We Were Regulators Once: Ed Gray’s Finest Hour

By William K. Black
(Cross-posted from Benzinga)

On April 2, 1987, four U.S. Senators met secretly with Federal Home Loan Bank Board (Bank Board) Chairman Edwin J. Gray in the offices of Senator DeConcini (D.AZ).  Senator Donald Riegle (D. MI) was a surprise no-show.  DeConcini was joined by Alan Cranston (D. CA), John Glenn (D. OH), and John McCain (R. AZ).  Keating hired Alan Greenspan as a lobbyist to help recruit the Keating Five.  The Senators held the meeting at the request of Charles Keating, who controlled Lincoln Savings (a California chartered S&L).  Lincoln Savings would become the mostexpensive failure of the S&L debacle due to Keating’s political cronies and Keating became the most infamous S&L fraud.  A week later, on April 9, all five Senators met with four of Lincoln Savings’ senior regulators.  I took the detailed notes of that meeting.  The Senators became infamous as “the Keating Five.”  A quarter-century later, few remember what the meetings involved.

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Krugman’s Flashing Neon Sign

By Scott Fullwiler

Update: Paul Krugman has posted a reply to this post that is a straw man.  He and Nick Rowe are viewing this all through the lens of the old Monetarist/Keynesian debates in which there was a choice b/n interest rate targets and monetary aggregate targets; the Monetarist critique assumed the Keynesians were going to keep interest rates at the same level forever and not change them.  Once John Taylor came up with his “rule,” everyone agreed an interest rate target could work. 

What we are talking about here is operational tactics–the CB can only target an interest rate.  It cannot target a reserve balances or the monetary base directly.  But that is different from strategy–that is, WHERE the CB puts its target and WHEN it chooses to change the target.  There is NOTHING in anything I’ve ever said or anything any PK’er, MMT’er, etc., has ever said that suggests the CB can’t set the target wherever it wants whenever it wants.  The point is that whatever the target is, THAT is what its daily operations defend directly, not a monetary aggregate, not the monetary base, not reserve balances.  There is nothing in anything I’ve said that would preclude the CB from running a Taylor’s Rule type strategy, for instance, that responds at any point in time endogenously to the state of the economy.  That is, the target rate is an exogenous control variable (i.e., it is necessarily set by the CB) that it sets endogenously in response to economic events.

The debate between Paul Krugman and my friend Steve Keen regarding how banks work (see here, here, here, and here) has caused me to revisit an old quote.  Back in the 1990s I would use Krugman’s book, Peddling Prosperity (1995), in my intermediate macroeconomics courses since it provides a good overview of what were then contemporary debates in macroeconomic theory as well as Krugman’s criticisms of various popular views on macroeconomic policy issues from that era.  One passage near the very end of the book has always remained in the back of my mind; in it, Krugman critiques a popular view that was and still is highly influential regarding productivity and trade policy.  He writes: “So, if you hear someone say something along the lines of ‘America needs higher productivity so that it can compete in today’s global economy,’ never mind who he is or how plausible he sounds.  He might as well be wearing a flashing neon sign that reads:  ‘I DON’T KNOW WHAT I’M TALKING ABOUT.’” (p. 280; emphasis in original)

In his latest post in this debate (which Keen replied to here), Krugman demonstrates that he has a very good grasp of banking as it is presented in a traditional money and banking textbook.  Unfortunately for him, though, there’s virtually nothing in that description of banking that is actually correct.  Instead of a persuasive defense of his own views on banking, his post is in essence his own flashing neon sign where he provides undisputable evidence that “I don’t know what I’m talking about.”

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MMP Blog #44: The Job Guarantee and Macro Stability

By L. Randall Wray

The JG posts here at MMP have generated a huge number of comments. I have focused my responses at the comments more-or-less directly directed to the actual posted blogs. I can understand the impatience: many questions have not been answered. However many of these questions and comments concerned upcoming topics.

Let us move on to macro stability issues. I have given JG talks all over the world and the two main objections raised always refer to inflationary impacts and exchange rate impacts. It seems to me that those who respond with these fears have not paid attention to the set-up of the program and to the MMT arguments.

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Modern Monetary Theory on Central Standard

Stephanie Kelton and William K. Black discuss MMT with Jubulani Leffall.  Listen here

Where Did the Federal Reserve Get All that Money?

By Stephanie Kelton (h/t Matthew Berg)

Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke gave his fourth lecture at George Washington University yesterday. Buried in the lecture, beginning at about 19:18 in the video, Bernanke explained where the Fed got the money to “pay for” the assets it purchased as part of its Quantitative Easing (QE) policies.

I remember when the Fed announced the first round of QE. Those who don’t understand Fed operations – think most mainstream economists – went nuts. Many worried that the Fed would be unable to “unwind” its positions (i.e. divest itself of the assets – MBS, Treasuries, etc. – it had purchased) because banks would refuse to swap their nice safe cash for riskier instruments when the economy recovered. Others insisted that QE was “stuffing the market full” of too many dollars and that this, inevitably, would result in hyperinflation.

John Carney just wrote a very nice piece, showing that not only was the Fed able to find buyers for its assets but that markets actually bought them back at a premium. Bernanke addresses the second objection in his remarks below – idle balances don’t chase any goods – but it’s the financing of the asset purchases that I want readers to understand, because this is fundamental to understanding Modern Monetary Theory (MMT).

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Responses to Blog #43: Job Guarantee Basic Design

By L. Randall Wray

Thanks for the comments, many of which get ahead of the story.

I’d like to remind readers that we are ADDING the JG onto the EXISTING system. So the correct comparison is NOT against some UTOPIAN IDEAL in which we all live like Wall Street’s finest in some sort of Ayn Rand blissful Fountainhead. But RATHER to compare the existing system against one in which the JG is added. I realize this is a difficult mental gymnastic. I hope this will be clear as I respond to seven comments (the others concern upcoming topics; indeed, even these really are about topics we have not explored in detail but they are worth discussing).

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The Value of Applying Control Fraud Research to Microfinance

By William K. Black

My blog urging readers to look at a column by David Roodman and an article by Milford Bateman and his colleagues about the microfinance meltdown in Bosnia prompted strong exchanges between David and Milford.

Their debates caused me to consider seriously the application of accounting control fraud to microfinance.  I began to draft a letter to David and Milford, but it morphed into a substantive piece that I believe may be of more general interest to readers and of particular importance to the microfinance literature.  Here is the hybrid letter/article.

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MMP Blog #43: Job Guarantee Basics: Design and Advantages

By L. Randall Wray

Program Design. A JG or ELR program is one in which government promises to make a job available to any qualifying individual who is ready and willing to work. The national government provides funding for a universal program that would offer a uniform hourly wage with a package of benefits.  The program could provide for part-time and seasonal work, as well as for other flexible working conditions as desired.

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“The only winning move is not to play”—the insanity of the regulatory race to the bottom

By William K. Black

The plot of the movie WarGames (1983) involves a slacker hacker (played by Matthew Broderick) who starts playing the game “Global Thermonuclear War” with Joshua, a Department of Defense (DoD) supercomputer that has been given partial control by DoD of our nuclear forces.  The game prompts Joshua, who has been programmed to win games, to trick DoD into authorizing Joshua to launch an attack on the Soviet Union so that Joshua can win the game.  The hacker and the professor that programmed Joshua realize that the only way to prevent Joshua from attacking is to teach “him” that no one can “win” global thermonuclear war.  The insanity is that the people who created the game “Global Thermonuclear War” thought it could be won.  Joshua races through thousands of scenarios and ends his plan to win the “Global Thermonuclear War” game by attacking the Soviet Union when he realizes that “the only winning move is not to play.”

The JOBS Act is insane on many levels.  It creates an extraordinarily criminogenic environment in which securities fraud will become even more out of control.   One of the forms of insanity is the belief that one can “win” a regulatory “race to the bottom.”  The only winning move is not to play in a regulatory race to the bottom.  The primary rationale for the JOBS Act is the claim that we must win a regulatory race to the bottom with the City of London by adopting even weaker protections for investors from securities fraud than does the United Kingdom (UK).

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Bluto: Please Smash the Guitar and End the Bipartisan Deregulatory Kumbaya Chorus

By William K. Black
(Cross-posted from Benzinga)

The imminent passage of the fraud-friendly JOBS Act caused me to reflect on the fact that the worst anti-regulatory travesties in the financial sphere have had broad, bipartisan support.  The Garn-St Germain Act of 1982, which deregulated savings and loans (S&Ls) and helped drive the debacle, was passed with virtually no opposition.  The Texas and California S&L deregulation acts – the two states that “won” the regulatory “race to the bottom” – passed with virtually no opposition.  Texas S&L failures caused over 40% of total S&L losses and California failures caused roughly 25% of total losses.  In 1984, a majority of the members of the House of Representatives, including Newt Gingrich and most of the leadership of both parties, co-sponsored a resolution calling on us to cease our reregulation of the S&L industry.

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