Category Archives: William K. Black

A Suggested Theme for the Occupation of Wall Street


The systemically dangerous institutions (SDIs) are inaccurately called “too big to fail” banks.  The administration calls them “systemically important,” and acts as if they deserve a gold star.  The ugly truth, however, is what Wall Street and each administration screams when the SDIs get in trouble.  They warn us that if a single SDI fails it will cause a global financial crisis.  There are roughly 20 U.S. SDIs and about the same number abroad.  That means that we roll the dice 40 times a day to see which SDI will blow up next and drag the world economy into crisis.  Economists agree that the SDIs are so large that they are grotesquely inefficient.  In “good times,” therefore, they harm our economy.  It is insane not to shrink the SDIs to the point that they no longer hold the global economy hostage.  The ability — and willingness — of the CEOs that control SDIs to hold our economy hostage makes the SDIs too big to regulate and prosecute.  It also allows them to extort, dominate, and degrade our democracies.  The SDIs pose a clear and present danger to the U.S. and the world.




It takes a global effort against the SDIs because they constantly put nations in competition with each other in order to generate a “race to the bottom.”  We are always being warned that if the U.S. adopts even minimal regulation of its SDIs they will flee to the City of London or be unable to compete with Germany’s “universal” banks.  The result of the race to the bottom, however, as Ireland, Iceland, the UK, and U.S. all experienced is that we create intensely criminogenic environment that creates epidemics of “control fraud.”  Control fraud — frauds led by CEOs who use seemingly legitimate entities as “weapons” to defraud — cause greater financial losses than all other forms of property crime — combined.  Because of the political power of the SDIs and the destruction of effective regulation these fraudulent SDIs now commit endemic fraud with impunity.


Effective financial regulation is essential if markets are to work.  Regulators have to serve as the “cops on the beat” to keep the fraudsters from gaining a competitive advantage over honest firms.  George Akerlof, the economist who identified and labeled this perverse (“Gresham’s”) dynamic was awarded the Nobel Prize in 2001 for his insight about how control fraud makes market forces perverse.

“[D]ishonest dealings tend to drive honest dealings out of the market. The cost of dishonesty, therefore, lies not only in the amount by which the purchaser is cheated; the cost also must include the loss incurred from driving legitimate business out of existence.”  George Akerlof (1970).

One of the most perceptive observers of humanity recognized this same dynamic two centuries before Akerlof.

“The Lilliputians look upon fraud as a greater crime than theft.  For, they allege, care and vigilance, with a very common understanding, can protect a man’s goods from thieves, but honesty hath no fence against superior cunning. . . where fraud is permitted or connived at, or hath no law to punish it, the honest dealer is always undone, and the knave gets the advantage.”  Swift, J. Gulliver’s Travels

We are the allies of honest banks and bankers.  We are their essential allies, for only effective regulation permits them to exist and prosper.  Think of what would happen to banks if we took the regular cops off the beat and stopped prosecuting bank robbers.  That’s what happens when we take the regulatory cops off the beat.  The only difference is that it is the controlling officers who loot the bank in the absence of the regulatory cops on the beat.  It is the anti-regulators who are the enemy of honest banks and bankers.

Top criminologists, effective financial regulators, and Nobel Laureates in economics have confirmed that epidemics of control fraud, such as the FBI warned of in September 2004, can cause financial bubbles to hyper-inflate and drive catastrophic financial crises.  Indeed, the FBI predicted in September 2004 that the developing “epidemic” of mortgage fraud would cause a financial “crisis” if it were not stopped.  It grew massively after 2004.  The fraudulent SDIs (who were far broader than Fannie and Freddie, indeed, they only began to dominate the secondary market in sales of fraudulent loans after 2005) ignored the FBI and industry fraud warnings for the most obvious of reasons — they were leaders the frauds.  The ongoing U.S. crisis was driven overwhelmingly by fraudulent “liar’s” loans.  Studies have shown that the incidence of fraud in liar’s loans is 90% (MBA/MARI 2006) and that by 2006 roughly one-third of all mortgage loans were liar’s loans (Credit Suisse 2007).  Rajdeep Sengupta, an economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, reported in 2010 in an article entitled “Alt-A: The Forgotten Segment of the Mortgage Market” that:

“[B]etween 2003 and 2006 … subprime and Alt-A [loans grew] 94 and 340 percent, respectively.  The higher levels of originations after 2003 were largely sustained by the growth of the nonprime (both the subprime and Alt-A) segment of the mortgage market.”

Sengupta’s data greatly understate the role of “Alt-A” loans (the euphemism for “liar’s loans”) for they ignore the fact that by 2006 half of the loans called “subprime” were also liar’s loans (Credit Suisse: 2007).  It was the massive growth in fraudulent liar’s loans that hyper-inflated and greatly extended the life of the bubble, producing the Great Recession.  The growth of fraudulent loans rapidly increased, rather than decreased, after government and industry anti-fraud specialists warned that liar’s loans were endemically fraudulent.  No one in the government ever told a bank that it had to make or purchase a “liar’s” loan.  No honest mortgage lender would make liar’s loans because doing so must cause severe losses.  Criminologists, economists aware of the relevant criminological and economics literature on control fraud, and a host of investigations have confirmed the endemic nature of control fraud in the ongoing U.S. crisis.

But the banking elites that led these frauds have been able to do so with impunity from prosecution.  Take on federal agency, the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS).  During the S&L debacle, the OTS made well over 10,000 criminal referrals and made the removal of control frauds from the industry and their prosecution its top two priorities.  The agency’s support and the provision of 1000 FBI agents to investigate the cases led to the felony conviction of over 1,000 S&L frauds.  The bulk of those convictions came from the “Top 100” list that OTS and the FBI created to prioritize the investigation of the worst failed S&Ls.  In the ongoing crisis — which caused losses 40 times larger than the S&L debacle, the OTS made zero criminal referrals, the FBI (as recently as FY 2007) assigned only 120 agents nationally to respond to the well over one million cases of mortgage fraud that occurred annually, and the OTS’ non-effort produced no convictions of any S&L control frauds.  OTS’ sister agencies, the Fed and the OCC, have the same record of not even attempting to identify and prosecute the frauds.  The FDIC was better, but still only a shadow of what it was in fighting fraud in the early 1990s.  If control frauds can operate with impunity from criminal prosecutions, then the perverse Gresham’s dynamic is maximized and market forces will increasingly drive honest banks and firms from the marketplace.

The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission reported on the results of the Great Recession that was driven by this fraud epidemic:

“As this report goes to print, there are more than 26 million Americans who are out of work, cannot find full-time work, or have given up looking for work. About
four million families have lost their homes to foreclosure and another four and a half million have slipped into the foreclosure process or are seriously behind on their
mortgage payments. Nearly $11 trillion in household wealth has vanished, with retirement accounts and life savings swept away. Businesses, large and small, have felt the sting of a deep recession.”

It is the fraudulent SDIs that are the massive job killers and wealth destroyers.  It is the Great Recession that the fraudulent SDIs produced that caused most of the growth in the federal deficits and made the fiscal crises in our states and localities acute.  The senior officers that led the control frauds are the opposite of the “productive class.”  No one, without the aid of an army, has ever destroyed more wealth and dreams than the control frauds.  It is essential to hold them accountable, to help their victims recover, and to end their ongoing frauds and corruption that have crippled our economy, our democracy, and our nation.

Lenders Put the Lies in Liar’s Loans and Bear the Principal Moral Culpability

By William K. Black

A reader has asked several important questions about liar’s loans that are critical to understanding the causes of the ongoing U.S. crisis. By 2006, half of all loans called “subprime” were also liar’s loans. Roughly one-third of all home loans made in 2006 were liar’s loans. The crisis was originally called a “subprime” crisis, but it was always a liar’s loan crisis. The reader is correct to inquire about causation and moral culpability.

“Dr. Black, are liar’s loans the same as stated income loans? In either case, how do we know whether buyers or loaners put the income for the loan? If most of these reported incomes were entered by borrowers, I would think most of the blame falls on them.”

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The Solyndra Loans as Liar’s Loans

By William K. Black
(Cross-posted from Benzinga.com)

This column comments on Joe Nocera’s September 23, 2011 column entitled: The Phony Solyndra Scandal

Nocera’s column compares the statements of Solyndra’s controlling managers to Dick Fuld’s statements to the public about Lehman’s conditions and asserts with minimal explanation that neither could have been criminal. I have testified before the House Financial Services Committee at some length as to why Lehman was a “control fraud” so I disagree with Nocera. Lehman engaged in extensive accounting and securities fraud and caused massive losses by selling endemically fraudulent liar’s loans to the secondary market. It Soyndra’s controlling managers made false disclosures analogous to those made or permitted to go uncorrected by Fuld, then they too face a serious risk of criminal prosecution – it we ever replace Attorney General Holder with a prosecutor.

I also write to explain why Nocera is wrong to absolve the White House from scandal in the Solyndra matter. Nocera argues that it is inherently highly risky for the government to lend to companies the market will not loan to because their “green” projects are extremely risky commercial projects. He concludes that it is inevitable that many such loans will fail and that such failures do not demonstrate that the federally subsidized loan program for green energy companies is flawed. He concludes by warning that China dominates solar panel manufacture and that China will be the winner if the Republicans cut funding for the green energy programs.

Nocera is correct that the subsidized program is extremely risky. He identifies two of the risks. First, the technology developed may prove unmarketable. Second, entry by competitors may be so robust that the price of the relevant products (e.g., solar panels) suffer a “stunning collapse” and cause the U.S. Treasury-financed firm to fail even if the development of improved technology is modestly successful. 

There are obvious economic arguments against Nocera’s play of the Red Menace card. China heavily subsidizes solar panel manufacturing. Other nations (including the U.S.) subsidize solar panel manufacturing. Solar panels are still a specialty application that is not cost-effective in general usage absent public subsidies. The subsidies to the purchasers are not large enough to develop a market that has kept pace with the tremendous growth of solar panel production. The result has been a glut of solar panel production and a sharp drop in solar panel prices. In sum, the Chinese government is taking the very large financial risks of developing a new technology and the financial losses that come from selling us the solar panels at a low and sharply falling price that is inadequate to defray the costs of production and the risks of new product development. Nocera states that China has provide a $30 billion subsidy to solar panel producers purchasers, which has helped produce a glut of solar panels and caused a “stunning collapse” in their “market” price. That means that the great bulk of the Chinese subsidy has flowed to purchasers of solar panels, including Americans. Even if the Chinese develop a solar panel technology that is cost effective in general residential and commercial real estate usage there is no assurance that the Chinese government or public will find the production subsidies desirable. China may lose its solar panel production lead to a lower-cost producer or a higher quality producer. Other nations’ producers may be less than vigorous in enforcing the intellectual property rights of the Chinese producers, allowing domestic competitors to skip the large risks and costs of the research and development stage.

This column, however, generally emphasizes financial regulation, and there are reasons to use the word “scandal” to describe the administration’s treatment of its regulators in the Solyndra loan. Here is Nocera’s defense of the administration’s behavior:

 “Undoubtedly, the Solyndra “scandal” will draw a little blood: there are some embarrassing e-mails showing the White House pushing to get the deal done quickly so it could tout Solyndra’s green jobs as part of the stimulus package.

But if we could just stop playing gotcha for a second, we might realize that federal loan programs — especially loans for innovative energy technologies — virtually require the government to take risks the private sector won’t take. Indeed, risk-taking is what these programs are all about. Sometimes, the risks pay off. Other times, they don’t. It’s not a taxpayer ripoff if you don’t bat 1.000; on the contrary, a zero failure rate likely means that the program is too risk-averse. Thus, the real question the Solyndra case poses is this: Are the potential successes significant enough to negate the inevitable failures?”

Nocera’s effort to minimize the administration’s misconduct and his misstatements about risk are interrelated and they reprise the mistakes that the Bush administration made in its assault on financial regulation that led to the ongoing financial crisis. Life does not reward all risks. The quintessential risk that it does not reward in lending is failing to underwrite. A lender that fails to underwrite prudently is taking a severe risk, for the failure causes “adverse selection.” Lenders that make large loans (e.g., mortgages or loans to solar panel manufacturers) under conditions of adverse selection have a “negative expected value” – they are gambling against the house. Lenders that make loans with a negative expected value will suffer severe losses.

We are still suffering from a crisis driven by CEOs of lenders who deliberately destroyed essential underwriting in order to maximize the accounting control fraud “recipe” that I have explained many times. The result was “liar’s” loans. By 2006, roughly half of loans called “subprime” were also liar’s loans. Approximately one-third of U.S. mortgage loans made in 2006 were liar’s loans and the fraud incidence in studies of liar’s loans is 90 percent. Liar’s loans caused staggering direct losses and hyper-inflated and extended the residential real estate bubble, driving the Great Recession.

So the “real question” is not the one Nocera framed. The real question is why a lender (the U.S. government in this case) would gratuitously fail to underwrite a loan properly. The fact that the type of loan was inherently extremely risky makes it imperative that the lender engage is superb underwriting. The Obama administration, and Nocera, have failed to learn the most obvious and costly lesson of the ongoing U.S. crisis – liar’s loans cause catastrophic losses and failures and are “an open invitation to fraudsters” (quoting MIRA’s 2006 report to the members of the Mortgage Bankers Association).

Nocera does not explain what is embarrassing about the Obama emails. The government’s professional loan underwriters were worried about lending to Solyndra. They were warning the administration that they had not been able to complete the professional underwriting essential to making loans prudently. The Obama administration officials did not respond by backing their professional regulators. The administration did not stress that it was essential that the loan be approved only after it passed a rigorous underwriting process. The administration responded to the efforts of its professionals to protect the government from loss by abusing the regulators and pressuring them to approve the loans without completing the underwriting. The administration thought it was fine to make a liar’s loan to Solyndra. 

The administration exposed the government to a gratuitous risk of loss of hundreds of millions of dollars in order to achieve an overarching priority – they wanted a presidential photo op. If that isn’t a scandal, if Nocera thinks it is merely business as usual, then our failure to hold Dick Fuld, President Obama, and a host of other elites to a higher standard of accountability is the scandal that will generate repeated scandal.

Bill Black is the author of The Best Way to Rob a Bank is to Own One and an associate professor of economics and law at the University of Missouri-Kansas City. He spent years working on regulatory policy and fraud prevention as Executive Director of the Institute for Fraud Prevention, Litigation Director of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and Deputy Director of the National Commission on Financial Institution Reform, Recovery and Enforcement, among other positions.


Bill writes a column for Benzinga every Monday. His other academic articles, congressional testimony, and musings about the financial crisis can be found at his Social Science Research Network author page and at the blog New Economic Perspectives.

Why do Banking Regulators bother to Conduct Faux Stress Tests?

By William K. Black
(Cross-posted from Benzinga.com)

One of the many proofs that banking regulators do not believe that financial markets are even remotely efficient is their continued use of faux stress tests to reassure markets. But why do markets need reassurance? If markets do need reassurance that banks can survive stressful conditions, why are they reassured by government-designed stress tests designed to be non-stressful?

Stress tests were first mandated for Fannie and Freddie by statute. Fannie and Freddie’s managers referred to them as “nuclear winter” scenarios – impossibly unlikely and stark disasters. The managers used the ability of Fannie and Freddie to pass the stress tests as proof that the institutions were safe and so well capitalized that they could survive even a lengthy depression. In reality, Fannie and Freddie had exceptionally low capital levels. Fannie and Freddie met their capital requirements under a newly toughened version of the statutory stress test weeks before they collapsed and were revealed to be massively insolvent.

AIG passed its stress test immediately before it failed. The three big Icelandic banks passed their stress tests shortly before they were revealed to be massively insolvent. Lehman passed its stress tests. The stress tests ignored the actual primary causes of losses and failures – extreme losses on fraudulent liar’s loans and CDOs.

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Upcoming Appearances

Catch our bloggers live and in person.  Bill Black speaks tonight at UMKC and Marshall Auerback will speak at an event in Amsterdam on Wednesday, Sept 21st, and he will speak in Dublin on Thursday, Sept. 22nd.  Visit our Upcoming Appearances page for more details.
And here is the rest of it.[[ NOTE: If this is a Primer posting, it must have ‘MMP’ as the last label or it will not be removed from the NEP homepage ]]

William Black: Why Nobody Went to Jail During the Credit Crisis

Jim welcomes Professor of Economics and Law William Black to Financial Sense Newshour. He explains to Jim why no one has gone to jail four years after the beginning of the historic Credit Crisis. Professor Black believes that the level of corruption and fraud is so pervasive that very few of the guilty will ever be brought to justice.

Bill Black is an Associate Professor of Economics and Law at the University of Missouri – Kansas City (UMKC). He was the Executive Director of the Institute for Fraud Prevention from 2005-2007. He has taught previously at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin and at Santa Clara University, where he was also the distinguished scholar in residence for insurance law and a visiting scholar at the Markkula Center for Applied Ethics.
(Click here to listen to the interview)

Transcript

Jim Puplava: Joining me on the program is Professor William Black. He is a Lawyer and an Associate Professor of Economics and Law at the University of Missouri, Kansas City. He was a Director of the Institute for Fraud Prevention from 2005 to 2007. He taught at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas. He was also a Litigation Director for the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. He is also author of the book “The Best Way to Rob a Bank Is to Own One.”

And Professor, you played a critical role during the S&L crisis in exposing congressional corruption. During that period of time, a lot of corruption was exposed; a lot of people in the financial sector went to jail, including Charles Keating. I wonder if you would contrast that to the last credit crisis, let us say from 2007 to 2009 where a lot of money was lost, a lot of things went wrong, but nobody went to jail. Instead of going to jail, they walked out instead with multi-million dollar bonuses. What was the difference, what was behind this in your opinion?

William Black: Well, I say the both of them were driven by fraud. The Savings & Loan crisis was a tragedy in two parts. First part was not fraud, it was interest rate risk. But the second phase, which was vastly more expensive, was to defraud and the National Commission that looked into the causes of the crisis said that the typical large failure fraud was invariably present. And there were real regulators then. Our agency filed well over 10,000 criminal referrals that resulted in over 1,000 felony convictions and cases designated as nature. And even that understates the grade in which we went after the elite. Because we worked very closely with the FBI and the Justice Department, to prioritize cases—creating the top 100 list of the 100 worst institutions which translated into about 600 or 700 executives—and so the bulk of those thousand felony convictions were the worst fraud, the most elite frauds.

In the current crisis, of course they appointed anti-regulators. And this crisis goes back well before 2007 and of course it is continuing, it does not end at 2009. So the FBI warned in open testimony in the House of Representatives, in September 2004—we are now talking seven years ago—that there was an epidemic of mortgage fraud, their words, and they predicted that it would cause a financial crisis, crisis being their word, if it were not contained. Well no one thinks that it was contained.

All right so you have massive fraud driving this crisis, hyperinflating the bubble, an FBI warning and how many criminal referrals did the same agency do, in this crisis. Remember it did well over 10,000 in the prior crisis. Well the answer is zero. They completely shut down making criminal referrals and whichever administration you hate the most, you can hate because while most of this certainly occurred in the Bush Administration, the Obama Administration has obviously not changed it. Obviously did not see it as a priority to prosecute these elite criminals who caused this devastating injury.

Another way to look at it is, how much fraud is there and we know the following: There are no official statistics on sub prime and similar categories because there are no official definitions. So there is a little wishy-wishy in this but the best numbers we have are that by 2006, half of all the loans called sub-prime, were also liars loans. Liars loans means that there was no prudent underwriting of the loan. And total, about one-third of all the loans made in 2006, were liars loans.

Now that’s an extraordinary number, especially when you look at the studies. And here I am going to quote from the Mortgage Bankers Association. That is the trade association of the perps and this is their Anti-Fraud Specialist Unit, and they reported this to every member of the Mortgage Bankers Association in 2006. So nobody can claim they did not know. They found three critical things, first they said this kind of loan where you do not do underwriting is, and I am quoting again, “an open invitation to fraudsters.” Second, they said “the best study of this found a 90% fraud incident.” In other words, if you look at 100 liars loans, 90 of them are fraudulent. And third they said, therefore these loans where the euphemism is stated income are Alt-A loans, actually deserve the title that the industry calls the Behind Closed Doors, and that is liars loans. The other thing we know from other studies and investigations, is that it was overwhelmingly lenders and their agents that put the ‘lie’ in liars loans. Now that is obvious when you look at the lies about appraisals, because homeowners cannot inflate appraisals. But lenders can and how they did it was shown in an investigation by then New York Attorney General Cuomo, now Governor, who found that Washington Mutual, which is called WAMU, and is the largest bank failure in the history of the United States, and indeed the history of the world, had a black list of appraisers. But you got on the black list if you were an honest appraiser, and refused to inflate the appraisal.

Similarly, we know that you could get, for example, a California jumbo mortgage, that’s one say the size of $800,000. As a loan broker, just one of these, you could get a fee of $20,000. If it hit certain parameters. And those parameters would have to do with what is the interest rate, but also what is the loan to value ratio, and what is the debt to income ratio. So the loan to value ratio is how big is the loan compared to the value of your house. Well that is an easy ratio to gimmick, and we have just explained why, by inflating the appraisal. If you inflate the appraisal then the loan to value ratio falls and the loan looks like it is a lot safer, and you can sell it to Wall Street for significantly more. The debt to income ratio, well that is even easier to gain. The debt is simply how much are you going to borrow to buy the house. And the income is, what is the income stated on the loan application for the borrower. Except that this is a liars loan, so the lender has agreed that it is not going to check. It is not going to verify whether the income is real. And so the loan broker can write down any income number he or she wants. And that will gimmick that ratio and again it will put it into the sweet spot, for all of these things, so that you could get your $20,000 fee. Now step back and ask yourself, many of these guys who are loan brokers, their previous job was literally flipping burgers, right. So are you going to leave it up to the borrower to come up magically with the right income and the right appraisal when they don’t even know what the magic numbers are and cannot inflate the appraisal? Of course not. You are going to do it as the loan broker. You are going to tell the borrower to write in a greatly inflated income number, or maybe you are afraid that they are too honest, so you may simply write it in yourself, which happened in many cases.

So again, we got thirty, roughly one-third of all the loans by 2006, after these warnings. They rapidly increased the number of liars loans they made. One-third of them are liars loans and 90% of them are fraudulent, which is to say, that the amount of fraud annually was well over a million fraud a year. We are talking about hundreds of billions of dollars in fraudulent instruments.

Jim Puplava: Professor, I guess one question I would have is, did the guys at the top of the bank not know that this was going on? I mean I would find it hard to believe that if I am the CEO of a financial organization, that I don’t know that our loan standards, that we went to liar loans and that we were not documenting or verifying. I mean what happened to 20% down, two years worth of tax returns, I mean how would somebody at the top, not know this.

William Black: You mean you think liars loan might be a hint?

Jim Puplava: Yeah, maybe just a little (sarcasm).

William Black: Yeah, we have known for centuries, that if you don’t underwrite loans, or if you don’t underwrite insurance, you’ll get something called “adverse selection”. And that means you get the worse possible borrowers or people being insured and the expected value of lending to somebody, in conditions of serious adverse selection, is negative. Or to put that in English, that means if you lend this way, you lose money. And we have known this for centuries. This is like betting against the house in Las Vegas. You could win some individual bets, but you stay at the table for three years, and you are going to lose everything. And as we say, you will lose the house, to the house. And, that is exactly what is going to happen here. So yeah, the CEO’s knew all about this. Why did they do it? And the answer is, here is the recipe, it’s got four ingredients for creating what the Nobel Prize Winner in Economics, George Akerlof and his colleague Paul Romer said in 1993 was “a sure thing”. And that sure thing is what in criminology we call accounting control fraud.

So control fraud is when the person who controls a seemingly legitimate entity, uses it as a weapon to fraud. In the financial sphere, the weapon of choice is accounting. So here are the four ingredients of the recipe that produce a sure thing of record accounting income.

  1. Grow like crazy
  2. Make preposterously bad loans but at a premium yield.
  3. Have extreme leverage. That means you have a ton on debt.
  4. Put aside only ridiculously low allowances for future loan losses.

You do those four things, you are mathematically guaranteed to report record, albeit fictional, profits in the short term. You are also guaranteed with modern executive compensation, to make the Senior Executives wealthy, and you are guaranteed, because after all, if you think about those four ingredients, they are the perfect recipe as well for maximizing real losses. And that’s why the title of Akerlof and Romer’s article says it all, “Looting: The Economic Underworld of Bankruptcy for Profit.” The firm fails but the executives walk away rich. This is the same concept with my book “The Best Way to Rob a Bank Is to Own One.” It is these internal people who control the seemingly legitimate entity that can get away with financial murder. And here is the really bad news. I mean that is bad news right there, but the really bad news, is that this tends to happen as the FBI warned, and again in 2004, seven years ago. So the next time you hear some moron tell you that no one could have predicted this, it was predicted by the Premiere Law Enforcement entity in the world dealing with white-collar crime.

Jim Puplava: You know, we just talked about, with these liar loans being made, the executives at the top knew that this was going on. But it was driving record profits that they were reporting, their stock prices were going up. They were getting paid bonuses and you know their option values were worth just, you know, some of these compensation packages were just unreal. But here’s the thing that I guess some of these people did know as we mentioned the executives at the top, but some knew how to make profit from them. For example, we found out in congressional testimony that Goldman Sachs at the same time that they were selling these mortgage polls to let’s say many of it’s customers, at the same time, internal memos and e-mails said the stuff was garbage and they were shorting it, making money. Is it because they control so many of Congress that this time there was no law enforcement by the regulators coming in and looking at these guys that walked away with these bonus packages. Or the fact that you had conflicts of interest of selling bogus mortgage polls that you knew that were garbage. And at the same time you were selling them to a customer, you were taking the opposite side of the trade and shorting it.

William Black: So to just close the loop on what I was saying, if a bunch of folks follow the same strategy at the same time, they hyper-inflate a financial bubble. And when you have huge financial bubbles and they collapse, that’s when you get great recession. So your question is, so why, this is the greatest financial crime in the history of the world and no one senior, at any of the major places that drove the crisis, has gone to jail? In fact, no one has been indicted. There were some at Bear Stearns, for the real specialized stuff, but for the basic fraud we are talking about, no one has even been charged with a crime. What has happened? And the answer, the first answer is it all has to start with the regulators. The regulators have to serve as the Sherpas on something like this, in criminal prosecution. The Sherpas of course, are the folks that help you get to the top of the Himalayan Mountains. And this is a hard task, it is hard to prosecute sophisticated white-collar crimes, and they do have the best criminal defense lawyers in the world. So it is not an easy thing. And getting those thousand plus felony convictions in the Savings and Loan crisis, was a massive success for which the Department of Justice, the FBI and the agencies deserve a lot of credit. What do the Sherpas do? The Sherpas do two functions. One, they do the heavy lifting and in this context, that means they the great bulk of the investigative work. And two, they serve as the guides, they have the expertise, they’ve seen this before, they know what works and what does not. And in this context, that means they have expertise in the fraud mechanisms, the fraud schemes, identifying it and explaining it. And so a criminal referral is not just a sort of a useful thing, it is the absolutely essential thing. Criminal referral in our era might be twenty to thirty pages and have two hundred to three hundred pages of attachments of all the key documents. It would be the roadmap to continue this metaphor that says, here’s the fraud, here’s how it works, here are the key people, here is where the money moved, here are the key documents to be able to prove the case. Here are the key witnesses, this is how you contact them, right? And I told you that we went to zero criminal referrals from well over ten thousand. That has made it impossible for the FBI and the justice department to have any substantial success. But of course, this is not the question of them simply not having substantial success, they ain’t having no success. And there you have to look at what, after a brilliant start with this September 2004 warning, with no help from the regulators, well you could not get any significant number of FBI agents assigned in the Bush Administration, to investigate these cases.

Now part of what has happened is in some sense understandable, when the 9/11 attacks ten years ago occurred, we of course found that our national security FBI agents, could not infiltrate Al Qaeda. So what we could do is follow the money. And the experts at following the money are the white-collar FBI agents. So they transferred 500 white collar FBI Specialists, over to National Security. Okay, we can understand why they do that. What you cannot understand is why the Bush Administration refused to allow the FBI to replace this enormous loss of white-collar specialists. And so as a whole, white collar prosecutions fell significantly in the Bush Administration. That meant that as recently as fiscal year 2007, there were nationwide, only 120 FBI agents working all mortgage fraud cases. To give you a comparison, at the peak of the Savings and Loan Crisis, there were 1,000 FBI agents working the cases.

Jim Puplava: Wow

William Black: Eight times more FBI agents than were working the cases in fiscal year 2007. And this crisis is forty times bigger and worse than the Savings and Loan Crisis. So you would have required massively more people. To give you another idea of scope, to investigate Enron, and Enron was complex, but it was nowhere near as big and as complex as Washington Mutual. It took 100 FBI agents. So you can see that with 120 nationwide, at most you could have done one major case. But instead, they divided them up in what the military would call, Penny Packets, which is to say two or three agents per field office. And that means they cannot investigate anything substantial. So they were put on relatively smaller cases. And they being diligent FBI agents, they worked those cases, and that’s where they wrote the memos, okay we found this, prosecute these people, don’t prosecute these people. The FBI in late 2007 – 2008, figures out this cannot work. Remember I told you there were over a million cases of mortgage fraud a year and that overwhelmingly it’s lenders who foot the fraud, the lie in the liars loan. But the FBI couldn’t and didn’t investigate any of the major lenders. So it is looking at these relatively small folks, and that is what it reports back. The FBI decides you know, as I said, this cannot work. This is like going to a beach in San Diego and throwing handfuls of sand in the Pacific Ocean and wondering when you are going to be able to walk to Hawaii. Every year, with a million plus cases of fraud a year, if you prosecute a thousand of them or two thousand of them or three thousand of them, you are a million cases further behind every year, right. It is just insane. So the FBI says we got to start going after the big guys at which point Bush’s Attorney General Mukasey says no, he refuses to even create a National Task Force against mortgage fraud, saying famously, this is simply the equivalent of, and I am quoting again, “White Collar Street Crime,” little tiny stuff. Well of course he has assigned the FBI to only look at little cases and they report back, hey we’re finding little cases. And the Mukasey interprets from that, hey only little cases exist.

Jim Puplava: Yeah, but you know, in the S&L Crisis, you had some high profile cases. For example Charles Keating, and that got a lot of play. So maybe if they didn’t have the manpower, maybe going after some very high profile cases, might have made the point. You are saying they backed off from that. What about the Obama Administration?

William Black: They never did it. They didn’t even back off. They never, you can tell from the numbers that they have, in how many FBI personnel it takes to do a really sophisticated, large institutional investigation. They have never done what would have been considered a real investigation in the Savings and Loan era of any, any of the major fraudulent lenders and investment banks that created the worthless financial derivates—not worthless, but not worth very much—financial derivatives.

Jim Puplava: What about the Obama Administration? Had they came in, they continued with the same policy basically, they ignored it. Where they could have had let us say, an opportunity. Is it because Professor, that the process is you know, some have said that Congress is bought and paid for by the financial industry. I mean, is that part of the reason?

William Black: Well, it’s not just Congress of course. The President has said that he wants to raise a billion dollars in the reelection effort and despite all the press you may have heard about how the White House is despised by finance—in fact, last I read, a bigger percentage and a bigger absolute dollar amount of contributions in this effort, than in the original effort had come from finance. And so both parties are tremendously beholden to finance. That is part of it but again, the Obama Administration was better than the Bush Administration. The Obama Administration was willing to create a task force and it’s the numbers of FBI Agents have been increased, but they are still looking at relatively small cases. And they are nowhere near the numbers required and so unless something dramatic or radical changes, this is going to be the greatest case of elite fraud with impunity in the history of the world. And it is only going to change if we express our outrage as the people and demand that it is changed. Let me tell you how bad it is. The Federal Housing Finance Administration, has just last week, or about ten days ago now, filed fifteen hundred plus pages of complaints against seventeen financial entities. And about ten of them are among the biggest financial entities in the world saying, every investigation has found repeated enormous fraud at these entities. So, and there is a track record, a paper trail of that fraud. But these entities got reports saying these assets were trash and that they lied and then sold the assets to Fannie and Freddie by making acts of deceit, which is of course, the key element of fraud.

So, now that this has happened, there are really only two possibilities. Either the Federal Housing Finance Administration has gotten all those documents wrong, and there is no such record, or there is such a record in which case, where is the Justice Department, why is it not bringing criminal prosecution against most of the largest banks in the world.

Jim Puplava: You know, there was a documentary film called “Inside Job,” which won an Oscar this year, and it ended with the Director and Producer pointing out the fact that you just brought up—not one single prosecution was brought in this entire situation, what is probably the largest fraud committed in history. And yet it still goes on Professor, we still have the financial industry contributing large amounts of money to politicians in both parties, both at the national level, the local level, and so basically, what you have is influence buying here. Because it seems to me that there were so many obviously cases, even in the hearings, where I think it was, Senator Levin, basically talking about the conflicts of interest in internal e-mails. I thought my goodness, there was enough evidence to go after but not one thing was done. And even when a lot of these firms went under, as the shareholders lost everything, the taxpayers losing everything, the guys at the top walked away with some of the biggest bonus packages I’ve seen in my investment career.

William Black: Again, Akerlof and Romer have been proven correct. Akerlof and Romer worked with us and strongly support the kind of efforts that need to be done. The title of their article again is “Looting: The Economic Underworld of Bankruptcy for Profit.” The firm failed because you followed the fraud recipe that I gave you, which causes catastrophic losses but their CEO’s and other Senior Officers can walk away incredibly rich. There is, by the way, one case and was done after the movie, the documentary that you are talking about, and it’s the proverbial exception that proves the rule. The Taylor case, and it refers to a pretty obscure mortgage-banking firm in the southeast. Ten people have been convicted who were officers. But the only reason they were convicted was because these people after thousands of acts of fraud, over a ten-year period, tried to defraud the TARP Program and the Special Inspector General to the TARP Program, which is called SIGTARP, was very good. He has since left the government service. And they found this and they made the criminal referral. What we discovered in the course of that, was that Fanny Mae discovered this fraud in 2000 but refused to make a criminal referral.

They refused to make a criminal referral because it wanted to secretly dump the paper that had been provided by this mortgage-banking firm. And so the mortgage banking firm, the fraudulent mortgage banking firm, they would have been caught red handed doing the frauds. Simply went across the street, metaphorically, and defrauded Freddie Mac for nine years. So again, if people, I do not understand who have never done this, how absolutely critical the criminal referrals are.

Jim Puplava: Well, it seems like as we have seen here, as you pointed out, zero criminal referrals have been brought in this entire case, and you just cannot help but believe that this goes on and meanwhile, you and I as taxpayers, are going to have to front the bill for this. It is unfortunate. Let me ask you a final question, we supposedly as a result of all of this, we had Dodd Frank, that was supposed to bring in like Sarbanes-Oxley, all this financial legislation that would basically prevent this kind of thing from happening again. Will Dodd Frank help us in this way or is it just more red tape and which is useless if regulators and let’s say the FBI, aren’t allowed to do their job.

William Black: Dodd Frank has some individual components that are useful and the Republican Party unfortunately is trying to kill each of them. The Administration is not necessarily fighting strong for any, the Dodd Frank Bill was not created and designed to deal with the actual causes of the crisis. And so it most likely will not stop the next crisis. But the focus on legislation is a bit misleading. Under the existing laws and regulation, this was an easy crisis to prevent. People think of it as much more difficult and complex. But as I say, it was overwhelmingly driven by liars loans. Liars loans were easy to figure out. We, as regional regulators in 1990 and 1991, killed a wave of liars loans that was starting, especially in Orange Country Savings and Loans. And as a result, those lenders gave up their Federal Deposit Insurance precisely to escape our jurisdiction, and created mortgage banks. But the Fed, the Federal Reserve Board, had authority from 1994 on, in other words, a long time before the crisis, to regulate anybody that did home loans. And it was an easy call that something called a liars loan had to be stopped. Alan Greenspan and Ben Bernanke refused to do their statutory authority to stop them. Because they didn’t believe in regulation. Bernanke was reappointed by President Obama. You know, I tried as little, what one little person could, to stop that. We need to have a complete new crew. Geithner needs to go, Attorney General Holder needs to go, and Bernanke needs to go and we need to put people in who will make a high priority ending the ability to loot institutions with impunity.

Jim Puplava: Yeah, that was one of the aspects that was brought out in the documentary, “Inside Job.” A lot of the people, Larry Summers who until recently was in the Obama Administration, Geithner, Alan Greenspan tried to stop Brooksley Born on derivatives. And it seems like the guys that were behind all of this are the same people that have been put in charge of fixing it. Well listen Professor, your book once again is “The Best Way to Rob a Bank Is to Own One.” And you have written several articles so if our listeners would like to follow the work that you do, I hope you keep up the good work because we do need hopefully some day we will get honest people in there that will care more about doing what is right than about their positions and the pay that they get.

William Black: We have written hundreds of articles that if folks are interested, check out “New Economic Perspectives”, the UMKC Economics blog.

Jim Puplava: Okay, one more time?

William Black: “New Economic Perspectives”, the blog of the Economics Department at the University of Missouri at Kansas City.

Jim Puplava: All right, well we have been speaking with Professor Black, Professor thank you for coming on the program and helping to clarify why this big crime really went unpunished, which is a real tragedy for not only most Americans but all of us as taxpayers who have paid for the bill.

William Black: Thank you sir, take care.

Jim Puplava: Thank you.

Who Put the Rot in Herr Hummler’s Wurst?

By William K. Black

 
I write this column as I am flying home from presenting a keynote address Friday to the 32nd annual Burgenstock Meeting (now held in Interlaken, Switzerland).  The Burgenstock meeting is one of the top international meetings on financial derivatives and attracts a mixture of senior regulators, market participants, and a scattering of academics.  I changed the presentation I intended to make entirely in order to respond to Thursday’s famous Thursday keynote presenter, Dr. Hummler, the head of the oldest private bank in Swizerland.  Dr. Hummler is famous for his monthly newsletters, which goes out to a select mailing list of 100,000 and often prompt significant discussion.  I found his keynote address provocative.  I was not adequately aware of his work, so I stayed up until 4:00 a.m. researching his positions and then prepared a new keynote address responding to his central thesis.

Continue reading

FHFA Complaints: Can Control Frauds Recover for Being Defrauded by other Control Frauds?

By William K. Black 

(Cross-posted from Benzinga.com)

Reading the FHFA complaints against many of the world’s largest banks is a fascinating and troubling process for anyone that understands “accounting control fraud.” The FHFA, a federal regulatory agency, sued in its capacity as conservator for Fannie and Freddie. Its complaints are primarily based on fraud. The FHFA alleges that the fraud came from the top, i.e., it alleges that many of the world’s largest banks were control frauds and that they committed hundreds of thousands of fraudulent acts. The FHFA complaints emphasize that other governmental investigations have repeatedly confirmed that the defendant banks were engaged in endemic fraud. The failure of the Department of Justice to convict any senior official of a major bank, and the almost total failure to indict any senior official of a major bank has moved from scandal to farce.

The FHFA complaints are distressing, however, intheir failure to explain why the frauds occurred and how an accounting controlfraud works.  The FHFA complaint againstCountrywide is particularly disappointing because it accepts hook line andsinker Countrywide’s internal claim that it acted improperly for the purpose ofattaining a larger market share. Executive compensation drops entirely out of the story even though it isthe reason the frauds occur and the means by which controlling officers loot“their” banks.  The FHFA complaintagainst Countrywide ignores executive compensation.  The FHFA complaint against J.P. Morgan(purchaser of WaMu) mentions only that loan officers’ compensation was based onloan volume rather than loan quality. 

The complaints fail to explain the extraordinarysignificance of widespread appraisal fraud – something that only the lender andits agents can produce and a “marker” of accounting control fraud.  No honest lender would inflate, or permit tobe inflated, appraisals.

The complaints also fail to explain why no honestmortgage lender would make “liar’s” loans. The FHFA complaint against Countrywide notes that Countrywide loanofficers would use undocumented loans to aid their creation of fraudulent loanapplications.

Even neoclassical economists – the weakest of allfields in understanding fraud – understand that this crisis was driven byexecutive compensation.  Consider theadmirably short piece entitled
Fake alpha or Heads I win, Tails you lose” by Raghuram Rajan.  Rajan’spiece is badly flawed, but it at least understands the importance ofcompensation, accounting, and risk. 

“Whatthe shareholder will really pay for is if the manager beats the S&P 500index regularly, that is, generates excess returns while not taking more risk.Hence pay for alpha.”
Rajan is correct that the neoclassicaltheory of CEO compensation is that the CEO should only be compensated for high (“excess”)returns if they were not generated by“taking more risks.”  Modern bonus plans oftenpurport to provide exceptional compensation to CEOs who achieve extreme short-term“excess” returns that are not generated by “taking more risks.”  Rajan gets the next point analytical pointcorrect as well:  “In reality, there areonly a few sources of alpha for investment managers.  [S]pecial ability is by definition rare.”  It is the “rare” CEO who can achieve massivebonuses through exceptional performance, but all CEOs desire massive bonuses.  
Rajan gets the next step in theanalytics correct – the answer to the CEO’s dilemma is to create “fake alpha,”but he falls off the rails in the last clause.
“Alphais quite hard to generate since most ways of doing so depend on the investment managerpossessing unique abilities – to pick stock, identify weaknesses in managementand remedy them, or undertake financial innovation. Unique ability is rare. Howthen can untalented investment managers justify their pay? Unfortunately, alltoo often it is by creating fake alpha – appearing to create excess returns butactually taking on hidden tail risk.” 
In his recent book, Rajan explainsthat by “hidden tail risk” he means taking risks that will only cause losses inhighly unusual circumstances.  I willreturn to why this aspect of Rajan’s reasoning is false. 
Rajan gets the next part correct– generating fake alpha will cause the bank to fail when the risks blow up.  Rajan’s “tail risk” theory, however, predictsthat these risks will only blow up rarely.
Rajan then stresses, correctly,that executive compensation based largely on short-term reported income willcreate perverse incentives to generate fake alpha.  He also        
“Truealpha can only be measured in the long run ….  Compensation structures that reward managersannually for profits, but do not claw these rewards back when lossesmaterialize, encourage the creation of fake alpha.”
Rajan, being a good neo-classicaleconomist, recognizes the vital need to change compensation, but has no urgencyabout doing so. 
“[U]nlesswe fix incentives in the financial system, we will get more risk than webargain for. And the enormous pay of financial sector managers, which has hithertobeen thought of as just reward for performance, will deservedly come underscrutiny.”
Corporations have changedexecutive compensation in response to the crisis – by making it even moredependent on short-term reported income. Rajan does not ask why corporations base executive compensation onshort-term reported income without clawbacks. Rajan is correct that such compensation systems create intenselyperverse incentives that cause managers to loot the shareholders and creditorsand cause the bank to fail. 
Rajan’s extreme tail risk theorydescribes an accounting control fraud. Rajan does not understand that he is describing conduct that wouldconstitute accounting fraud.  Rajan alsodoes not understand that his hypothetical has nothing to do with what actuallyhappened in the crisis.  The extreme tailrisk scheme he hypothesizes would be a terrible fraud scheme.  He does not understand accounting controlfraud.
The real investments that drovethe financial crisis were not assets that would suffer losses only in rarecircumstances.  They were nonprimeloans.  Roughly 30% of total loansoriginated by 2006 were “liar’s” loans – with a 90% fraud incidence.  Liar’s loans and subprime are not mutuallyexclusive categories.  By 2006, half ofall loans called subprime were also liar’s loans.  Appraisal fraud was also epidemic.  The probability of endemically fraudulentloans causing losses (instead of fictional “excess return”) was certainty.  The loss recognition could only be delayedthrough a combination of accounting fraud (failing to provide remotely adequateallowances for loan and lease losses (ALLL)) and hyper-inflating thebubble.  Hyper-inflating the bubbleincreases the ultimate losses.
Making extreme tail riskinvestments is a deeply inferior fraud scheme. Rare risks produce tiny risk premiums and the entire game is to createsubstantial risk premiums.  Making liar’sloans allows exceptional growth (part one of the fraud “recipe” for a lender)and booking a premium yield (if one engages in accounting fraud on theALLL).  The key is found in GeorgeAkerlof and Paul Romer’s article title – “Looting: the Economic Underworld ofBankruptcy for Profit” (1993).  As theycorrectly observed, the fraud recipe is a “sure thing” – it maximizes(fictional) short-term reported income, executive bonuses, and real losses.
Rajan got many things correct andmany things wrong about generating fake alpha, but at least he sought toexplain the perverse dynamic.  The FHFAcomplaints lose explanatory power and persuasiveness because they ignorecompensation and accounting.  It pays tounderstand accounting control fraud.       
                 

The Washington Mutual Wish List: Optimizing a Criminogenic Environment

By William K. Black

(Cross-posted from Benzinga.com)

On November 7, 2007, the Financial Services Roundtable released its “The Blueprint for U.S. Financial Competitiveness.” I explained in a three-part series of columns how Federal Home Loan Bank Board Chairman Ed Gray and Office of Thrift Supervision Director Tim Ryan led crackdowns on the “control frauds” that caused the S&L debacle. I emphasized how Gray did so in the face of enormous political opposition from the Reagan administration, Speaker of the House Jim Wright, a majority of the House of Representatives, and the “Keating Five.” One of the odd moments during these political attacks was that a Republican Representative from the Dallas area requested a meeting with Gray when Speaker Wright’s attacks on Gray’s reregulation of the industry and actions against the control frauds were becoming public an notorious. In my naiveté, I thought that Bartlett requested the meeting to support his fellow Republican, Gray. Of course, Bartlett’s purpose was the opposite. He was enraged by our efforts against the Texas control frauds and wanted us to back off. Years later, after a stint as Dallas’ mayor, the Financial Services Roundtable made Bartlett its head, a position he continues to occupy.

Naturally, Bartlett learned nothing productive from being proven disastrously wrong about the S&L debacle. The financial industry chose him as its lead representative because he never learned. He remains an implacable anti-regulator.

The Blueprint describes and situates this anti-regulatory effort, which was the product of a “Blue Ribbon Commission” co-chaired by “Richard M. Kovacevich, Chairman, Wells Fargo & Company; and James Dimon, Chairman and CEO, JPMorgan Chase and Co.”

“Within the past year, three reports on U.S. financial competitiveness—including the Bloomberg-Schumer Report—have called for a system of principles-based regulation. Last March, Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr. said, “[W]e should also consider whether it would be practically possible and beneficial to move to a more principles-based regulatory system as we see working in other parts of the world.”

The Blueprint was part of a coordinated anti-regulatory effort with Goldman Sachs alums at the U.S. Treasury Department and the Chamber of Commerce.

“Three major studies – the bipartisan report by New York Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg and New York Senator Charles E. Schumer (D-NY), the U.S. Chamber report, and the study by the Committee on Capital Markets – have concluded that the United States is losing its position as the world’s leading financial marketplace.1”

The text of the footnote shows the “race to the bottom” rationale that characterized each of these purportedly “independent” “studies.”

“1 Michael R. Bloomberg and Charles E. Schumer, Sustaining New York’s and the US’ Global Financial Services Leadership, January 2007 at www.nyc.gov; hereafter, Bloomberg-Schumer Report. See also Michael R. Bloomberg and Charles E. Schumer, “To Save New York, Learn from London,” Wall Street Journal, November 1, 2006, p. A-18; Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, Interim Report, November 2006 at www.capmktsreg.org; hereafter, Interim Report; Commission on the Regulation of U.S. Capital Markets in the 21st Century (U.S. Chamber of Commerce), Report and Recommendations, March 2007 at www.uschamber.com; hereafter, U.S. Chamber Report.”

“To Save New York, Learn from London.” Mayor Bloomberg and Senator Schumer (D. NY) urged the U.S. to adopt the UK’s approach to financial regulation, which during this era was the three “de’s” – deregulation, desupervision, and de facto decriminalization. Henry Paulson was confirmed by the Senate as Bush’s Treasury Secretary on June 28, 2006. Paulson’s top priority was deregulation. In particular, he worked to weaken Sarbanes-Oxley (SoX) on an urgent basis. Paulson’s strategy was to generate a series of anti-regulatory studies and proposals that would serve as the basis for a broad legislative assault on what remained of financial regulation. He was gearing up to propose this assault when the markets collapsed. This led to the March 31, 2008 roll out of the Treasury’s incoherent “reform” package. The Paulson plan was incoherent for an excellent reason. His plan’s analysis consisted overwhelmingly of an embrace of the standard anti-regulatory “race to the bottom” dynamic contained in the Blueprint, the Bloomberg-Schumer writings, and the Chamber of Commerce, married to a grudging concession that financial regulation had been too weak. This made no sense, for the U.S. and most of the Western world had just run a real world experiment in which the three “de’s” had once again proven intensely criminogenic precisely because they invariably lead to the “bottom.” Paulson’s plan was dead on arrival.

By late March 2008, the absurdity of embracing the anti-regulatory “race to the bottom” – and then admitting that the dynamic was disastrous – was so obvious that the public reacted with scorn to the Paulson plan. The Blueprint’s analytics presented in support of the race to the bottom were even worse than the analytics presented by Paulson, for they did not contain any concession that such a race must cause regulation to become catastrophically weak and lead to crises. The Blueprint was very late in the game – November 2007. The bubble had collapsed over a year ago. Most large mortgage banks had failed – catastrophically. Nonprime mortgage defaults were surging. The secondary market in nonprime mortgages collapsed. The authors of the Blueprint knew that the central dynamic they were embracing – the purported “need” to “win” the anti-regulatory race to the bottom – had again proven disastrous.

“More recently, the liquidity crisis and ensuing credit crunch in several significant capital markets sectors has revealed weaknesses in the regulatory system. Many homeowners have been confronted with the prospect of foreclosure, and U.S. financial markets have been roiled by problems that can be traced to aggressive practices by some firms, gaps between national and state regulation of the U.S. mortgage industry, and opaqueness in some structured financial instruments innovations. Many of these problems also have impacted the broader credit and capital markets, both domestically and globally.”

The passage illustrates the Blueprint’s authors’ refusal to be honest with the reader. They embraced euphemisms for fraud (“aggressive practices”) and gravely understated the financial crisis that was sweeping like a tornado through the financial markets. They ignored how the industry had deliberately ignored the FBI’s September 2004 warning that the developing “epidemic” of mortgage fraud would cause a financial “crisis.” They ignored how the fraud epidemic, generated overwhelmingly by lenders and their agents, hyper-inflated the largest bubble in financial history. But all of this pales against the Blueprint’s fundamental dishonesty. Why were there “gaps” between national and state regulation? The mortgage lending industry deliberately cultivated a race to the bottom by creating regulatory black holes and because the industry successfully urged Fed Chairmen Greenspan and Bernanke not to use their statutory authority under HOEPA to ban fraudulent “liar’s” loans. Why were “structured financial instrument innovations” “opaque?” The financial industry demanded passage of the Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000 for the specific purpose of making the credit default swap (CDS) market wholly opaque. The express goal of the Act was to prevent all federal and state regulation of CDS. The Act, as the industry intended, created a regulatory black hole. The Fed economist who testified to Congress premised the Fed’s support for this obscene Act on the purported need to win the race to the bottom in competition with the City of London.

The problem that the Blueprint identified was the insane idea that because the UK, Germany, Ireland, and Iceland were racing toward the anti-regulatory bottom and creating an extraordinarily criminogenic environment the U.S. should respond by creating an even more criminogenic anti-regulatory environment so that more of the accounting control fraud would take place in the U.S. and cause even more catastrophic losses here instead of in Europe. The Blueprint is bizarre primarily because it calls for the U.S. to embrace even more fully the anti- regulatory bottom – even though the disastrous consequences of doing so were obvious at the time the Blueprint was published. The Blueprint (implicitly) identified the problem (the anti-regulatory race to the bottom to “win” global competitiveness – and called it the solution. This was significantly insane.

The Blueprint, having found that the anti-regulatory race to the bottom was suicidal, urged the U.S. to run faster.

“External factors threatening the competitive position of U.S. financial firms and the stability of financial markets include the relentless growth in international financial services competition, rapidly expanding foreign financial markets, and foreign regulatory regimes purposefully designed to adjust quickly to market developments.”

This is nonsensical. The “competitive position of U.S. financial firms” would have been aided immeasurably by competent financial regulation, of the kind we employed in 1990-1991 to forbid S&Ls to make liar’s loans. The actions that most impaired the competitive position of U.S. financial firms were the three “de’s.” Our firms would have had a decisive competitive advantage over European banks, to an extent not seen since the early post-World War II years, had we not destroyed effective financial regulation.

Note the lack of logical coherence in the sentence quoted above. The Blueprint concedes that Europe’s race to the bottom “threaten[s] … the stability of financial markets.” That concession is true and it has enormous analytical importance (that escaped the authors). It means that the Europe’s anti-regulatory race to the bottom does not “threaten” “the competitive position of U.S. financial firms.” Indeed, it must do the opposite. The European banks are inherently destroying themselves as competitive threats when they destroy effective financial regulation because such an action is so criminogenic. The Blueprint’s fundamental incoherence leads the authors to recommend anti-regulatory policies that are the opposite of what their logic (if made internally consistent) would recommend. The authors’ total blindness to the internal inconsistency of their logic is revealed in this sentence.

Similarly, if Europe’s anti-regulatory race has led to “regulatory regimes” that serve as cheerleaders (“adjust quickly”) for criminogenic lending practices (“market developments”) then this is the last thing the U.S. should emulate. The way to enhance both U.S. competitiveness and financial stability, particularly if our competitors are racing to the criminogenic bottom, is to employ effective financial regulation. It’s a lot like every mother advises her child: “And if Johnny jumps off a cliff do you think that you should also jump off the cliff?”

We all know that the CEOs who co-chaired the “Blue Ribbon” group that produced the Blueprint did not write the Blueprint. Who actually produced this blueprint for creating an even ore criminogenic environment sure to produce recurrent, intensifying financial crises?

“The Roundtable is grateful for the outstanding guidance provided throughout this project by William A. Longbrake of Washington Mutual, Inc., who also is the Anthony T. Cluff Senior Policy Advisor to The Financial Services Roundtable.”

Yes, unintentional self-parody remains unbeatable. The Financial Services Roundtable, with 100 massive members, chose as its “Senior Policy Advisor” and go-to guy on the Blueprint a WaMu’s Vice Chairman. Longbrake served as the Chairman of The Financial Services Roundtable’s Housing Policy Council during the hyper-inflation of the housing bubble. When you need expertise on creating the most intensely criminogenic environment possible it only makes sense to go to a bank that made, purchased, and sold hundreds of thousands of fraudulent mortgage loans. Longbrake’s bio describes his work for WaMu.

“From 1982 to 1994 Longbrake was chief financial officer of Washington Mutual except for a two-year stint when he was the principal executive responsible for retail banking and home lending. When he returned to Washington Mutual from the FDIC in 1996 he resumed the position of chief financial officer until 2002 when he became the bank’s first chief enterprise risk officer. In 2001, Longbrake was named CFO of the Year in the Driving Revenue Growth category by CFO Magazine. From 2004 until retirement he served in a non-executive position as the company’s liaison with regulators, legislators, and industry trade organizations.”

Kerry Killinger, WaMu’s Chairman and CEO, was a member of the “Blue Ribbon” group that created the Blueprint for disaster.


Bill Black is the author of The Best Way to Rob a Bank is to Own One and an associate professor of economics and law at the University of Missouri-Kansas City. He spent years working on regulatory policy and fraud prevention as Executive Director of the Institute for Fraud Prevention, Litigation Director of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and Deputy Director of the National Commission on Financial Institution Reform, Recovery and Enforcement, among other positions.

Bill writes a column for Benzinga every Monday. His other academic articles, congressional testimony, and musings about the financial crisis can be found at his Social Science Research Network author page and at the blog New Economic Perspectives.

Mark Steyn’s Ode to Criminogenic Environments

By William K. Black
(Cross-posted from Benzinga.com)

This column was prompted by listening to Mark Steyn (an ultra right writer) giving a C-SPAN talk on his new book that asserts that America has destroyed itself and will be superseded soon by China. Steyn is best known for his fear of a Muslim takeover of Europe. (During the C-SPAN talk he warned that the “Mullahs of Dearborn” had created “Michiganistan.” I grew up in Dearborn, Michigan, so perhaps I am agent of this dread conspiracy that has subjugated one of our states – and cleverly disguised its takeover by radical Islamic agents by electing conservative Republicans to run the state.)

Steyn’s contradictory concerns are that the United States government borrows too much money and spends too little on the military and too much on education. (He opines that university educations are a “waste” for “most” college students. Again, I may be an agent of this evil conspiracy to educate our kids.) He was a strong supporter of our recent invasions. He expressed his distress that the U.S. military was not leading the war in Libya. Under Steyn’s view of how financial systems work, those invasions were financed primarily by issuing large amounts of debt and were major contributors to what he terms a “debt catastrophe.” Indeed, he emphasizes his support for the massive amount of money that the U.S. spends on its military even when we are not a war – roughly the same amount as the rest of the world combined. He also claims that Western Europe is able to fund its generous social programs because they are “free riders” on the U.S. military. In other words, he argues that military spending limits U.S. growth and increases Treasury debt – and we should expand our spending and our invasions. His views are logically incoherent.

Steyn claims that he is most concerned about “wealth that is not yet created.” That is an excellent concern, one that competent economists stress. It is a concern that has virtually disappeared, however, in the context of the budget deficit games. We have roughly 25 million Americans that want to work full time but cannot do so because of the Great Recession. Their potential productivity is the quintessential example of “wealth that is not yet created” – the thing Steyn purports to find most distressing. Keeping twenty-five million Americans who want to work full time unemployed and underemployed constitutes the definition of “waste” and the gratuitous destruction of “wealth that has not yet created.” The waste and destruction of wealth are pointless – there is no benefit. The waste and damage are far broader than economic. Unemployment damages people, particularly adults, and communities. We can end all but a small residual of transitional unemployment any time we choose to do so. Doing so would shorten the Great Recession and greatly reduce its damage.

It is deficit hawks like Steyn, however, that keep us from creating the “wealth that is not yet created.” Steyn can’t understand that the primary reason that the deficit rose sharply was because of the Great Recession. Steyn is so unaware of economic theory that he wants the U.S. to adopt pro-cyclical policies that would have made the Great Recession far worse. He also thinks that governments with sovereign currencies are just like households when it comes to their debt. Worse, he thinks budget deficits are “moral” issues rather than financial issues. “It’s not a spending crisis, it’s a moral one.” “We are looting the future to bribe the present.”

There is a moral component to this crisis and “looting” is the key. George Akerlof and Paul Romer captured the component in the title of their famous 1993 article (“Looting: the Economic Underworld of Bankruptcy for Profit”). There are real looters out there, running many of our largest financial institutions. Their frauds hyper-inflated the financial bubble and drove the Great Recession. Running a deficit in a recession is not “looting.” Balancing a budget during a recession is insanely pro-cyclical. In 1937, when President Roosevelt made the grave mistake of listening to his conservative economic advisors and tried to balance the budget the policy through the U.S. back into the worst of the Great Depression.

Steyn is correct that the core of the real moral crisis is that we are “… absolving the citizenry for responsibility from their actions.” The citizens we are absolving are the perpetrators of the looting. The CEOs running the “control frauds” are not being prosecuted. They simultaneously caused catastrophic losses and profited enormously from their frauds (“bankruptcy for profit”). Steyn explicitly warns about the damage that elite frauds do to a nation, stressing “the fragility of civilization.” He claimed that the U.S. was about to become a Latin American nation entrenched in crony capitalism characterized by a wealthy, corrupt elite and vast numbers of the poor. He is correct that this crisis both represents and causes “the diversion of too much human capital into wasteful and self-indulgent activity.” The CEOs that run control frauds cause enormous, inefficient diversion of capital to the least productive investments and do so for the most self-indulgent reasons and in the most indulgent manner. They gloried in their toys, the private jets and many luxury cars. In a nation with a grave shortage of citizens with expertise in mathematics and the hard sciences we took many of our top graduates and made them financial “quants.” The quants, acting in accordance with the perverse financial incentives that the senior officers created, destroyed wealth. The full opportunity cost of diverting quantitative experts from science to aiding fraudulent finance includes the scientific research opportunities foregone. Steyn claims that college is a “waste” for “most” people who attend, but I’m one of the millions who are alive because of health research by university-trained scientists.

Steyn, however, is again a major part of the problem. He is notorious for his defense of the CEOs found guilty of running control frauds, i.e., his friend and fellow Canadian Conrad Black (no relation to me). Rather than holding these elite frauds accountable, Steyn is one of the leaders in the effort to allow them to loot with impunity. As Akerlof explained in his classic 1970 article on a market for “lemons,” fraud can create a “Gresham’s” dynamic in which markets become powerfully perverse. When frauds prosper, bad ethics drives good ethics from the marketplace. It is imperative that regulators serve as the regulatory “cops on the beat” to ensure that the frauds do not prosper and prevent economic catastrophe. Steyn is a virulent opponent of effective financial regulation. In his talk, he expressed no concern over the fraudulent elites extracting billions of dollars in wealth from creditors and shareholders. His rage was addressed to schoolteachers. Ignoring the trade-off they made between receiving lower salaries but superior pensions, Steyn focuses solely on the pensions received by public workers and claims that they are outrageous. He does not explain why his outrage is reserved for the little people, and only for the one portion of their compensation that is not sub-market.

The U.S. followed Steyn’s anti-regulatory policies for years, creating the criminogenic environment that produced our recurrent, intensifying financial crises. The three “de’s” – deregulation, desupervision, and de facto decriminalization – that led to the current crisis disappear in Steyn’s telling of the tale. Instead, he claims: “We see an unprecedented transfer of resources from the productive class to the obstructive class – to government, to regulators, to bureaucracies.” “We are redistributing liberty.” “Law has been supplanted by regulation.” Many of the regulators are “to the left of either party.” They U.S. is engaged in unprecedented, “hyper-regulatory direct rule….”

The reality is that the financial regulatory agencies, for decades, have been led overwhelmingly by conservative business people who are reflexively opposed to regulation. There are exceptions, but Steyn is correct that our financial policies are “rule[d] by a monopoly of ideas.” That monopoly is the opposite of the one Steyn fears – it is the neoclassical economics and modern finance idea that markets are efficient and automatically exclude fraud and that regulation is therefore unnecessary and harmful.

Steyn appears to assume, contrary to fact, that the CEOs of the financial firms are the “productive class.” He contrasts them to President Obama: “We entrusted a multi-trillion dollar enterprise to a guy who has never created a dime of wealth in his life and then we were surprised that for some reason it did not work out.” Let’s recall reality. We entrusted the U.S. government to President Bush. As a serial failure as an oil executive, our nation’s first MBA president destroyed wealth. He was repeatedly bailed out and ultimately made wealthy by political opportunists. As President, he destroyed staggering amounts of wealth and life. The CEOs of the nonprime lenders and investors destroyed massive amounts of wealth (roughly $10 trillion) – and were made personally wealthy because they did so.

But for the bailout by the U.S. government, the financial system would have collapsed. Steyn praised Americans as unique. Nearly all other Western nations experienced major protests demanding that the government take on the elite bankers, but in the U.S. the Tea Party protests were funded by the most conservative business factions and the protests demanded that the government adopt those factions’ anti-regulatory agenda. Steyn claimed that the Tea Party message was that they would be just fine if only the government were to do nothing in response to the crisis. That message is false as a matter of economics. Only the government was able to protect the Tea Party members from alling into a depression. Individuals cannot protect themselves effectively from a Great Depression or a Great Recession.

Steyn concluded his substantive argument with these words.
“I quote Milton Friedman: ‘don’t elect the right people to do the right things, create the conditions whereby the wrong people are forced to do the right things. There should be nothing controversial [about that statement].’”

What Steyn fails to understand is that Friedman’s point refutes Steyn’s anti-regulatory thesis. Friedman was simply making the fundamental point of economics – focus on the incentives and ensure that they are (1) powerful and (2) prevent perverse behavior. Control fraud both arises from and causes intense, perverse incentives. Fraud begets fraud. Accounting control frauds deliberately create perverse Gresham’s dynamic to spur fraud within their product line and create criminogenic environments that produce “echo” fraud epidemics in related fields. The CEOs of the lenders that specialized in making fraudulent nonprime loans, for example, used their ability to hire, fire, and compensate to create these perverse incentives among appraisers, loan brokers, loan officers, and credit rating agencies. Note that this allowed the fraudulent CEOs to suborn “controls” into their most valuable fraud allies and created deniability while making it more difficult to prove the CEO’s intent to defraud.

Once more, Steyn is a leading critic of the reforms that are essential under Steyn’s logic to prevent these crises. A Gresham’s dynamic can cause good people to do the wrong things. Vigorous financial regulators who serve as the regulatory “cops on the beat” are essential to the creation of the proper incentives so that the wrong CEOs are forced to do the right things.


Bill Black is the author of The Best Way to Rob a Bank is to Own One and an associate professor of economics and law at the University of Missouri-Kansas City. He spent years working on regulatory policy and fraud prevention as Executive Director of the Institute for Fraud Prevention, Litigation Director of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and Deputy Director of the National Commission on Financial Institution Reform, Recovery and Enforcement, among other positions.

Bill writes a column for Benzinga every Monday. His other academic articles, congressional testimony, and musings about the financial crisis can be found at his Social Science Research Network author page and at the blog New Economic Perspectives.