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Yearly Archives: 2012
The BBC as Apologist for Lying about Libor
The right has a reservoir of writers who can be relied on to defend and even praise elite white-collar criminals, but the center has managed to produce eager apologists for lies. This column discusses the BBC’s Business Editor, Robert Preston. The title of his article emphasizes his view that it is exceptionally difficult to know whether the banks’ lying about Libor was desirable: “The elusive truth about Barclays’ lie.” Preston frames the question in a fashion that favors finding Barclays’ lies desirable.
“Aside from the forensic analysis about who said what to whom, there is a very simple question at the heart of the furore of Barclays’ involvement in the LIBOR-rigging scandal: is it ever acceptable to lie?” Continue reading
Posted in William K. Black
MMT, The Euro and The Greatest Prediction of the Last 20 Years
Lest you think NEP is tooting its own hyperbolic horn a bit too much, I borrowed the title of this post from a 2011 piece written by someone who is currently hostile to MMT even though he acknowledges its predictive accuracy. Continue reading
Posted in L. Randall Wray
Paul De Grauwe is Right: All Roads Lead Back to the ECB
By Marshall Auerback
We’ve always been a fan of Professor Paul De Grauwe from University of Leuven, who has consistently pointed out the structural flaws inherent in the original structures of the EU. Recently, Professor de Grauwe wrote an excellent analysis explaining why the latest “rescue plan” cobbled together by the Eurozone authorities is destined to fail.
The key points:
1) ECB is not currently a ‘lender of last resort’. The ECB was set up with fundamental flaws, where “… one of the ECB’s main concerns is the defense of its balance sheet quality. That is, a concern about avoiding losses and showing positive equity- even if that leads to financial instability.” This is a profoundly misconceived idea. As we have noted many times, a private bank needs capital – clearly because there are prudential regulations requiring that – but because it can become insolvent. It has not currency-issuing capacity in its own right. While the ECB has an elaborate formula for determining how capital is from the national member banks at an intrinsic level, it has no need for capital. It could operate forever with a balance sheet that if held by a private bank would signal insolvency. There are no comparable concepts for a currency issuer and a currency user in terms of solvency. The latter is always at risk of insolvency the former never, so the ECB’s focus on profitability is not only misguided, but leading to inadequate policy responses.
2) The creation of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the ESM has been motivated by the overriding concern of the ECB to protect its balance sheet and to avoid engaging in “fiscal policy”. The problem again goes back to the creation of the euro: no supranational fiscal authority to go with a supranational central bank, which means that the only entity that can conceivably carry out “fiscal transfers” of the sort exemplified by a bond buying operation is the ECB. Sure, the actual fiscal transfers can be ‘subcontracted” to the EFSF and ultimately the ESM, but it can only work if the latter’s balance sheet is linked to the ECB’s, giving it the same unlimited capacity to buy up the bonds and thereby deal with the insolvency issue. As things stand now, per de Grauwe: “The enlarged responsibilities that are now given to the ESM are to be seen as a cover-up of the failure of the ECB to take up its responsibility of the guardian of financial stability in the Eurozone; a responsibility that only the ECB can fulfill”.
3) Related to this problem is the fact that the ESM has been given only finite resources as per Germany’s stipulation the minute it begins. It is capitalised at 500bn euros. And it’s unclear that Germany can go much further, given that there are currently 3 constitutional challenges which the ESM is now facing within Germany’s courts. This will delay ratification of the vote taken last week by Germany’s parliament to ratify the ESM’s existence, as well as limiting its firepower going forward. The ESM’s “bazooka” is in effect a pop-gun. Consequently, as de Grauwe argues, “Investors will start forecasting the moment when the ESM will run out of cash. They will then do what one expects from clever people. They will sell bonds now rather than later.”
As is clear from every FX crisis in the past, “A central bank that pegs the exchange rate and has a finite stock of international reserves to defend its currency against speculative attacks faces the same problem. At some point, the stock of reserves is depleted and the central bank has to stop defending the currency. Speculators do not wait for that moment to happen. They set in motion their speculative sales of the currency much before the moment of depletion, triggering a self-fulfilling crisis. “
Until Europe’s authorities have this figured out, the crisis will continue. All roads lead back to the ECB.
Posted in Uncategorized
The Mixed Economy Manifesto – Part 5 (of 5)
By Michael F. Hoexter, Ph.D.
[Part 1 is posted here; Part 2 is posted here; Part 3 is posted here; Part 4 is posted here]
Principles of Mixed Economies and Their Study
The challenge goes out to all of those who claim to know something about the macro-economy and society more generally to refute, dispute, modify or amend these principles listed below. Additionally, after public discussion, having arrived at a perhaps-truer version that accords with the evidence, to go on and challenge in their professional and everyday lives unreal and dysfunctional beliefs about how our economies and human civilizations actually work. Continue reading
Posted in Michael Hoexter
The Mixed Economy Manifesto – Part 4
By Michael Hoexter, Ph.D.
[Part 1 is posted here; Part 2 is posted here; Part 3 is posted here]
The Anti-Keynes Revolt
Against the Keynesian consensus of the WWII era and afterwards, there remained marginalized economic schools that held to ideal notions about markets and remained convinced that a reliance on government was tantamount to a “Road to Serfdom” and ultimately led to Communism. The core of the neoliberal campaign, gathered around the Mt. Pelerin Society founded by economist/social philosopher Friedrich von Hayek, denied that government management of capitalism’s excesses was needed and that the price system and the market were pure, self-regulating entities which bring maximum prosperity and liberate the individual. Continue reading
Brad DeLong: We’re All Minskians Now!
By L. Randall Wray
(Cross-posted from Great Leap Forward)
Earlier this week I noted, tongue-firmly-in-cheek, that we’re all MMTers now, following Paul McCulley’s recommendation that we just declare victory. And be nice about it.
Well here is a strange post from Brad DeLong: He proclaims that essentially anyone who is anyone is a Minskian. And apparently always was. That is why mainstream economists like “Paul Krugman, Paul Romer, Gary Gorton, Carmen Reinhart, Ken Rogoff, Raghuram Rajan, Larry Summers, Barry Eichengreen, Olivier Blanchard, and their peers” ought to be trusted. Continue reading
Posted in L. Randall Wray
Tagged brad delong, Great Financial Crisis, Hyman P. Minsky, Steeve Keen
How Chief Justice Rube Goldberg Saved the Individual Mandate
By Dan Kervick
Imagine that the US Congress someday decides that as a matter of national security it is imperative for each American adult to be in possession of a smartphone. (Perhaps they believe that we might all need to receive an important text message from Homeland Security in the event of a major terrorist attack.) Suppose also that at the time of this decision there are 100 million American adults still without smartphones, and that the average smartphone costs $200.
According to the Supreme Court of the United States, here is a procedure Congress is permitted to follow:
Posted in Uncategorized
What Should Brazilian Economists and Policy Makers have Learned from the Crisis?
By Daniel Negreiros Conceição
A global economic winter is coming. The Euro experiment is nearing its total collapse—an entirely avoidable disaster long foretold by MMTheorists. In the US, people’s blind aversion to public deficits and the public debt, fuelled by the alarmist cries of a Republican Party currently controlled by lunatics and economic illiterates, makes it impossible for the government to make use of the stimulating fiscal instruments that are needed to get that country out of its current recession. Even China, the one country that had been seemingly unaffected by the global depression until now, shows signs of slowing down. Brazil better be prepared.
Posted in Uncategorized