The Obama administration’s record of prosecuting elite financial frauds is worse than the Bush administration’s record, which is a very large statement. Syracuse University’s TRAC issued a report on November 11, 2011 entitled “Criminal Prosecutions for Financial Institution Fraud Continue to Fall.”
Neither administration has prosecuted any elite CEO for the epidemic of mortgage fraud that drove the ongoing crisis. This contrasts with over 1,000 elite felony convictions arising from the S&L debacle. The ongoing crisis caused losses more than 70 times greater than the S&L debacle and the amount of elite fraud driving this crisis is also vastly greater than during the S&L debacle. Bank CEOs leading “accounting control frauds” now do so with impunity from the criminal laws. They become wealthy through fraud and even if they are sued civilly they almost invariably walk away wealthy with the proceeds of their frauds.
“But a final agreement remained out of reach Monday despite political pressure from the White House, which had been trying to have a deal in hand that President Obama could highlight in his State of the Union address Tuesday night.
The housing secretary, Shaun Donovan, met on Monday in Chicago with Democratic attorneys general to iron out the remaining details and to persuade holdouts to agree with any eventual deal. He later held a conference call with Republican attorneys general. But as he renewed his efforts, Democrats in Congress, advocacy groups like MoveOn.org and several crucial attorneys general said the deal might be too lenient on the banks.
In a bid to win support from California officials, Mr. Donovan proposed earmarking $8 billion in aid for beleaguered California homeowners, but that left other state attorneys general incensed, according to an official familiar with the negotiations.”
The NYT did not make the point, but these facts represent multiple disgraces on the administration’s part that go beyond the substance of deal. First, there is the obvious impropriety of pressuring state attorney generals (AGs) who are Democrats to approve a deal so that the President can claim credit for it in the SOTU. Second, it is disgraceful that HUD Secretary Donovan met separately with Democratic AGs. Prosecutions and suits against banks must have nothing to do with political affiliation. Holding separate meetings with AGs based on their party affiliation brings the entire system into disrepute. Third, the idea of offering California a unique earmark in order to buy AG Harris’ support for a deal is as stupid as it was offensive. The administration thinks that everything is about politics. As a former Department of Justice attorney I regret the administration’s bringing the department into disgrace. I can personally assure the nation that nothing like this ever occurred during the S&L debacle in our prosecutions, civil lawsuits, and agency enforcement actions.
“One of my proudest possessions is the flag that the SEAL Team took with them on the mission to get bin Laden. On it are each of their names. Some may be Democrats. Some may be Republicans. But that doesn’t matter. Just like it didn’t matter that day in the Situation Room, when I sat next to Bob Gates – a man who was George Bush’s defense secretary; and Hillary Clinton, a woman who ran against me for president.
All that mattered that day was the mission. No one thought about politics. No one thought about themselves.”
The failure of the article to generate a scandal reflects badly on both parties. The candidates for the Republican Party’s nomination have been searching for every conceivable issue as a potential basis for attacking Obama. The administration’s conduct as described by the NYT article provides the perfect club to the Republican candidates, yet none of them will use it. Why? The Republican candidates could not oppose a settlement that, substantively, was so exceptionally favorable to the largest banks. Finance is the largest contributor to both parties. The only criticism in the article came from liberal Democrats (Senator Brown and Representative Miller).
The administration recognized that the only threat to the disgraceful settlement came from liberal Democrats. The administration devised a sophisticated propaganda campaign to counter this opposition. It bore fruit immediately. The day after the NYT story ran, the Center for Responsible Lending (CRL) issued a press release entitled “AGSettlement: Not Perfect, but Significant Reform of Mortgage Servicing.”
The press release was based on a friendly leak, presumably from the administration, of the terms of the settlement as of January 24, 2012. The settlement had two express, related substantive defects. The amount of money the banks would pay was grossly inadequate, relative to the claims being released by the federal and state governments. The third substantive defect is not contained in the written release, but it is one of the keys to the governmental surrender to the fraudulent financial CEOs who caused the crisis. The federal government does not intend to prosecute criminally the large financial firms and their senior officers who committed hundreds of billions of dollars in fraudulent mortgage originations. That figure only counts the fraudulent liar’s loans the five large banks made. The total amount of mortgage origination fraud through liar’s loans exceeds $1 trillion. The five banks’ civil liability for mortgage origination fraud is vastly larger than their civil liability for their endemic foreclosure fraud. I have explained in detail in prior articles and testimony why only fraudulent banks made material amounts of liar’s loans.
Here is how the administration successfully spun the deal to CRL.
“Banks remain accountable. While the state AGs would not be able to bring additional origination or servicing claims against the participating banks, the settlement would preserve the ability of homeowners to pursue claims against banks. Moreover, the settlement would not shield banks from prosecution related to criminal activities, claims based on mortgage securities violations, fair lending suits, or claims against MERS. Finally, the settlement would be enforceable in court by an independent monitor.”
As of January 24, the deal the administration was desperate to conclude prior to the SOTU required the state and federal governments to release civil claims for mortgage origination fraud.
The administration’s efforts to pressure the state AGs (all Democrats) to withdraw their opposition to this cynical deal to immunize expressly the largest banks from civil liability for their mortgage origination fraud and, implicitly, to immunize them from criminal liability for mortgage origination fraud failed. The administration responded to the failure through an elaborate symbolic creation of a new task force and a renewed propaganda campaign designed to neutralize liberal opposition to its proposed surrender to the largest banks. The maneuver, however, required an important substantive change in the proposed deal that reveals how bad for the public the administration’s proposed deal of January 24 was.
The administration is good at spinning, and this effort had a clever twist and a substantive change that added to its credibility. To date, the spin has been largely successful with liberal commentators. The clever twist was adding the AG leading the opposition to the surrender, NY AG Eric Schneiderman, to the newly created working group. Schneiderman has great credibility with liberals because he blocked the administration’s proposed grants of immunity to the five large banks (which were apparently far broader and included express terms raising crippling barriers even to criminal prosecutions). The administration needed Schneiderman on the task force to grant it any credibility. The need for credibility became even more intense after Scot Paltrow’s January 20 expose in Reuters (Insight: Top Justice officials connected to mortgage banks). The article revealed that U.S. Attorney General Holder and Lanny Breuer, head of DOJ’s criminal division, had been partners at the law firm Covington & Burling, which represented many of the largest banks and had provided key legal opinions to the infamous MERS (Mortgage Electronic Registration System) that has contributed greatly to foreclosure fraud.
Schneiderman apparently recognized the great leverage he had over the administration and insisted on the modification of the deal’s release of the big banks’ civil liability for their mortgage origination fraud. The administration used Schneiderman’s willingness to serve on the new task force and the reduced grant of immunity for the big banks’ mortgage origination fraud as the centerpiece of its effort to spin liberals. It promptly leaked a description of the new proposed deal terms to several liberals – and was immediately rewarded with praise from liberals. Given the fact that Holder and Breuer have no credibility with liberals, this was an exceptional achievement that has delighted the administration. Mike Lux, who has consistently and strongly opposed the administration’s earlier proposed settlement drafts, broke the story of the substantive improvements to the deal on January 27. His story explains that two sources he trusts leaked the terms of the new deal to him. He entitled his article “Settlement Release Looks Tight.” I encourage reading Lux’s entire article, but here is the key excerpt.
“Big breaking news about the long-fought over bank settlement: senior sources high up in the negotiations have outlined the terms of the legal release. Here’s what I was told:***
No release on the “vast majority” of origination claims.
No release on the “vast majority” of securitization claims, including all claims of state pension funds.***
All along in this battle, there have been two things progressives working on this issue have been fighting hardest for: one was that we got a broad, deep, well-resourced, and serious investigation of the big financial fraud issues that have gone down in this country over the last decade; the other was that if there was a settlement, that the legal releases the banks got was drawn as narrowly as it could be drawn, as tight as a drum. That combination, in the view of New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman and those of us fighting by his side, would create real potential of finally holding the Wall Street bankers who wrecked our economy and abused us all accountable for their actions, and for getting a serious amount of money for writing down underwater mortgages. While there are still legitimate questions in both areas, it is looking like we may be achieving both of these huge goals.
One other big question remains in all this: with a release this narrow, will the big banks actually settle? JP Morgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon and unnamed bank lobbyists are already threatening to walk away, and are clearly really unhappy, so that isn’t clear. If they walk away, though, progressives can certainly live very well knowing that they will be prosecuted aggressively by AGs like Schneiderman, Beau Biden of Delaware, Kamala Harris of California, and hopefully others, so it’s a win-win for us. My view is: anything that makes Jamie Dimon and big-bank lobbyists unhappy is good for the rest of us.”
Lux obviously recognizes that there are important outstanding questions about the proposed deal. I write to add several cautions.
1. There is no reason for granting any civil immunity on mortgage origination or securitization frauds and the grant of even limited immunity for such frauds can only create future problems.
2. The state AGs do not have the resources to investigate mortgage origination fraud. It isn’t even close. Collectively, the 50 state AGs could investigate Countrywide’s frauds if they took every investigator with expertise in financial institutions and assigned them to the case for five years.
3. The state AGs are not investigating mortgage origination fraud by major lenders.
4. The new working group will not investigate mortgage origination fraud. Obama described the task force in these words in his SOTU address.
“And tonight, I am asking my Attorney General to create a special unit of federal prosecutors and leading state attorneys general to expand our investigations into the abusive lending and packaging of risky mortgages that led to the housing crisis. This new unit will hold accountable those who broke the law, speed assistance to homeowners, and help turn the page on an era of recklessness that hurt so many Americans.”
The working group will not “investigate … abusive lending” and it will not “hold accountable those who broke the law … [by defrauding] homeowners.” It will not “speed assistance to homeowners.” It will not “turn the page on an era of recklessness” – and fraud, not “recklessness” is what prosecutors should prosecute. The name of the working group makes its crippling limitations clear: the Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities Working Group. Attorney General Holder’s memorandum about the working group makes clear that the name is not misleading. The working group will deal only with mortgage backed securities (MBS) – not the fraudulent mortgage origination that drove the crisis (the only exception is federally insured mortgages).
Fraudulent mortgage originators engaged in fraudulent sales of the mortgages, mostly to Wall Street and, eventually, Fannie and Freddie. As I stressed earlier, the administration is continuing to grant de facto immunity to CEOs at the large lenders whose massive mortgage origination frauds drove the crisis. The working group’s mandate helps confirm the administration’s continued refusal to prosecute elite mortgage origination fraud.
5. The working group is a symbolic political gesture designed to neutralize criticism of the administration’s continuing failure to hold accountable the elite frauds that drove the crisis. Neither the Bush nor the Obama administration has convicted a single elite fraud that drove the crisis. This is a national disgrace and represents the triumph of crony capitalism. Remember that the FBI warned in September 2004 that there was an “epidemic” of mortgage fraud and predicted that it would cause a financial “crisis.” There are no valid excuses for the Bush and Obama administrations’ failures. The media have begun to pummel the Obama administration for its failure to prosecute. The administration could not answer this criticism with substance because it has nothing substantive to offer in prosecuting elite mortgage origination frauds. The ugly truth is that we are three full years into his presidency and Holder could not find a single indictment to bring that Obama could brag about in his SOTU address. Who doubts that Holder and Obama would have done so if they had anything in the prosecutorial pipeline? Why do Holder and Obama have nothing in the pipeline? There are three fundamental problems, and the working group has not even addressed, much less resolved, any of the three fundamental defects.
One, criminal prosecutions of elite financial criminals have to come from investigations initiated by those with the expertise and resources to detect and investigate “accounting control fraud” (the form of fraud that can hyper-inflate financial bubbles and cause catastrophic losses and financial crises). Only the federal banking regulators have this capability. The absolute essential to achieving broad success is superb criminal referrals from those regulators. The central difficulty with such referrals should be that roughly 75% of the fraudulent mortgage loans were made by entities not regulated by the federal (or state) banking regulators. They were primarily made by mortgage bankers. Sadly, that did not prove to be the central difficulty with federal banking regulators’ criminal referrals. The federal banking regulators essentially ceased making criminal referrals last decade.
Banks will not file criminals against their CEOs – the people who run the accounting control frauds that produced the epidemics of mortgage fraud. Police and detectives do not investigate elite accounting control frauds. The FBI does not patrol a beat. Unless the regulatory cops on the beat (e.g., the banking regulators) make the criminal referrals the DOJ and the FBI will never investigate or prosecute the fraud. Indeed, because accounting control fraud is inherently complex and requires specialized knowledge to recognize, the DOJ will rarely recognize accounting control fraud even when the facts are only consistent with accounting control fraud (as opposed to bad luck or optimism). Absent high quality criminal referrals from the banking regulatory agencies, DOJ may have episodic successes but it will fail utterly to prosecute any epidemic of elite accounting control fraud. Criminal referrals provide the road map that allows effective investigations and prosecutions.
Holder consistently emphasizes the lack of criminality. Indeed, since he has prosecuted no elite CEO involved in causing this crisis, he is actually saying that he believes this is our first Virgin Crisis. Countrywide and its ilk made millions of fraudulent mortgage loans – yet Holder thinks that Countrywide’s CEO was a victim of the fraud.
I have concluded that the entire working group gambit upsets me so much because it rests on such crude propaganda. Holder decided to embellish the gambit with the illusion of concrete action. Reuters reported Holder’s claims at his press conference on the working group.
“We are wasting no time in aggressively pursuing any and all leads,” Holder said at a news conference announcing details of a new working group to investigate misconduct in the residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) market, “you can expect more to follow.””
One assumes that reporters were so stunned by Holder’s audacity that they failed to challenge his claim that “we are wasting no time in aggressively pursuing any and all leads.” Let us review only the most obvious reasons why this statement is preposterous. The subpoenas are civil subpoenas, not grand jury subpoenas. There is no indication that Holder is serious even now about conducting any criminal investigation of elite banks or bankers.
The question is not whether the Working Group wasted a day or two in issuing civil subpoenas. The Obama administration has wasted three years before issuing these subpoenas. (The Bush administration wasted eight years. The total waste is cumulative.) Civil subpoenas are the most preliminary form of investigation. DOJ should have been issuing grand jury subpoenas to every lender making liar’s loans and every entity packaging liar’s loans no later than September 2004 when the FBI warned that there was an “epidemic” of mortgage fraud and predicted that it would cause a financial “crisis.”
The Obama and Bush administrations have consistently failed to “pursu[e] any and all leads.” Let us count the ways DOJ has typically failed to pursue leads against the elite officers whose frauds drove this crisis: they have not used grand juries, they have not issued civil subpoenas, they have not used electronic surveillance, they have not used undercover investigators, they have not “wired” cooperating witnesses who they have “flipped”, they have not appealed for whistleblowers to come forward, they have not called elite witnesses before grand juries, they have not convened grand juries, they have not sent FBI agents to their homes or offices to conduct formal interviews, they have not retained expert witnesses or consultants with expertise in accounting control fraud, they have not demanded that the banking regulatory agencies produce high quality criminal referrals, they have not asked those agencies to “detail” examiners and other skilled staff to the FBI to serve as internal experts, they have not trained AUSAs, special agents, and banking regulators in how to detect, investigate and prosecute accounting control frauds, they have not prosecuted where other federal agencies, after investigation, have charged that financial elites committed fraud, and they have not flipped intermediate officers and gone up the chain of command, they have not assigned remotely adequate staff to investigate and prosecute frauds, they have not assigned any meaningful number of their staff to investigate the elite frauds, and they have not made strong, consistent demands that Congress fund adequate staff to end the ability of financial elites to commit fraud with impunity. Conversely, DOJ has assigned its inadequate staff almost exclusively to non-elite mortgage fraud, has formed a “partnership” with the Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) – the trade association of the “perps”, and has adopted the MBA’s absurd “definition” of mortgage fraud that implicitly defines accounting control fraud out of existence. How does Holder expect to get “leads” against elite frauds when he gets no criminal referrals from the banking regulatory agencies, “defines” the leading fraud perpetrators of mortgage fraud as the “victim” of mortgage fraud, conducts no credible investigation of elite frauds, takes no proactive steps to investigate (e.g., using undercover FBI investigations), makes no plea for whistleblowers to come forward with evidence on the elite frauds, and provides training for regulators, FBI agents, and AUSAs that implicitly denies the existence of accounting control fraud? I understand that he inherited a disaster and a disgrace from his predecessor, but he has made it worse.
Collectively, the Bush and Obama administration have provided de facto impunity from the criminal laws for our largest financial firms and their elite officers who drove our crisis. DOJ has had episodic successes against financial elites not involved in creating the crisis (e.g., Madoff and a prominent insider trader). These “successes” were bittersweet. Madoff conducted a Ponzi scheme that last for decades. DOJ only learned about the scheme because Madoff confessed to his family. He only confessed because the Ponzi scheme was about to collapse. The government learned of the insider trading through a whistleblower and found key facts through electronic surveillance and “wiring” “flipped” participants in the insider trading. The insider trading fraud went on for many years and likely would have gone on for many more years without the government learning of it but for the whistleblower. Both of these frauds were elite financial control frauds, so it is bizarre that Holder simultaneously takes credit for their successful prosecution while implicitly denying that control fraud could exist in elite financial institutions in the mortgage fraud context.
The Reuters story records Holder’s effort to claim that DOJ is vigorously prosecuting elite corporate frauds.
“[Holder] responded to criticism that federal enforcers have brought few marquee cases in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Holder said the department has brought around 2,100 mortgage-related cases.
“The notion that there has been inactivity over the course of the last three years is belied by a troublesome little thing called facts,” Holder said.”
It is Holder whose claims are “belied by a troublesome little thing called facts.” He was responding to the factual critique that he has not indicted or prosecuted any elite banking officers of the large fraudulent lenders that drove the financial crisis. That critique is true. Holder, however, implied that it was an untrue critique by deliberately making a non-responsive response. His answer was that he has indicted 2,100 defendants in mortgage-related cases (roughly 700 annually). By 2006, lenders made roughly two million fraudulent liar’s loans. In 2005, they made over one million fraudulent liar’s loans. Prosecuting roughly 700 (or 7,000) smaller mortgage fraud cases annually is, at best, a symbolic act that cannot possibly have any material effect in slowing an epidemic of mortgage fraud, bringing to justice the elite frauds that caused the ongoing crisis, or deterring future crises. If Holder had led any elite prosecutions of the senior officers of the huge, fraudulent lenders and investment bankers that drove the crisis he would have used them to refute the criticism. Instead, he tried misdirection.
In January 1993, the GAO released a report entitled: Bank and Thrift criminal Fraud” prepared at the request of Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Biden, who is now Obama’s Vice-President. Here are key excerpts from that report that demonstrate how real investigations and prosecutions occur:
Renamed the National Bank Fraud Enforcement Working Group, the group included officials from Justice (including the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section, the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee of Attorneys, and FBI), OTS, FDIC, occ, the Fed, NCUA, the Farm Credit Administration, the Secret Service, the Department of the Treasury, and the Securities and Exchange Commission.
[WKB note: Contrast this membership with Holder’s announcement of the members of his working group:
“The mission of the group — to hold accountable those who violated the law and provide relief for homeowners struggling from the collapse of the housing market — will be furthered through the active participation of the following members:
• Executive Office for United States Attorneys
• Federal Bureau of Investigation
• Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
• Internal Revenue Service - Criminal Investigation
• Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
• Federal Housing Finance Agency's Office of Inspector General
• United States Department of Housing and Urban Development
• United States Department of Housing and Urban Developments Office of Inspector General”]
Notice the conspicuous (except that no one I have read mentions it) failure to include any of the banking regulatory agencies – the entities that should have the expertise and should be making the vital criminal referrals. The administration will eventually be forced to add the banking regulatory agencies to the working group to quell criticism. The administration’s failure to name them originally is revealing. Any serious effort would start with the banking regulatory agencies. The more fundamental problem is, that unlike the S&L debacle, when the banking regulatory agencies led the demand for criminal prosecution of the elite frauds, the current crop of regulatory leaders under Bush and Obama have been notoriously silent and have failed to take even the most basic, essential step – reestablishing a superb criminal referral process and vigorous regulatory investigations of the largest frauds. There is no excuse for this continuing failure.]
In 1990, in testimony before the House Committee on the Judiciary, the Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division noted that the group had a number of accomplishments. Among other things, he noted that it produced a uniform criminal referral form….
[WKB note: this may seem a small, bureaucratic step if you have never created a system that resulted in the most successful prosecution of elite white-collar criminals. It is in fact the absolute essential place to start. The bank working groups engaged in what we would now call “continuous improvement.” The banking regulators responsible for making criminal referrals got feedback from the FBI on what aspects of our referrals were most useful and what aspects failed to meet the FBI’s needs. Our criminal referral specialists took that knowledge back to our staff and, through training and editing of draft referrals, continuously improved the quality of our referrals.]
The criminal financial institution fraud investigative workload in FBI has continued to grow. As of July 31, 1992, FBI had 9,669 investigations pending, an increase of about 46 percent from 1987. More than half of those investigations were classified as “major” fraud cases….
Table 2.1: [Number of criminal referrals filed by the banking regulatory agencies]
Federal Home Loan Bank Board/OTS [WKB note: the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) was the successor agency to the FHLBB.]
[WKB note: these figures do not include criminal referrals made by OTS after 1991, criminal referrals by the RTC (which resolved failed S&Ls’ bad assets), and criminal referrals by S&Ls placed into receiverships by OTS). Collectively, the federal agencies regulating S&Ls and dealing with S&L failures filed well over 30,000 criminal referrals during the S&L debacle.]
[WKB note: number of criminal referrals filed by OTS in the ongoing crisis: 0.]
Following enactment of FIRREA, the Attorney General designated criminal fraud in financial institutions a top enforcement priority. He announced but did not implement plans to address this “enormous and unprecedented challenge” by establishing task forces in 26 cities around the country modeled after the Dallas Bank Fraud Task Force. The Crime Control Act of 1990 authorized more than a doubling of available Justice resources and focused responsibility for the overall effort in Justice’s new Office of Special Counsel for Financial Institutions Fraud.
[WKB note: the Dallas Bank Fraud Task Force was staffed with nearly 100 FBI and IRS agents and other analytical support staff and 38 attorneys.]
FBI has relied on the cooperation of staff from the regulatory agencies to provide information and expertise needed for investigations.
Between October 1, 1988, and June 30, 1992, Justice charged 3,270 defendants through indictments and informations [in “major cases”] and convicted 2,603 defendants (110 defendants were acquitted, establishing a conviction rate near 96 percent). The courts sentenced 1,706 of 2,205 offenders to jail (77.4 percent).
The major difference between working groups and task forces is that task forces investigate and prosecute cases, while working groups do not.
As of July 31, 1992, FBI had 9,669 financial institution fraud cases pending, an increase of 11.3 percent over the 8,678 pending at the end of fiscal year 1991 and 45.3 percent over the 6,649 pending at the end of fiscal year 1987.
In 1989 and 1990, Congress passed two major pieces of legislation that shaped the government’s approach. The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRRRA) of 1989 and the Crime Control Act of 1990 (Crime Control Act) provided Justice with additional powers and resources to investigate and prosecute financial institution fraud.
The House report accompanying FIRREA reflects the belief that Title IX of FIRREA was “absolutely essential to respond to a serious epidemic of financial institution insider abuse and criminal misconduct and to prevent its recurrence in the future.”
Title XXV of the Crime Control Act [was] entitled the Comprehensive Thrift and Bank Fraud Prosecution and Taxpayer Recovery Act of 1990….
Appropriations following FIRREA and the Crime Control Act nearly tripled the investigative and prosecutive resources that had previously been available to Justice to address the mounting volume of criminal bank and thrift fraud. The Crime Control Act also authorized additional appropriations to support more IRS resources important to fraud investigations. In addition, the act appropriating funds for the Department of the Treasury in fiscal year 1991 also authorized the Secret Service to participate in financial institution fraud investigations.
Appendix III: FBI and U.S. Attorney Resource Allocations Under FIRREA
[Additional staffing resources made available to aid the prosecution of S&L and bank frauds pursuant to the Financial Institution Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989]
FBI: Special Agents: 219; Accounting technicians: 100
U.S. Attorney office: AUSAs: 121; Auditors: 22; Support: 120
Appendix IV: FBI and U.S. Attorney Resource Allocations Under the Crime Control Act [of 1990]
FBI: Special Agents: 289
U.S. Attorney Office: AUSAs: 228; Support: 198 [WKB note: this category included paralegals and auditors]
Table 2.4: Increased Justice Authorized Staff Positions
Fiscal years 1990 to 1992 (special agent, attorney, and other support positions)
FBI (total positions): 1621
U.S. Attorneys (total positions): 772
Criminal Division (total positions): 116
Tax Division (total positions): 65
Civil Division (total positions): 46
Total [DOJ] positions 2,620
[WKB note: these figures do not include IRS, Secret Service, Postal Service, and banking regulators working on the S&L and bank fraud task cases.]
[WKB (very long) note: in FY 2007 the FBI had 120 agents assigned to mortgage fraud cases. By FY 2009 that number rose to 300.
The Working Group continues the sham and political symbolism at the expense of substance. Holder’s press release explained its staffing levels.
“Attorney General Holder announced that the new Working Group will consist of at least 55 Department of Justice attorneys, analysts, agents and investigators from around the country. Currently, 15 civil and criminal attorneys are part of the Working Group, along with 10 FBI agents and analysts who will be assigned to the Working Group efforts. An additional 30 attorneys, investigators and other staff around the country will join the Working Group efforts in the coming weeks. This team will join existing state and federal resources investigating similar misconduct under those authorities.”
Compare that staffing with the staffing levels we know from experience are required to be successful against elite accounting control frauds. The Working Group does not pass even the most generous laugh test. No one who has ever been involved in a successful, complex criminal investigation of a large organization could take this Working Group seriously. It lacks the capacity to conduct a competent investigation of any of the largest financial frauds – and there are scores of huge institutions engaged in MBS frauds and hundreds of large mortgage banks engaged in MBS frauds.]
Lux notes that Jamie Dimon (JP Morgan Chase’s CEO) has expressed skepticism about whether the five large banks will continue to support the settlement now that its substance has been changed (assuming the accuracy of the leaks) to remove the “great majority” of the grants of immunity from civil liability and all grants of criminal immunity. The banks considered the earlier drafts of the deal that offered substantial immunity for mortgage origination fraud to be worth far more than the $25 billion they would pay in return to secure the immunity. Their civil liability exposure for mortgage origination fraud is in the hundreds of billions of dollars, so being released from both mortgage origination and foreclosure fraud for $25 billion would have been a spectacular win for the banks. Even if they received no express immunity from criminal prosecutions, it was clear that the administration was implicitly signaling that it would prosecute their mortgage origination frauds. By eliminating civil liability for mortgage origination fraud, the banks also would have made civil suits far less likely or even impossible and that would greatly reduce the risk that civil investigations would disclose criminal conduct that DOJ could not avoid prosecuting, particularly in an election year.
If the revised settlement has virtually no releases from civil liability for mortgage origination fraud and none for criminal actions, then it should be a no brainer that the deal no longer makes any sense for the banks. Their civil liability for their foreclosure fraud should be far less than $25 billion. It will be instructive to see whether the banks walk away from the deal or the government sweetens the deal for the banks by reducing the settlement amount or broadening again the releases from civil liability. If the banks sign the revised deal, as it is has been represented to Lux, then we will know that the big banks realize that they have such rotten skeletons in their foreclosure fraud closets that it is imperative that they settle the suits and prevent the civil suits from going forward and bringing the skeletons to light.
Bill Black is the author of The Best Way to Rob a Bank is to Own One and an associate professor of economics and law at the University of Missouri-Kansas City. He spent years working on regulatory policy and fraud prevention as Executive Director of the Institute for Fraud Prevention, Litigation Director of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and Deputy Director of the National Commission on Financial Institution Reform, Recovery and Enforcement, among other positions.