all pathologies of the dismal “No, we can’t!” era in which we now live.

The promoters of these three variations on the theme of austere, hard news pessimism no doubt fancy themselves realists and responsible grownups.  But they are nothing of the sort.  They are burned-out casualties of neoliberalism, afflicted with dead imaginations or ideological blinders, who have forgotten what it means to grow a country and build a society.  We need to move beyond their miserable and dismal trilemma.  If the die-hard adherents of these schools of thought want to mope around the shuffleboard courts at the End of History Home for Final Surrender, let them.  But it’s time for the rest of us to reject all three approaches and reignite our history.

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Responses to MMP Blog #46: The Job Guarantee – Program Manageability

By L. Randall Wray

Responses to MMP Blog #46: The Job Guarantee – Program Manageability

Sorry, late yet again. One more week of teaching and then things should be less hectic. Note I had planned for 52 MMP blogs and we are nearing the end…… But it looks like we’ll need a few more. I’m going to be a bit lazy this week, cutting and pasting the comments and providing brief responses.

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MMP Blog #45: The JG and Affordability Issues with Special Considerations for Developing Nations

By L. Randall Wray

Affordability Issues. As we have seen over the course of the previous 44 blogs, a sovereign nation operating with its own currency in a floating exchange rate regime can always financially afford an JG/ELR program. So long as there are workers who are ready and willing to work at the program wage, the government can “afford” to hire them. It pays wages by crediting bank accounts. If it credits more accounts than it debits through tax payments, a deficit results. This initially takes the form of net credits to the banking system, held as reserves. If the reserve holdings are excessive, banks bid the overnight rate down. The government can then either choose to let the overnight rate fall toward zero (or its support rate if it pays interest on reserves), or it can intervene to sell interest-paying bonds at the desired support rate; this will drain excess reserves. In no sense is the government spending on JG/ELR constrained either by tax revenues or the demand for its bonds.

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The Political Path to Full Employment

By Dan Kervick

Paul Krugman argues in a recent New York Times column  that right-wing critics of Ben Bernanke and his colleagues are trying to bully the Fed into a misguided obsession with inflation, and that “the truth is that we’d be better off if the Fed paid less attention to inflation and more attention to unemployment. Indeed, a bit more inflation would be a good thing, not a bad thing.”

Krugman is absolutely right to lament conservative pundits’ and politicians’ obsessions with inflation when tens of millions of Americans are languishing in unemployment, with all of the personal, social and economic misery and waste that unemployment entails.  But his argument, which assumes that the Fed can boost employment by engineering higher inflation, is problematic.  He defends the inflationist approach this way:

“For one thing, large parts of the private sector continue to be crippled by the overhang of debt accumulated during the bubble years; this debt burden is arguably the main thing holding private spending back and perpetuating the slump. Modest inflation would, however, reduce that overhang — by eroding the real value of that debt — and help promote the private-sector recovery we need. Meanwhile, other parts of the private sector (like much of corporate America) are sitting on large hoards of cash; the prospect of moderate inflation would make letting the cash just sit there less attractive, acting as a spur to investment — again, helping to promote overall recovery.”

I believe this is the wrong approach.  The Fed’s ability to boost employment is very limited, well-intentioned citations of the Fed’s full employment “mandate” notwithstanding.  Rather than looking to central bankers and the banking system to accomplish a task for which they are not really cut out, we should turn our attention back toward fiscal policy as the primary tool for bringing the country up to full employment and keeping it there.   And rather than seeking engineered inflation as the mechanism for boosting spending and employment, we should implement the MMT job guarantee proposal to achieve full employment and price stability at the same time.

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Bring Back Fiscal Policy

By Dan Kervick

The recent exchange on the nature of banking among Paul Krugman, Scott Fullwiler, Steve Keen and others has been feisty and instructive.  But some readers might be left wondering whether the whole exercise is too wonky by half.   The anatomical details of banking systems might be juicy and interesting for the academics who like to dissect those systems and dig deep into their entrails.  But how significant are the details for practical questions of public policy?  They are in fact very significant.

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Krugman’s Flashing Neon Sign

By Scott Fullwiler

Update: Paul Krugman has posted a reply to this post that is a straw man.  He and Nick Rowe are viewing this all through the lens of the old Monetarist/Keynesian debates in which there was a choice b/n interest rate targets and monetary aggregate targets; the Monetarist critique assumed the Keynesians were going to keep interest rates at the same level forever and not change them.  Once John Taylor came up with his “rule,” everyone agreed an interest rate target could work. 

What we are talking about here is operational tactics–the CB can only target an interest rate.  It cannot target a reserve balances or the monetary base directly.  But that is different from strategy–that is, WHERE the CB puts its target and WHEN it chooses to change the target.  There is NOTHING in anything I’ve ever said or anything any PK’er, MMT’er, etc., has ever said that suggests the CB can’t set the target wherever it wants whenever it wants.  The point is that whatever the target is, THAT is what its daily operations defend directly, not a monetary aggregate, not the monetary base, not reserve balances.  There is nothing in anything I’ve said that would preclude the CB from running a Taylor’s Rule type strategy, for instance, that responds at any point in time endogenously to the state of the economy.  That is, the target rate is an exogenous control variable (i.e., it is necessarily set by the CB) that it sets endogenously in response to economic events.

The debate between Paul Krugman and my friend Steve Keen regarding how banks work (see here, here, here, and here) has caused me to revisit an old quote.  Back in the 1990s I would use Krugman’s book, Peddling Prosperity (1995), in my intermediate macroeconomics courses since it provides a good overview of what were then contemporary debates in macroeconomic theory as well as Krugman’s criticisms of various popular views on macroeconomic policy issues from that era.  One passage near the very end of the book has always remained in the back of my mind; in it, Krugman critiques a popular view that was and still is highly influential regarding productivity and trade policy.  He writes: “So, if you hear someone say something along the lines of ‘America needs higher productivity so that it can compete in today’s global economy,’ never mind who he is or how plausible he sounds.  He might as well be wearing a flashing neon sign that reads:  ‘I DON’T KNOW WHAT I’M TALKING ABOUT.’” (p. 280; emphasis in original)

In his latest post in this debate (which Keen replied to here), Krugman demonstrates that he has a very good grasp of banking as it is presented in a traditional money and banking textbook.  Unfortunately for him, though, there’s virtually nothing in that description of banking that is actually correct.  Instead of a persuasive defense of his own views on banking, his post is in essence his own flashing neon sign where he provides undisputable evidence that “I don’t know what I’m talking about.”

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(Re) Occupy Greece

By William K. Black
(Cross-posted from Benzinga.com)

While the Occupy Wall Street (OWS) movement set its sights on occupying a financial center, Germany has accomplished the vastly more impressive feat of occupying an entire nation – Greece.  Germany has experience at occupying Greece having done so during World War II.  The art of occupying another nation is to recruit a local puppet to do the dirty work required to repress the citizens.  Germany used several puppets, most notoriously the murderous Ioannis Rallis, to (nominally) rule Greece and terrify the Greek people during World War II.  (After Germany’s defeat, Rallis was executed for his treason.)

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The Public Money Monopoly (Pt. II)

By Dan Kervick

In Part One of this essay I defended the MMT view that the national government is the monopoly issuer of the currency in the US, and I attempted to clarify the actual economic status of that government currency with respect to the Fed’s conventional balance sheet accounting.   In this concluding part of the essay I will further develop the contrast between the government’s role as currency issuer and the role of private sector households and firms – including commercial banks – as currency users.  I will then make a few points about how the government supplies currency to the non-governmental sectors of the economy before concluding with a discussion of several topics that tend to engender resistance to the very idea that such a currency monopoly exists.

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