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Not with a Bang, but a Whimper: Bank of America’s Death Rattle

By William K. Black

Bob Ivry, Hugh Son and Christine Harper have written anarticle that needs to be read by everyone interested in the financialcrisis.  The article (available here) is entitled: BofA Said to Split RegulatorsOver Moving Merrill Derivatives to Bank Unit. The thrust of their story is that Bank of America’s holdingcompany, BAC, has directed the transfer of a large number of troubled financialderivatives from its Merrill Lynch subsidiary to the federally insured bank Bank of America (BofA).  The story reports that the FederalReserve supported the transfer and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation(FDIC) opposed it.  Yves Smith of Naked Capitalism has written an appropriately blistering attack on this outrageous action, which puts thepublic at substantially increased risk of loss.  

I write toadd some context, point out additional areas of inappropriate actions, and adda regulatory perspective gained from dealing with analogous efforts by holdingcompanies to foist dangerous affiliate transactions on insureddepositories.  I’ll begin by adding somehistorical context to explain how B of A got into this maze of affiliateconflicts.

KenLewis’ “Scorched Earth” Campaign against B of A’s Shareholders

AcquiringCountrywide: the High Cost of CEO Adolescence

During this crisis, Ken Lewis went on a buying spreedesigned to allow him to brag that his was not simply bigger, but thebiggest.  Bank of America’s holdingcompany – BAC – became the acquirer of last resort.  Lewis began his war on BAC’s shareholders byordering an artillery salvo on BAC’s own position.  What better way was there to destroyshareholder value than purchasing the most notorious lender in the world –Countrywide.  Countrywide was in themidst of a death spiral.  The FDIC wouldsoon have been forced to pay an acquirer tens of billions of dollars to induceit to take on Countrywide’s nearly limitless contingent liabilities and toxicassets.  Even an FDIC-assistedacquisition would have been a grave mistake. Acquiring thousands of Countrywide employees whose primary mission wasto make fraudulent and toxic loans was an inelegant form of financialsuicide.  It also revealed the negligiblevalue Lewis placed on ethics and reputation.  
    
But Lewis did not wait to acquire Countrywide with FDICassistance.  He feared that a rival wouldacquire it first and win the CEO bragging contest about who had the biggest,baddest bank.  His acquisition ofCountrywide destroyed hundreds of billions of dollars of shareholder value andled to massive foreclosure fraud by what were now B of A employees. 

But there are two truly scary parts of the story of B of A’sacquisition of Countrywide that have received far too little attention.  B of A claims that it conducted extensive duediligence before acquiring Countrywide and discovered only minor problems.  If that claim is true, then B of A has beendoomed for years regardless of whether it acquired Countrywide.  The proposed acquisition of Countrywide was hugeand exceptionally controversial even within B of A.  Countrywide was notorious for its fraudulentloans.  There were numerous lawsuits andformer employees explaining how these frauds worked. 

B of A is really “Nations Bank” (formerly named NCNB).  When Nations Bank acquired B of A (the SanFrancisco based bank), the North Carolina management took completecontrol.  The North Carolina managementdecided that “Bank of America” was the better brand name, so it adopted thatname.  The key point to understand isthat Nations/NCNB was created through a large series of aggressive mergers, sothe bank had exceptional experience in conducting due diligence of targets foracquisition and it would have sent its top team to investigate Countrywidegiven its size and notoriety.  Theacquisition of Countrywide did not have to be consummated exceptionallyquickly.  Indeed, the deal had an “out”that allowed B of A to back out of the deal if conditions changed in an adversemanner (which they obviously did).  If Bof A employees conducted extensive due diligence of Countrywide and could notdiscover its obvious, endemic frauds, abuses, and subverted systems then theyare incompetent.  Indeed, that word istoo bloodless a term to describe how worthless the due diligence team wouldhave had to have been.  Given the manyacquisitions the due diligence team vetted, B of A would have been doomedbecause it would have routinely been taken to the cleaners in those earlierdeals.

That scenario, the one B of A presents, is not credible.  It is far more likely that B of A’s seniormanagement made it clear to the head of the due diligence review that the dealwas going to be done and that his or her report should support that conclusion.  This alternative explanation fits well with Bof A’s actual decision-making. Countrywide’s (and B of A’s) reportedfinancial condition fell sharply after the deal was signed.  Lewis certainly knew that B of A’s actualfinancial condition was much worse than its reported financial condition andhad every reason to believe that this difference would be even worse atCountrywide given its reputation for making fraudulent loans.  B of A could have exercised its option towithdraw from the deal and saved vast amounts of money.  Lewis, however, refused to do so.  CEOs do not care only about money.  Ego is a powerful driver of conduct, and CEOscan be obsessed with status, hierarchy, and power.  Of course, Lewis knew he could walk awaywealthy after becoming a engine of mass destruction of B of A shareholdervalue, so he could indulge his ego in a manner common to adolescent males.   


AcquiringMerrill Lynch: the Lure of Liar’s Loans

Merrill Lynch is the quintessential example of why it wascommon for the investment banks to hold in portfolio large amounts ofcollateralized debt obligations (CDOs). Some observers have jumped to the naïve assumption that this indicatesthat the senior managers thought the CDOs were safe investments.  The “recipe” for an investor maximizingreported income differs only slightly from the recipe for lenders.

  1. Grow rapidly by
  2. Holding poor quality assets that provide a premium nominal yield while
  3. Employing extreme leverage, and
  4. Providing only grossly inadequate allowances for future losses on the poor quality assets
Investment banks that followed this recipe (and most largeU.S. investment banks did), were guaranteed to report record (albeit fictional)short-term income.  That income wascertain to produce extreme compensation for the controlling officers.  The strategy was also certain to produceextensive losses in the longer term – unless the investment bank could sell itslosing position to another entity that would then bear the loss. 

The optimal means of committing this form of accountingcontrol fraud was with the AAA-rated top tranche of CDOs.  Investment banks frequently purport to basecompensation on risk-adjusted return.  Ifthey really did so investment bankers would receive far less compensation.  The art, of course, is to vastly understatethe risk one is taking and attribute short-term reported gains to the officer’s brilliance in achievingsupra-normal returns that are not attributable to increased risk(“alpha”).  Some of the authors of Guaranteed to Fail call this processmanufacturing “fake alpha.” 

The authors are largely correct about “fake alpha.”  The phrase and phenomenon are correct, butthe mechanism they hypothesize for manufacturing fake alpha has no basis inreality.  They posit honest gambles on“extreme tail” events likely to occur only in rare circumstances.  They provide no real world examples.  If risk that the top tranche of a CDO wouldsuffer a material loss of market values was, in reality, extremely rare then itwould be impossible to achieve a substantial premium yield.  The strategy would diminish alpha rather thanmaximizing false alpha.  The risk thatthe top tranche of a CDO would suffer a material loss in market value washighly probable.  It was not a tailevent, much less an “extreme tail” event. CDOs were commonly backed by liar’s loans and the incidence of fraud inliar’s loans was in the 90% range.  Thetop tranches of CDOs were virtually certain to suffer severe losses as soon asthe bubble stalled and refinancing was no longer readily available to delay thewave of defaults.  Because liar’s loanswere primarily made to borrowers who were not creditworthy and financiallyunsophisticated, the lenders had the negotiating leverage to charge premiumyields.  The officers controlling therating agencies and the investment banks were complicit in creating a corruptsystem for rating CDOs that maximized their financial interests by routinelyproviding AAA ratings to the top tranche of CDOs “backed” largely by fraudulentloans.  The combination of the fake AAArating and premium yield on the top tranche of fraudulently constructed (andsold) CDOs maximized “fake alpha” and made it the “sure thing” that is one ofthe characteristics of accounting control fraud (see Akerlof & Romer 1993;Black 2005).  This is why many of theinvestment banks (and, eventually, Fannie and Freddie) held substantial amountsof the top tranches of CDOs.  (A similardynamic existed for lower tranches, but investment banks also found it muchmore difficult to sell the lowest tranches.)  

Merrill Lynch was known for the particularly large CDOpositions it retained in portfolio. These CDO positions doomed Merrill Lynch.  B of A knew that Merrill Lynch had tremendouslosses in its derivatives positions when it chose to acquire MerrillLynch. 

Giventhis context, only the Fed, and BAC, could favor the derivatives deal

Lewis and his successor, Brian Moynihan, have destroyednearly one-half trillion dollars in BAC shareholder value.  (See my prior post on the “Divine Right ofBank Profits…”)  BAC continues todeteriorate and the credit rating agencies have been downgrading it because ofits bad assets, particularly its derivatives. BAC’s answer is to “transfer” the bad derivatives to the insured bank – transforming (alaIreland) a private debt into a public debt. 

Banking regulators have known for well over a century aboutthe acute dangers of conflicts of interest. Two related conflicts have generated special rules designed to protectthe bank and the insurance fund.  Onerestricts transactions with senior insiders and the other restrictstransactions with affiliates.  The scamis always the same when it comes to abusive deals with affiliates – theytransfer bad (or overpriced) assets or liabilities to the insured institution.  As S&L regulators, we recurrently facedthis problem.  For example, Ford MotorCompany attempted to structure an affiliate transaction that was harmful to theinsured S&L (First Nationwide).  Thebank, because of federal deposit insurance, typically has a higher creditrating than its affiliate corporations.

BAC’s request to transfer the problem derivatives to B of Awas a no brainer – unfortunately, it was apparently addressed to officials atthe Fed who meet that description.  Anycompetent regulator would have said: “No, Hell NO!”  Indeed, any competent regulator would havedeveloped two related, acute concerns immediately upon receiving therequest.  First, the holding company’scontrolling managers are a severe problem because they are seeking to exploitthe insured institution.  Second, thesenior managers of B of A acceded to the transfer, apparently without protest,even though the transfer poses a severe threat to B of A’s survival.  Their failure to act to prevent the transfercontravenes both their fiduciary duties of loyalty and care and should lead totheir resignations.

Now here’s the really bad news.  First, this transfer is a superb “naturalexperiment” that tests one of the most important questions central to thehealth of our financial system.  Does theFed represent and vigorously protect the interests of the people or thesystemically dangerous institutions (SDIs) – the largest 20 banks?  We have run a real world test.  The sad fact is that very few Americans willbe surprised that the Fed represented the interests of the SDIs even though theywere directly contrary to the interests of the nation.  The Fed’s constant demands for (andcelebration of) “independence” from democratic government, combined withslavish dependence on and service to the CEOs of the SDIs has gone beyondscandal to the point of farce.  I suggestorganized “laugh ins” whenever Fed spokespersons prate about their“independence.”

Second, I would bet large amounts of money that I do nothave that neither B of A’s CEO nor the Fed even thought about whether thetransfer was consistent with the CEO’s fiduciary duties to B of A (v.BAC).  We took depositions during theS&L debacle in which senior officials of Lincoln Savings and its affiliateswere shocked when we asked “whose interests were you representing – the S&Lor the affiliate?”  They had obviouslynever even considered their fiduciary duties or identified their actualclient.  We blocked a transaction thatwould have caused grave injury to the insured S&L by taking the holdingcompany (Pinnnacle West) off the hook for its obligations to the S&L.  That transaction would have passed routinely,but we flew to the board of directors meeting of the S&L and reminded themthat their fiduciary duty was to the S&L, that the transaction was clearlydetrimental to the S&L and to the benefit of the holding company, and thatwe would sue them and take the most vigorous possible enforcement actionsagainst them personally if they violated their fiduciary duties.  That caused them to refuse to approve thetransaction – which resulted in a $450 million payment from the holding companyto the S&L.  (I know, $450 millionsounds quaint now in light of the scale of the ongoing crisis, but back then itpaid for our salaries in perpetuity.) 

Third, reread the Bloomberg column and wrap your mind aroundthe size of Merrill Lynch’s derivatives positions.  Next, consider that Merrill is only one,shrinking player in derivatives. Finally, reread Yves’ column in NakedCapitalism where she explains (correctly) that many derivatives cannot beused safely.  Add to that my point abouthow they can be used to create a “sure thing” of record fictional profits,record compensation, and catastrophic losses. This is particularly true about credit default swaps (CDS) because ofthe grotesque accounting treatment that typically involves no allowances forfuture losses. (FASB:  you must fix thisurgently or you will allow a “perfect crime.”). It is insane that we did not pass a one sentence law repealing theCommodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000. Between the SDIs, the massive, sometimes inherently unsafe and largelyopaque financial derivatives, the appointment, retention, and promotion offailed anti-regulators, and the continuing ability of elite control frauds toloot with impunity we are inviting recurrent, intensifying crises. 

I’ll close with a suggestion and request to reporters.  Please find out who within the Fed approvedthis deal and the exact composition of the assets and liabilities that weretransferred.


To keep up with Bill’s work follow on Twitter @WilliamKBlack and @deficitowl

Creative Ways to Promote MMT

We always knew our readers were a smart bunch, but we had no idea how imaginative you are! Please keep sharing your creative endeavors with us (merchandise, animated videos, signs/slogans, etc.), and please keep spreading the word about MMT and NEP.  Understanding the monetary system is the first step in a long journey toward creating a better world for us all.

Courtesy of Tschaff Reisberg

Today’s Modern Money Primer

Complications and private preferences. There are often two objections to the claim that government spending effectively takes place by simultaneously crediting the recipient’s bank account as well as the bank’s reserves: a) it must be more complicated than this; and b) what if the private sector’s spending and portfolio preferences do not match the government’s budget outcome?
Read More…

MMP Blog #20: Effects of Sovereign Government Budget Deficits on Saving, Reserves and Interest Rates, (continued)

By L. Randall Wray

Complications and private preferences. There are often two objections to the claim that government spending effectively takes place by simultaneously crediting the recipient’s bank account as well as the bank’s reserves: a) it must be more complicated than this; and b) what if the private sector’s spending and portfolio preferences do not match the government’s budget outcome?

The first of these objections has been carefully dealt with in a long series of published articles and working papers (by Bell (a.k.a. Kelton), Bell and Wray, Wray, Fullwiler, and Rezende who look at actual operating procedures in the US, Canada, and Brazil; I’ll provide references later as well as more details). In practice, the treasury cannot directly credit bank accounts when it wants to spend.

Rather, a complex series of steps is required that involve the treasury, the central bank and private banks each time the treasury spends or taxes. The central bank and the treasury develop such procedures to ensure that government is able to spend, that taxpayer payments to treasury do not lead to bounced checks, and—most importantly—that undesired effects on banking system reserves do not occur. While the end result is exactly as described above (treasury spending leads to bank credits, taxes lead to debits, and budget deficits mean net credits to both demand deposits and bank reserves), it is more complicated.

This often generates another question: what if the central bank refused to cooperate with the treasury? The answer is that the central bank would miss its overnight interest rate target (and eventually would endanger the payments system because checks would start bouncing). Readers are referred to the substantial literature surrounding the coordination (more details for the wonky coming up in a later blog). Nonspecialists can be assured that the simple explanation above is sufficient: the conclusion from close analysis is that government deficits do lead to net credits to reserves, and if undesired excess reserves are created they are drained through bond sales to maintain the central bank’s target interest rate.

The operational impact of bond sales is to substitute government bonds for reserves—it is like providing banks with a savings account at the central bank (government bonds) instead of a checking account (central bank reserves). This is done to relieve downward pressure on the overnight interest rate.

With regard to the second objection we first must notice that if the government’s fiscal stance is not consistent with the desired saving of the nongovernment sector, then spending and income adjust until the fiscal outcome and the nongovernment sector’s balance are consistent. For example, if the government tried to run a deficit larger than the desired surplus of the nongovernment sector, then some combination of higher spending by the nongovernment sector (lower nongovernment saving and lower budget deficit), greater tax receipts (thus lower budget deficit and lower saving), or higher nongovernment sector income (so greater desired saving equal to the higher deficit) is produced.

Since tax revenues (and some government spending) are endogenously determined by the performance of the economy, the fiscal stance is at least partially determined endogenously; by the same token, the actual balance achieved by the nongovernment sector is endogenously determined by income and saving propensities. By accounting identity (presented above) it is not possible for the nongovernment’s balance to differ from the government’s balance (with the sign reversed—one has a deficit and the other a surplus); this also means it is impossible for the aggregate saving of the nongovernment sector to be less than (or greater than) the budget deficit.

So, those are the general responses to those objections. I will do a wonky blog later with more details. But next week we look in more detail at the private saving decision.

The Message I Would Deliver from Zucotti Park

By Marshall Auerback
First, to the thin blue line: thank you and we ask for your protection rather than your discipline. Why should we expect that? Because the forces we are protesting are the very forces making it difficult for you and your families to save your wages and keep up with the cost of living. The Wall Street companies  giving you contributions that are part of the problem, not the solution.  They are bribing you to act against your own interests. So in protesting here, we are protesting on your behalf against a corrupted system, and we ask for your protection.
Second, to Brookfield Properties. This square produces little if any revenues for your shareholders. It is made of concrete and bricks. We have neither destroyed it, nor do we intend to. We cannot rationally understand your anxiety in letting us gather here, so we must conclude that your repeated demands for us to leave so you can clean it come from somewhere else. We will meet your demands with the more powerful force of massive non-violent resistance.
To the Board of Directors of Brookfield Properties, if you continue your demands for us to disband, we will scrutinize closely your contracts with the City of New York, past, present and in the future, to ensure that there is no evidence, explicit or circumstantial, of impropriety. We will deliberately hold your company specifically to the highest level of scrutiny.
Third, to Mayor Bloomberg. We see you and your business, Bloomberg LP, which caters specifically to the very same Wall Street banks and brokers whose practices we are protesting, as being in a violent conflict of interest. Thus, we do not respect your encouragement to leave and we will not obey and order for us to disband, which comes from your office.
Fourth, to the public at large: Brookfield Properties and Mayor Bloomberg do not have natural interests inserting themselves into this protest. To whomever it is whispering in their ears for us to disband, we say show yourself. If you are frightened that exposing the masses to the plutocratic status quo, consisting of our banking system and centrist politicians, we say you should be frightened. We will win because we have intelligence, moral clarity and because we are aggregating. You will lose because you are centralized only in systemic terms and there is no incentive for individuals supporting the status quo to fight to retain it.
And finally, we call out to the Tea Party, whom the mainstream media has artfully positioned as right-wing hard-headed idiots. We do not see you that way at all, but rather as every bit as idealistic as we are. When we strip out our social differences, the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street movements have much in common, namely the recognition that the closed power system of the Washington/banking axis is suffocating 99% of the people of power. We both agree this power must be reversed and given back to the people. So join with us in support of this one issue, and we may then settle our social differences once power is restored to the people.

Why You and I Can’t Spend More Than We Bring In, but the Government Can – and Probably Should

Watch Stephanie Kelton explain why TINA falls apart as justification to tolerate unemployment once we understand the relationship between the United States and her currency.  The lecture took place at Luther College in beautiful Decorah, Iowa on September 28, 2011.   Note: if you would like to see the handout featured in the video click here.

Budget Deficits and Saving, Reserves and Interest Rates: Responses to Blog #19

By L. Randall Wray

This week we began our investigation of effects of sovereign deficits on saving, reserves, and interest rates. As usual I will group responses by topic. I counted nine main topics. I’ll be very brief in presenting the questions (some of which were quite long!!) so please refer back to Blog 19 for the details.

Q1: Wray claims sovereign government can buy anything for sale in its own currency; but why can’t it just go to forex markets, get foreign currency, then buy everything for sale in ALL currencies?

A: Takes at least two to tango. Domestically, government ensures sellers by imposing a tax in its own currency. Hard to do that on foreigners in their own countries—impinges on sovereignty. So, for example, the US cannot force Italians to pay taxes in Italy in dollars. To buy stuff from Italians, our government MIGHT be forced to use euros. (Note, I did have a caveat—foreigners might take dollars, in which case there is no affordability problem.) So let us say Italians don’t want the cheap, risky dollars (Hah!). Yes the US can go to forex markets and trade dollars for euros. Here’s the problem: it is now subject to forex market demand for dollars. It can never run out of dollars, but the exchange rate can move against the US. At the extreme, it could find no takers even at an infinite exchange rate against the dollar. (Zimbabwe! Weimar!) I am not saying this is probable. I am just saying we need to be careful in our claims. Domestically, government can buy anything for sale if it is for sale in terms of its own currency. And it can create that demand by imposing taxes. Externally, all bets are off. If stuff is for sale only in foreign currency, the government of Rwanda might not be able to buy it.

Q2: Inflation. What causes it? Shortage of supply? External shocks? Excess demand? Unions? Can ELR deliver price stability?

A: Ahhhh, the question of the ages. Here is Keynes: “true inflation” only results once the economy exceeds the full employment level of demand. That is a useful definition, but not consistent with empirical measures—that usually rely on a consumer or producer basket, the index price of which can rise long before full employment. Bottlenecks (say, high tech goods and skilled labor) cause prices to rise. “Supply shocks” (a nice euphemism for OPEC conspiring to raise oil prices!) cause key commodities to rise in price—which causes prices to rise across the full range of output. And so on.

Note also that much, or even most, of inflation results from imputation of price increases to things that are not bought or sold at all (“shelter services”—the sheer joy of living in a house one owns). That gets into complicated discussions ( I wrote about it years ago at www.levy.org). So let us put it this way: beyond full employment, raising aggregate demand (or reducing supply) is almost certain to cause inflation. Before that, inflation is possible but not inevitable. Depends on a wide variety of factors—and is not necessarily a bad thing at all in any case. (Shifting the composition of the consumer basket due to changes of tastes can cause the Consumer Price Index to rise. Is that bad? Of course not—consumers changed their tastes.) The focus on inflation has become a phobia in the worst sense of the term. But in any case, yes, the employer of last resort program helps to stabilize prices—as we discuss in weeks to come.

Q3: The Fed sets the overnight rate but what about others? What if markets react against budget deficits, so the bond market vigilantes demand more blood in the form of higher rates?

A: As discussed, the Fed can set the overnight rate, plus the rate on any other financial assets it stands ready to buy and sell. It can peg the 10 year government bond rate, or the 30 year. It actually did that in WWII. But now it usually does not do that; and even under QE it used a backassward method to try to bring down long rates on Treasuries—trying to use quantities rather than prices to hit a price target! Dumb and Dumber. But whoever claimed Bernanke knows what he is doing? (Hint: he doesn’t. But I suspect you did not need the hint.)

Any rates the Fed does not target are set complexly—some more complexly than others. We used to set the saving and demand deposit rates (Remember Regulation Q? No? Ok you are younger than me. I used to get zero on my checking account and 5.25 max on my saving deposit, and I paid banks for the privilege of banking with them. Just you wait—it will be back to the future soon.) We set some loan rates. (Remember NDSL rates that benefitted students? No? Ok, ditto. Imagine 3% interest rates on student loans, with government forgiving half your debt if you became a teacher! Hey, today’s Real Housewives of Wall Street get similar deals! And they don’t even have to go to college. They just have to marry rich guys on Wall St.) 

Leaving to the side government-managed interest rates, others are set by a complex of factors: markups and markdowns, credit and liquidity risks, expectations of Fed policy, expected exchange rate movements, and so on. Too complicated to discuss here. Let me just (cryptically) say that while the purchasing power parity theorem as well as the Fisher interest rate equations perform poorly, Keynes’s interest rate parity theorem holds up well. ‘Nuff said.

Bond vigilantes? Don’t sell them the bonds. Sovereign government NEVER needs to sell bonds. Just leave the reserves in the banks instead. Pay them zero or whatever the support rate is. Euthanize the rentier class, don’t bend over backward for the vigilantes. That was Keynes’s recommendation.

Q4: Can the CB manage the level of reserves by paying a support rate?

A: In the old days when the Fed paid zero on reserves, but had a target rate substantially above zero, the supply of reserves was completely nondiscretionary. The Fed accommodated. Now, it can “pump” trillions of reserves into banks and pay them 25 basis points—the support rate—and charge any bank that is short reserves 50bp. The fed funds rate will stay within that band. So, now, a QE-adopting Bernanke Fed can decide banks should hold $100 gazillion of reserves and buy every toxic waste trashy asset banks have—they are happy to give up the waste—and thereby increase reserves “exogenously”.

Why any Fed would want to do that is beyond me. But Bernanke’s Fed wants to do it. It will do QE3, just you wait.

Q5: Barbara argues that balance sheets are false for government.

A: This sounds a lot like my buddies at the American Monetary Institute (AMI) who want to abolish accounting so that the government can create “debt-free” money. Look, accounting is certainly a human device. (Well, Apes have accounting records too—but they are somewhat more straight-forward. So far as we know they have not yet invented subprimes and credit default swaps.) But there is a logic behind it—to some extent you can say we “discovered” rather than “invented” double entry book-keeping. Frankly, I think anyone who thinks that we can change accounting so that we only look at the asset side and ignore the liability side has at least one screw loose. Government has a balance sheet; its IOUs are our assets. Its deficits are our savings. Changing the way we report the balance sheets will not change the reality. (Hey, banks have been cooking their accounting and they are still toast.) More below.

Q6: Deficits create excess reserves only if all else is equal.

A: Yes. But look at the scale. Budget deficits are in the tens and hundreds of billions or even trillions of dollars. Required bank reserves are miniscule by comparison: a few months of budget deficits will completely satisfy all required reserve needs for the next decade. The flow of reserves that result from typical budget deficits will ALWAYS create excess reserves because required reserves grow much more slowly.

Q7: Isn’t the accounting of debits and credits reversed?

A: OK to simplify I use “T accounts” that are presented in every money and banking textbook. Bank loans are on the asset side of the bank’s balance sheet; demand deposits are on the liability side. Reverse that for the borrower. For the wonkier with a bit of business school education behind them, I strongly recommend this article: Ritter, “The flow-of-funds Accounts: A New Approach” (Jnl of Finance, May 1963) which goes through the balance sheet, the financial uses and sources approach, treatment of real and financial, and integration into flow of funds accounts. It sounds like a couple of commentators are confusing a balance sheet with sources and uses.

Q8: What if the budget deficit is too low to satisfy net financial saving desires by the private (and foreign) sectors? And the Fazzari paper is excellent!

A: Yes that happens. In that case, the private (and foreign) sector reduces spending, causing the budget deficit to widen. Now, to be clear, causation is complex. There can be many slips between lip and cup. As private sector spending falls, its income falls (sales fall, people get laid off) and that could either intensify the desire to save, or reduce it as people must dip into saving to avoid starvation.

And Steve Fazzari was my teacher, so how can I argue against his paper!

Q9: Provide more details on the process of setting interest rates in the current institutional environment.

A: Well, ignoring QE, we now have a Fed that sets the support rate (paid on reserves) and charges a higher rate to lend reserves; the market rate (fed funds rate) fluxes between the two. The best work on all this is by Scott Fullwiler. I’ll provide a bit more in later blogs—but it gets wonky.

The Cost of Theoclassical Economics and Economists

By William K. Black
(Cross-posted from Benzinga)

Hernando de Soto is an extremely interesting Peruvian economist who is simultaneously deeply conservative and highly innovative. He published a column in the Washington Post on October 7, 2011 entitled “The Cost of Financial Ignorance” that caused me to reexamine “The Washington Consensus” [TWC].

I agree with de Soto, but his title would have been more accurate if it read: “The Costs of Theoclassical Economics and Economists.” The nature of the TWC is itself highly contested, so I will hold off providing “the” definition of TWC other than to warn that its originator and its proponents are engaged in historical revisionism to try to hide the damage TWC has done.

I agree with de Soto’s criticisms of financial deregulation. Indeed, I will (briefly) add to those criticisms. But de Soto’s argument that the deregulators violated TWC is not correct. Indeed, the opposite is true – TWC encouraged the disastrous deregulation. TWC had 10 points of supposed consensus. Three of them are of greatest relevance to de Soto’s column and my response.

John Williamson is a deficit hyper-hawk with the Peterson Institute for International Economics. The Peterson Institute’s mission, if you are a supporter, is to save the Republic from an avalanche of debt by making major cuts to Social Security, etc. Williamson created the ten-point TWC in preparation for a November 1989 conference as a purported statement of consensus policies favored by economists in the U.S. government, IMF, and the World Bank as to how best to spur development in Latin America.

Three of Williamson’s points are of particular relevance to de Soto’s column and my response. In reviewing them, I discovered that Williamson, stung and embittered by the criticism of TWC, began to rewrite the original points. That would have been fine; of course, if what he was doing was changing his recommendations based on the facts. However, Williamson, and now de Soto, are passing off the revisionist points of the TWC as if they were Williamson’s original points when the actual TWC doctrines contradict the revisionism and caused catastrophic crises. I will also show (briefly) that this revisionism establishes the validity of a broader criticism of TWC by economists such as Luiz-Carlos Bresser Pereira (Brazil’s former finance minister) that most distresses Williamson.

Williamson has created a revisionist history for two TWC policies that are the subject of this column. 


Privatization

“However, the main rationale for privatization is the belief that private industry is managed more efficiently than state enterprises, because of the more direct incentives faced by a manager who either has a direct personal stake in the profits of an enterprise or else is accountable to those who do. At the very least, the threat of bankruptcy places a floor under the inefficiency of private enterprises, whereas many state enterprises seem to have unlimited access to subsidies. This belief in the superior efficiency of the private sector has long been an article of faith in Washington (though perhaps not held quite as fervently as in the rest of the United States), but it was only with the enunciation of the Baker Plan in 1985 that it became official US policy to promote foreign privatization. The IMF and the World Bank have duly encouraged privatization in Latin America and elsewhere since.” 

Deregulation

“Another way of promoting competition is by deregulation. This was initiated within the United States by the Carter administration and carried forward by the Reagan administration. It is generally judged to have been successful within the United States, and it is generally assumed that it could bring similar benefits to other countries.”

“Productive activity may be regulated by legislation, by government decrees, and case-by-case decision making. This latter practice is widespread and pernicious in Latin America as it creates considerable uncertainty and provides opportunities for corruption. It also discriminates against small and medium-sized businesses which, although important creators of employment, seldom have access to the higher reaches of the bureaucracy.” 

Williamson made his TWC proposals at a time when the three “de’s” – deregulation, desupervision, and de facto decriminalization had created the criminogenic environment that unleashed the epidemic of accounting control fraud that drove the second phase of the S&L debacle. The debacle was widely described as the nation’s worst financial scandal and Williamson’s original TWC article mentions it but ignores the accounting control fraud and its ties to financial deregulation.

The original TWC did not recognize or warn of the risk of corrupt private parties (i.e., the CEOs running control frauds) that drive financial crises. TWC did the opposite; it provided strong, unambiguous support for deregulation. Indeed, he expressly argued that there was a consensus in Washington that deregulation, which had just caused the U.S.’s worst financial scandal in its history, was “successful.”  This supposed consensus on the success of deregulation ignores the severe crisis that the deregulation caused and the dramatic reregulation of the industry that we had implemented in 1983-86. It also ignores the adoption of the Financial Institution Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989. FIRREA reregulated and “bailed out” the S&L industry. President Bush, who had chaired President Reagan’s Financial Deregulatory Task Force, had recognized the catastrophic error of the very consensus deregulatory policies that had led to the S&L debacle and drafted FIRREA to undue his errors. It is remarkable that Williamson presented a discredited deregulatory policy that had caused catastrophic losses and been repudiated by its leader as a desirable “consensus” policy that Latin America should adopt.

Williamson’s privatization discussion further confirms his fallacious theoclassical dogma that private elites could not be accounting control frauds and could not survive bankruptcy. The language he uses reveals the dogmatic nature of the consensus. He explains that it is “an article of faith” that the private sector is efficient (despite the S&L debacle) because of modern executive compensation and the discipline of bankruptcy. It is the combination of the powerfully perverse incentives produced by modern executive and professional compensation with the three “de’s” that combined to produce the criminogenic environments that drive our recurrent, intensifying financial crises.

Williamson’s failure to understand the multiple limits of bankruptcy’s limits in restraining financial crises driven by epidemics of accounting control fraud is total. First, individual accounting control fraud can delay bankruptcy for years and become massively insolvent through accounting fraud. Creditors do not discipline accounting control frauds – they fund their massive growth. Second, epidemics of accounting control fraud can hyper-inflate financial bubbles and simultaneously delay the collapse for many more years and cause the losses to become crippling. Third, once the fraud epidemic and bubble collapse bankruptcy is not stabilizing but systemically destabilizing.  Accounting control frauds, particularly if it hyper-inflates a bubble, can cause cascade failures as the losses they impose on their creditors can render them insolvent. Fourth, private sector banks, even investment banks with no deposit insurance, are frequently bailed out by the public sector when they are sufficiently politically connected or considered to be systemically dangerous institutions (SDIs) whose failures could trigger systemic collapses.

Here is how Williamson’s revisionist history of those same three points as he offered it on November 6, 2002. The title of the article shows that it was part of his effort to defend TWC: “Did the Washington Consensus Fail?”

8. Privatization. “This was the one area in which what originated as a neoliberal idea had won broad acceptance. We have since been made very conscious that it matters a lot how privatization is done: it can be a highly corrupt process that transfers assets to a privileged elite for a fraction of their true value, but the evidence is that it brings benefits when done properly.”

9. Deregulation. This focused specifically on easing barriers to entry and exit, not on abolishing regulations designed for safety or environmental reasons.”

I have no criticism of Williamson modifying his original 1989 views on privatization in a 2002 publication that acknowledges that he now has a better understanding of the risks of corruption causing privatization to become perverse. I fault him for claiming that his original statement of TWC covered only regulations restricting entry and exit. His 1990 paper does not limit his support of deregulation to easing entry barriers and it does not exempt safety and environmental rules. (I also fault him for not understanding that such regulations are essential to the safety of banking – easy entry poses critical risk.)

By April 22, 2009, Williamson had added to his historical revisionism in order to defend TWC from criticism that its policies had helped create the global crisis.

“Skeptics may also be inclined to point to the recommendation to deregulate. But in the days when Dan Quayle was Vice President I already made it clear that this was intended to endorse freeing entry and exit, rather than to advocate an absence of regulations intended to protect the consumer, or the environment, or to supervise the banking system. With that interpretation there is no contradiction.”

Williamson’s original TWC document did not “make it clear” that its deregulation recommendation excluded banking supervision.

Williamson is deeply embittered by criticisms of TWC. He refers to them as “foaming” at the mouth like rabid dogs. He dismisses economists who respect Keynes’ work as leftist cranks: “Left-wing believers in “Keynesian” stimulation via large budget deficits are almost an extinct species.” Williamson cites the following exchange as evidence that he had become a “global whipping boy” because he developed TWC.

“The other incident that I recall clearly occurred in Washington in 1993 but concerns a Brazilian, an ex-finance minister called Luiz-Carlos Bresser Pereira. He told me that just because I had invented the term, [that] did not give me the right to say what it meant. He still believes this and is still attacking it, as he told me two weeks ago when I was in Sao Paulo.”

Williamson thinks Bresser Pereira’s statement is obviously false, but the fact that Williamson has succumbed repeatedly to the temptation to improve his original statement of TWC via historical revisionism shows that Bresser Pereira’s warning to Williamson was correct. Williamson’s description of the means by which he determined the existence of a “consensus” also disqualifies him as the arbiter of judging what TWC really was.

“I looked around. I thought there was a broad agreement in Washington that these were good policies. And then I relied on the three people I asked to be discussants that spanned the range of ideological views in Washington: Allan Meltzer, Richard Feinberg and Stan Fischer. The most important reservation I got was from Feinberg, who thought I had misnamed it, that it should have been called the “Universal Convergence.””  

Think about Williamson’s exchange with Feinberg in late 1989. Williamson tells Feinberg that he thinks that there is a consensus in Washington, D.C. that a particular idea, e.g., deregulation is unambiguously good, and Feinberg responds that there isn’t a mere consensus – there’s universal agreement in favor of deregulation. Meanwhile, deregulation has just caused the U.S. to suffer its worst financial scandal, a scandal so severe that the President of the United States – formerly the leader of financial deregulation – changes his policies and reregulates the S&L industry. The top industry advocate of deregulation, Charles Keating of Lincoln Savings infamy, has been revealed to be a control fraud.  The S&L regulators have been reregulating for six years in a desperate effort to stem the epidemic of accounting control fraud. None of this penetrates the theoclassical bubble inhabited by Williamson and Feinberg. If the three economists Williamson chose as discussants truly “spanned the range of ideological views in Washington” then Washington has to start seeing other people. The narrow range of differences in the views of the scholars Williamson chose as his discussants for the conference made it easy for them to form a “consensus” and to conclude that all of “Washington” and “Latin America” shared that consensus. Williamson demonstrated his self-blindness with this conclusion:

“I submit that it is high time to end this debate about the Washington Consensus. If you mean by this term what I intended it to mean, then it is motherhood and apple pie and not worth debating.”

He thinks there really is a Universal Convergence in favor of theoclassical economic dogma and that his dogmas are universally good for the world and supported by all intelligent persons.

De Soto’s Revisionism about Property Rights 

De Soto’s column provides the revisionist interpretation of the tenth TWC point. Williamson originally phrased it this way:

Property Rights

“In the United States property rights are so well entrenched that their fundamental importance for the satisfactory operation of the capitalist system is easily overlooked. I suspect, however, that when Washington brings itself to think about the subject, there is general acceptance that property rights do indeed matter. There is also a general perception that property rights are highly insecure in Latin America (see, for example, Balassa et al. 1986, chapter 4).”

In 2002, Williamson used similar phrases to describe the tenth point.

“10. Property Rights. This was primarily about providing the informal sector with the ability to gain property rights at acceptable cost.”

Here is de Soto’s revisionism about the meaning of point ten of TWC. Note that under de Soto’s account of the facts, Bernanke is also guilty of historical revisionism about TWC. De Soto uncritically asserts that TWC was a great success in Latin America and that the U.S. needs to adopt TWC. Precisely the opposite was true – TWC’s policies deregulatory and privatization policies proved criminogenic in much of Latin America, just as they did in the U.S. S&L debacle. TWC led to such severe problems that electorates through most of Latin America have voted out of office TWC supporters. The U.S. crisis was driven by the criminogenic environment that TWC principles created.

 “Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke said recently that, given the ongoing credit contraction, “advanced economies like the U.S. would do well to re-learn some of the lessons” that have led to success among emerging market economies. Ironically, those economies in the 1990s accepted 10 points for promoting economic growth that were known as the “Washington Consensus.”  

Advanced nations seem to have forgotten Point 10 of that consensus: how important documenting assets and transactions is to the creation of credit. Consider that most private credit is made up not of bills and coins, anchored in bank reserves, but in papers that establish rights over the assets, equity and liabilities that guarantee loans. Over the past 15 years, however, as they package, bundle and resell securities, Americans and Europeans have gradually undermined the reliability of the records that guarantee or make credit trustworthy — the deeds, titles, liens and other documentation that establish who owns what and how much, and who holds the risks.  

Not having reliable information reduces confidence, which in turn leads to credit contractions, fewer or smaller transactions, and declines in demand. And these cause employment and the value of assets to fall.” 

I agree with de Soto that transparency is vital and that anti-fraud provisions are essential if markets are to approach efficiency. I also agree that government must provide these functions. Contrary to theoclassical economics’ predictions, when we forbade effective regulation of financial derivatives the result was not efficient markets, an optimal level of disclosures, financial stability, or the exclusion of fraud. Theoclassical dogma, as was the norm, proved to be false.

The problem is that TWC did not embrace transparency and effective financial regulation. It proposed the opposite – deregulation – and its proponents did not serve as vigorous proponents of effective financial regulation in the U.S. or in Latin America. Economists stress the reliability of “revealed preferences” – not self-serving statements after the fact that rewrite history. The revealed preferences of Williamson during the lead up to the crisis demonstrate that he did not understand and strive to counter criminogenic environments, the perverse incentives of modern executive and professional compensation, epidemics of control fraud, Gresham’s dynamics, the hyper-inflation of financial bubbles, or the collapse of effective financial regulation led at agencies run by anti-regulators.

De Soto is correct that Williamson should have made point 10 of TWC far broader, embracing effective regulation as an essential component of effective and stable markets, but he knows that Williamson did not do so. Instead, point 10 simply held that private parties should be able to own property. De Soto errs in praising Bernanke. Bernanke was a strong anti-regulator, consistent with TWC. He appointed Patrick Parkinson as head of all Fed supervision. Parkinson is an anti-regulatory economist with no real supervisory or examination experience. Parkinson was the Fed’s lead economist urging Congress to remove the CFTC’s statutory authority to regulate credit default swaps (CDS).The effort to squash CFTC Chair Born’s proposed rule restricting CDS succeeded and created a regulatory black hole that contributed greatly to systemic risk for the reasons de Soto explained in his recent column. De Soto is correct that regulation and effective markets are not mutually exclusive choices. Rather, financial markets are better able to remain effective when regulation provides the necessary transparency and reduces fraud risks. Financial deregulation in the U.S. and the EU was the enemy of effective markets, honest bankers, customers, and shareholders. The fact that Bernanke thinks that the theoclassical anti-regulatory dogma contained in TWC was the solution rather than the problem in the U.S. demonstrates that he has failed to learn the most basic lessons about the crisis.


Bill Black is the author of The Best Way to Rob a Bank is to Own One and an associate professor of economics and law at the University of Missouri-Kansas City. He spent years working on regulatory policy and fraud prevention as Executive Director of the Institute for Fraud Prevention, Litigation Director of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and Deputy Director of the National Commission on Financial Institution Reform, Recovery and Enforcement, among other positions.
Bill writes a column for Benzinga every Monday. His other academic articles, congressional testimony, and musings about the financial crisis can be found at his Social Science Research Network author page and at the blog New Economic Perspectives.

Follow him on Twitter: @WilliamKBlack

Today’s Modern Money Primer

Check out the latest in the Modern Money Primer series:  The Effect of Sovereign Budget Deficits on Saving, Reserves and Interest Rates.

MMP Blog #19: Effects of Sovereign Government Budget Deficits on Saving, Reserves and Interest Rates


Last week we began to analyse fiscal and monetary policy formation by a government that issues its own currency. We went through a list of false statements about sovereign government spending, and offered a list of general statements that do apply. Let us now begin to examine in more detail the government’s budget and impacts on the nongovernment sector. This week we will look at the relation between budget deficits and saving, and the effects of budget deficits on bank reserves and interest rates. 

Budget deficits and saving. Recall from earlier discussions in the Primer that it is the deficit spending of one sector that generates the surplus (or saving) of the other; this is because the entities of the deficit sector can in some sense decide to spend more than their incomes, while the surplus entities can decide to spend less than their incomes only if those incomes are actually generated. In Keynesian terms this is simply another version of the twin statements that “spending generates income” and “investment generates saving”. Here, however, the statement is that the government sector’s deficit spending generates the nongovernment sector’s surplus (or saving). 

Obviously, this reverses the orthodox causal sequence because the government’s deficit “finances” the nongovernment’s saving in the sense that the deficit spending by government provides the income that allows the nongovernment sector to run a surplus. Looking to the stocks, it is the government’s issue of IOUs that allows the nongovernment to accumulate financial claims on government.  

While this seems mysterious, the financial processes are not hard to understand. Government spends (purchasing goods and services or making “transfer” payments such as social security and welfare) by crediting bank accounts of recipients; this also leads to a credit to their bank’s reserves at the central bank. Government taxes by debiting taxpayer accounts (and the central bank debits reserves of their banks).  

Deficits over a period (say, a year) mean that more bank accounts have been credited than debited. The nongovernment sector realizes its surplus initially in the form of these net credits to bank accounts.  

All of this analysis is reversed in the case of a government surplus: the government surplus means the nongovernment sector runs a deficit, with net debits of bank accounts (and of reserves). The destruction (net debiting) of nongovernment sector net financial assets of course equals the government’s budget surplus.  

Effects of budget deficits on reserves and interest rates. Budget deficits initially increase bank reserves by the same amount. This is because treasury spending leads to a simultaneous credit to the bank deposit account of the recipient and to that bank’s reserve account at the central bank. 

Let us first examine a system like the one that existed in the US until recently, in which the central bank does not pay interest on reserves. Deficit spending that creates bank reserves will (eventually) lead to excess reserves—banks will hold more reserves than desired. Their immediate response will be to offer to lend reserves in the overnight interbank lending market (called the fed funds market in the US).  

If the banking system as a whole has excess reserves, the offers to lend reserves will not be met at the going overnight interbank lending rate (often called the bank rate, but in the US this is called the fed funds rate). Hence the banks with excess reserve positions will offer to lend at ever-lower interest rates. This drives the actual “market” rate below the central bank’s target rate for overnight funds. 

Once the rate has fallen sufficiently far away from the target, the central bank will intervene to remove the excess reserves. Since the demand for reserves is fairly interest inelastic, lowering the offered lending rate will not increase the quantity of reserves demand by very much. In other words, it is difficult to eliminate a position of system-wide excess reserves by lowering the overnight rate. Instead, the central bank must remove them. 

The way that it does this is by selling from its stock of treasury bonds. That is called an open market sale (OMS). An OMS leads to a substitution of bonds for excess reserves: the central bank’s liabilities (reserves) are debited, and the purchasing bank’s reserves are also debited. At the same time, the central bank’s holding of treasuries is debited and the bank’s assets are increased by the amount of treasuries purchased.  

Since the bank’s reserves decline by the same amount that its holdings of treasuries are increased, this is effectively just a substitution of assets. However, it now holds a claim on the treasury (bonds) instead of a claim on the central bank (reserves); and the central bank holds fewer assets (bonds) but owes fewer liabilities (reserves). The bank is happy because it now receives interest on the bonds. 

It is easy to see that the same process would be triggered even if the central bank paid interest on reserves—as is now done in the US. Once banks have accumulated all the reserves they want, they will try to substitute for higher-earning treasuries. They will not push the overnight rate below the central bank’s “support rate” (what it pays on reserves)—since no bank would lend to another at a rate below what it can receive from the central bank. Instead banks with undesired reserves will immediately go into the treasuries market to seek a higher return. 

The impact, then, will be to push rates on treasuries down. In this second case, the central bank need not do anything—it does not need to sell bonds since it maintains its overnight interest rate by paying interest on reserves. 

In practice, a central bank that adopts this second procedure usually pays a slightly lower rate on reserves than it charges to lend reserves. As discussed earlier, in the US the central bank lends “at the discount window” and at the “discount rate”. It might charge 25 basis points (0.25 percentage points) more on its lending than it pays on reserves. For example, it might charge 2% on loans and pay 1.75% on reserves. The “market” interest rate on interbank lending will remain approximately within that band since a bank needing reserves has the option of borrowing at the central bank at 2%, while a bank having extra reserves can earn 1.75% simply by holding them at the central bank.

That’s enough for today—just about over my 1000 word target! Send your comments and questions.