Tag Archives: Control Fraud

Deal Book Thinks Lawyers’ “Cardinal Rule” is to Advise CEOs how to Defraud with Impunity

By William K. Black
(Cross posted at Benzinga.com)

Overview and Background

The New York Times’ “Deal Book” continues its ethics-free treatment of the ethical collapse of the leaders of many of our most elite firms related to finance. Matthew Goldstein’s*  March 6, 2014 article is entitled “4 Accused in Law Firm Fraud Ignored a Maxim: Don’t Email.”

The article is about the indictment charging the leaders of one of finance’s leading law firms – Dewey & LeBoeuf – with securities fraud and larceny.

“The indictment paints a portrait of a law firm being run like a criminal enterprise. Mr. Vance said his office had already secured guilty pleas from seven other people who once worked for Dewey.”

Deal Book refuses to recognize control fraud even when the indictment describes a control fraud.  The indictment does not “paint a portrait of a law firm being run like a criminal enterprise.”  The indictment describes a criminal enterprise led by the partners controlling Dewey & LeBouef.  Deal Book still can’t bend its mind around the fact that seemingly legitimate firms make the best “weapons” for fraud.

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Finance Refuses to Take Akerlof and Romer Seriously about Looting

By William K. Black
(Cross posted at Benzinga.com)

I have often written and spoken of my frustration that economists refuse to read George Akerlof and Paul Romer’s classic 1993 article (“Looting: The Economic Underworld of Bankruptcy for Profit”) and apply it to an analysis of the current financial crisis.   Note that their title expresses the paradox they were reporting – the best way to loot the bank is for its controlling officer to cause it to make extraordinary amounts of terrible loans that will typically cause the bank to fail.

In my fantasy world I am even frustrated that they refuse to read the white-collar criminology literature that my colleagues and I have spent decades developing about “accounting control fraud” (what Akerlof and Romer called “looting”).  Economists do not study fraud and in my flights of fantasy I imagine a world in which they would read the work of those who specialize in that field.  Silly, I know, though that is exactly what Akerlof and Romer did, see their beginning note*, because they wanted to get the facts correct.  If you think that is the obvious approach that any scientist examining an issue would take – congratulations – you just might be a scientist, but you’re almost certainly not an economist.

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How to Prosecute the Elite Bank CEO that Led the Frauds that Drove the Crisis

By William K. Black

Step one: Understand the three “control fraud” epidemics that drove the crisis.

Control fraud occurs when the person that controls a seemingly legitimate entity uses it as a “weapon to defraud.”  In finance, accounting is the “weapon of choice.”  Lenders engaged in accounting control fraud display the four “ingredients” of the fraud “recipe.”

  1. Grow massively by
  2. Making loans at a premium yield that are so bad that they will produce losses
  3. Employing extreme leverage and
  4. Providing only trivial allowances for loan and lease losses (ALLL)

The recipe produces three “sure things.”  The lender will report record profits in the near term, the controlling officers will promptly be made wealthy through modern executive compensation, and the firm will suffer catastrophic losses.  The recipe is also an ideal means to hyper-inflate a financial bubble in real estate, which can delay loss recognition for many years.  Minor variants on this recipe drove the savings and loan debacle and the Enron-era frauds.

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Cowen Condemns the Corporations he Comes to Praise

By William K. Black

Tyler Cowen often seeks to defend corporations from what he views as unjust criticism.  He does not, however, evidence any understanding of the relevant criminology or economics literature on “control fraud” so his defenses sometimes actually represent indictments of the risks posed by corporations.  A good example is blog about libertarianism and the workplace.

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Why do Conservatives Oppose Prosecuting Elite Corporate Frauds?

By William K. Black
(Cross posted at Benzinga.com)

There are at least four principles that virtually all conservatives purport to support – except when the potential defendant is socially elite.  I have written previously about two of these principles on several occasions – the need for accountability and “broken windows” theory that calls for the prosecutors to make the prosecution of even minor street crimes a high priority if they have, even indirectly, a material effect on the community.

The third principle is that it is vital to punish in order to deter crime.  Gary Becker, the very conservative Nobel laureate in economics, emphasized this point (again, in the context of street crime).  Under Becker’s theory of crime our current practices of allowing elite banksters to become wealthy through leading the “sure thing” of accounting control fraud with immunity from the criminal laws will predictably lead to new, larger epidemics of fraud that will continue to cause our recurrent, intensifying financial crises.  It is rare, however, to find a prominent conservative who is demanding a priority effort to prosecute the elite bank officers who ran those frauds.  I know of no conservative member of Congress publicly making that demand today.  Senator Chuck Grassley has previously criticized the Obama administration’s failure to prosecute elite bankers.

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“Makers and Takers:” They’re Projecting Again!

By Joe Firestone

I found a segment on MCNBC’s Up With Steve Kornacke show revealing for what it did not say. The segment started off with a clip from a Recent Town Hall of John McCain’s. Senator McCain took a question from a woman who said, with more than a little emotion.

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Woman: “It kills me every time i hear senators, especially republicans, talk about those takers. they’re just taken. the takers. i paid taxes for over 30 years and i have a rare illness and now i’m disabled. the state of arizona raised the eligibility for a program that was paying $100 a month for my medicaid to 3.4%. consequently, i was cut off. $100 a month, which meant (breaks down) i could no longer go to physical therapy. do it intentionally to cut as many people as they can for as long as they can from benefits that are desperately needed and it’s just not right. we’re the takers.”

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What Would You Have the President Do? Part III, Doing Some Economic and Social Justice

The first two Parts in this series began answering the question “what would u have him do?” It arose in the context of a Post at Naked Capitalism by Michael Hudson with some additions by Yves Smith. A commenter, objecting to the criticism of the President’s Knox College speech, issued the challenge in connection with the President’s promised effort to restore prosperity to the middle class and the poor. Continue reading

The Fraud Shotgun: The Overlapping Fields of Fraudulent Fire that Drove the Crisis

By William K. Black

I have written a series of articles recently that focus on appraisal fraud.

I did so because appraisal fraud allows such “clean” tests of what (and who) drove the financial crisis and how many different private and public sector actors could have easily prevented the crisis had they acted against the fraud epidemics.

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Why did the Fed Refuse to Heed the Appraisers, Prosecutors, and Industry’s Fraud Warnings?

By William K. Black

The Appraisers’ Warning of the Lenders’ Fraud Epidemic

Two of my recent columns have explained the effort by a very large number of appraisers to combat the “Gresham’s” dynamic that home lenders and their agents were deliberately generating by extorting appraisers to inflate appraisals.  A “Gresham’s” dynamics perverts market forces.  When cheaters prosper the markets drive honest firms and professionals out of business. Honest appraisers tried to block this dynamic.

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Heeding the Appraisers’ Fraud Warnings Would have Prevented the Crisis

By William K. Black

On July 9, 2013 I participated in a radio interview with a lobbyist for the 100 largest financial firms.  The San Francisco radio program host asked me what question I would ask the lobbyist and I said that any discussion should begin with allowing him to state his view of what caused the crisis.  In the course of his explanation, he bemoaned the fact that there was no warning about the crisis.

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