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Einmal ist Keinmal (Once is Never)


I can no longer say that not a single senior executive of one of the major nonprime lenders whose frauds hyper-inflated the housing bubble and caused the Great Recession has been convicted of his frauds.  A single senior executive of one of the hundreds of fraudulent nonprime lenders was convicted yesterday, April 19, 2011.  A jury found Lee Farkas, Chairman of the Board of Taylor, Bean & Whitaker (TBW), guilty of fraud.  TBW was a large mortgage banking firm that made many nonprime loans, but the prosecution does not address the fraudulent nonprime lending.    

To be fairer, this single overall case has produced four senior convictions.

Department of Justice
Office of Public Affairs
Monday, March 14, 2011
Former President of TBW Pleads Guilty to Fraud Scheme

WASHINGTON – Raymond Bowman, the former president of Taylor, Bean & Whitaker (TBW), pleaded guilty today to conspiring to commit bank, wire and securities fraud, and lying to federal agents about his role in a fraud scheme that contributed to the failures of TBW and Colonial Bank.
In June 2010, Farkas was arrested and charged in a 16-count indictment for his role in the fraud scheme.  Desiree Brown, the former treasurer of TBW, pleaded guilty on Feb. 24, 2011, and Catherine Kissick, a former senior vice president of Colonial Bank and head of its Mortgage Warehouse Lending Division, pleaded guilty on March 2, 2011, for their roles in the fraud scheme.

I congratulate everyone involved with the successful prosecutions.  The TBW/Colonial Bank cases are the exceptions that prove the rule – the senior officers of the large nonprime lenders that caused the financial crisis have been able to loot with impunity.  How did the TBW/Colonial Bank frauds come to prosecuted?  They were very special cases and their frauds and their investigations reveal many of the pathologies that explain the severity of this crisis and the underlying frauds.  First, according to the Department of Justice (DOJ), TBW was already failing by early 2002 – nine years ago!  TBW was able to continue a fraud for over seven years (it was closed in 2009). 

Court documents state that in early 2002, Bowman learned that TBW began running overdrafts in its master bank account at Colonial Bank because of TBW’s inability to meet its operating expenses….

Second, in addition to the fraud against Colonial Bank, TBW defrauded Freddie Mac by selling to Freddie Mac the same assets (bad loans) it was purportedly selling to Colonial Bank. 

In his statement of facts, Bowman admitted that he learned from Farkas and other co-conspirators at TBW that within a year of its creation, Ocala Funding had a significant collateral deficit. As Bowman acknowledged, the government could prove that by August 2009, that deficit had grown to approximately $1.5 billion and that TBW had caused Colonial Bank and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) to falsely believe that they each had an undivided ownership interest in thousands of the same loans worth hundreds of millions of dollars.
Third, note that while a Colonial Bank officer pleaded guilty for assisting these frauds against Colonial Bank, no one has pleaded guilty at Freddie Mac.  The critical question is whether TBW actually delivered the key loan documents to Freddie Mac.  Did Freddie Mac obtain an enforceable security interest or was it defrauded by TBW?  Was Colonial Bank the only victim of the double sale/pledge? 
Fourth, a number of states identified severe problems with TBW, and brought actions against it, before the Federal authorities took any action.  Similarly, Alabama took the lead in closing Colonial Bank.
In August 2009, the Alabama State Banking Department, Colonial Bank’s regulator, seized the bank and appointed the FDIC as receiver.  
Fifth, the criminal case was brought to the FBI’s attention by the Special Inspector General for the TARP program (SIGTARP) and perhaps the HUD/FHA inspectors.  The FDIC did not initiate the criminal case or produce the key investigative findings.  The record of the banking regulatory agencies’ failure to identify and make criminal referrals against the fraudulent lenders that drove the crisis remains intact.
Sixth, the task force that supported the TBW/Colonial Bank investigation did not include federal banking examiners or supervisors.  The only federal banking regulatory personnel listed as supporting the investigation are the FDIC’s OIG staff.  That is disturbing.  The FDIC OIG is not expert in banking or banking fraud.  It is an internal audit unit and its reports on failed banks reveal a repeated inability to identify fraud even when they describe actions that only make sense if the failed bank’s officers were engaged in accounting fraud.  The FDIC has hundreds of examiners who have far greater expertise than their internal auditors with respect to banks and bank frauds.  Again, even the FDIC (and the FDIC is by far the most vigorous of the federal banking regulatory agencies) did not make support for the first major fraud prosecution of a large nonprime lenders’ officers a priority.
Seventh, TBW was not subject to the Community Reinvestment Act.  Its senior officers caused it to make bad loans, and cover up the losses on those bad loans in order to produce fictional short-term accounting income that would cause their compensation to increase.  The title to Akerlof & Romer’s 1993 article says it all:  “Looting: the Economic Underworld of Bankruptcy for Profit.”  The question is why Freddie Mac would purchase loans from a mortgage banker that was notorious for the poor quality of its underwriting.  The answer is that Freddie Mac’s senior managers’ rose dramatically when they purchased bad loans at a premium yield. 
Eighth, the senior managers of Colonial Bank were either in on the fraud or grossly negligent.  They allowed their SVP in charge of their Mortgage Warehouse Lending Division to assist TBW in carrying out an enormous, crude series of frauds for seven years.  Colonial Bank’s controlling officers and directors also appear from the DOJ allegations to have entered into transactions designed to fund TBW’s fraudulent capital injection into Colonial Bank.  
Ninth, neither the FHA nor the FDIC appear to have spotted any of these frauds even though they were enormous, crude, and growing over a seven year period.  Indeed, the FHA and the FDIC appear to have been supportive for some time of TBW’s fraudulent (and fictional) injection of capital into Colonial Bank.  The FHA allowed TBW and Colonial to grow so rapidly that they became among the FHA’s largest providers.         
Tenth, the DOJ’s March 14, 2011 press release that I have been quoting from makes one point quite forcefully.
This prosecution was brought in coordination with President Barack Obama’s Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force.  President Obama established the interagency Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force to wage an aggressive, coordinated and proactive effort to investigate and prosecute financial crimes. 
Got that, “President Obama” deserves the credit.  There’s some truth to this PR.  President Bush’s Attorney General Mukasey notoriously refused to create a national task force to investigate the accounting control frauds that caused this crisis.  He claimed that the mortgage frauds were so small-time that they were the equivalent of “white-collar street crimes.” 

Mukasey was right in a way – because he was so wrong.  Under his leadership the FBI investigated only the small time mortgage frauds.  There are two great truths to investigating epidemics of accounting fraud:
  1.  If you don’t look; you don’t find
  2. Wherever you look; you will find
Because he refused to look at the massive frauds he didn’t find any of the massive mortgage frauds.  Because he looked at the small frauds he found tens of thousands of small frauds.  Because his staff found only minor frauds he assigned only a minimal number of FBI agents to investigate mortgage fraud (120 nationwide in FY 2007 – one-eighth of the number of FBI agents assigned to investigate S&L frauds during the S&L debacle even though the current crisis is dramatically more severe than the S&L debacle).  His staff of FBI agents assigned to mortgage fraud cases was divided up among scores of field offices.  That meant that no field office could investigate even one of the large nonprime lenders.  (The military rightly condemns these tiny units incapable of effective action against a major foe as “penny packets.”)  Because his penny packets assigned to investigate the smaller frauds found – smaller frauds – Mukasey reached the “logical” conclusion that their investigations confirmed his assumption that mortgage fraud was equivalent to “white-collar street crime.”    

Senator Obama warned of the wave of mortgage fraud and called for increased budgets for the FBI and DOJ to investigate and prosecute the frauds.  He could have made the investigation and prosecution of the major accounting control frauds one of the nation’s top priorities.  The result would have transformed his administration and the public support for those holding the elite frauds accountable.  The DOJ press release says all the right things.

President Obama established the interagency Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force to wage an aggressive, coordinated and proactive effort to investigate and prosecute financial crimes. 

But DOJ has not “walked the walk.”  Instead, we have one case brought not because of the underlying accounting fraud involving its lending, but because the leaders of the accounting control fraud sought to rip off TARP and came to the attention of one of our two (the other is Elizabeth Warren) most vigorous and effective public servants – Neil Barofsky (SIGTARP).  Unfortunately, Mr. Barofsky has resigned. 

One more time credit rating agencies show their incompetence

By Eric Tymoigne

Yesterday morning S&P released the following information:

“Although we believe these strengths currently outweigh what we consider to be the U.S.’s meaningful economic and fiscal risks and large external debtor position, we now believe that they might not fully offset the credit risks over the next two years at the ‘AAA’ level,” said Standard & Poor’s credit analyst Nikola G. Swann. […] “Our negative outlook on our rating on the U.S. sovereign signals that we believe there is at least a one-in-three likelihood that we could lower our long-term rating on the U.S. within two years,” Mr. Swann said.

So the credit risk of the US is potentially growing according to S&P so it threatens to downgrade the US credit rating. In order to understand how S&P arrived to this conclusion let’s have a look at how credit risk is defined in its 2007 sovereign debt primer:

QUOTE 1: “A sovereign rating is a forward-looking estimate of default probability. […] The key determinants of credit risk [are economic risk and political risk]. Economic risk addresses the government’s ability to repay its obligations on time and is a function of both quantitative and qualitative factors. Political risk addresses the sovereign’s willingness to repay debt. Willingness to pay is a qualitative issue that distinguishes sovereigns from most other types of issuers. Partly because creditors have only limited legal redress, a government can (and sometimes does) default selectively on its obligations, even when it possesses the financial capacity for timely debt service.”

S&P has two ratings, a local currency rating (default risk on domestic-currency-denominated debt) and a foreign currency rating (default risk on foreign-currency-denominated debt). The primer notes:

QUOTE 2: “A sovereign government’s ability and willingness to service local currency debt are supported by its taxation powers and its ability to control the domestic monetary and financial systems, which give it potentially unlimited access to local currency resources. To service foreign currency debt, however, the sovereign must secure foreign exchange, usually by purchasing it in the currency markets. This can be a binding constraint, as reflected in the higher frequency of foreign than local currency debt default. The primary focus of Standard & Poor’s local currency credit analysis is on the government’s economic strategy, particularly its fiscal and monetary policies, as well as on its plans for privatization, other microeconomic reform, and additional factors likely to support or erode incentives for timely debt service. When assessing the default risk on foreign currency debt, Standard & Poor’s places more weight on the impact of these same factors on the balance of payments and external liquidity, and on the magnitude and characteristics of the external debt burden.”

S&P provides a table that shows the number of defaults on foreign-denominated sovereign debt and notes that: “Defaults on sovereign foreign currency bonds occurred repeatedly, and on a substantial scale, throughout the 19th century and as recently as the 1940s.” Interestingly, however, it does not provide such a table for the domestic-denominated sovereign debt. The primer continues by noting:

QUOTE 3: “One might ask why, if sovereigns have such extensive powers within their own borders—including the ability to print money—sovereign local currency ratings are not all ‘AAA’. The reason is that while the ability to print local currency gives the sovereign, and the sovereign alone, tremendous flexibility, heavy reliance upon such an expansionary monetary stance may bring the risk of hyperinflation and of more serious political and economic damage than would a rescheduling of local currency debt. In such instances, sovereigns may opt to reschedule their local currency obligations.”

So overall here is the view of S&P:

  • Credit risk = economic risk (capacity to pay) + political risk (willingness to pay)
  • There are two type of sovereign debt: Domestic-currency denominated and foreign-currency denominated
  • Governments that can tax and issue their own currency have the full capacity to pay domestic-currency-denominated debt
  • Inflation risk is a form of default risk

Now let’s look if all this makes sense in the case of the US. First, note that the US is a monetarily sovereign country: the federal government issues its own currency, the federal government has no foreign-denominated debts outstanding, and the federal government does not peg its currency in anyways (and so does not promise to convert US dollars into another currency or gold on demand). This means that the US federal government can always meet payments that are due to its creditors anytime (today or in the future) and anywhere (in the US or abroad) by crediting bank accounts. Stated alternatively, there is NO possible risk of default for economic/technical reasons. The federal government cannot run out of money, it has a perfect capacity to pay: economic risk is zero.

The problem with S&P is that it has a shifting definition of economic risk. As quote 3shows, S&P is aware of the absence of economic risk in the case of the US but it proceeds to argue that there is one by changing the definition of default risk to include risk of hyperinflation. OK…hold on… are we talking about default or inflation risk? These are two completely different risks.

In terms of default risk, higher inflation (if revenues of borrowers are indexed to it) increases the capacity of repayment and so LOWERS default risk rather than increases it. If, following S&P’s logic in quote 2, one considers taxes a form of revenues that helps to pay debt, then tax revenues rise with inflation and so lower the risk of default.

In terms of inflation risk, inflation pressures on the demand side are very low and the risk of uncontrollable hyperinflation that S&P refers to in quote 3… give me a break! But there is a deeper misconception at play. S&P (and all politicians in Washington) seems to think that they have some meaningful control over the fiscal balance of the federal government. They do not; as the UK experience, among others, is painfully showing us. The fiscal balance of the government is ultimately driven by the net saving of the private domestic sector and of the rest of the world, as was explained many times on this blog. The following identity holds at the aggregate level:

(G – T) ≡ (S – I) + (J – X)
Government deficit ≡ Net domestic saving + net foreign saving

Stated alternatively, the US government must deficit spend currently and in the near future in order for the private sector to repay its outstanding debt and for foreigners to accumulate dollars. It is only if the private sector as a whole decides to dissave (spends more than what it earns) and/or foreigners decide to dissave (import more than they export to the US) that the government can lower its deficit and potentially run a surplus. Any attempts to go against the desires of the two sectors will lead to a recession. The deficit will go down by itself as the private and foreign sector gain confidence and decrease their net saving.

By conflating inflation risk and default risk in their rating, S&P (and probably other CRAs) creates confusions in financial markets and promotes dangerous ideas. Sounds familiar? Remember all those toxic mortgage products that were rated AAA? One more time, S&P is showing how silly it is to extend a rating methodology that was developed for corporate bonds to other sectors of the economy. Even for corporate bonds, results are far from perfect (remember all those financial institutions that had an AAA rating or so right before they failed?)

So overall there is zero default risk due to economic risk in the US, as an issuer of the currency in which sovereign debt is denominated, the US (like the UK and Japan but contrary to Eurozone countries) can always repay dollar-denominated debts it issued. But what about credit risk due to political risk, i.e. unwillingness to pay?

First and foremost, cases of voluntary default by a monetarily sovereign government on its domestic-currency-denominated date are extremely rare. Following Rogoff and Reinhart, it looks like Japan is a candidate in 1942, a very unusual political and economic situation (and probably a means to limit inflationary pressures by not adding purchasing power to the private sector, so default could be a good policy). It is hard to detect more countries given that the authors do not give us any background about the monetary system at the time of default. The US is not experiencing any massive war exhausting its resources (even that is not enough to increase the risk much), its political system is stable, and Geithner has told us many times that the debt ceiling will be raised that any chance of political problem is at best remote. True, the Congress may tie its own hands and decide not to raise the debt limit, but how realistic is that possibility?

Bottom line, credit risk is remotely remote. You have more chance to be hit by lightening twice during your life than to experience a default of dollar-denominated sovereign US debt. The only really worrisome variable is the stupidity of US congress and its willingness to try to fix something that is not broken. People love Medicare (by far the most popular program of the government), they love social security, and automatic stabilizers are working as predicted. Let them be.

Speaker Wright and Secretary Geithner’s Shared Hate for Prosecuting Criminal Contributors

By William K. Black

In the Savings and Loan (S&L) debacle Speaker Wright became enraged at the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and the Department of Justice when he learned that the FBI was investigating 400 individuals, most of them Texans, for their possible role in the S&L control frauds that were causing the regional bubble in commercial real estate (CRE) to hyper-inflate. (Akerlof & Romer’s 1993 article – “Looting: the Economic Underworld of Bankruptcy for Profit” discussed the major contribution the S&L frauds made to expanding that regional bubble.) Legend has it that an FBI agent accidentally left the list of investigative targets with an interviewee who copied it. Whatever the truth of the legend, Speaker Wright eventually reviewed a copy of the list and noticed that it had the names of many contributors to the Democratic Party. He and several senior Democratic colleagues and a staffer responded to the list by dividing up telephone calls to the FBI, Justice Department and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (Bank Board). Wright was enraged and concluded immediately that the investigation was politically motivated. He wanted the investigation killed.

Wright began intervening with the Bank Board on behalf of a series of Texas S&L control frauds in 1986 and 1987. He eventually held the bill to “recapitalize” the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) (the “FSLIC recap” bill) hostage to extort more favorable regulatory treatment for these frauds’ CEOs. Wright’s extortion focused on preventing agency actions against three Texas executives. Each of the executives shared two traits – they had voted for President Reagan in 1980 and they were now contributing to the Democratic Party. When we met with Speaker Wright in early 1987 his primary argument was the extreme fragility of Texas’ economy. (The meeting was set up by Bob Strauss, the grand old man of Texas Democrats, as a “peace meeting.”) I was the agency’s “point man” seeking to get FSLIC recap passed. The meeting was a disaster, Wright ended up claiming (incorrectly) that the head of our agency had lied to him and let loose in a swearing tirade aimed at me.

What Wright never understood was that the most politically active Texas S&Ls were so active because they were frauds and desperately needed protection from being closed by us. In particular, we intended to use the additional funds we would receive under FSLIC recap to close the worst control frauds and those frauds were located primarily in the states with the weakest regulation and supervision. Texas was the most criminogenic environment because it had the earliest extensive deregulation and the most complete state desupervision. (The top State of Texas S&L regulator later admitted to using prostitutes provided by Vernon Savings (aka “Vermin)). Vernon was the second worst control fraud in the nation and had 96% of its loans in default when it was finally placed in receivership despite Wright’s extortion. We had been so aggressive in closing the control frauds that by early 2007 we had roughly $500 million in the FSLIC fund – to insure an (insolvent) industry with $1 trillion in liabilities. We were running on fumes. Wright knew this and knew that holding the FSLIC recap bill hostage would give him exceptional leverage over our agency. Unfortunately for Wright, the result of the failed peace meeting was that we were able to convince the head of our agency that we had to take on Speaker Wright rather than continuing to capitulate to his ever increasing extortion. Doubly unfortunately, I was assigned the task of explaining to the public how the Speaker was extorting us on behalf of frauds and endangering the public. Thereafter, he tried repeatedly to get me fired. (One of the proposed ethic charges by the independent counsel for the House ethics committee investigating Speaker Wright was those attempts.)

Speaker Wright cultivated an image designed to terrorize opponents. He was nasty, asking us to fire our top supervisor in the Texas region on the “grounds” that he Wright had heard he was a homosexual. Wright had exceptional leverage over us because we were desperately short of funds and he held our access to funds hostage. Our agency (over several of our objections) gave in to many of his demands, including terminating a civil suit against a lender who had defaulted on his debts to roughly a dozen S&Ls. At no time, however, did we even consider giving in to Speaker Wright’s desire that we back off of criminal referrals, investigations, or prosecutions.

Later, under Bank Board Chairman Danny Wall, the agency’s head of enforcement wrote a “side letter” promising Charles Keating’s Lincoln Savings that the agency had no present intention of filing additional criminal referrals. (We, the Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco (FHLBSF), had filed criminal referrals based on the findings of a formal investigation that established that Lincoln Savings had forged thousands of signatures and scores of documents and had stuffed the files with purported underwriting files. Those files were actually created by Arthur Andersen years after the junk bonds were purchased for the sole purpose of deceiving the examiners into believing that the S&L had underwritten the bonds before purchasing them.) The FHLBSF had discovered evidence of additional likely crimes by Lincoln Savings, but had not completed the referrals, at the time the “side letter” was written. Danny Wall and Bank Board member Roger Martin removed our (the FHLBSF’s) jurisdiction over Lincoln Savings (an unprecedented act) because we refused to withdraw our recommendation that Lincoln Savings be placed in conservatorship despite the political intervention of the five U.S. Senators who became known as the “Keating Five” and Speaker Wright on behalf of Keating. The Bank Board made no criminal referrals against Lincoln Savings after it removed our jurisdiction despite finding new evidence of likely fraud. The FHLBSF was not informed of the existence of the side letter and while the deal documents detailing the Bank Board’s de facto surrender to Keating were provided to us the side letter was not. I learned accidentally about the existence of the side letter in preparing for the House hearings on the scandal of the successful political intervention on behalf of Keating – the most notorious S&L control fraud. I then exposed the side letter and its import in my testimony. The side letter sealed Danny Wall’s fate. The Committee, on a bipartisan basis, was outraged by it. Wall resigned in disgrace.

I set forth this history because of the disclosures in Gretchen Morgenson and Louise Story’s April 14 article in the New York Times “In Financial Crisis, No Prosecutions of Top Figures.”

Morgenson and Story’s reporting revealed that Timothy Geithner discouraged criminal investigations of suspected accounting control frauds. I was asked to comment on this “elite felons go free” policy by Kai Ryssdal, Marketplace’s business journalist.

Ryssdal: What about the argument, though, that the financial system is so fragile still, and these cases so complicated, that we can’t really tear things apart with substantive investigations and prosecutions because it will all fall apart again?

Black: Yeah, that’s an excellent point. We should leave felons in charge of our largest financial institutions as a means of achieving financial stability.

When more junior officials took actions discouraging criminal investigations against Charles Keating that were considerably less harmful than Geithner’s actions the Congress, the administration, and the media treated those actions as infamous and the head of the Office of Thrift Supervision, Danny Wall, had to resign. Why aren’t Geithner’s and Holder’s far more harmful and unprincipled actions, and failures to act, with regard to the elite criminals that caused the Great Recession a national scandal? Why isn’t Attorney General Mukasey, who was even more derelict than Holder, considered a national embarrassment? Have we lost our capacity as a nation for outrage? Are these elite ethical failures too powerful to hold accountable?

Fiat Justitia Ruat Caelum (Let Justice be done, though the Heavens Fall)


It is one of the paradoxes of life that the most practical means to ensure that the system does not collapse is to insist on justice for all and to ignore demands for special treatment premised on claims that justice places the system at grave risk of collapse.  Nietzsche argued that the ubermensch (generally translated as “Superman”) transcended the normal rules.  The elites claim impunity from normal rules on the basis of their purported superiority and because they claim that they are so important that applying the normal rules to them will harm society.  Some pigs are more equal than others.  What any competent financial regulator learns is that the best way to destroy a financial system is to refuse to hold the elites accountable.  Regulators that insist on doing justice prevent the heavens from falling.     

Gretchen Morgenson and Louise Story authored a column addressing one of our national scandals – the elite banking frauds who caused the Great Recession through their looting have done so with impunity.  Not a single one of them has been convicted.  This is the hallmark of crony capitalism. 

Gretchen and Louise’s reporting exposed for the first time two underlying scandals that produced the overall scandal.  In 2008, the FBI, belatedly, realized that it had improperly targeted relatively trivial mortgage frauds while ignoring the massive lenders that specialized in making fraudulent mortgages.  The FBI developed a plan to reorient its resources towards the “accounting control frauds” that always should have been its priority.  We now know that the Department of Justice (DoJ) deliberately, and successfully, sabotaged this effort to investigate the major frauds.  We need additional investigative reporting to discover why DoJ did so. 


The second underlying scandal that their column disclosed is that two key members of what Tom Frank aptly termed Bush’s “Wrecking Crew” – Geithner and Bernanke – who President Obama chose to promote and reappoint and make his anti-regulatory leaders sought to discourage or limit federal and state prosecutions, enforcement actions, and suits.  Geithner’s express rationale was that the financial system extreme fragility made vigorous investigations of the elite frauds too dangerous.
Here is how I responded to Kai Ryssdal, Marketplace’s business journalist, who asked about Geithner’s rationale:

Ryssdal: What about the argument, though, that the financial system is so fragile still, and these cases so complicated, that we can’t really tear things apart with substantive investigations and prosecutions because it will all fall apart again?
Black: Yeah, that’s an excellent point. We should leave felons in charge of our largest financial institutions as a means of achieving financial stability.
Ryssdal: See, that’s funny because I was expecting you to come back with — I don’t know, JPMorgan earned $5 billion last quarter. How shaky can they be?
In retrospect, that interchange should have been a warning to me – Ryssdal actually thought Geithner’s position favoring immunity for elite felons was acceptable when financial conditions are “shaky.”  Sure enough, Matthew Yglesias wrote a column on April 14, 2011 embracing the Geithner immunity doctrine.   He titled it: “The Fraud Free Financial Crisis” – and it proves our family rule that it is impossible to compete with unintentional self-parody. 

Here is Yglesias’ position:

[T]he key sentiment underlying the whole thing is that the Obama administration felt it was important to restabilize the global financial system. That meant, at the margin, shying away from anxiety-producing fraud prosecutions. And faced with a logistically difficult task, that kind of pressure at the margin seems to have made a huge difference. There simply was no appetite for the kind of intensive work that would have been necessary.
I’m not as persuaded as, say, Jamie Galbraith is that the failure to do this is a key causal element in our economic problems. Indeed, I’d say that if you look at the situation literally, Tim Geithner’s judgment was probably correct.

Yglesias believes that “Geithner’s judgment was probably correct” because investigating the accounting control frauds that caused the economic crisis would have been “anxiety-producing.”  Geithner’s overriding goal was to “restabilize the global financial system,” so he was correct to discourage the fraud investigations of the elite bankers.  Yglesias obviously believes that Geithner “restabilize[d] the global financial system.” 

I’ve noted the brief answer that I gave on Marketplace.  Here’s the expanded answer.  This was not a “fraud free financial crisis.”  It is a prosecution free financial crisis for the elites whose frauds caused the crisis.  Historically, “control frauds” – frauds run by the senior officers who control seemingly legitimate banks and use them as “weapons” to defraud creditors and shareholders – drive serious financial crises.  That was true of our two most recent financial scandals.  The national commission investigating the causes of the S&L debacle found that at the typical large failure “fraud was invariably present.”  The major Enron era frauds were all control frauds.  This current crisis was driven by accounting control frauds.  We have known, for well over a century, how to make home loans in a manner that limits fraud to negligible levels.  We have known for centuries that if bankers do not underwrite the inevitable results are massive losses, endemic fraud, and failure.  Honest mortgage lenders do not make liar’s loans.  No one ever forced a banker to make liar’s loans.  Only fraudulent mortgage lenders make material numbers of liar’s loans.  My prior columns have explained that it was the lenders that overwhelmingly put the lies in liar’s loans.

The FBI warned in House testimony in September 2004 that there was an “epidemic” of mortgage fraud and predicted that it would cause a “financial crisis” if it were not stopped.  It was not contained.  Everyone agrees that the mortgage fraud epidemic expanded massively after the FBI warning.  Here’s the four-part “recipe” for a fraudulent lender optimizing fictional accounting income and real losses:

1.     Grow massively
2.     By making awful loans at a premium yield
3.     While employing extreme leverage, and
4.     Providing only grossly inadequate loss reserves

Deregulation and desupervision are more extreme in some industries and regions and certain assets provide superior “ammunition” for accounting fraud.  If entry is relatively easy (and it was ridiculously easy for mortgage banking and loan brokers), then accounting control frauds will cluster in particular asset categories, industries, and regions.  Clustering, extreme growth, and the fact that accounting control frauds rapidly increase their lending even when they know that they are lending into the teeth of a massive bubble are all factors that make accounting control fraud epidemics uniquely dangerous devices for hyper-inflating financial bubbles.  All other factors being held constant, the more a bubble hyper-inflates the greater the economic inefficiency and losses and the greater the risk that it will cause a severe recession.  The second ingredient in the fraud recipe – lending to borrowers who will often be unable to repay their loans – also plays a major role in causing bubbles to hyper-inflate.  There are tens of millions of Americans who cannot afford to purchase homes and therefore are normally unable to obtain loans to purchase homes.  When accounting control frauds lend to the uncreditworthy they make it possible for millions of additional Americans to purchase homes – but not to repay their loans.  In economics jargon, this shifts the demand curve to the right.  Shifting the demand curve for housing to the right will increase the price of housing and hyper-inflate the bubble. 

How much of the bubble was driven by the accounting control fraud?  We don’t know the precise amount.  Data on the frequency of liar’s loans are uncertain.  The three major categories of home loans: prime, subprime, and “alt-a” (aka: “stated income” or “liar’s loans) had no formal definition and no standard reporting.  The loan categories are not mutually exclusive.  The best information we have is that by 2006 one-half of subprime loans were also liar’s loans.  The most reliable estimates of the total number of liar’s loans made in 2006 are that they represent between 25 and 49% of home loans.  That is a disturbingly wide range of estimates.  Even the lower bound estimate represents over a million loans.  Independent studies of the incidence of fraud in liar’s loans run from 80 – 100%.  That means that the annual number of mortgage frauds arising from liar’s loans alone is likely to be roughly one million.  (Extrapolating the likely number of frauds from the number of criminal referrals leads to a similar estimate of the annual number of mortgage frauds.)  Expanding the number of home purchasers by loaning to those who would often prove unable to repay their home loans caused a major right shift in the demand curve – providing somewhere between 25 and 50% of the total home purchasers in 2006.  Losses do not increase in a linear fashion when a bubble hyper-inflates.  A 25% increase in the bubble could produce a 100% increase in the ultimate losses.  We do not know how rapid the rise in losses will be when a bubble hyper-inflates, but our experience with the collapse of massive bubbles is generally dire. 

We could have far better data if the administration heeded our requests that we sample the Fed’s and Fannie and Freddie’s massive holdings of mortgage instruments to determine the facts.  Instead, the FDIC and OTS have created a “data base” of mortgages that is worse than useless.  It treats prime, subprime, and alt-a as mutually exclusive categories and defines alt-a not by the lack of underwriting but rather by FICO score.  Both of these practices are not only obviously wrong, but indefensibly wrong.  These errors will irretrievably cripple meaningful research and fact-based policies if senior FDIC officials fail to intervene.  

These facts about the current crisis and prior crises led prominent economists such as George Akerlof (Nobel Prize, 2001), Paul Romer, and James Galbraith to warn that accounting control fraud epidemics posed critical dangers to our economy.  Yglesias, who is not writing in an area in which he has any experience or expertise, offers a bare conclusion – he’s “not persuaded” by the economists, criminologists, or regulators who have made a specific study of the causes of the crises.  He apparently believes that the FBI’s prescient 2004 warning that the fraud epidemic would cause a financial crisis was fanciful – even though it proved correct.  Among the factors that Yglesias fails to consider is the first rule of investigating accounting control fraud – if you don’t look; you don’t find.  The people that look have to understand accounting fraud mechanisms and they have to work intensively with serious commitments of expert personnel.  Geithner blocked the investigations.  It is clear from the FBI’s own numbers that it never provided remotely adequate staff to conduct a serious investigation of any major failed bank.  We know that there were no serious investigations by the regulatory agencies.  Contrast that with the S&L debacle where our regulatory investigations led the agency to make well over 10,000 criminal referrals.  It’s easy to be “not persuaded” when no one is investigating and making public the persuasive facts.  We’ve had to rely on a Senate committee and the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission to do a literal handful of investigations because the banking regulatory agencies (1) had their budgets and staff’s shredded and (2) were led by anti-regulators who ended the entire criminal referral process and institutions that we built up despite their proven success.  It is bizarre that Yglesias uses the paucity of publicly available data – caused by the anti-regulators’ refusal to conduct meaningful investigations and make criminal referrals – to justify his skepticism that bankers who wear nice suits could be criminals.          
 Liar’s loans are not “complicated.”  The huge commercial real estate (CRE) loans that were the dominant “ammunition” used for accounting fraud during the S&L debacle were very complicated.  We were able to get over one thousand felony convictions in “major” S&L cases (with a conviction rate of over 90%) despite the complexity of CRE deals.

I end on the fundamental problems with Geithner’s immunity doctrine and Yglesias’ support for it.  The policy represents the intersection of the curves of injustice and stupidity at their respective maxima.  Those curves have intersected to produce Secretary Geithner’s policy of protecting from prosecution the elite C-suite criminals who caused the financial crisis and the Great Recession. It is stupidity of truly epic proportions to leave felons in charge of banks.  Doing so cannot stabilize a financial system – it is certain to cause recurrent, intensifying crises.  When I was a regulator during a financial crisis our agency’s top priority was to prevent frauds from controlling S&Ls.  Our second priority was to support the prosecution of those fraudulent leaders.

The injustice of Geithner’s “elite frauds go free” doctrine is every bit as extreme as the stupidity of believing that giving fraudulent CEOs de facto immunity is the road to financial stability.  It is a travesty that I have to defend the importance of integrity and justice.  No nation can be great if it allows its elites to loot with impunity and prosecutes its whistleblowers.  Geithner is destroying the things that made America great.  He did so as part of Bush’s wrecking crew and he is doing so now as part of Obama’s wrecking crew.

Geithner’s “elite frauds go free” plan is not new.  Speaker Wright demanded that my colleagues and I go easy on fraudulent Texas S&Ls to save the Texas economy (which the S&L frauds were savaging – but he assumed they were salvaging).  The five senators that became known as the “Keating Five” told us that Lincoln Savings was critical to the health of Arizona’s economy.  In reality, it was the worst threat to Arizona’s economy.  One of my agency’s presidential appointees, Bank Board member Roger Martin, argued that if Keating was a fraud and had made Lincoln Savings insolvent by looting the S&L it was all the more important to keep him in charge so that he could use his exceptional political power to get zoning changes that would reduce losses.  He opposed any closures of insolvent, fraudulent Arizona S&Ls on the grounds that the Arizona economy was fragile.  Here’s the difference.  We, the professional regulators, explained in excruciating detail why leaving frauds in charge of S&Ls would massively increase losses and harm regional economies.  Only one of the three Board members (Larry White) listened to us – the other two (Martin and Bank Board Chairman Danny Wall) took the unprecedented action of removing our jurisdiction over Lincoln Savings because we refused to withdraw our recommendation that it be promptly taken over and Keating removed.  We told the Keating Five to their faces that they were intervening on behalf of a fraud.  Even before Wall and Martin removed our jurisdiction over Lincoln Savings they expressly ordered us to cease our examination of Lincoln Savings, to cancel the upcoming examination (nominally, they ordered us to postpone it indefinitely), and ordered that the formal investigation of Lincoln Savings (which had produced the admissions of fraud) be terminated (nominally, suspended).  The result was that Lincoln Savings became the worst S&L failure.  Losses increased substantially after our examination, investigation, and supervision of Lincoln Savings were halted.  All of this became a national scandal when House banking chairman, Henry B. Gonzalez, over the opposition of the Democratic leadership, conducted a series of intense oversight hearings that exposed the Bank Board’s capitulation to the political extortion of the Keating Five and Speaker Wright.  Danny Wall resigned in disgrace as a result of those hearings.   

For those readers who doubt that regulators can ever be trusted let me note several facts about the Keating Five meeting (which occurred 24 years and one week ago).  Four of the Senators were Democrats, one was a Republican.  Speaker Wright was a Democrat.  Four of us from the Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco met with the Keating Five.  To this day, I have no idea what the political affiliations, if any, of my colleagues were.  It was irrelevant to us.  We detested the frauds and their political allies.  Our job was to protect the public.  We were constantly abused, sued for hundreds of millions of dollars, investigated, and threatened with being fired.  We prioritized the most elite, most destructive frauds for removal from the industry, enforcement actions, civil suits, and prosecutions.  We persevered.
In 1990-91, as the nation entered a recession, and the banking agencies were accused of preventing the recovery of the fragile economy through excessively strict regulation, suits, and prosecutions we ignored those accusations and used normal supervisory means to end a developing wave of nonprime lending by California S&Ls.  Our supervision prevented any nonprime crisis in that era.  Indeed, we were so effective that the fraudulent S&L leaders of that era “voted with their feet” and left the S&L industry to escape our supervision.  For example, the most notorious nonprime lender of that period, Roland Arnall, the head of Long Beach Savings, gave up his federal charter and created a mortgage banking firm (Ameriquest) so that he would not be subject to our supervision.  One of his primary mortgage banking competitors was controlled by a married couple we removed and prohibited from a California S&L they controlled.   

Competent financial regulators understand that good ethics makes for good regulation.  As soon as you depart from the justice and integrity and attempt to save elite bankers from “anxiety” you become a grave threat to the public.  I have no hopes about Geithner.  What distresses me is Yglesias’ casual willingness to give up on justice because Geithner believed it might cause “anxiety” among his cronies.  Justice must not occupy a very high position in either man’s values if they are so willing to abandon it.  Powerful bankers commonly press regulators to abandon justice as soon as we find that they have violated the law.  These pleas are far more common than threats, and they are more insidious because they are far more likely than threats to be effective.  A regulator who gives in to the plea can feel great – he saved the entire system.  A regulator that gives in to a threat knows that he has violated his duty and exhibited cowardice. 

Yglesias substitutes faux violence for integrity in his vision of how to respond to the massive frauds that caused the Great Recession and cost 10 million Americans their jobs.  He muses about the desirability of Nancy Pelosi slapping a bank CEO.  His every instinct is wrong.  He trivializes the crimes and the concepts of justice and accountability.  The web has the opposite extreme – jokes about executing the senior bank frauds.  This is the not a mindset of effective regulators or white-collar criminologists.  My boss, Michael Patriarca, famously directed us to “cut square corners” in all our dealings with Lincoln Savings even though we knew it be a fraudulent operation engaged in the vilest of tactics against us and the public.  Justice, not punishment, is the key.

Effective regulators are the cops on the beat who are essential to defeating the Gresham’s dynamic that arises when frauds gain a competitive advantage.  As regulators, we know and deal regularly with a large number of honest bankers.  When we leave criminals in place as CEOs by discouraging even investigations of their fraud we endanger their honest competitors, our economy, and our democratic system.  Geithner’s path is the coward’s retreat from imagined fears.  If he really believes that the fraudulent bank CEOs are essential to the “success” of our economy then he must believe that our economy is fatally flawed and he should be leading the charge to radically transform it.        
  
[Please note:  my phrase about the intersection of the curves is a variant of Charles Black’s famous denunciation of a dishonest, racist statement in the infamous Supreme Court opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson upholding the constitutionality of racial segregation:  “The curves of callousness and stupidity intersect at their respective maxima.”  I am surprised that Paul Krugman has not used Charles Black’s classic phrase (or a variant such as “callousness and mendacity”) to describe Representative Ryan’s budget plan.]

Bill Black is an Associate Professor of Economics and Law at the University of Missouri-Kansas City.  He is a white-collar criminologist, a former senior financial regulator, and the author of The Best Way to Rob a Bank is to Own One.

William Black interviewed on The Real News

William Black was interviewed The Real News recently.  See video below.

Why aren’t the honest bankers demanding prosecutions of their dishonest rivals?

By William K. Black

This is the second column in a series responding to Stephen Moore’s central assaults on regulation and the prosecution of the elite white-collar criminals who cause our recurrent, intensifying financial crises. Last week’s column addressed his claim in a recent Wall Street Journal column that all government employees, including the regulatory cops on the beat, are “takers” destroying America.

This column addresses Moore’s even more vehement criticism of efforts to prosecute elite white-collar criminals in an earlier column decrying the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s criminal provisions: “White-Collar Witch Hunt: Why do Republicans so easily accept Neobolshevism as a cost of doing business?” [American Spectator September 2005] This column illustrates one of the reasons why elite criminals are able to loot “their” banks with impunity – they have a lobby of exceptionally influential shills. Moore, for example, is the Wall Street Journal’s senior economics writer. Somehow, prominent conservatives have become “bleeding hearts” for the most wealthy, powerful, arrogant, and destructive white-collar criminals in the world. Criminology research has demonstrated the importance of “neutralization.” Criminals don’t like to think of themselves as criminals and their actions as criminal. They have to override their societal inhibitions on criminality to commit their crimes. When prominent individuals like Moore call their actions lawful and demonize the regulatory cops on the beat and the prosecutors it becomes more likely that CEOs will successfully neutralize their inhibitions and commit fraud. People like Moore have never studied white-collar crime, have no knowledge of white-collar criminology, do not understand control fraud, and do not understand sophisticated financial fraud mechanisms. They show no awareness of the economics literature on accounting control fraud, particularly George Akerlof & Paul Romer’s famous 1993 article – “Looting: the Economic Underworld of Bankruptcy for Profit.” People like Moore not only spur neutralization, they actively campaign to minimize the destructiveness of elite white-collar crime and to deny the regulators and the prosecutors the resources to prosecute the criminals.

My favorite in this genre was authored by Professor John S. Baker, Jr. and published by Heritage on October 4, 2004.

Baker concludes his article with this passage:

“The origin of the “white-collar crime” concept derives from a socialist, anti-business viewpoint that defines the term by the class of those it stigmatizes. In coining the phrase, Sutherland initiated a political movement within the legal system. This meddling in the law perverts the justice system into a mere tool for achieving narrow political ends. As the movement expands today, those who champion it would be wise to recall its origins. For those origins reflect contemporary misuses made of criminal law–the criminalization of productive social and economic conduct, not because of its wrongful nature but, ultimately, because of fidelity to a long-discredited class-based view of society.”

We “stigmatize” criminals precisely to increase the difficulty potential criminals face in neutralizing restraints against engaging in crime. Stigmatization is an important restraint reducing crime. Indeed, it is likely that stigmatization can be most effective in reducing crime in the context of elite white-collar criminals because such individuals have more valuable reputations that can be harmed by stigma. A violent street criminal may find a reputation for violence useful. Sutherland’s research demonstrated that elite white-collar criminals were often able to violate the law with impunity. The corporation they controlled might pay a fine, but the CEO was typically not sanctioned when the corporation violated the law – even when the violations were repeated and egregious. Class proved, empirically, to be a powerful predictor of criminal prosecutions, convictions, and sentencing. Sutherland correctly sought to stigmatize elite white-collar criminals and to get policy-makers, academics, and the criminal justice system to view their crimes as important. Sutherland’s partial success in doing so is what enrages people like Moore and Baker. By the way, in order to publish his famous book on white-collar crime, Professor Sutherland was forced to delete his tables setting forth the violations of law by many of America’s top corporations – even though it was all public record information. The censorship had the ironic effect of demonstrating the accuracy of Sutherland’s observation that class mattered when it came to how we framed and responded to fraud by elite criminals. What aspect of holding fraudulent CEOs criminally responsible for their crimes is “socialist”, “anti-business”, or “neo-Bolshevism”? Baker claims that “class” has long been discredited as an important variable. Baker is not a social scientist and he is flat out wrong about class. There are literally thousands of empirical studies demonstrating the explanatory power of class in a host of settings. Baker is also flat out wrong empirically in claiming that white-collar prosecutions target “productive social and economic conduct.” White-collar prosecutions of elites are overwhelmingly based on fraud. Fraud is one of the most destructive of all social and economic conduct. Consider six forms of economic injury caused by accounting control fraud.

Eroding Trust

The essence of fraud is convincing the victim to trust the perpetrator – and then betraying that trust. The result is that fraud, particularly by elites, is the most destructive acid for eroding trust. Research in economics, political science, psychology, and sociology concurs on the enormous value that trust provides in each of these settings. We have all attended conferences that provided the participants with bottled water. If we knew that one bottle in a hundred were contaminated how many of us would drink our bottle? This dynamic explains why hundreds of markets collapsed during the events leading to the Great Recession – bankers no longer trusted other bankers’ representations as to asset quality. Accounting control fraud can cause systemic risk by eroding trust.

Bubbles

When bubbles hyper-inflate they can cause catastrophic economic damage and systemic risk. Accounting control fraud can hyper-inflate bubbles. The first two ingredients in the recipe for lenders engaged in accounting control fraud (extreme growth though lending to uncreditworthy borrowers) have the effect of right-shifting the demand curve. Because particular assets are superior devices for accounting fraud and because accounting frauds will tend to cluster in industries in which entry is easier and regulation and supervision are weak, accounting frauds tend to cluster in particular industries and regions. Accounting control frauds drove the Southwest bubble in commercial real estate during the S&L debacle and the U.S. residential real estate bubble in the current crisis. Hyper-inflated bubbles cause catastrophic losses to lenders and (late) owners, trigger severe recessions, and misallocate credit and assets (causing real economic losses).

Misallocation of credit and human talent

Even when accounting control fraud does not lead to a hyper-inflated bubble, it misallocates credit and human and non-human capital. Accounting control fraud substantially inflates individual asset values. Individuals with strong science and mathematics skills – critical shortages in our real economy – are wasted in making models designed to inflate asset values by fraudulently ignoring or minimizing risk. Accounting control fraud commonly produces reverse Pareto optimality – the borrower and the lender on a liar’s loan made in 2006 and 2007 typically suffered losses while the unfaithful agents become wealthy by betraying their principals and customers. (It is important to recall that it was the lenders and their agents who normally prompted by false statements in liar’s loans.) Fraud makes markets profoundly inefficient.

Gresham’s dynamics

“Private market discipline” becomes perverse under accounting control fraud. Capital is allocated in abundance, at progressively lower spreads (despite massively increased risk), to fraudulent firms and professionals. In this form of Gresham’s dynamic, bad ethics drives good ethics out of the marketplace. Note that once, for example, a significant number of appraisers are suborned by the fraudulent lenders to inflate appraised value it is more likely that such appraisers will go on to commit other frauds during their career. If cheaters prosper, then honest businesses are placed at a crippling competitive disadvantage. Effective regulation and prosecution is essential to make it possible for honest firms to compete.

“Echo” fraud epidemics

Fraud begets fraud. Or to put it in criminology terminology – accounting control fraud is criminogenic. Fraudulent lenders created perverse incentives that produced endemic fraud (often by generating Gresham’s dynamics) in other fields. Fraudulent lenders making liar’s loans, for example, created overwhelming financial incentives they knew would lead their loan officers and loan brokers to engage in pervasive fraud. Indeed, fraudulent lenders embraced liar’s loans because they facilitated endemic fraud by eviscerating underwriting.

Accounting control fraud also leads to the spontaneous generation of criminal profit opportunities, causing opportunistic fraud. Liar’s loans, for example, generated a host of fraudulent entrepreneurs offering illicit opportunities to use someone else’s credit score to secure a loan. (Austrian school economists should recognize this dynamic.)

Undesired frauds arising from control fraud

Lenders engaged in accounting control fraud must suborn or render ineffective their underwriting and internal and external controls. They also select, praise, enrich, and promote the most unethical officers. The real “tone at the top” of a control fraud is pro-fraud – often overlaid with a cynical propaganda campaign extolling the Dear Leader’ astonishing virtues. The result is that the firm environment is criminogenic. Some officers may loot the firm through private schemes, e.g., embezzlement at Charles Keating’s Lincoln Savings and self-dealing at Enron.

White-collar crime prosecutions are overwhelmingly taken against frauds. There is nothing economically productive about fraud. When Heritage and the Wall Street Journal feature odes to elite frauds they are fertilizing the seeds of the destruction of capitalism and its replacement by crony capitalism.

Moore’s article has the same tone and themes as Baker’s complaints against prosecuting elite white-collar criminals. 

“[T]he anti-capitalist left … [is] using the criminal law for the endgame purpose of striking down the productive class in American that they so envy and despise….”

Moore decries the passage of “Sarbanes-Oxley and other such laws criminalizing economic behavior….” He claims that prosecuting CEOs leading control frauds will harm shareholders – which he plainly sees as prohibiting criminal liability for corporate officers. Moore’s complaints about SOX are confusing because Sarbanes-Oxley does not criminalize honest “economic behavior.” “Economic behavior” is not privileged. It can be honest or dishonest. Only honest economic behavior is potentially productive. Even honest economic behavior may prove unproductive or cause severe negative externalities. Dishonest economic behavior can benefit shareholders. A firm that gains a competitive advantage over its market rivals through fraud will be more profitable and should have a higher share price. That increased profit and share price is bad for the world. It creates a Gresham’s dynamic and misallocates capital. It may also maim and kill if the competitive advantage arises from selling harmful products to consumers or firms.

Moore eventually explains that what disturbs him most about white-collar prosecutions is that the CEO of a publicly traded company can be prosecuted for accounting fraud. SEC rules require that registrants comply with GAAP, so material accounting fraud constitutes securities fraud (a felony). Criminologists have long pointed out that accounting is the “weapon of choice” for financial firms. Moore objects to prosecuting the most destructive property crimes committed by elite white-collar criminals. Accounting control fraud drove the second phase of the S&L debacle. The first phase was interest rate risk and ultimately led to roughly $25 billion in losses. The Enron-era frauds prosecuted by the federal government were accounting control frauds. The current crisis was driven by the accounting control frauds – the largest nonprime lenders, Fannie, and Freddie. The officers that were prosecuted during the S&L debacle and the Enron-era frauds were not members of the “productive class.” No one destroyed more wealth, for purposes of personal greed, than these fraudulent elites. Their crimes and the harm they caused, however, pale in comparison to the accounting control frauds that drove the current crisis. That makes it all the more astonishing that not a single fraudulent senior officer at the major nonprime lenders, Fannie, or Freddie has been convicted. The shills for elite white-collar criminals have swept the field. The administration they constantly deride as socialist has continued the Bush administration’s policy of de facto decriminalization of accounting control fraud. Moore and Baker have, once more, proven Sutherland correct – we treat elite white-collar criminals in a way that bears no relationship to street criminals. We now bail them out after they loot and cause “their” banks to fail and change the accounting rules at their demand to hide their losses. We even invite them repeatedly to the White House to advise us on what policies we should follow.

The anti-regulators got their wish – they took the regulatory cops off the beat. The banking regulatory agencies ceased making criminal referrals, the SEC ceased bringing even their wimpy consent actions against the massive accounting control frauds, and the Justice Department ceased prosecuting the accounting control frauds during the run up to the crisis. The results were multiple echo epidemics of fraud, a hyper-inflated bubble, and the Great Recession. If Baker and Moore think these fraudulent CEOs constitute the “productive class” – then capitalism was killed by the producers. The financial frauds, however, were not productive. They were weapons of mass financial destruction. Their fraudulent CEOs were motivated by the most banal of motivations that every major religion warns against – unlimited greed, ego, and a radical lack of empathy for their victims. The most pathetic figures in the crisis, however, are not the CEOs but their shills. Why aren’t the honest bankers leading the charge to prosecute their fraudulent rivals?

Why Iceland Voted “No”

By Michael Hudson

About 75% of Iceland’s voters turned out on Saturday to reject the Social Democratic-Green government’s proposal to pay $5.2 billion to the British and Dutch bank insurance agencies for the Landsbanki-Icesave collapse. Every one of Iceland’s six electoral districts voted in the “No” column – by a national margin of 60% (down from 93% in January 2010).

The vote reflected widespread belief that government negotiators had not been vigorous in pleading Iceland’s legal case. The situation is reminiscent of World War I’s Inter-Ally war debt tangle. Lloyd George described the negotiations between U.S. Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon and Stanley Baldwin regarding Britain’s arms debt as “a negotiation between a weasel and its quarry. The result was a bargain which has brought international debt collection into disrepute … the Treasury officials were not exactly bluffing, but they put forward their full demand as a start in the conversations, and to their surprise Dr. Baldwin said he thought the terms were fair, and accepted them. … this crude job, jocularly called a ‘settlement,’ was to have a disastrous effect upon the whole further course of negotiations …”

And so it was with Iceland’s negotiation with Britain. True, they got a longer payment period for the Icesave payout. But how is Iceland to obtain the pounds sterling and Euros in the face of its shrinking economy. This is the major payment risk that is still unaddressed. It threatens to plunge the krona’s exchange rate.

Furthermore, the settlement included running interest charges on the bailout since 2008, even the extra-high interest charges that led depositors to put their funds in Icesave in the first place. Icelanders viewed these interest premiums as compensation for risks – that were taken and should be lost by the high-interest Internet depositors.

So the Icesave problem will now go to the courts. The relevant EU directive states “that the cost of financing such schemes must be borne, in principle, by credit institutions themselves.” As priority claimants Britain and the Netherlands will indeed get the lion’s share of what is left from the Landsbanki corpse. That was not the issue before Iceland’s voters. They simply aimed at saving Iceland from an open-ended obligation to take the bank’s losses onto the public balance sheet without a clear plan of just how Iceland is to get the money to pay.

Prime Minister Johanna Sigurdardottir warns that the vote may trigger “political and economic chaos.” But trying to pay also threatens this. The past year has seen the disastrous experience of Greece, Ireland and now Portugal in taking reckless private sector bank debts onto the public balance sheet. It is hard to expect any sovereign nation to impose a decade or more of deep depression on its economy inasmuch as international law permits every nation to act in its own vital interests.

Attempts by creditors to persuade nations to bail out their banks at public expense thus is ultimately an exercise in public relations. Icelanders have seen how successful Argentina has been since it imposed a crew haircut on its creditors. They also have seen the economic and political disruption in Ireland and Greece resulting from trying to pay beyond their means.

Creditors did not give accurate advice when they told Ireland that it could pay for its bank failures without plunging the economy into depression. Ireland’s experience stands as a warning to other countries about trusting overly optimistic forecasts by central bankers. In Iceland’s case, in November 2008 the IMF staff projected yearend-2009 gross external public and private debt at 160% of GDP – but observed that an exchange rate depreciation of 30% would push the ratio to 240% of GDP, which would be “clearly unsustainable.” But the most recent IMF staff report (January 14, 2011) shows end-2009 gross external debt at 308% of GDP, and estimates end-2010 gross external debt at 333% – even before taking the Icesave and other debts into account!

The main problem with Iceland’s obligation to Britain and the Netherlands is that foreign debt is not paid out of GDP. Apart from what is recovered from Landsbanki (now with the help of Britain’s Serious Fraud Office), the money must be paid in exports. But there has been no negotiation with Britain and Holland over just what Icelandic goods and services these countries would be willing to take in payment. Already in the 1920s, John Maynard Keynes pointed out that the Allied creditor nation had to take some responsibility just how Germany could pay its reparations, if not by exporting more to these countries. In practice, German cities borrowed in New York, turned the dollars over to the Reichsbank, which paid Britain and France, which paid the money back to the U.S. Government for their Inter-Ally Arms debts. In other words, Germany tried to “borrow its way out of debt.” It never works over time.

The normal practice would be for Iceland to appoint a Group of Experts to lay out the strongest possible case. No sovereign nation can be expected to acquiesce in imposing a generation of financial austerity, economic shrinkage and forced emigration of labor to pay for the failed neoliberal experiment that has dragged down so many other European economies.

Will Iceland Vote “No” on April 9, or commit financial suicide?

By Michael Hudson

A year ago, in March 2010, Iceland’s economy was so small that it did not warrant much attention when 93% of its voters rejected the Social Democratic-Green government’s surrender to demands by Gordon Brown and the Dutch, the European Union (EU) bureaucracy and IMF that the island nation impose austerity. Britain and the Netherlands wanted to be reimbursed for having paid out more than $5 billion to some 340,000 of their own depositors – whom their own bank oversight agencies had failed to warn about the looting that was going on.

Iceland’s taxpayers were told to bear the cost, as virtual tribute. In effect, it was to be penance for believing the neoliberal fairy tales about how bank deregulation and “free markets” would make it the richest, happiest country in the world. Indeed it seemed to be, according to United Nations data. But the dream was dashed after the Icesave electronic Internet bank branches abroad were emptied out by their proprietors.

The dream was the neoliberal promise that running into debt was the way to get rich. Nobody at the time anticipated that taking private (and indeed, fraudulent) bank losses onto the public balance sheet would become the theme dividing Europe over the coming year, dividing European politics and even threatening to break up the Eurozone.

A landmark in this fight is to occur this Saturday, April 9. Icelanders will vote on whether to subject their economy to decades of poverty, bankruptcy and emigration of their work force. At least, that is the program supported by the existing Social Democratic-Green coalition government in urging a “Yes” vote on the Icesave bailout. Their financial surrender policy endorses the European Central Bank’s lobbying for the neoliberal deregulation that led to the real estate bubble and debt leveraging as if it were a success story rather than the road to national debt peonage. The reality was an enormous banking fraud and insider dealing as bank managers lent the money to themselves, leaving an empty shell – and then saying that this was all how “free markets” operate. Running into debt was promised to be the way to get rich. But the price to Iceland was for housing prices to plunge 70% (in a country where mortgage debtors are personally liable for their negative equity), a falling GDP, rising unemployment, defaults and foreclosures.

To put Saturday’s vote in perspective, it is helpful to see what has occurred in the past year along remarkably similar lines throughout Europe. For starters, the year has seen a new acronym: PIIGS, for Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain.

The eruption started in Greece. One legacy of the colonels’ regime was tax evasion by the rich. This led to budget deficits, and Wall Street banks helped the government conceal its public debt in “free enterprise” junk accounting. German and French creditors then made a fortune jacking up the interest rate that Greece had to pay for its increasing credit risk.

Greece was told to make up the tax shortfall by taxing labor and charging more for public services. This increases the cost of living and doing business, making the economy less competitive. That is the textbook neoliberal response: to turn the economy into a giant set of tollbooths. The idea is to slash government employment, lowering public-sector salaries to lead private-sector wages downward, while sharply cutting back social services and raising the cost of living with tollbooth charges on highways and other basic infrastructure.

The Baltic Tigers had led the way, and should have stood as a warning to the rest of Europe. Latvia set a record in 2008-09 by obeying EU Economics and Currency Commissioner Joaquin Almunia’s dictate and slashing its GDP by over 25% and public-sector wages by 30%. Latvia will not recover even its 2007 pre-crisis GDP peak until 2016 – an entire lost decade spent in financial penance for believing neoliberal promises that its real estate bubble was a success story.

In autumn 2009, Socialist premier George Papandreou promised an EU summit that Greece would not default on its €298bn debt, but warned: “We did not come to power to tear down the social state. Salaried workers will not pay for this situation: we will not proceed with wage freezes or cuts.” [1] But that seems to be what socialist and social democratic parties are for these days: to tighten the screws to a degree that conservative parties cannot get away with. Wage deflation is to go hand in hand with debt deflation and tax increases to shrink the economy.

The EU and IMF program inspired the modern version of Latin America’s “IMF riots” familiar from the 1970s and ‘80s. Mr. Almunia, the butcher of Latvia’s economy, demanded reforms in the form of cutbacks in health care, pensions and public employment, coupled with a proliferation of taxes, fees and tolls from roads to other basic infrastructure.

The word “reform” has been turned into a euphemism for downsizing the public sector and privatization sell-offs to creditors at giveaway prices. In Greece this policy inspired an “I won’t pay” civil disobedience revolt that grew quickly into “a nationwide anti-austerity movement. The movement’s supporters refuse to pay highway tolls. In Athens they ride buses and the metro without tickets to protest against an ’unfair’ 40 per cent increase in fares.” [2] The police evidently are sympathetic enough to refrain from fining most protesters.

All this is changing traditional political alignments not only in Greece but throughout Europe. The guiding mentality of Tony Blair-style “New Labour” policy is economic loyalty to Europe’s financial centers as government spending is slashed, public infrastructure privatized and banks bailed out with “taxpayer” burdens that fall mainly on labor. “Both the conservative and communist leaders have refused to support the EU-IMF programme. ‘This programme is strangling the Greek economy … it needs renegotiation and radical change,’ said Antonis Samaras, the conservative leader.” (Ibid.)

A Le Monde article accused the EU-IMF plan of riding “roughshod over the most elementary rules of democracy. If this plan is implemented, it will result in a collapse of the economy and of peoples’ incomes without precedent in Europe since the 1930s. Equally glaring is the collusion of markets, central banks and governments to make the people pay the bill for the arbitrary caprice of the system.” [3]

Ireland is the hardest hit Eurozone economy. Its long-term ruling Fianna Fail party agreed to take bank losses onto the public balance sheet, imposing what looks like decades of austerity – and the largest forced emigration since the Potato Famine of the mid-19th century. Voters responded by throwing the party out of office (it lost two-thirds of its seats in Parliament) when the opposition Fine Gael party promised to renegotiate last November’s $115-billion EU-IMF bailout loan and its accompanying austerity program.

A Financial Times editorial referred to the “rescue” package (a euphemism for financial destruction) as turning the nation into “Europe’s indentured slave.” [4] EU bureaucrats “want Irish taxpayers to throw more money into holes dug by private banks. As part of the rescue, Dublin must run down a pension fund built up when Berlin and Paris were violating the Maastricht rules. … so long as senior bondholders are seen as sacrosanct, fire sales of assets carry a risk of even greater losses to be billed to taxpayers.” EU offers to renegotiate the deal promise only token concessions that fail to rescue Ireland from making labor and industry pay for the nation’s reckless bank loans. Ireland’s choice is thus between rejection of or submission to EU demands that its government “make bankers whole” at the expense of labor and industry. It is reminiscent of when the economist William Nassau Senior (who took over Thomas Malthus’s position at the East India College) was told that a million people had died in Ireland’s potato famine. He remarked succinctly: “It is not enough.” So neoliberal junk economics has a long pedigree.

The result has radically reshaped the idea of national sovereignty and even the basic assumption underlying all political theory: the premise that governments act in the national interest. As Yves Smith’s Naked Capitalism website has pointed out:

The eurozone is up against Dani Rodrik’s trilemma: Democratic politics and the Nation State vs globalism based on the Bretton Woods system. You cannot have all three corners of the triangle at once. The creators of the European Union knew that the end game was the dissolution of nation states. …

But what they failed to anticipate is that the costs of these crises would be visited on the inhabitants of particular nation states, and that would lead them to rebel against the “inevitable” integration. As long as democratic mechanisms are intact in enough of the countries being pressed to wear the austerity hairshirt, revolt is indeed possible. Economists argue that the cost for any nation to exit the eurozone is prohibitive. But how does that stack up with a “rescue” program that virtually guarantees continued economic contraction and depopulation for Ireland? Faced with two unattractive alternatives, the desire for self-determination and for punishment of coercive European technocrats may make supposedly irrational moves seem compelling. [5]

The shape of Europe that is emerging is not the original view of mobilizing technology to raise living standards. The leaders who originally sponsored the EU viewed nation states as having plunged the continent into a millennium of warfare. But today, finance is the new mode of warfare. Its objective is the same as military conquest: to seize the land and basic infrastructure, and to levy tribute – euphemized as bailout repayments, as if the financial system were necessary to fuel industry and labor rather than siphoning off their surplus.

The Irish government’s €10 billion interest payments are projected to absorb 80% of the government’s 2010 income tax revenue. This is beyond the ability of any national government or economy to survive. It means that all growth must be paid as tribute to the EU for having bailed out reckless bankers in Germany and other countries that failed to realize the seemingly obvious fact that debts that can’t be paid won’t be. The problem is that during the interim it takes to realize this, economies will be destroyed, assets stripped, capital depleted and much labor obliged to emigrate. Latvia is the poster child for this, with a third of its population between 20 and 40 years old already having emigrated or reported to be planning to leave the country within the next few years.

The EU’s nightmare is that voters may wake up in the same way that Argentina finally did when it announced that the neoliberal advice it had taken from U.S. and IMF advisors had destroyed the economy so much that it could not pay. As matters turned out, it had little trouble in imposing a 70% write-down on foreign creditors. Its economy is now booming – because it became credit-worthy again, once it freed itself from its financial albatross!

Much the same occurred in Latin America and other Third World countries after Mexico announced that it could not pay its foreign debts in 1982. A wave of defaults spread – inspiring negotiated debt write-downs in the form of Brady Bonds. U.S. and other creditors calculated what debtors realistically could pay, and replaced the old irresponsible bank loans with new bonds. The United States and IMF members applauded the write-downs as a success story.

But Ireland, Greece and Iceland are now being told horror stories about what might happen if governments do not commit financial suicide. The fear is that debtors may revolt, leading the Eurozone to break up over demands that financialized economies turn over their entire surplus to creditors for as many years as the eye of forecasters can see, acquiescing to bank demands that they subject themselves to a generation of austerity, shrinkage and emigration.

That is the issue in Iceland’s election this Saturday. It is the issue now facing European voters as a whole: Are today’s economies to be run for the banks, bailing them out of unpayably high reckless loans at public expense? Or, will the financial system be reined in to serve the economy and raise wage levels instead of imposing austerity.

It seems ironic that the Socialist parties (Spain and Greece), the British Labour Party and various Social Democratic parties have moved to the pro-banker right wing of the political spectrum, committed to imposing anti-labor austerity not only in Europe, but also in New Zealand (the 1990s poster child for Thatcherite privatization) and even Australia. Their policy of downsizing public social services and embrace of privatization is the opposite of their position a century ago. How did they become so decoupled from their original labor constituencies? It seems as if their function is to impose whatever right-wing agenda the Conservative parties cannot get away with – not unlike Obama neutering possible Democratic Party alternatives to Republican lobbying for more Rubinomics.

Is it simply gullibility? That may have been the case in Russia, whose leaders seemed to have little idea of how to fend off destructive advice from the Harvard Boys and Jeffrey Sachs. But something more deliberate plagues Britain’s own Labour Party in out-Thatchering the Conservatives in privatizing the railroads and other key economic infrastructure with their Public-Private Partnership. It is the attitude that led Gordon Brown to threaten to blackball Icelandic membership in the EU if its voters oppose bailing out the failure of Britain’s own neoliberal bank insurance agency to prevent banksters from emptying out Icesave.

What seems remarkable is that Icelandic voters may take seriously their prime minister’s threat that a “No” vote on the Icesave bailout would lead the UK and Holland to blackball Icelandic entry. The new Conservative Prime Minister has little love for Mr. Brown, and realizes that his own voters are not eager to support membership of a country that is willing to sacrifice the domestic economy to pay bankers for what looks like shady loans. And what of the rest of Europe? Is buckling under to unfair bank demands really the way to make friends with the indebted PIIGS countries? Do these countries want to admit another neoliberal advocate favoring banks over their domestic economies? Or would Iceland make more friends by voting “No”?

Last weekend half a million British citizens marched in London to protest the threatened cutbacks in social services, education and transportation, and tax increases to pay for Gordon Brown’s bailout of Northern Rock and the Royal Bank of Scotland. The burden is to fall on labor and industry, not Britain’s financial class. The Daily Express, a traditionally campaigning national paper, is now running a full throttle campaign for Britain to leave the EU, on much the same ground that Britain has long rejected joining the euro.

What is the rationale of Iceland and other debtor countries paying, especially at this time? The proposed agreements would give Britain and Holland more than EU directives would. Iceland has a strong legal case. Social Democratic warnings about the EU seem so overblown that one wonders whether the Althing members are simply hoping to avoid an investigation as to what actually happened to Landsbanki’s Icesave deposits. Britain’s Serous Fraud Office recently became more serious in investigating what happened to the money, and has begun to arrest former directors. So this is a strange time indeed for Iceland’s government to agree to take bad bank debts onto its own balance sheet.

The EU has given Iceland bad advice: “Pay the Icesave debts, guarantee the bad bank loans, it really won’t cost too much. It will be fairly easy for your government to take it on.” One now can see that this is the same bad advice given to Ireland, Greece and other countries. “Fairly easy” is a euphemism for decades of economic shrinkage and emigration.

The problem is that the more Iceland’s economy shrinks, the more impossible it becomes to pay foreign debts. Iceland’s government is desperately begging to join Europe without asking just what the cost will be. It would plunge the krona’s exchange rate, shrink the economy, drive young workers to emigrate to find jobs and to avoid the bankruptcy foreclosures that would result from subjecting the nation to austerity.

Nobody really knows just how deep the hole is. Iceland’s government has not made a serious attempt to make a risk analysis. What is clear is that the EU and IMF have been irresponsibly optimistic. Each new statistical report is “surprising” and “unexpected.” On the basis of the IMF’s working assumption about the króna’s exchange rate at end-2009, for example, the IMF staff projected that gross external debt would be 160% of GDP. To be sure, they added that a further depreciation of the exchange rate of 30 percent would cause a precipitous rise in the debt ratio. This indeed has occurred. Back in November 2008, the IMF warned that the foreign debt it projected by yearend 2009 might reach 240% of GDP, a level it called “clearly unsustainable.” But today’s debt level has been estimated to stand at 260% of Icelandic GDP – even without including the government-sponsored Icesave debt and some other debt categories.

Creditors lose nothing by providing junk-economic advice. They have shown themselves quite willing to encourage economies to destroy themselves in the process of trying to pay – something like applauding nuclear power plant workers for walking into radiation to help put out a fire. For Ireland, the EU pressed the government to take responsibility for bank loans that turned out to be only about 30% (not a misprint!) of estimated market price. It said that this could “easily” be done. Ireland’s government agreed, at the cost of condemning the economy to two or more decades of poverty, emigration and bankruptcy.

What makes the problem worse is that foreign-currency debt is not paid out of GDP (whose transactions are in domestic currency), but out of net export earnings – plus whatever the government can be persuaded to sell off to private buyers. For Iceland, the question would become one of how many of its products and services – and natural resources and companies – Britain and the Netherlands would buy.

It is supposed to be the creditor’s responsibility to work with debtors and negotiate payment in exports. Instead of doing this, today’s creditors simply demand that governments sell off their land, mineral resources, basic infrastructure and natural monopolies to pay foreign creditors. These assets are forfeited in what is, in effect, a pre-bankruptcy proceeding. The new buyers then turn the economy into a set of tollbooths by raising access fees to transportation, phone service and other privatized sectors.

One would think that the normal response of a government in this kind of foreign debt negotiation would be to appoint a Group of Experts to lay out the economy’s position so as to evaluate the ability to pay foreign debts – and to structure the deal around the ability to pay. But there has been no risk assessment. The Althing has simply accepted the demands of the UK and Holland without any negotiation. It has not even protested the fact that Britain and Holland are still running up the interest clock on the charges they are demanding.

Why doesn’t Iceland’s population behave like that of Ireland or Greece, not to mention Argentina or the United States, and say to Europe’s financial negotiators: “Nice try! But we’re not falling for it. Your creditor game is over! No nation can be expected to keep committing financial suicide Ireland-style, imposing economic depression and forcing a large portion of the labor force to emigrate, simply to pay bank depositors for the crimes or negligence of bankers.”

The credit rating agencies have tried to reinforce the Althing’s attempt to panic the population into a “Yes” vote. On February 23, Moody’s threatened: “If the agreement is rejected, we would likely downgrade Iceland’s ratings to Ba1 or below.” If voters approve the agreement, however, “we would likely change the outlook on the government’s current Baa3 ratings to stable from negative,” in view of a likely “cut-off in the remaining US$1.1 billion committed by the other Nordic countries and probably also to delays in Iceland’s IMF program.”

Perhaps not many Icelanders realize that credit ratings agencies are, in effect, lobbyists for their clients, the financial sector. One would think that they had utterly lost their reputation for honesty – not to mention competence – by pasting AAA ratings on junk mortgages as prime enablers of the present global financial crash. The explanation is, they did it all for money. They are no more honest than was Arthur Andersen in approving Enron’s junk accounting.

My own view of ratings agencies is based in no small part on the story that Dennis Kucinich told me about the time when he was mayor of Cleveland, Ohio. The banks and some of their leading clients had set their eyes on privatizing the city’s publicly owned electric company. The privatizers wanted buy it on credit (with the tax-deductible interest charges depriving the government of collecting income tax on their takings), and sharply raise prices to pay for exorbitant executive salaries, outrageous underwriting fees to the banks, stock options for the big raiders, heavy interest charges to the banks and a nice free lunch to the ratings agencies. The banks asked Mayor Kucinich to sell them the bank, promising to help him be governor if he would sell out his constituency.

Mr. Kucinich said “No.” So the banks brought in their bullyboys, the ratings agencies. They threatened to downgrade Cleveland’s rating, so that it could not roll over the loan balances that it ran as a normal course with the banks. “Let us take your power company or we will wreck your city’s finances,” they said in effect.

Mr. Kucinich again said no. The banks carried out their threat – but the mayor had saved the city from having its incomes squeezed by predatory privatization charges. In due course its voters sent Mr. Kucinich to Congress, where he subsequently became an important presidential candidate.

So returning to the problem of the credit rating agencies, how can anyone believe that agreeing to pay an unpayably high debt would improve Iceland’s credit rating? Investors have learned to depend on their own common sense since losing hundreds of billions of dollars on the ratings agencies’ reckless ratings. The agencies managed to avoid criminal prosecution by noting that the small print of their contracts said that they were only providing an “opinion,” not a realistic analysis for which they could be expected to take any honest professional responsibility!

Argentina’s experience should provide the model for how writing off a significant portion of foreign debt makes the economy more creditworthy, not less. And as far as possible lawsuits are concerned, it is a central assumption of international law that no sovereign country should be forced to commit economic suicide by imposing financial austerity to the point of forcing emigration and demographic shrinkage. Nations are sovereign entities.

It thus would be legally as well as morally wrong for Iceland’s citizens to spend the rest of their lives paying off debts owed for money that should rather be an issue between Britain’s Serious Fraud Office and the British bank insurance agencies.

Overarching the vote is how high a price Iceland is willing to pay to join the EU. In fact, as the Eurozone faces a crisis from the PIIGS debtors, what kind of EU is going to emerge from today’s conflict between creditors and debtors? Fears have been growing that the euro-zone may break up in any case. So Iceland’s Social Democratic government may be trying to join an illusion – one that now seems to be breaking up, at least as far as its neoliberal extremism is concerned. Just yesterday (Thursday, April 7) a Financial Times editorial commented on what it deemed to be Portugal’s premature cave-in to EU demands:

Another eurozone country has been humbled by its banks. Earlier this week, Portugal’s banks were threatening a bond-buyers’ go-slow unless the caretaker government sought financial help from other European Union countries. … Lisbon should have stuck to its position. … it should still resist doing what the banks demanded: seeking an immediate bridging loan. … By jumping the gun, the government risks having scared markets away entirely. That may prejudice the outcome of negotiations about the longer-term facility.

The caretaker government has neither the moral nor the political authority to determine Portugal’s future in this way. It should not precipitately abandon the markets. That may mean paying high yields on debt issues in coming months – higher than they might have been had the government not folded its hand too soon. … The right time to opt for an external rescue would have been at the end of a national debate.” [6]

The same should be true for Iceland. Looking over the past year, it seems that the island nation has been used as a target for a psychological and political experiment – a cruel one – to see how much a population will be willing to pay that it does not really owe for what bank insiders have stolen or lent to themselves.

This is not only an Icelandic problem. It remains a problem in Ireland, and in the United States for that matter, as well as in Britain itself.

The moral is that creditor foreclosure – or voluntary forfeiture to pay international bankers – has become today’s preferred mode of economic warfare. It is cheaper than military conquest, but its aim is similar: to gain control of foreign property and levy tribute – in a way that the tribute-payers accept voluntarily. Land is appropriated and foreclosed on – or, what turns out to be the same thing, its rental income is pledged to foreign bank branches extending mortgage credit that absorbs the net rent. The result is economic austerity and chronic depression, ending the upsweep in living standards promised a generation ago.

Iceland’s government seems to have become decoupled from what is good for voters and for the very survival of Iceland’s economy. It thus challenges the assumption that underlies all social science and economics: that nations will act in their own self-interest. This is the assumption that underlies democracy: that voters will realize their self-interest and elect representatives to apply such policies. For the political scientist this is an anomaly. How does one explain why a national parliament is acting on behalf of Britain and the Dutch as creditors, rather than in the interest of their own country? Voters in other countries have removed their governments for agreeing to pay such questionable debts.

[1] Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, “Greece defies Europe as EMU crisis turns deadly serious,” The Telegraph (UK), December 18, 2009.

[2] Kerin Hope, “Greeks adopt ‘won’t pay’ attitude,” Financial Times, March 10, 2011.

[3] Olivier Besancenot and Pierre-François Grond, “The Greek People are the Victims of an Extortion Racket,”
Le Monde, May 14, 2010.

[4] Ireland’s winter of discontent,” Financial Times editorial, March 1, 2011.

[5] Yves Smith, “Will Ireland Threaten to Default?” Naked Capitalism, March 15, 2011

[6] “Banks 1, Portugal 0,” Financial Times editorial, April 7, 2011.

4 Trust Funds, 3 Problems: Why is the Other one so “Healthy”?

By Stephanie Kelton

Every year, the Trustees of Social Security and Medicare issue an annual report that examines the financial status of the various “trust funds” that purportedly sustain these vital programs. Social Security’s (OASI) and (DI) Trust Funds, as well as Medicare’s (HI) Trust Fund all face chronic problems, some in the not-too-distant future.  In contrast, Medicare’s (SMI) Trust Fund always receives a clean bill of health. Why is that?

The answer is so simple it apparently escapes notice, but here it is, straight from the annual report:

The Hospital Insurance (HI) Trust Fund is expected to remain solvent until 2029. The Disability Insurance (DI) fund is projected to become exhausted in 2018. And the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) Trust Fund is considered adequately financed until 2040.  In contrast:

Part B of Supplemental Medical Insurance (SMI), which pays for doctors’ bills and other outpatient expenses, and Part D, which pays for access to prescription drug coverage, are both projected to remain adequately financed into the indefinite future because current law automatically provides financing each year to meet the next year’s expected costs.

In other words, it is sustainable — INDEFINITELY — because the government is committed to making the payments. Indefinitely.

And, as we have argued many times on this site (and elsewhere), the same commitment can easily be made to sustain Social Security (OASI and DI) and Medicare (HI) in their current form.  There is no economic justification for cuts to either program.  The decision is entirely political.

The American people must realize this before it is too late.

Modern Budget Cutting Hooverians Want a Return to the 1930s

By L. Randall Wray

In a Wall Street Journal article this week three Hoover Institute economists (Gary Becker, George Schultz and John Taylor) endorsed Republican efforts to make large federal government budget cuts.  I will not address all the arguments made in defense of a “Hooverian” approach to economics (we tried that in the early 1930s!). Here I want to focus on the two main points made:

  1. “When private investment is high, unemployment is low. In 2006, investment—business fixed investment plus residential investment—as a share of GDP was high, at 17%, and unemployment was low, at 5%. By 2010 private investment as a share of GDP was down to 12%, and unemployment was up to more than 9%. In the year 2000, investment as a share of GDP was 17% while unemployment averaged around 4%. This is a regular pattern.”
  2. “In contrast, higher government spending is not associated with lower unemployment. For example, when government purchases of goods and services came down as a share of GDP in the 1990s, unemployment didn’t rise. In fact it fell, and the higher level of government purchases as a share of GDP since 2000 has clearly not been associated with lower unemployment.”

The authors supply a graph showing investment and government spending as a share of GDP to demonstrate these two points. Based on that data, these economists argue that the solution is to cut federal spending and then to hold its growth rate below that of GDP. This will allow the share of government spending to fall—while economic growth will let tax revenues rise a bit faster so that the budget will move toward balance.

By framing their argument in terms of ratios to GDP, the authors provide a misleading characterization of cause and effect. It is true that high investment spending tends to increase GDP while lowering unemployment—that is the Keynesian “multiplier” at work. High growth of GDP, in turn, lowers the ratio of government spending to GDP so that we will observe a correlation between falling unemployment and a falling government share of GDP—but that is a correlation of no causal significance. When an investment boom collapses—as it did in 2006-2007—GDP growth then falls and the government share of a smaller GDP will rise. Our Hooverians interpret that as “proof” that a rising government share does not help to fight unemployment.

In fact, however, relatively stable government spending over a cycle helps to cushion a private sector “bust”. While it is hard to prove the counterfactual—how bad would things have been without sustained government spending—it is hard to believe their argument that a loss of 8% of GDP due to reduction of private spending would not have led to a much deeper recession (or depression) without the stabilizing force of our government spending.

Let us take a look at the components of GDP over the past two decades. Recall from your Econ 101 course that the aggregate measure of a nation’s output of goods and services (GDP) is equal to the sum of consumption, private investment, government purchases, and net exports (for the US that is of course negative). We can further divide investment into residential (housing) and nonresidential (investment by firms). Finally, we can divide government spending between federal government and state and local government. The following chart graphs the domestic components of GDP (net imports are left out), indexing each component to 100 in 1990. (This makes the scale easier to show in the graph, and simplifies comparison of growth by component. For example, if consumption spending doubles between 1990 and 2000, its index increases from 100 to 200.)

What we see in this graph is that the slowest growing component over the two decades was federal government spending—it actually did not grow much until the term of President George W. Bush. (A substantial portion of federal government growth since 2000 can be attributed to our multiple wars, as well as to domestic spending on security.) By 2010, federal government spending was just over 2.3 times bigger (in nominal terms) than its spending in 1990. Private consumption as well as state and local government spending grew steadily, increasing by about 267% before the deep recession led to some retrenchment. By contrast, residential investment boomed in the real estate bubble, growing by 350% until 2005. It then collapsed so that it stood at an index of just 150 in 2010 (fifty percent higher than in 1990). Nonresidential investment shows a clear cyclical nature, and it too collapsed in the aftermath of the global financial collapse. Viewed in this light, it is not at all surprising that when total investment (residential plus nonresidential) is growing rapidly, unemployment tends to fall; but when investment spending collapses we lose jobs at a stupendous pace.

This has long been the concern of Keynesian economists: investment by its very nature is highly cyclical, subject to what J.M. Keynes called “whirlwinds of optimism and pessimism”. That is not all bad. J. Schumpeter referred to the “creative destruction” that makes capitalism dynamic—waves of innovation generate new investment, wiping out firms that get left behind. But if an entire economy is whipped about by unstable investment, we oscillate between the extremes of boom and bust. That is why we need some spending that is more stable—better yet, we need a source of spending that can act in a countercyclical manner to offset the swings of investment.

And that is precisely what we created in the aftermath of the Great Depression. First, we grew the federal government—from about 3% of GDP in 1929 to above 20% after WWII. As the chart above shows, federal government spending is not subject to the wild swings that afflict investment, so it helps to stabilize GDP and jobs. Second, we put in place a variety of federal government programs that help to stabilize household consumption (unemployment benefits, Social Security retirement, and “welfare” for households, firms, and farms). That is, again, reflected in the chart above—even when the financial sector crashed and unemployment exploded, consumption dipped only slightly, thanks in large part to government “transfer” payments like unemployment benefits.

Our modern Hooverians would like to return to the “good old days” of President Hoover, when the government was smaller and both unwilling and unable to offset the swings of private investment spending. Back then, when investment collapsed unemployment did not go to 9 or 10 percent, it went all the way to 25 percent. Hooverian economics would turn back the clock to ring in another Great Depression with the same old pre-Keynesian ideas that failed us in the 1930s.