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The Anti-Regulators are the “Job Killers”


The new mantra of the Republican Party is the old mantra –regulation is a “job killer.”  It iscertainly possible to have regulations kill jobs, and when I was a financialregulator I was a leader in cutting away many dumb requirements.   Wehave just experienced the epic ability of the anti-regulators to kill well overten million jobs.  Why then is there nota single word from the new House leadership about investigations to determinehow the anti-regulators did their damage? Why is there no plan to investigate the fields in which inadequateregulation most endangers jobs?  Whilewe’re at it, why not investigate the areas in which inadequate regulationallows firms to maim and kill.  This columnaddresses only financial regulation.

Deregulation, desupervision, and de facto decriminalization (thethree “des”) created the criminogenic environment that drove the modern U.S.financial crises.  The three “des” wereessential to create the epidemics of accounting control fraud thathyper-inflated the bubble that triggered the Great Recession.  “Job killing” is a combination of two factors– increased job losses and decreased job creation.  I’ll focus solely on private sector jobs –but the recession has also been devastating in terms of the loss of state andlocal governmental jobs. 


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From 1996-2000, for example, annual private sector gross jobincreases rose from roughly 14 million to 16 million while annual privatesector gross job losses increased from 12 to 13 million.  The annual net job increases in those years,therefore, rose from two million to three million.  Over that five year period, the net increasein private sector jobs was over 10 million. One common rule of thumb is that the economy needs to produce an annualnet increase of about 1.5 million jobs to employ new entrants to our workforce,so the growth rate in this era was large enough to make the unemployment andpoverty rates fall significantly.

The Great Recession (which officially began in the thirdquarter of 2007) shows why the anti-regulators are the premier job killers inAmerica.  Annual private sector gross joblosses rose from roughly 12.5 to a peak of 16 million and gross private sector jobgains fell from approximately 13 to 10 million. As late as March 2010, afterthe official end of the Great Recession, the annualized net job loss in theprivate sector was approximately three million (that job loss has now turnedaround, but the increases are far too small). Again, we need net gains of roughly 1.5 million jobs to accommodate newworkers, so the total net job losses plus the loss of essential job growth waswell over 10 million during the Great Recession.  These numbers, again, do not include the largejob losses of state and local government workers, the dramatic rise inunderemployment, the sharp rise in far longer-term unemployment, and thesalary/wage (and job satisfaction) losses that many workers had to take to finda new, typically inferior, job after they lost their job.  It also ignores the rise in poverty,particularly the scandalous increase in children living in poverty.

The Great Recession was triggered by the collapse of thereal estate bubble epidemic of mortgage fraud by lenders that hyper-inflatedthat bubble.  That epidemic could nothave happened without the appointment of anti-regulators to key leadershippositions.  The epidemic of mortgagefraud was centered in loans that the lending industry (behind closed doors)referred to as “liar’s” loans – so any regulatory leader who was not ananti-regulatory ideologue would (as we did in 1990-1990 during the first waveof liar’s loans in California) have ordered banks not to make these pervasivelyfraudulent loans.  One of the problemswas the existence of a “regulatory black hole” – most of the nonprime loanswere made by lenders not regulated by the federal government.  That black hole, however, conceals two broaderfederal anti-regulatory problems.  Thefederal regulators actively made the black hole more severe by preempting stateefforts to protect the public from predatory and fraudulent loans.  Greenspan and Bernanke are particularlyculpable.  In addition to joining the jihad state regulation, the Fed hadunique federal regulatory authority under HOEPA (enacted in 1994) to fill theblack hole and regulate any housing lender (authority that Bernanke finallyused, after liar’s loans had ended, in response to Congressional criticism).  The Fed also had direct evidence of thefrauds and abuses in nonprime lending because Congress mandated that the Fedhold hearings on predatory lending.   

The S&L debacle, the Enron era frauds, and the currentcrisis were all driven by accounting control fraud.  The three “des” are critical factors increating the criminogenic environments that drive these epidemics of accountingcontrol fraud.  The regulators are the“cops on the beat” when it comes to stopping accounting control fraud.  If they are made ineffective by the three“des” then cheaters gain a competitive advantage over honest firms.  This makes markets perverse and causesrecurrent crises.       

From roughly 1999 to the present, three administrations havedisplayed hostility to vigorous regulation and have appointed regulatoryleaders largely on the basis of their opposition to vigorous regulation.  When these administrations occasionallyblundered and appointed, or inherited, regulatory leaders that believed inregulating the administration attacked the regulators.  In the financial regulatory sphere, recentexamples include Arthur Levitt and William Donaldson (SEC), Brooksley Born(CFTC), and Sheila Bair (FDIC).  Similarly,the bankers used Congress to extort the Financial Accounting Standards Board(FASB) into trashing the accounting rules so that the banks no longer had torecognize their losses.  The twinpurposes of that bit of successful thuggery were to evade the mandate of thePrompt Corrective Action (PCA) law and to allow banks to pretend that they weresolvent and profitable so that they could continue to pay enormous bonuses totheir senior officials based on the fictional “income” and “net worth” producedby the scam accounting.  (Not recognizingone’s losses increases dollar-for-dollar reported, but fictional, net worth andgross income.)  When members of Congress(mostly Democrats) sought to intimidate us into not taking enforcement actionsagainst the fraudulent S&Ls we blew the whistle.  Congress investigated Speaker Wright and the“Keating Five” in response.  I testifiedin both investigations.  Why is the new Houseleadership announcing its intent to give a free pass to the accounting controlfrauds, their political patrons, and the anti-regulators that created thecriminogenic environment that hyper-inflated the financial bubble thattriggered the Great Recession and caused such a loss of integrity?  The anti-regulators subverted the rule of lawand allowed elite frauds to loot with impunity. Why isn’t the new House leadership investigating that disgrace as one oftheir top priorities?  Why is the new Houseleadership so eager to repeat the job killing mistakes of taking the regulatorycops off their beat?              
Bill Black is an Associate Professor of Economics and Law atthe University of Missouri-Kansas City. He is also a white-collar criminologist, a former senior financialregulator, a serial whistleblower, and the author of The Best Way to Rob a Bank is to Own One.  

Say W-h-a-a-a-t?


Warren Buffet told CNBC reporter Becky Quick that he could fix our nation’s deficit problem real quick — in precisely five minutes. Problem is, the US doesn’t have a deficit problem. We do, however, have an aggregate demand problem, as MMTers have been arguing for more than two years. And we could fix that in five minutes too, if we could just circumvent Congress.

The Occupy Wall Street Protestors have announced that Nov. 5th is “Move Your Money Day.” A few folks started early and discovered an unusual new penalty for “early withdrawal.” You have to see it to believe it.



Prior to Sept. 17, 2011, no one would blink (or cringe) at a photo like this.  But with the Occupy Wall Street movement drawing so much attention to the cosy relationship between Wall Street and the politicians who serve them, this photo of Mitt Romney and his colleagues at Bain Capital just doesn’t seem very funny.


In this private letter from Charles Koch to Fredrich Von Hayek, Koch urges the grand poobah of free-market economics to be sure to take advantage of the benefits he is entitled to under Social Security.



Until today, the bloggers at New Economic Perspectives had ever heard of Ben Strubel. But he’s definitely got our attention (and our respect) now. He posted a very nice summary of our macro approach — often dubbed MMT — and made a strong case for increased deficit spending. Maybe it’s just easier for people like this (practitioners/traders who haven’t had their heads fuddled with mainstream economic theory) to grasp how the modern monetary system actually works.

Here’s a terrific parable on de-leveraging from an anonymous author.  We recommend using it the next time someone takes out a chart of outstanding debt (public, private, or both) and the money stock (monetary base, M1, M2, MZM) and tries to make the asinine point that we don’t have enough money to pay off all the debt.

CNBCs John Carney says that “very few people understand how the modern banking system really works.” He praises MMT for its more accurate depiction of finance and banking.
 
 
 
Here’s an incredible statistic on the FIRE economy Interest on mortgages is now over 20% of personal consumption expenditure vs. 5% in 1980.  And this is in spite of the fact that 60% of the housing stock is owned outright.

Budget Deficits and Saving, Reserves and Interest Rates Part 2: Responses to Blog #20


Q1:  Andy. What does”wonky” mean? 

A: Think “policy wonk” someone who gets all data-heavy andinto the deep technical details to do policy analysis. So it is used to warnthe reader that only those really interested in details needs to read on.

Q2: Ryan. Let’s assume the economy already works with fullcapacity, and the government would like to maintain it without any furtherinflation or deflation. Does the government now have to make an educated guess(regarding the exogenous part of gov. deficit) what the nongovernment savingdesire might be, so that it (government) fulfills its goal (full employment andprice stability). Kind of trying to hit moving target? And in this regard, isthe ELR governmental program kind of “shoot and forget” mechanism,which automatically, always finds, or helps to find the moving target(nongov.  saving desire)?

A: No, not really. Let us say government puts in place theELR and 20 million show up for work. Before the program was in place, everyonewas worried about the future—paying bills, losing jobs, etc. Net privatefinancial saving desires were, say, $1 trillion. No one wanted to spend. Nowwith 20 million new jobs and the certainty that you can find one reduces thesesaving desires. You go shopping. You feed your family. The private sectorstarts hiring, producing. GDP starts growing. You get recruited out of the ELRprogram into a hiring paying private sector job. You pay more taxes. Federalgovernment spending on ELR falls, its budget deficit falls into line with thelower net financial saving desires. The only planning you need by government isthe “real stuff”—create jobs. Govt does not need to try to hit the net savingdesires—that is done automatically.

Q3:  Paolo. “thisalso means it is impossible for the aggregate saving of the nongovernmentsector to be less than (or greater than) the budget deficit”Take the”greater than” option. What about a nongovt. sector export surplus?Wouldn’t that add net financial assets to the nongovt. sector aggregate savingsabove the amount generated by govt deficits?

A: Yes, Americans might also save in foreign currencydenominated assets—ie UK pounds. Those can come from export surpluses. I was talkingabout domestic currency. But you are correct, in some countries the net savingdesire could largely take the form of foreign currency (ie in places where USDollars are desired).
Q4. Guest. Prof. Wray, On page 7 of “Waiting for the Next Crach: The Minskyan Lessons Wefailed to Learn”(http://www.levyinstitute.org/p…, you said Goldman Sachslet hedge fund manage Henry Paulson design sure-to-fail synthetic CDO’s. Didyou mean John Paulson? If I’m not mistaken, Henry Paulson was Sec of treasuryduring the GFC…   Just checking, causeI’m sure John Paulson wants his credit for being one of the world’s premier**s****s.

A: Yes a helpful editor added the wrong first name. I thinkit is now corrected.
Q5: MamMoth, Dale, Neil, Samuel.  Many questions and comments on exogenous vsendogenous.

A: In economics the distinction between endogand exog is used in three different senses: control, theoretical, andstatistical. Only the econometricians reading this care about the last one soI’ll leave it. In the control sense it means the govt can “control” thevariable: ie control the money supply, control the interest rate, control theprice level. MMT shares with the “endogenous money” or “horizontalist”approaches the view that the CB cannot control the money supply or bankreserves. Instead the CB must accommodate the demand for reserves. HOWEVER thesetheories were formulated back when the interest rate paid on reserves was zerobut the Fed’s target overnight interest rate was nonzero. Excess reserves drovethe market (fed funds) rate below zero so the Fed would have to drain reservesby selling Treasuries. But now the Fed has a near zero interest rate target(like Japan) and so can leave excess reserves in the system and pay 25 basispoints on them and the market rate remains near 25 basis points.  So you could say that with QE the Fed“exogenously” increases bank reserves. There is an asymmetry, though, becausethe Fed can leave banks full of excess reserves but cannot leave them shortreserves—which would drive the market rate above the target. On the other hand,the CB’s target interest rate is clearly exog in the control sense: the Fed canset its target at 25 bp, or raise it at the next meeting to 150 bp. Finally,the control sense and the theoretical sense are related but not identical. Letus say the US had a fixed exchange rate and used the interest rate policy tohit the peg. We can say the interest rate is exogenously controlled (set by theFed) but it is not theoretically exog because the overriding policy is to pegthe exchange rate.

Marshall Auerback’s Talk at FEASTA

Marshall Auerback’s discusses strategies for Ireland in dealing with its debt crisis at FEASTA. Watch below:

Prof. Bill Black and #OWS: “This is Not a Red State / Blue State Issue”

Dylan Ratigan speaks with William K. Black, and two Wall Street occupiers in his latest podcast of Radio Free.

http://player.soundcloud.com/player.swf?url=http%3A%2F%2Fapi.soundcloud.com%2Ftracks%2F25908258&Ep 73: Prof. Bill Black and Occupiers Goldi & Calvin by Dylan Ratigan

William K. Black on Democracy Now: 10/19/2011

For those of you who missed the live interview this morning, watch Bill Black on Democracy Now with Amy Goodman:

Not with a Bang, but a Whimper: Bank of America’s Death Rattle

By William K. Black

Bob Ivry, Hugh Son and Christine Harper have written anarticle that needs to be read by everyone interested in the financialcrisis.  The article (available here) is entitled: BofA Said to Split RegulatorsOver Moving Merrill Derivatives to Bank Unit. The thrust of their story is that Bank of America’s holdingcompany, BAC, has directed the transfer of a large number of troubled financialderivatives from its Merrill Lynch subsidiary to the federally insured bank Bank of America (BofA).  The story reports that the FederalReserve supported the transfer and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation(FDIC) opposed it.  Yves Smith of Naked Capitalism has written an appropriately blistering attack on this outrageous action, which puts thepublic at substantially increased risk of loss.  

I write toadd some context, point out additional areas of inappropriate actions, and adda regulatory perspective gained from dealing with analogous efforts by holdingcompanies to foist dangerous affiliate transactions on insureddepositories.  I’ll begin by adding somehistorical context to explain how B of A got into this maze of affiliateconflicts.

KenLewis’ “Scorched Earth” Campaign against B of A’s Shareholders

AcquiringCountrywide: the High Cost of CEO Adolescence

During this crisis, Ken Lewis went on a buying spreedesigned to allow him to brag that his was not simply bigger, but thebiggest.  Bank of America’s holdingcompany – BAC – became the acquirer of last resort.  Lewis began his war on BAC’s shareholders byordering an artillery salvo on BAC’s own position.  What better way was there to destroyshareholder value than purchasing the most notorious lender in the world –Countrywide.  Countrywide was in themidst of a death spiral.  The FDIC wouldsoon have been forced to pay an acquirer tens of billions of dollars to induceit to take on Countrywide’s nearly limitless contingent liabilities and toxicassets.  Even an FDIC-assistedacquisition would have been a grave mistake. Acquiring thousands of Countrywide employees whose primary mission wasto make fraudulent and toxic loans was an inelegant form of financialsuicide.  It also revealed the negligiblevalue Lewis placed on ethics and reputation.  
    
But Lewis did not wait to acquire Countrywide with FDICassistance.  He feared that a rival wouldacquire it first and win the CEO bragging contest about who had the biggest,baddest bank.  His acquisition ofCountrywide destroyed hundreds of billions of dollars of shareholder value andled to massive foreclosure fraud by what were now B of A employees. 

But there are two truly scary parts of the story of B of A’sacquisition of Countrywide that have received far too little attention.  B of A claims that it conducted extensive duediligence before acquiring Countrywide and discovered only minor problems.  If that claim is true, then B of A has beendoomed for years regardless of whether it acquired Countrywide.  The proposed acquisition of Countrywide was hugeand exceptionally controversial even within B of A.  Countrywide was notorious for its fraudulentloans.  There were numerous lawsuits andformer employees explaining how these frauds worked. 

B of A is really “Nations Bank” (formerly named NCNB).  When Nations Bank acquired B of A (the SanFrancisco based bank), the North Carolina management took completecontrol.  The North Carolina managementdecided that “Bank of America” was the better brand name, so it adopted thatname.  The key point to understand isthat Nations/NCNB was created through a large series of aggressive mergers, sothe bank had exceptional experience in conducting due diligence of targets foracquisition and it would have sent its top team to investigate Countrywidegiven its size and notoriety.  Theacquisition of Countrywide did not have to be consummated exceptionallyquickly.  Indeed, the deal had an “out”that allowed B of A to back out of the deal if conditions changed in an adversemanner (which they obviously did).  If Bof A employees conducted extensive due diligence of Countrywide and could notdiscover its obvious, endemic frauds, abuses, and subverted systems then theyare incompetent.  Indeed, that word istoo bloodless a term to describe how worthless the due diligence team wouldhave had to have been.  Given the manyacquisitions the due diligence team vetted, B of A would have been doomedbecause it would have routinely been taken to the cleaners in those earlierdeals.

That scenario, the one B of A presents, is not credible.  It is far more likely that B of A’s seniormanagement made it clear to the head of the due diligence review that the dealwas going to be done and that his or her report should support that conclusion.  This alternative explanation fits well with Bof A’s actual decision-making. Countrywide’s (and B of A’s) reportedfinancial condition fell sharply after the deal was signed.  Lewis certainly knew that B of A’s actualfinancial condition was much worse than its reported financial condition andhad every reason to believe that this difference would be even worse atCountrywide given its reputation for making fraudulent loans.  B of A could have exercised its option towithdraw from the deal and saved vast amounts of money.  Lewis, however, refused to do so.  CEOs do not care only about money.  Ego is a powerful driver of conduct, and CEOscan be obsessed with status, hierarchy, and power.  Of course, Lewis knew he could walk awaywealthy after becoming a engine of mass destruction of B of A shareholdervalue, so he could indulge his ego in a manner common to adolescent males.   


AcquiringMerrill Lynch: the Lure of Liar’s Loans

Merrill Lynch is the quintessential example of why it wascommon for the investment banks to hold in portfolio large amounts ofcollateralized debt obligations (CDOs). Some observers have jumped to the naïve assumption that this indicatesthat the senior managers thought the CDOs were safe investments.  The “recipe” for an investor maximizingreported income differs only slightly from the recipe for lenders.

  1. Grow rapidly by
  2. Holding poor quality assets that provide a premium nominal yield while
  3. Employing extreme leverage, and
  4. Providing only grossly inadequate allowances for future losses on the poor quality assets
Investment banks that followed this recipe (and most largeU.S. investment banks did), were guaranteed to report record (albeit fictional)short-term income.  That income wascertain to produce extreme compensation for the controlling officers.  The strategy was also certain to produceextensive losses in the longer term – unless the investment bank could sell itslosing position to another entity that would then bear the loss. 

The optimal means of committing this form of accountingcontrol fraud was with the AAA-rated top tranche of CDOs.  Investment banks frequently purport to basecompensation on risk-adjusted return.  Ifthey really did so investment bankers would receive far less compensation.  The art, of course, is to vastly understatethe risk one is taking and attribute short-term reported gains to the officer’s brilliance in achievingsupra-normal returns that are not attributable to increased risk(“alpha”).  Some of the authors of Guaranteed to Fail call this processmanufacturing “fake alpha.” 

The authors are largely correct about “fake alpha.”  The phrase and phenomenon are correct, butthe mechanism they hypothesize for manufacturing fake alpha has no basis inreality.  They posit honest gambles on“extreme tail” events likely to occur only in rare circumstances.  They provide no real world examples.  If risk that the top tranche of a CDO wouldsuffer a material loss of market values was, in reality, extremely rare then itwould be impossible to achieve a substantial premium yield.  The strategy would diminish alpha rather thanmaximizing false alpha.  The risk thatthe top tranche of a CDO would suffer a material loss in market value washighly probable.  It was not a tailevent, much less an “extreme tail” event. CDOs were commonly backed by liar’s loans and the incidence of fraud inliar’s loans was in the 90% range.  Thetop tranches of CDOs were virtually certain to suffer severe losses as soon asthe bubble stalled and refinancing was no longer readily available to delay thewave of defaults.  Because liar’s loanswere primarily made to borrowers who were not creditworthy and financiallyunsophisticated, the lenders had the negotiating leverage to charge premiumyields.  The officers controlling therating agencies and the investment banks were complicit in creating a corruptsystem for rating CDOs that maximized their financial interests by routinelyproviding AAA ratings to the top tranche of CDOs “backed” largely by fraudulentloans.  The combination of the fake AAArating and premium yield on the top tranche of fraudulently constructed (andsold) CDOs maximized “fake alpha” and made it the “sure thing” that is one ofthe characteristics of accounting control fraud (see Akerlof & Romer 1993;Black 2005).  This is why many of theinvestment banks (and, eventually, Fannie and Freddie) held substantial amountsof the top tranches of CDOs.  (A similardynamic existed for lower tranches, but investment banks also found it muchmore difficult to sell the lowest tranches.)  

Merrill Lynch was known for the particularly large CDOpositions it retained in portfolio. These CDO positions doomed Merrill Lynch.  B of A knew that Merrill Lynch had tremendouslosses in its derivatives positions when it chose to acquire MerrillLynch. 

Giventhis context, only the Fed, and BAC, could favor the derivatives deal

Lewis and his successor, Brian Moynihan, have destroyednearly one-half trillion dollars in BAC shareholder value.  (See my prior post on the “Divine Right ofBank Profits…”)  BAC continues todeteriorate and the credit rating agencies have been downgrading it because ofits bad assets, particularly its derivatives. BAC’s answer is to “transfer” the bad derivatives to the insured bank – transforming (alaIreland) a private debt into a public debt. 

Banking regulators have known for well over a century aboutthe acute dangers of conflicts of interest. Two related conflicts have generated special rules designed to protectthe bank and the insurance fund.  Onerestricts transactions with senior insiders and the other restrictstransactions with affiliates.  The scamis always the same when it comes to abusive deals with affiliates – theytransfer bad (or overpriced) assets or liabilities to the insured institution.  As S&L regulators, we recurrently facedthis problem.  For example, Ford MotorCompany attempted to structure an affiliate transaction that was harmful to theinsured S&L (First Nationwide).  Thebank, because of federal deposit insurance, typically has a higher creditrating than its affiliate corporations.

BAC’s request to transfer the problem derivatives to B of Awas a no brainer – unfortunately, it was apparently addressed to officials atthe Fed who meet that description.  Anycompetent regulator would have said: “No, Hell NO!”  Indeed, any competent regulator would havedeveloped two related, acute concerns immediately upon receiving therequest.  First, the holding company’scontrolling managers are a severe problem because they are seeking to exploitthe insured institution.  Second, thesenior managers of B of A acceded to the transfer, apparently without protest,even though the transfer poses a severe threat to B of A’s survival.  Their failure to act to prevent the transfercontravenes both their fiduciary duties of loyalty and care and should lead totheir resignations.

Now here’s the really bad news.  First, this transfer is a superb “naturalexperiment” that tests one of the most important questions central to thehealth of our financial system.  Does theFed represent and vigorously protect the interests of the people or thesystemically dangerous institutions (SDIs) – the largest 20 banks?  We have run a real world test.  The sad fact is that very few Americans willbe surprised that the Fed represented the interests of the SDIs even though theywere directly contrary to the interests of the nation.  The Fed’s constant demands for (andcelebration of) “independence” from democratic government, combined withslavish dependence on and service to the CEOs of the SDIs has gone beyondscandal to the point of farce.  I suggestorganized “laugh ins” whenever Fed spokespersons prate about their“independence.”

Second, I would bet large amounts of money that I do nothave that neither B of A’s CEO nor the Fed even thought about whether thetransfer was consistent with the CEO’s fiduciary duties to B of A (v.BAC).  We took depositions during theS&L debacle in which senior officials of Lincoln Savings and its affiliateswere shocked when we asked “whose interests were you representing – the S&Lor the affiliate?”  They had obviouslynever even considered their fiduciary duties or identified their actualclient.  We blocked a transaction thatwould have caused grave injury to the insured S&L by taking the holdingcompany (Pinnnacle West) off the hook for its obligations to the S&L.  That transaction would have passed routinely,but we flew to the board of directors meeting of the S&L and reminded themthat their fiduciary duty was to the S&L, that the transaction was clearlydetrimental to the S&L and to the benefit of the holding company, and thatwe would sue them and take the most vigorous possible enforcement actionsagainst them personally if they violated their fiduciary duties.  That caused them to refuse to approve thetransaction – which resulted in a $450 million payment from the holding companyto the S&L.  (I know, $450 millionsounds quaint now in light of the scale of the ongoing crisis, but back then itpaid for our salaries in perpetuity.) 

Third, reread the Bloomberg column and wrap your mind aroundthe size of Merrill Lynch’s derivatives positions.  Next, consider that Merrill is only one,shrinking player in derivatives. Finally, reread Yves’ column in NakedCapitalism where she explains (correctly) that many derivatives cannot beused safely.  Add to that my point abouthow they can be used to create a “sure thing” of record fictional profits,record compensation, and catastrophic losses. This is particularly true about credit default swaps (CDS) because ofthe grotesque accounting treatment that typically involves no allowances forfuture losses. (FASB:  you must fix thisurgently or you will allow a “perfect crime.”). It is insane that we did not pass a one sentence law repealing theCommodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000. Between the SDIs, the massive, sometimes inherently unsafe and largelyopaque financial derivatives, the appointment, retention, and promotion offailed anti-regulators, and the continuing ability of elite control frauds toloot with impunity we are inviting recurrent, intensifying crises. 

I’ll close with a suggestion and request to reporters.  Please find out who within the Fed approvedthis deal and the exact composition of the assets and liabilities that weretransferred.


To keep up with Bill’s work follow on Twitter @WilliamKBlack and @deficitowl

Creative Ways to Promote MMT

We always knew our readers were a smart bunch, but we had no idea how imaginative you are! Please keep sharing your creative endeavors with us (merchandise, animated videos, signs/slogans, etc.), and please keep spreading the word about MMT and NEP.  Understanding the monetary system is the first step in a long journey toward creating a better world for us all.

Courtesy of Tschaff Reisberg

MMP Blog #20: Effects of Sovereign Government Budget Deficits on Saving, Reserves and Interest Rates, (continued)

By L. Randall Wray

Complications and private preferences. There are often two objections to the claim that government spending effectively takes place by simultaneously crediting the recipient’s bank account as well as the bank’s reserves: a) it must be more complicated than this; and b) what if the private sector’s spending and portfolio preferences do not match the government’s budget outcome?

The first of these objections has been carefully dealt with in a long series of published articles and working papers (by Bell (a.k.a. Kelton), Bell and Wray, Wray, Fullwiler, and Rezende who look at actual operating procedures in the US, Canada, and Brazil; I’ll provide references later as well as more details). In practice, the treasury cannot directly credit bank accounts when it wants to spend.

Rather, a complex series of steps is required that involve the treasury, the central bank and private banks each time the treasury spends or taxes. The central bank and the treasury develop such procedures to ensure that government is able to spend, that taxpayer payments to treasury do not lead to bounced checks, and—most importantly—that undesired effects on banking system reserves do not occur. While the end result is exactly as described above (treasury spending leads to bank credits, taxes lead to debits, and budget deficits mean net credits to both demand deposits and bank reserves), it is more complicated.

This often generates another question: what if the central bank refused to cooperate with the treasury? The answer is that the central bank would miss its overnight interest rate target (and eventually would endanger the payments system because checks would start bouncing). Readers are referred to the substantial literature surrounding the coordination (more details for the wonky coming up in a later blog). Nonspecialists can be assured that the simple explanation above is sufficient: the conclusion from close analysis is that government deficits do lead to net credits to reserves, and if undesired excess reserves are created they are drained through bond sales to maintain the central bank’s target interest rate.

The operational impact of bond sales is to substitute government bonds for reserves—it is like providing banks with a savings account at the central bank (government bonds) instead of a checking account (central bank reserves). This is done to relieve downward pressure on the overnight interest rate.

With regard to the second objection we first must notice that if the government’s fiscal stance is not consistent with the desired saving of the nongovernment sector, then spending and income adjust until the fiscal outcome and the nongovernment sector’s balance are consistent. For example, if the government tried to run a deficit larger than the desired surplus of the nongovernment sector, then some combination of higher spending by the nongovernment sector (lower nongovernment saving and lower budget deficit), greater tax receipts (thus lower budget deficit and lower saving), or higher nongovernment sector income (so greater desired saving equal to the higher deficit) is produced.

Since tax revenues (and some government spending) are endogenously determined by the performance of the economy, the fiscal stance is at least partially determined endogenously; by the same token, the actual balance achieved by the nongovernment sector is endogenously determined by income and saving propensities. By accounting identity (presented above) it is not possible for the nongovernment’s balance to differ from the government’s balance (with the sign reversed—one has a deficit and the other a surplus); this also means it is impossible for the aggregate saving of the nongovernment sector to be less than (or greater than) the budget deficit.

So, those are the general responses to those objections. I will do a wonky blog later with more details. But next week we look in more detail at the private saving decision.

Today’s Modern Money Primer

Complications and private preferences. There are often two objections to the claim that government spending effectively takes place by simultaneously crediting the recipient’s bank account as well as the bank’s reserves: a) it must be more complicated than this; and b) what if the private sector’s spending and portfolio preferences do not match the government’s budget outcome?
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