Category Archives: MMT

Why MMT is Like an Autostereogram

By Isabella Kaminska
(Cross-posted from FT Alphaville)

We’ve discussed MMT’s recent foray into the mainstream, and the confusion it has consequently courted.

But that’s the funny thing about the theory. It is naturally divisive because most of the time it fails to communicate its message succinctly. Which is weird, since the premise is actually fairly simple to understand. We’d say it’s akin to looking at an autostereogram. Once you get it, you never see things quite the same way again. But at the same time, try as they might, some people will never be able to see the image. Ever.

And it all rests on one key fact (at least as far as we can tell!) . Rather than treating money as an object of wealth or somebody else’s debt, a means to trade … MMT treats money as a claim on wealth, a product of trade.

This one view makes all the difference. Unlike the first viewpoint, which assumes that debt and money came out of trade, MMT believes debt, or more specifically monetary credit, pre-dates trade. Coinage and all forms of monetary token are thus just a physical representation of what is actually an innate credit system. In and of itself, money — the token — has no value. And this is largely why a fiat monetary system can work. The monetary unit doesn’t need to be a ‘valuable’ piece of metal. It’s who guarantees the token that matters. In modern times, that means the state.

What’s more, suppress the credit system (which in the case of the United States is represented by the government’s debt) and inevitably you suppress an economy’s ability to trade. And this, by the way, is why MMTers believe government debt can never really constrain an economy whose government controls the official currency. Furthermore, this is also why in a time of crisis they believe you need moregovernment guarantees, not less — hence their support of higher debt limits.

If one chart sums up the theory best we think it’s this one from Stephanie Kelton:

What the chart demonstrates beautifully is the symmetry that applies to the balances of a centrally controlled credit system.

That’s to say, for the US domestic private sector to carry a positive balance, the government must in effect carry a negative balance.

This makes a lot of sense if you think of the United States as representing a completely self-contained credit system, where only one official government controlled currency is allowed (and no foreigners can buy US debt). If the economy is to be kept well lubricated and functioning, the government must be willing to take on more debt on behalf of its citizens when the situation calls for it. Think of it as the private sector positve balances (or savings) representing claims on goods and services which haven’t as yet been redeemed. If not for the government’s negative balance, these claims would be represented by billions of private negative balances instead — representations of debts/credits between individuals. Money earned, and taxed, but not yet redeemed. Everything from your right to redeem a dozen baked rolls from your baker one day in the future, to your right to claim 10 days worth of medical services from your local doctor.

Allowing the government to take on those debts/credits (and really we’re talking more about credits) in place of your counterparties allows for claim standardisation. This not only ensures claims can be redeemed more quickly, having a greater wealth effect on the economy, they can also penetrate the system more completely. Furthermore, they are given a state guarantee in place of a private guarantee.

No more is there a risk that the doctor’s services you earned (by fixing the boiler at the medical centre) are lost because the doctor in question has passed away. You will still be able to redeem the services due to the intermediary role played by the government. Your claim is now against the government, not the doctor. You can thus redeem it with anyone who feels inclined to settle transactions with government paper instead of private paper. And why wouldn’t they? Everyone, after all, has a use for official government currency since it’s the only payment unit which will be accepted for the settlement of tax bills — a.k.a the government’s redemption of the claims it has against you.

In a way, the government, via its debt issuance and willingness to take on negative balances, acts as the ultimate central counterparty, clearer and intermediary to the trillions of transactions and trades that take place in its economy every day. The system’s claims against counterparties (of lesser credit quality than the government) are transformed via the financial framework into claims against the state. This is achieved either by convincing those with positive claim balances into signing them over to the state (via debt auctions) or by having the government “spend” on services directly, creating entirely new claims in the process that then circulate through the system.

Taxes, meanwhile, reflect the government’s own ability to redeem the claims it holds against you, generated in the first place by spending on your behalf.

The budget surplus issue

Of course, if the government runs a budget surplus, and receives more tax receipts than it spends — things can get tricky. Some believe surpluses are actually the equivalent of eating away at the stock of wealth in the system. That’s to say, worse than mere monetary tightening.

That’s largely because there are limits to what the government can do with the surpluses. For example, it can use them to pay down existing government debt (by buying back securities), or to borrow less in the new budget year. Alternatively it can offer more tax cuts, or deploy the surpluses into foreign or private investment securities (a la China).

This, though, is dangerous territory for an economy which is already suffering from ashortage of safe assets already (safe stores of value). That is to say, an economy which has generated more claims than it is currently prepared to redeem.

John Carney at CNBC’s Net Net, for example, has explained the problem as follows :

More importantly, even when it isn’t wasted on stupid government projects, the surplus itself is a waste. If it bothers you that the government spends tax money on bridges to nowhere, you should apoplectic when the government takes tax money and spends it on nothing at all. That, of course, is exactly what happens when our federal government taxes more than it spends. The financial assets of the people are simply confiscated.

But more to the point, if the government runs a surplus, it stands to reason that the private sector has to take on a negative balance in exchange, (see Kelton’s chart once again).

Though, if non-domestic claims against the government enter the frame things get even more complicated still. The debt which was originally intended to help mediate the credit transactions of its own citizens is sucked out of the system entirely, forcing the private sector to mediate transactions with non-government securities (and thus more risky guarantees) instead.

The more demand there is for US government securities from abroad, especially in an environment where the government is not willing to generate additional debt, the more the private sector’s negative balance is forced to rise to compensate.

This, by the way, is a situation we are now arguably seeing in Australia.

The MMT response, of course, would be simple. Issue more government debt and let the government take the negative balance, not the private sector.

That’s not to say, however, that there is never a constraint to debt.

It is possible that the state ends up guaranteeing many more claims than are actually possible to redeem — like with our doctor’s example above, because the counterparties who issued the credits are no longer around to make good on them. In that sense a fair share of the claims circulating through the system routinely represent a surplus. As that share rises, the purchasing power of active claims is reduced, since there are more claims than available redemption options. This will naturally be inflationary, and calls for the government to limit the amount of credit stock in the system, which can be achieved by taxation.

So the question is, which situation are we in now? One where there are more claims than redemption options (capacity to satisfy claims) — thus the rush for safe stores of value, of which there are not enough to guarantee everyone’s claims — or one where there is enough capacity to match claims, but not enough government credit to lubricate the system?

Hard to say, really (presuming you buy the MMT view in the first place).

MMT Had a Banner Day

By Mitch Green

Via Animals Explain Economics

MMT received some love from the mainstream press today.  WashPo ran a story titled, “You know the deficit hawks.  Now meet the deficit owls.” via Ezra Klein’s Wonkblog.  Jared Bernstein, Dean Baker and Kevin Drum have each responded with a few words regarding their take on MMT.  For the initiated, this comes as a welcome surprise:  First they ignore you, then they ridicule you, then they run a story about you in the Washington Post.

Every now and again the planets align, and we are presented with an opportunity to do what just moments earlier seemed out of grasp.  There is now space for MMT to influence policy debates beyond the fringes of the blogosphere.  The time is ripe to clarify and strengthen MMT, especially given that as it spreads through new channels we are bound to encounter misinterpretations of our central positions.

It is also important to bear in mind that as MMT spreads beyond the confines of its corner of the blogosphere, we are likely to encounter hostile or opposing views.  Remember to be patient:  you’ve studied this stuff for awhile now; stay classy and offer resources where appropriate.  It’s easy to lose our sense of civility when we forget that at the end of a long chain of cables, routers and wireless cards are two human beings trying to have a conversation.

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Via WaPo

Mine’s Bigger than Yours: Notes on Optimal Size of Govt.

By L. Randall Wray

For most of my career—going on 30 years–I’ve been accused of advocating Big Government. That is mostly because I adopted Hyman Minsky’s views—which I won’t go through here. Of course, those claims came from the right. I’ve always been proud of it, to some extent, even if I’ve always been critical of what my government actually does with its spending. And if I don’t piss-off at least one person every day, I’ve failed.

For the past 20 years as we developed the MMT approach and the JG/ELR proposal, we’ve faced all manner of ridiculous accusations: we advocate slavery (offering a job to someone who wants to work is no different from chaining him and whipping him and forcing him to pick cotton in the hot sun from sunrise to sunset) or communism (proposing full employment as a policy goal is the same thing as forcing everyone to share their undergarments) or fascism (noting that taxes-drive-money is equated to herding Jews into gas chambers).

Of course, those claims came mostly from the left—indeed, all three were proclaimed in the same sentence by a prominent Post Keynesian, and repeated at every opportunity by him and all his followers.

And now there is a whole website devoted to an “alternative” modern money view (called MMR—which I’ve not been able to decipher; it either stands for Measles, Mumps, and Rubella, or Monetarily Mentally Retarded—neither is very PC as an identity, I must say) insisting that the MMT approach embraces Nazi authoritarianism, since as we all know, no democratic government would ever impose taxes, much less use them to drive money (nay, according to MMR everyone would sit around leaderless campfires and barter with seashells whilst singing Kumbaya).

Oh and then there is the guilt by association: some financial markets people as well as Austrians agree with some of MMT, thus, MMT has to be an evil plan developed by Goldman Sachs to take over the world. This is the view of both right and left critics.

And now we find ourselves accused of advocating Small Government. The ultimate insult!
In a bizarre twist, the critics have been able to combine the guilt-by-association (some MMTers actually are willing to discuss Austrians views! Oh my, what has the world come to?), ad hominem attacks (a hedge fund manager must be against government!), and faulty logic (explaining how a JG is an automatic stabilizer must mean you are against discretionary fiscal stimulus!) to come up with yet another attack—and, again by Progressives (obviously—since Austerians want smaller government, so presumably they welcome us to the Small Government fold!).

I don’t think either our Austerian friends or our Progressives have the foggiest notion how big the federal government now is, what it spends on, and how much greater spending would need to be to fund all the programs Progressives want (and that Austrians fear).

I don’t know if this is going to make me more of a Big Government type or enhance my newly found Small Government reputation. But let’s see what the Federal government actually spends, using 2010 data (latest more-or-less actual data from the 2012 Economic Report of the President). The total is $3.5 Trillion, which is 24% of GDP that reached $14.66 Trillion.

Note that this is unusually high compared to trends due to the “big spending Democrats in the White House”.
No, actually it is big because GDP was depressed by the deep recession while government spending rose mostly automatically to deal with unemployment, poverty, and medical problems brought on by the crash.
But let’s take 24% of GDP as a rough approximation of the size of our “Big Government”. Note I am not including state and local governments—these are users, not issuers of the currency. Their spending is “paid for” by taxes, fees, fines, and some funding from Washington. I can see arguments either way for including them in our measure of the size of “Big Government” but I think that from the MMT perspective it makes more sense to leave them to the side.

I have added in parentheses the percent of GDP for the biggest items: defense (5%), Education and so on (1%), Health (2.5%), Medicare (3%), Income Security (4%), and Social Security (5%). Nothing else really matters much individually. Note there are well-known problems with the defense number—the reported figure significantly understates actual spending because a lot of “defense” activities are secret; some of the spending is hidden in other categories. Some is probably not reported anywhere.

2010 FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OUTLAYS BY FUNCTION ($Millions)
Total: On-budget and off-budget …………………………………. 3,456,213    (24%)
National defense …………………………………………………………….. 693,586     (5%)
International affairs ……………………………………………………….. …45,195
General science, space and technology ………………………… ….31,047
Energy ………………………………………………………………………. ……..11,613
Natural resources and environment ……………………………… ….43,662
Agriculture ………………………………………………………………… …….21,356
Commerce and housing credit ……………………………………  ….–82,298
Transportation ………………………………………………………………… 91,972
Community and regional development …………………………. …23,804
Education, training, employment, and social services ……..127,710      (1%)
Health ………………………………………………………………………. ……369,054      (2.5%)
Medicare ………………………………………………………………….. ……451,636      (3%)
Income security ……………………………………………………………….622,210      (4%)
Social security …………………………………………………………… …..706,737      (5%)
Veterans benefits and services …………………………………….. .108,384
Administration of justice …………………………………………….. ….53,436
General government …………………………………………………… ……23,031
Net interest ………………………………………………………………….. ..196,194
Undistributed offsetting receipts ……………………………………–82,116
OK for our conservative and Austrian Austerians, a government that is almost 25% of our economy is far too big. For our progressive friends it is far too small. Let’s focus on the big things.
At least a fifth of all government spending goes to “defense”—and the actual figure is probably double that (say, 10% of GDP). Judging from libertarian support for Ron Paul and from the traditional progressive opposition to US imperialism abroad, I suspect we can agree that “defense” spending is far too big. Personally, I have opposed all US invasions of other nations with the exception of our participation in WWII. I’d bring all troops home, close all foreign bases, and prohibit further military adventures abroad; as our Republican friends say, “starve the beast” by cutting all military spending down to what is necessary to maintain a purely defensive force within our borders. The only foreign intervention I would support would be to air drop food and medical supplies wherever they are needed.
I know I won’t get my way. I would not call this a Big Government or Small Government preference—it is anti-war. But let us presume we scale back “defense” spending to a scale that makes it hard to mount sustained invasions abroad—to, say, 2% of GDP. (That should be sufficient to put a tank into the hands of every gun-loving and motherland-protecting patriot to ward-off attack.) We’ve thereby reduced the reported size of government by 3% of GDP (and perhaps actual size by 8% of GDP—but we will ignore that in calculations below). So, a 3% reduction of Big Government.
MMTers want a universal Job Guarantee program at a living wage. Various calculations have put that at about 1% of GDP, with net cost close to zero (due to savings on anti-poverty programs, unemployment compensation, and so on). Let’s say that is off by an order of a three hundred percent—true cost turns out to be 3% of GDP. That just replaces the reduction of defense spending, getting us back to 24% of GDP.
Now it is unreasonable to presume there is absolutely no reduction of “welfare” spending—in the form of “income security” that is 4% of GDP. We’ll offer a job to all who want to work, creating somewhere between 10 million and 30 million new jobs at a living wage (note that not all of the new jobs will be in the JG program—that depends on “multiplier” job creation in the private sector, but those jobs will also pay living wages or otherwise workers cannot be recruited out of the JG). Unemployment compensation, food stamps, and even some “tax expenditures” on the earned income tax credit will all decline.
Stephanie Kelton and I have replicated earlier work done by Hyman Minsky showing that a JG program will eliminate most poverty (defined as those below the official poverty line) just by providing one minimum wage job per household. At a higher wage, and by offering more than one job to households that want more work, the JG would raise most families well above the poverty line. Let us say that income security spending falls by a couple of percentage points (2% reduction). That offsets two-thirds of the JG program spending.
Note also there will be a bit of saving in the “education, training, employment, and social services” category that currently prepares workers for jobs that do not exist. But let’s keep the 1% devoted to that spending but instead prepare workers for jobs that will exist. So I won’t count any reduction here.
So we are down to 22% of GDP. Now let’s replace our failing US healthcare system with a universal and free, federally paid-for program that offers the range of services that are provided in the average rich nation. That will run about 7-8% of GDP. We already devote an amount equal to 5.5% of GDP to “health” and “Medicare”. Then there’s another 10% of GDP spent by consumers either out-of-pocket, through their state and local governments (“taxpayers”) and through private insurers. So we can cut total spending if we ramped up federal spending by a couple of percentage points. We’ll presume that extraordinary health spending (vanity nose jobs, anatomical augmentation, hair transplants from hairy backs to shiny scalps, etc) is taken care of by the private sector, while all the important stuff is covered by the federal government.
Let’s leave the savings to the nongovernment sector spending to the side and focus on the government’s portion: we go from 5.5% of GDP to, say, 8% of GDP for an increase of federal spending equal to 2.5% of GDP.
The remaining big category is Social Security—about three-quarters of which goes to retirees. That is the main income support for the majority of our seniors. Progressives believe benefits are too small—especially for retirees who had low earnings, and also for many who receive disabilities as well as for dependents and spouses of workers who die. Let’s ramp that up by 2% of GDP.
Note that with the JG program discussed above, that offers a living wage to all who want to work, seniors and their dependents will already have the option of earning more income from work. We should let them “double dip”—no reduction in work opportunity due to retirement onto Social Security benefits, nor in Social Security benefits should they choose to work. Living standards should be significantly higher with the boost to benefits plus the enhanced jobs prospects.
Our net impact on federal government spending so far: net increase of 2.5% of GDP. We’ve gone from a Big Government of 24% to 26.5%.
But we aren’t done yet. Let’s look to our progressive wish list for more. Public infrastructure is deficient—a point made by President Obama, and by our society of engineers that finds a deficit in our public infrastructure amounting to trillions of dollars. Yes we need bullet trains, cleaner water, better airports, bridges and hiways, and more dependable sewage treatment. And we need to join the developed world in getting our darned electrical wires safely underground so that power isn’t knocked out in every ice storm.
How much? Let’s look to the estimates provided by the progressive PERI report. They found that the rate of growth of public infrastructure spending fell by about half over the past decades; they project a needed “baseline” annual increase of $87 billion to make up for the shortfall, of which $54 billion would come from all levels of government.
Their “wish list” high end estimate would be for the public sector to spend even more, an additional $93 billion annually. However our state and local governments are broke—so let’s put the full burden on the federal government, and ramp up its spending by 1% of GDP (make it a nice round $150 billion per year). That is well above the PERI dreams—which will go beyond traditional projects and make a dent in our sustainability problems with insulation retrofitting and so on. (There is a nice synergy here as our JG workers will be doing these sorts of projects.)
So we add another percentage point to government spending.
Our Big Government is now 27.5% of GDP. We’ve got true full employment at a living wage. We’ve got universal and free healthcare. We’ve got a more generous retirement system, and better care for survivors and those with disabilities. We’ve got bullet trains and bridges that don’t fall into rivers. And we’re reducing our foreign entanglements.
All for 3.5% of GDP additional spending.
And we’ve avoided “dynamic budgeting”—we have not counted potential savings in terms of reduced incarceration for the young jobless males who turn to a life of crime. We haven’t counted health benefits; we didn’t reduce spending very significantly on income support that will face fewer demands. We didn’t count multiplier effects on private sector spending—that would reduce government spending in some areas. And so on.
All of us, progressives and Austrians alike, know we can “afford it” because a sovereign government cannot run out of its own currency. Three point five percent.
I do not know if that will comfort our Austerians, who think 24% is already far too big. Nor do I know if it will comfort our Progressives, who are now sure that MMTers have become advocates for Small Government.
To be sure, I can add some more items to the list above: more federal funding for education, federal support for sustainable agriculture (but less support for corporate farming—so that probably balances), more foreign aid, and good wine flowing from every water fountain in America.
All that might add one or two or three more percent—and get us to a 30% government. Will that horrify our Austrians, and still dissatisfy our Progressives?
Probably. Both.
What should government do?
I think reasonable people can disagree when it comes to what government ought to do. I think it is worth discussing. Lay it out on the table. Forget the silly arguments about deficits and hyperinflations and taxation by dictatorships and JG slavery and bankrupting our grandkids and associating with Austerians and Hedge Fundarians.
And about arbitrary government-to-GDP ratios. We don’t need to argue about whose is bigger. What matters is what you do with government.
What should government do? It’s a mostly political question. A 24% government (US) can do most of what most people seem to want government to do. And more than what others want. And so can a 50% government (France). The jury is still out on a 15% government (Mexico)—it would be hard to point to Mexico as either a case of a successful government doing what people want it to do, or as an Austrian Austerian utopian Small Government.
What do you want government to do? 

A Scribbler’s Response to Marc Lavoie on MMT

By Philip Pilkington
(Cross-posted from Naked Capitalism)

Recently the eminent monetary economist Marc Lavoie published a paper engaging with Modern Monetary Theory (MMT). The paper was interesting for a number of reasons, not least the discussion of the European banking system; speculation about which in the media has generated much mythology in the past few months.

Lavoie is largely supportive of MMT and sees it as being essentially correct. However, he also finds that it has much ‘excess baggage’ that he thinks it needs to do away with. At the same time Lavoie notes that MMT has succeeded in appealing to a broad non-academic audience (Naked Capitalism being mentioned by name) which post-Keynesian economics has so far failed to do.

Unfortunately, Lavoie does not consider that what he calls the ‘excess baggage’ of MMT may well be the reason for its embrace by non-academics. In this Lavoie may well be sidestepping the underlying ideological issues that must be taken into account when considering the embrace of a given economic doctrine.


Excess baggage

While I will not go into too much detail about the arguments that Lavoie raises in what follows (the interested or critical reader can weigh my assertions against Lavoie’s paper themselves if they wish), I can sum up Lavoie’s gripes with MMT quite easily: he distinguishes between where the MMTers see what ‘is’ and where they see what ‘ought to be’.

This distinction revolves around the consolidation of the government sector in MMT – which basically means that the MMTers claim that it is theoretically valid to see the Treasury and the Central Bank as a single entity which they refer to as ‘the government’.

Lavoie raises criticisms against this which have been raised oftentimes in the past before – not least by the MMTers themselves. Basically what he is saying is that many governments that operate under their own currencies create institutional arrangements that separate the actions of the Treasury and the Central Bank.

This may seem like a nuanced point to the outside observer, but much of the MMTers rhetoric about taxes not funding spending and about governments spending by crediting bank accounts flows from here. If we accept a strict division between the Treasury and the Central Bank we can no longer make certain rhetorical claims about how the monetary system works.

MMTers consider the institutional arrangements facilitating such divisions to be ‘voluntary restraints’ imposed by ill-informed central bankers and policymakers and in this, so far as I can tell, Lavoie does not disagree. But this is where we see a distinction between what ‘is’ and what ‘ought to be’.

In academic fashion Lavoie insists that we must simply describe existing institutional arrangements and we should not prescribe what we think should, in fact, be the case. And it is on this point, I think, that he is fundamentally in disagreement with the MMTers.

MMT as a political program

My central point is that it is such rhetoric that gives MMT its strength. Ideally, MMT would like to see these constraints – which are weak and fairly inconsequential anyway –be done away with as they are viewed as leftovers from the gold standard-era. With these constraints out of the way all the MMTers rhetoric would be perfectly true.

Every heterodox economist should recognise what gives neoliberalism its strength. It is not its perfect logical consistency or fidelity to the real world (far from!), but its prescriptive capacity. It has, since the mid-1970s, given policymakers the world over – from both the right and the so-called left – a prism through which they could view the world. MMT turns this prism upside-down and that is what makes it so appealing to people who have seen the world economy led into such destruction through misguided neoliberal ideology.

Neoliberalism operates in a very similar manner to MMT in that it essentially gives policymakers a vision for what the world should be like and a toolkit to achieve this. In this regard MMT is far more humble and, rather than chasing the spectre of self-equilibrating markets or some other such imaginary entity, it merely asks that we reform the monetary system so that a functional finance approach can be taken to policymaking.

In this, MMT sees a far more stable and prosperous world in which policymakers understand that, among other things, taxation should be used as a means to stabilise aggregate demand rather than to raise funds for government spending. Without changing the very terms of debate – as the MMTers seek to do – such would be impossible, as it is clear to anyone today that politics is largely dominated by soundbites and ideology.

In my experience MMTers are aware of this and in this they are far more politically savvy than their academic post-Keynesian colleagues. If the frame of reference is not changed there is simply no hope that we can ever change the direction taken by government.

Policymakers and opinion-makers (and many economists) are not rational people. When they hear the term ‘government spending’, for example, it triggers a reflex in their mind that activates the term ‘inflation’. This is never going to be changed through rational argument – as I said a moment ago: these are not strictly rational people. Instead it has to be changed by shifting the very terms of debate.

In the past politically savvy economists recognised this. Certainly Keynes spent as much, if not more of his life trying to shift the terms of debate than he did writing academic treatises. And Abba Lerner, I think, was clearly aware of this need – and this was one of the reasons for formulating his functional finance approach (note that when examined carefully, this approach is mainly about a change in nomenclature rather than a new theoretical approach).

Where does post-Keynesianism fit in?

Post-Keynesian economists must be praised with being easily the most rational in their discipline. They should also be credited with doing some of the most impressive work undertaken in many fields – from theories of capital to monetary economics. However, they have failed to reach an audience beyond their own immediate group. Indeed, they have failed to even have their critiques and constructions taken seriously by their own colleagues and, from the point of view of an outside observer, seem to spend a great deal of time squabbling amongst themselves (which is probably more so an effect of isolation than a cause).

Every one of them can formulate a reason why this has been the case. And I suspect many will think that politics and ideology plays more than a minor role. If they are smart they will see in MMT something that they can hang their flag on – and, possibly, have their theories taken seriously by the mainstream.

Already MMT oriented blogs have begun to pay attention to post-Keynesian theory more generally (I wrote a popularised exposition of the Kalecki profit equation for this site, for example) and things will likely continue in this direction given MMT’s ever-growing popularity.

Put simply: the shift from a broadly defined post-war Keynesianism to neoliberalism was long and complex, but it was undoubtedly a key feature that its main proponents (especially Milton Friedman) had a clearly defined ideological program for governments. This program – based as it was on tenuous assumptions and philosophical trickery – now lies in ruins and there stands nothing ready to take its place.

Something will have to step in to fill this intellectual vacuum and I suspect that, should the academic cloisters be left to themselves, I can confidently predict what this ‘something’ will be: namely, a new Samuelsonian Keynesianism that will be as weak and as watery as its post-war cousin (most likely with someone like Paul Krugman as its leading media light). If this occurs all the fine work of the post-Keynesians will again be confined to the dustbin of history and the ISLM model – which Lavoie rightly presents in the paper as the guiding principle for the majority of the profession – will remain king.

When Friedman stepped into the breach he was largely ignored by his colleagues. “Keynes,” they all assured themselves confidently, “had proved him wrong years ago”. But through a careful refining of his message – together with a formulation of a broad new program for society – he found himself well-placed to fill the intellectual vacuum leftover from ISLM-Keynesianism in the inflationary 1970s (even though, in retrospect, his arguments were at best a sideshow as to what were truly the causes of the inflations of the 1970s).

It was the moral clarity that Freidman gave that found him an audience. And while the MMTers (thankfully) do not construct the sorts of metaphysical systems that Friedman peddled, they do allow us to once again raise fundamental questions about the role of government in advanced capitalist economies. They allow us to raise these questions in a fundamentally popular, interesting, but also eminently post-Keynesian way. To retreat from this because MMTers currently have no say in obscure institutional practices between certain Treasuries and their Central Banks, is a gross error; the equivalent of Freidman fleeing from his prescriptions for controlling the money supply because central bankers were then not adopting this approach.

For too long one gets the impression that, closed in upon themselves and shunned by the outside world, the point of being a post-Keynesian was to win the argument. Today, as this fine tradition gradually emerges from out of the shadows, the point is to win more generally. And one cannot win unless one has a clearly formulated game plan. MMT is the only positive game plan currently being put forward.

The Road to Serfdom

(With apologies to Friedrich Hayek)

The markets are again infree-fall and, once again, a lazy Mediterranean profligate is to blame.  This time, it’s an Italian, rather than aGreek.  No, not Silvio Berlusconi, buthis fellow countryman, Mario Draghi, the new head of the increasingly spinelessEuropean Central Bank.
At least the Alice inWonderland quality of the markets has finally dissipated.  It was extraordinary to observe the euphoricreaction to the formation of the European Financial Stability Forum a few weeksago, along with the “voluntary” 50% haircut on Greek debt (which has turned outto be as ‘voluntary’ as a bank teller opening up a vault and surrendering moneyto someone sticking a gun in his/her face). To anybody with a modicum of understanding of modern money, it wasobvious that the CDO like scam created via the EFSF would never end well andthat the absence of a substantive role for the European Central Bank wouldprove to be its undoing. 

As far as the haircuts went,the façade of voluntarism had to be maintained in order to avoid triggering aseries of credit default swaps written on Greek debt, which again highlightsthe feckless quality of our global regulators being hoisted on their own petard,given their reluctance to eliminate these Frankenstein-like financialinnovations in the aftermath of the 2008 disaster. 
What is required is a “backto the future” approach to banking:  Inthe old days, a banker “hedged” his credit risk by doing (shock!) CREDITANALYSIS.  If the customer was deemed tobe a poor credit risk, no loan was made. 
It goes back to a point wehave made many times:  creditworthinessprecedes credit.  You need policiesdesigned to promote job growth, higher incomes and a corresponding ability toservice debt before you can expect a borrower take on a loan or a banker toextend one.  And, as Minsky used to pointout, in the old days, banking was a fundamentally optimistic activity, becausethe success of the lender was tied up with the success of the borrower; inother words, we didn’t have the spectacle of vampire-like squids bettingagainst the success of their clients via instruments such as credit defaultswaps.
Credit default swapsthemselves are to “hedging” credit exposure what nuclear weapons are to“hedging” national defence requirements. In theory, they both sound like reasonable deterrents to mitigatedisaster, but use them and everything blows up. At least one decent by-product of the eurocrats’ incompetent handling ofthis national solvency disaster has been the likely discrediting of CDSs as ahedging instrument in the future.  Notethat 5 year CDSs on Italian debt have not blown out to new highs today in spiteof bond yields rising over 7%, because the markets are slowly but surely comingto the recognition that they are ineffective hedging instruments – althoughthey have been very useful in terms of lining the pockets of the likes of JPMorgan and Goldman Sachs. 
Say what you willabout Silvio Berlusconi (and there’s LOTS one can say about the man as anyreader of the NY Post can attest).  But hewas right to oppose to a crude political ploy being foisted on him by the ECB,the French and Germans to accept an irrational and economically counterproductiveprogram fiscal austerity program in exchange for “support” from the likes ofthe IMF.   All Berlusconi had to do wascast his eyes to the other side of the Adriatic to see the likely effect ofthat. The markets’ reaction to his resignation was surreal: akin to turkeysvoting for Thanksgiving.   The overriding imperative in Euroland(indeed, in the entire global economy) should be to stimulate economic growth to ensure that there are enoughjobs for all who want them.
Private spending is very flatand so they need to replace it with public spending or GDP will declinefurther. The eurocrats seem incapable of understanding that even if the budgetdeficit rises in the short-run, it will always come down again as GDP growsbecause more people pay taxes and less people warrant government welfaresupport.
As for Italy itself, this isa sordid case of the Europe’s mandarins subverting yet another democracy,through crude economic blackmail. Already one government has been destroyed this way: In the words ofFintan O’Toole of the Irish Times:

Firstly, it was madeexplicit that the most reckless, irresponsible and ultimately impermissiblething a government could do was to seek the consent of its own people todecisions that would shape their lives. And, indeed, even if it had gone ahead,the Greek referendum would have been largely meaningless. As one Greek MP putit, the question would have been: do you want to take your own life or to bekilled? Secondly, there was open and shameless intervention by European leaders(Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy) in the internal affairs of another state.Sarkozy hailed the “courageous and responsible” stance of the main Greekopposition party – in effect a call for the replacement of the elected Greekgovernment.
The third part of thismoment of clarity was what happened in Ireland: the payment of a billiondollars to unsecured Anglo Irish Bank bondholders. Apart from its obviousobscenity, the most striking aspect of this was that, for the first time, wehad a government performing an action it openly declared to be wrong. MichaelNoonan wasn’t handing over these vast sums of cash from a bankrupt nation tovulture capitalist gamblers because he thought it was a good idea. He was doingit because there was a gun to his head. The threat came from the EuropeanCentral Bank and it was as crude as it was brutal: give the spivs yourtaxpayers’ money or we’ll bring down your banking system.
Of course, this is nothing new for the EU, asany Irishman or Portuguese citizen can attest. Vote the “wrong” way in a national referendum and the result is ignoredby the eurocrats until the silly peasants realize the egregious errors of theirways and re-vote the right way.  If ittakes two, or even three, referenda, so be it. Politically, the interpretation of any aspect of the Treaties relatingto European governance have always been largely left in the hands of unelectedbureaucrats, operating out of institutions which are devoid of any kind ofdemocratic legitimacy.  This, in turn,has led to an increasing sense of political alienation and a corresponding movetoward extremist parties hostile to any kind of political and monetary union inother parts of Europe.  Under politicallycharged circumstances, these extremist parties might become the mainstream.
As for Italy itself, the country runs a primary fiscalsurplus. As George Soros has noted: “Italy is indebted, but it isn’tinsolvent.” Its fiscal deficit to GDP ratio is 60% of the OECD average.  It is less than the euro area average.  Its ratio of non-financial private debt toGDP is very low relative to other OECD economies.  
It is not at all like Greece.  It has avibrant tradeable goods sector.  It sells things the rest of the worldwants. You introduce austerity at this juncture, and you will cause even slowereconomic growth, higher public debt, thereby creating the very type of Greekstyle national insolvency crisis that Europe is ostensibly seeking toavoid.  And then it will move to France,and ultimately to Germany itself.  Nopassenger is safe when the Titanic hits the iceberg.
The entire eurozone is already in severe recession (depression, in fact, is not too strong aword), yet the ECB, the Germans, the French and virtually every single policymaker in the core continue to advocate the economic equivalent of mediaevalblood-letting via ongoing fiscal austerity. And, surprise, surprise, the public deficits continue to grow.
Here’s anotherinteresting thing:  in the 1990s, a number of countries, including Italy,engaged deliberately in transactions which had no economic justification,other than to mask their public debt levels in order to secure entry into theeuro (see an excellent paper on this by Professor Gustavo Piga, “Derivativesand Public Debt Management”, which documents this practice).  Italyactively exploited ambiguity in accounting rules for swap transactions in orderto mislead EU institutions, other EU national governments, and its own publicas to the true size of its budget deficit. 
And Eurostatsigned off on these transactions.  And who worked at the Italian Treasuryat that time?  That’s right:   “SuperMario” Draghi, who was director general of the Italian Treasury from 1991-2001 whenall this was going on, and then joined Goldman Sachs (2002-2005), when theprivatisations came up.  Interesting that he is now the guy who has todeal with the ultimate fall-out.  Karmic justice.
Virtuallyeverybody has lied about their figures (Spain is a notable offender today), solistening to Europe’s high priests of monetary chastity is akin to listening tosomeone coming out of a brothel proclaiming his continued virginity.
Is there a solution?  Ofcourse there is. But the eurozone’s chiefpolicy makers continue to avoid utilizing the one institution – the EuropeanCentral Bank – which has the capacity to create unlimited euros, and thereforeprovides the only credible backstop to markets which continue to query thesolvency of individual nation states within the euro zone.  They are, as Professor Paul de Grauwesuggests, like generals who refuse to go into combat fully armed (European Summits in Ivory Towers”): 
“Thegenerals… announce that they actually hate the whole thing and that they willlimit the shooting as much as possible. Some of the generals are so upset bythe prospect of going to war that they resign from the army. The remaininggenerals then tell the enemy that the shooting will only be temporary, and thatthe army will go home as soon as possible. What is the likely outcome of thiswar? You guessed it. Utter defeat by the enemy.
TheECB has been behaving like the generals. When it announced its programme ofgovernment bond buying it made it known to the financial markets (the enemy)that it thoroughly dislikes it and that it will discontinue it as soon aspossible. Some members of the Governing Council of the ECB resigned in disgustat the prospect of having to buy bad bonds. Like the army, the ECB hasoverwhelming (in fact unlimited) firepower but it made it clear that it is notprepared to use the full strength of its money-creating capacity. What is thelikely outcome of such a programme? You guessed it. Defeat by the financialmarkets.”
The ECB should, as De Grauwesuggests, be using the ecoomic equivalent of the Powell Doctrine: when a nationis engaging in war, every resource and tool should be used to achieve decisiveforce against the enemy, minimizing casualties and ending the conflict quicklyby forcing the weaker force to capitulate.
The ECB is themonopoly supplier of currency.  They can set the price on the rates,(obviously not the supply) so if they set a level (say, Italy at 5%) why shouldthere be a default?  Capitulating to the markets, or entering the battlehalf-heartedly not only ensures more economic collateral damage, buteffectively emboldens the speculators by granting them a free put option onevery nation in the euro zone.  They’llline them up, one by one, starting with Greece and ending with Germany.
The ECB continuesto hide behind legalisms to justify its inaction, ironic, considering theextent to which national accounting fraud has long been tolerated in the eurozone since its inception.  The notionthat it cannot act as lender of last resort is disingenuous:  The ECB does have the legal mandate under its”financial stability” mandate which was provided under the Treaty ofMaastricht. 
True it is fairto say that the whole Treaty of Maastricht is full of ambiguity.  Theinstitutional policy framework within which the euro has been introduced andoperates (Article 11 of Protocol on the Statute of the European System ofCentral Banks (ESCB) and of the European Central Bank) has severalkey elements.
One notable feature of the operation of the ESCB is the apparent absence of the lender of last resort facility, which is an issue raised by the WSJ today, and which Draghi uses to justify his inaction.  But it’s not as clear-cut as suggested: The Protocols under which the ECB is established enables, but does not require, the ECB to act as a lender of last resort.
Proof that theECB exploits these ambiguities when it suits them is evident in its bond buyingprogram.  The ECB articles say it cannotbuy government bonds in the primary market. And this rule was once used as anexcuse not to backstop national government bonds at all.  But this changed in early 2010, when it beganto buy them in the secondary market. 
The ECB also hasa mandate to maintain financial stability.  It is buying government bondsin the secondary market under the financial stability mandate.  And itcould continue to do so, or so one might argue that it could.  True thereis now great disagreement about this within the ECB.  It has been turnedover to the legal department, which itself is in disagreement, which ultimatelysuggests that this is a political judgement, and politics is what is drivingItaly (and soon France) toward the brink.
In fact, giventhe 50% “voluntary” haircut imposed on holders of Greek debt, arguably the ECBis the only entity that can buy these national government bonds today.  As Warren Mosler has noted,it is hard to see how anyone with fiduciary responsibility can  buyItalian debt or any other member nation debt  after EU officials announcedthe plan for  50% haircuts on Greek bonds held by the private sector: 
Yes,all governments have the authority, one way or another, to confiscate aninvestors funds. But they don’t, and work to establish credibility that theywon’t.
Butnow that the EU has actually announced they are going to do it, as a fiduciaryyou’d have to be a darn fool to support investing any client funds in anymember nation debt.
Thelast buyer standing is and was always to be the ECB, which will now be buyingmost all new member nation debt as there is no alternative that includessurvival of the union.
Andwhen this happens there will be a massive relief response, as the solvencyissue will be behind them, with the euro firming as well.
Of course, wewill still have to deal with the reality of a major recession in Europe so longas the faith based cult of Austerians continues to dominate policy making.  Sadly, that’s unlikely to change until peopleare shot on the streets of Madrid or Rome. But at the very least, let’s get this silly national solvency problemaddressed once and for all in the only credible way possible.  Mario Draghi, you have the chance to redeemyourself and your country.  Don’t wastethe opportunity. 

Why You and I Can’t Spend More Than We Bring In, but the Government Can – and Probably Should

Watch Stephanie Kelton explain why TINA falls apart as justification to tolerate unemployment once we understand the relationship between the United States and her currency.  The lecture took place at Luther College in beautiful Decorah, Iowa on September 28, 2011.   Note: if you would like to see the handout featured in the video click here.

Today’s Modern Money Primer

By L. Randall Wray


This week we will begin to examine our next topic: government spending, taxing, interest rate setting, and bond issue. We will examine fiscal and monetary policy formation by a government that issues its own currency. We will bear in mind that the exchange rate regime chosen does have implications for the operation of domestic policy. We will distinguish between operational procedures and constraints that apply to all currency-issuing governments and those that apply only to governments that allow their currency to float. Over the previous 17 (!) weeks we have touched on much of this, but now it is time to get down to “brass tacks” to look at some of the nitty-gritty.
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Today’s Modern Money Primer

Follow Professor Wray as he examines bank clearing and the notion of a “pyramid” of liabilities with the government’s own IOUs at the top of that pyramid.

Today’s Modern Money Primer

This week’s primer deals with IOU’s denominated in the national money of account. So before you go out spending your hard earned dollars on burgers and beer, take a glance at how they actually function as IOU’s in our modern monetary system.

And of course, have a safe and relaxing Labor Day!

Today’s Modern Money Primer

The second part in Wray’s discussion on the origin of coins is now available. If you are new, check out the Modern Money Primer. You’ll find part one of this series, as well as the most thorough introduction to MMT, short of enrolling at UMKC as a grad student.