Author Archives: admin

A Cartoon by Ruben Bolling

From politicalirony.com

Why we need regulatory cops on the beat – and why they make bankers cringe

(cross-posted with Benzinga.com)

One of the paradoxes of effective financial regulation is that the best way to help bankers and banks is to virtually never think in terms of helping banks and bankers. Financial regulators’ primary task is to detect, put out of business, and deter accounting control frauds. Those are the frauds that cause catastrophic individual failures, hyper-inflate financial bubbles, and produce our recurrent, intensifying financial crises. Accounting control frauds also produce “echo” epidemics in other professions (e.g., auditors, appraisers, and credit rating agencies) and industries, e.g., loan brokers. Fraud begets fraud and it can make fraud endemic in entire lines of business such as liar’s loans. The senior officers of investment and commercial banks spread these frauds through an industry and to other industries and professions by deliberately creating “Gresham’s” dynamics. In this context, the dynamic refers to situations in which bad ethics drives good ethics out of the market. George Akerlof first used this variant of the Gresham’s dynamic in his famous article on markets for “lemons” that led to the award of the Nobel Prize in Economics. Akerlof explained that if firms that defrauded their customers gained a competitive advantage over their honest rivals private market discipline became perverse and drove honest firms into bankruptcy.

The CEOs that lead accounting control frauds create intensely criminogenic environments by shaping perverse incentives that maximize such Gresham’s dynamics among their own officers – by basing executive compensation largely on short-term reported (fictional) income. They create perverse incentives among loan officers, “independent” professionals, and other firms (e.g., loan brokers) by hiring, firing, promoting, praising, and making wealthy those that will create and “bless” their fraudulent accounting practices. The art is to suborn – not defeat – “controls” by perverting them into allies.

The senior officers that control fraudulent banks are exceptionally successful in using these Gresham’s dynamics to produce fraud epidemics and massively overstated asset values and earnings. They routinely get clean accounting opinions for financial statements that do not comply with GAAP and are deliberately contrary to reality. They routinely get grossly inflated appraisal values. They routinely got “AAA” ratings for toxic waste that was not even single “C.” They routinely got “liar’s” loan applications and appraisals that their employees and agents falsified to make them appear to have far lower loan-to-value (LTV) and debt-to-income ratios. The result was loans with a premium yield that looked (to the credulous) as if they were not exceptionally risky. The lenders could sell these fraudulent liar’s loans at a premium or keep them in portfolio and claim high (fictional) earnings. Liar’s loans, of course, produce severe adverse selection and negative expected value (losses). The fictional reported income in the near-term, however, is a “sure thing” for accounting control frauds because they do not create remotely adequate allowances for loan and lease losses (ALLL).

These unique abilities, and dangers, posed by banks that are accounting control fraud mean that regulators are the only ones that can break a Gresham’s dynamic prior to catastrophe. Regulators’ unique advantage is that they are not paid, hired, or fired by bank CEOs. This logic also explains an important exception – if banks can create a “competition” in laxity among regulators (as they did with the Office of Thrift Supervision during the recent crisis) they can crate perverse incentives that can drive laxity. The worst bank CEOs often seek to create this competition in regulatory laxity by threatening to move internationally to the weakest regulator. They also seek to create regulatory black holes that serve as safe havens for control fraud.

When financial regulators are not captured by the industry and do not seek to serve the industry, then they can serve as regulatory cops on the beat. Their function is to break the Gresham’s dynamic by making it far less likely that cheaters will prosper through fraud. Regulators are in a better position to exercise real independence than any private sector “control.” This means that vigorous financial regulators who make fighting control fraud their top priority are honest bankers’ best friends and the control frauds’ worst nightmare.

As with Adam Smith’s paradox (which works well for the local village baker and fails utterly for global banker) financial regulators can be successful only when they do not act out of any desire to help banks, but rather to serve as the regulatory cop that is passionate about enforcing the law against even the most powerful banks when they engage in intentional misconduct. By taking the profit out of fraud, successful financial regulators help honest bankers and greatly reduce the scope, length, and damage of financial crises.

All of this explains why the “reinventing government” movement (a bipartisan project of then Texas Governor Bush and Vice President Gore) was a disaster for financial regulation. We were instructed to refer to banks and bankers as our “clients.” This is the worst possible mindset for effective financial regulation. Unfortunately, key politicians are determined to recreate this disastrous mindset.

Spencer Bachus (R. Ala.), the incoming Chair of the House Financial Services Committee, told the Birmingham News: “In Washington, the view is that the banks are to be regulated, and my view is that Washington and the regulators are there to serve the banks.”

Ron Paul (R. Tex.), asked to comment on Bachus’ statement, said: “I don’t think we need regulators. We need law and order. We need people to fulfill their contracts. The market is a great regulator, and we’ve lost understanding and confidence that the market is probably a much stricter regulator.”

The latest manifestation of this mindset was in response to Professor Elizabeth Warren’s recent congressional testimony. Dana Milbank’s March 16, 2011 column reported:

“You kept saying ‘cop on the beat, cop on the beat,’ ” complained Rep. Shelley Moore Capito (R-W.Va.), who chaired the day’s hearing.

Basically, the members of the panel didn’t want the new [Consumer Financial Protection Bureau] CFPB to have anything that would displease bankers.

Rep. Blaine Luetkemeyer (R-Mo.) said the agency was “the last thing that our lenders need.” Rep. Robert Dold (R-Ill.) ridiculed the “theoretical consumer protection” the agency would provide. Rep. Sean Duffy (R-Wis.) complained that, in Warren’s agency, “consumer protection could trump safety and soundness.” 

Apparently, these politicians learned nothing useful from the crisis. The first thing honest bankers need is an end to fraudulent mortgage lending. Ending fraudulent mortgage lending does not “trump safety and soundness” – it is essential to attain and maintain safety and soundness. Liar’s loans destroyed trillions of dollars in wealth and caused many lenders to fail. They created inverse Pareto optimality – both parties were made worse off by the typical liar’s loan. The agents were the winners. Akerlof & Romer explained this dynamic in the title of their 1993 article – “Looting: the Economic Underworld of Bankruptcy for Profit.” The looting causes the bank to fail (unless it is bailed out) but the senior officers walk away wealthy. Fraud is almost always a negative sum transaction – the losses exceed the gains. Accounting control fraud produced exceptional net losses at banks because the recipe for creating short-term fictional reported income also maximizes real losses.

A vigorous regulatory cop on the beat, and Elizabeth Warren is the exemplar, is exactly what honest banks and bankers need. But even honest bankers are typically Pavlovian about financial regulation. They have been taught for decades by theoclassical economists and anti-regulatory ideologues that regulation is evil. Regulators also ask embarrassing questions and criticize senior managers. So, it is the rare honest bank CEO who will publicly support vigilant regulation. If you have a psychological need to be liked by the bankers or if you think of them as your “clients” or “customers” you are unsuited to be a financial regulator because you are incapable of functioning as a cop on the beat.

The Assault on the Already Crippled SEC and CFTC Will Increase “Control Fraud”

By William K. Black

(cross-posted with Benzinga.com)

The SEC and the CFTC’s budgets are not provided by the federal budget. The agencies, as with the federal banking regulatory agencies, are funded by user fees. None of these agencies’ budgets contribute to the deficit. When these agencies fail to stop epidemics of “control fraud” the result can be a Great Recession and trillions of dollars in increased deficits. The asymmetry is so stark that anyone serious about deficits would make ensuring the effectiveness of the SEC, CFTC, and the banking regulatory agencies among their greatest priorities. Supposed deficit hawks in the House are also among the strongest proponents of cutting the SEC, CFTC, and banking regulatory agencies’ budget even though this cannot have any positive effect on deficits and is exceptionally likely to produce the next financial and economic crisis that will produce the next sharp increase in the federal deficit. This is significantly insane, and it is even more insane that no one seems to call them on their insanity.

The purported logic for slashing the SEC and CFTC budgets represents another form of insanity. The logic is that the SEC and the CFTC failed to prevent the epidemic of accounting control fraud that drove the current financial crisis, the Great Recession, and the growing budget deficit. That is true, but proves the opposite. The SEC and the CFTC failures were self-fulfilling prophecies by kindred ideologues of those now seeking to slash the SEC and CFTC budgets.

Deregulation was part of the story. The Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000 deliberately created two regulatory black holes. The Act’s primary goal was to block Brooksley Born’s efforts to protect the public from the risks of credit default swaps (CDS), but the subsidiary goal was Enron and its fellow cartel members’ desire to manipulate energy derivatives in order to produce the California energy crisis and reap monopoly rents. I have written previously about the SEC farce of supposed “comprehensive” regulation of the largest U.S. investment banking firms (designed explicitly to exempt them from comprehensive regulation by the European Union).

The larger part of the story, however, was desupervision and de facto decriminalization. My prior columns have detailed how our anti-regulatory leaders were selected precisely because they opposed vigorous enforcement of the nation’s securities and banking laws.

Collectively, the three “des” – deregulation, desupervision, and de facto decriminalization – created a crippling “systems capacity” crisis that achieved its goal of eliminating effective financial regulation in the U.S. for roughly a decade. The result of removing the regulatory system’s capacity to deal effectively with accounting control fraud was an epidemic of such fraud that caused the worst financial and economic crisis in 75 years. There is something outright obscene for the ideologues that gutted regulatory effectiveness to claim that their “success” in causing the regulatory failures justifies exacerbating those failures by budgetary cuts.

Deliberate, crippling limitations on financial regulatory budgets, staffing levels, and pay have played important roles in causing systems capacity problems in prior crises. Consider six recent financial regulatory staffing crises and the House’s ongoing attempts to worsen the SEC and the CFTC’s systems capacity problems.

1. In the savings & loan debacle, the Reagan administration froze the hiring of examiners and OMB refused to allow the agency the authority to hire any material increase in staff. Congress limited the Federal Home Loan Bank Board’s pay authority to levels materially less than its sister regulatory agencies. This mandatory pay disparity caused the Bank Board to suffer from excessive turnover, staff shortages, and inadequate staff quality. Bank Board Chairman Gray’s innovative use of the Federal Home Loan Banks to hire staff at competitive pay levels and his personal recruitment of senior banking regulators with a track record of vigorous regulation proved essential to the successful reregulation and supervision of the industry that contained that debacle before it could cause an economic crisis.

2. In the run up to the Enron era crisis, Congress limited the SEC’s pay grades to levels materially below the banking regulatory agencies. This produced the same pattern of high turnover, staff shortages, and impaired quality. Republicans in Congress repeatedly sought to exacerbate the SEC’s systems capacity crisis by reducing its budget – at a time when its regulatory duties were growing massively because of the extraordinary growth of finance.

3. In the run up to the current crisis the FDIC’s leadership, over the course of 15 years, cut the FDIC staff by more than three-quarters. The FDIC often used “early outs” to shed its most expensive staff, i.e., its most experienced staff. The combined effect was that the FDIC’s remaining staff was so grossly inadequate that it could not examine the banks. It responded to its systems incapacity by greatly reducing its non-safety and soundness examinations (particularly examinations of compliance under the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA)), by virtually ending the use of its “backup” examination authority of banks for which the FDIC was not the primary regulator, and by adopting the infamous MERIT examination system for safety and soundness examinations. MERIT was a travesty. It achieved its purported “maximum efficiency” by directing examiners not even to review a sample of bad loans. Again, this was insane – failing to examine loan quality makes examination a farce. The FDIC gutted its staff even as the need for examination and supervision grew dramatically due to the profusion of fraudulent liar’s loans and the hyper-concentration of smaller banks in commercial real estate lending.

4. The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) also cut its staff in the run up to the current crisis. It did so even though S&Ls were the leading federally insured lenders making fraudulent liar’s loans and the need for intense examination and supervision required greatly increased staff.

5. The SEC and the CFTC suffered from severe budgetary and staffing limitations in the run up to the current crisis. Congress initially expanded the SEC’s budget and staff in response to the Enron-era crisis, but the number of SEC staff fell materially during the key years in the run up to the financial crisis. For the SEC and the CFTC, this decreased staffing was particularly harmful because the agencies faced a substantial need to provide staff to investigate the Enron-era frauds and greatly increased market manipulation at the same time that the epidemics of accounting control fraud and the underlying mortgage fraud were surging. The SEC and the CFTC also faced the overall rapid expansion of finance and technological changes in derivatives and hyper-trading. These changes caused critical inadequacies in SEC and CFTC staff levels, staff expertise, and technological resources.

6. Contemporaneously, the FBI and the Department of Justice suffered from critical staffing inadequacies to deal with the twin, related epidemics of accounting control fraud and mortgage fraud. The FBI transferred 500 FBI agents specializing in white-collar crime investigations to national security in response to the 9/11 attacks. The administration refused to allow the FBI to replace these lost white-collar specialists. The loss of the white-collar FBI agents was made far worse by the need to assign hundreds of the remaining FBI white-collar crime specialists to investigate the Enron-era accounting control frauds. The combined effect was that as late as FY 2008 there were only 180 FBI agents assigned to investigate mortgage fraud. There were 1000 FBI agents assigned to investigate S&L frauds during the debacle. Those FBI agents, working closely with the regulators, were essential to producing the over 1000 felony convictions in “major” S&L frauds committed during the debacle. The current crisis, of course, is vastly greater than the S&L debacle but we have roughly one-fifth as many FBI agents assigned to investigating the current frauds (and they are overwhelmingly assigned to relatively minor cases).

Not a single senior executive at the large fraudulent lenders making the liar’s loans has been convicted. Our most elite accounting control frauds now loot with impunity. The deliberate creation of severe systems capacity problems is an important contributor to the death of accountability and the rise of crony capitalism in the United States.

In my next column I will draw on the warnings of Lynn Turner, the SEC’s former chief accountant, about the increasing systems capacity problems at the SEC and the CFTC and the role of proposed budget cutbacks in creating the criminogenic environment that will help produce the next financial crisis. Again, none of these insane policies reduce governmental debt, but they do cause the recurrent, intensifying financial crises. Those crises caused hundreds of billions of dollars of losses in prior crises and now cause trillions of dollars of losses and deficits.

Marshall Auerback on Fox Business

Marshall Auerback appeared earlier today on Fox Business to answer the question: “Is the US really broke?”  The video can be viewed here.

William Black interviewed on KKZZ

William Black was recently interviewed on KKZZ’s Brainstormin’ with Bill Frank.  The interview can be heard here.

Deficit Spending: Time to Reframe the Debate

By Stephanie Kelton

As followers of this blog have discovered, we work within a framework that has been dubbed Modern Money Theory (MMT). The approach itself is fundamentally descriptive, although there are logical ways to apply the principles of the approach to any number of policy-oriented (i.e. prescriptive) economic problems. Above all, we are committed to describing the way government spending works in a modern money system. Once that is understood, it becomes apparent that a government with flexible exchange rates and a sovereign currency (US dollar, British pound, Mexican peso, etc.) can afford to purchase anything that is for sale in its own sovereign currency.
This means that debates about “affordability” become inapplicable. As this becomes more widely understood, we can begin to have a completely different — and vastly more important — debate about the size and role of government.  What do we, as Americans, want? Medicare for all? A job guarantee?  High-speed rail? Renewable energy?
As promoters of MMT, we are all very keen on Abba Lerner, who was one of the first to articulate the foundations of the approach. Lerner believed that the government should maintain the level of aggregate spending in the economy (either by reducing taxes, increasing its own spending or a combination of the two) at the rate consistent with full employment. We agree. This is the overarching goal. How we get there is, as I said, a matter of (political/social) choice.
But we cannot ‘get there’ until we dispense, once-and-for-all, with the erroneous belief that deficit spending is reckless and irresponsible, something akin to “fiscal child abuse”, as Kotlikoff and Burns so disgracefully characterized it.
Insteaad, just remember this fundamental accounting identity:
Private Sector Surplus = Public Sector Deficit + Current Account Surplus
For me, this is the most important identity in economics. It holds true in every nation at every point in time, and it is useful when you run thought experiments like, for example, “What will happen to the private sector’s balance sheet position if the government’s budget is cut by X% of GDP and the current account deficit remains Y% of GDP?”
So, for example, in the US we have a current account deficit of, roughly, 5% of GDP. This SUBTRACTS from the Private Sector Surplus. So, the only way the private sector can have positive net savings (i.e. a surplus) is for the government to run a deficit that is LARGER than the current account deficit. This is exactly what the government has been doing, and it is the reason the private sector has managed to sharply increase its savings in the downturn. Cutting the public sector deficit will reduce the private sector surplus one-for-one in a closed economy (i.e. one with no foreign trade and therefore no current account). It is an easy way to demonstrate that the government’s deficit is the private sector’s surplus.
So the next time someone tells you that the US government cannot “afford” to keep its promises to retirees, fund the arts, build bullet trains, and so on, ask them whether they understand any of this!
** And, no, it does not follow that because the US government “can” do something that it “should” do it.  It has the ability to puchase anything for sale in terms of its own currency.  Let us accept that point and then debate whether, when, and to what extent it should exercise this power.

The Unanticipated Consequences of MERS

By William K. Black

(cross-posted with Benzinga.com)

One of the defining motifs of theoclassical economics textbooks is the provision of examples of the unintended consequences of government action. Those consequences are invariably negative. The narrative is the government intended to achieve some goal, e.g., help the poor, and ended up harming the poor. Four counter narratives virtually never appear in these tracts. Theoclassical economists rarely mention: 1. Any governmental program that succeeds in its aims 2. Any governmental program that has unanticipated, positive consequences 3. Any private action that has negative unanticipated consequences 4. Any private action that has negative, intended consequences
A fifth counter narrative sometimes appears in theoclassical accounts – governmental actions that are intended to be harmful by the private parties that corruptly convince public sector actors to aid the private parties at the expense of the public interest. The fifth example reflects poorly on both the public and private sector actors and suggests that the private sector is a source of corruption of the public sector – which fits poorly with theoclassical dogma.
This column focuses on MERS as an example of the first and third types of counter narrative. It will be the first in a series of columns about MERS. A conservative, but not theoclassical economist, Hernando de Soto, is famous for his work on private property. I highly recommend his book: The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else. De Soto’s primary point is that private ownership of real property allows even poorer people to mobilize their limited wealth by pledging the real estate as security for loans. The individuals can use those loans as a source of capital to become entrepreneurs. De Soto uses the United States as an exemplar of his thesis, explaining that the colonies that become the U.S. began a system of public recordation of land titles and a system of surveying land. The developing U.S. made these systems a major priority. De Soto argues that these public sector programs were spectacularly successful and helped produce America’s economic success by encouraging entrepreneurial activity.

These two successful government programs (public recordation of land titles and transfers and public land surveys) achieved their intended goals. They made it far easier to pledge real property, which made real property more valuable. Public recordation greatly reduced the risk of fraudulent pledges. Reducing the risk of fraudulent pledges makes lenders more willing to lend and reduces the interest rates on secured lending. Reduced interest rates mean a lower “hurdle” rate for investment, which means that more productive investments will occur and economic growth will increase.

Public recordation in the U.S. became even more effective in spurring growth and efficiency with the development of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). Article 9 set out to make it far easier for lenders to access public records of liens by dramatically increasing the degree of uniformity in how and where such records would be kept. Article 9 was not only a governmental program that achieved its aim – it was the brainchild of an academic (Yale Law School’s Professor Grant Gilmore). Article 9 further reduced the risk of fraudulent pledges and greatly increased efficiency. Business, particularly lenders, strongly supported its adoption.

MERS (Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems) sought to privatize key aspects of the public title system. The primary purpose was to avoid recordation fees when interests in real property were assigned or transferred. MERS’ founders read like a who’s who of the entities who caused the recent financial crisis, so some scholars view its creation as an example of a private sector action intended to harm the public. This column assumes that MERS’ harms were, originally, unintended. It focuses on the insanity – from the standpoint of honest lenders and investors – of MERS’ devastation of a public system of recordation that had served business, particularly lenders and investors, brilliantly.

MERS’ problems are legion, but they are also inherent in its structure. This column addresses only one aspect of its “agency” problem. MERS is set up in a bizarre fashion designed to minimize costs. It has only a trivial number of real employees. It has no ability to check its members’ initial or continuing quality or integrity. MERS appoints its members’ personnel as MERS officers and exercises no meaningful oversight over their actions.

As I have explained in prior articles, MERS’ members have endemic, severe problems with mortgage documentation. They originated, purchased, or agreed to service loans and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) without the underlying mortgage note. Fraud begets fraud. The exceptional incidence of underlying mortgage origination fraud led to widespread failure to prepare and maintain proper documentation – and that was before the mortgage originators failed. When the mortgage originators failed, as they did by the hundreds, mortgage documents were frequently thrown away. Mortgage documentation became particularly defective because originators could sell mortgages without the purchaser even checking whether the seller was delivering the original note.

The secondary market in nonprime mortgages operated under the financial version of “don’t ask; don’t tell.” The incidence of fraud and defective documentation in nonprime loans was so large that the purchaser faced an inescapable dilemma. If it did competent underwriting it would detect widespread fraud and missing notes and document that it knew that the nonprime loan portfolio it was purchasing (and then reselling them as the collateral for CDOs) was fraudulent. Documenting that one is selling CDOs one knows to be backed by fraudulent loans that often lacked the underlying note is an excellent strategy for going to prison and being sued by every CDO purchaser. The alternative was not to do any meaningful underwriting when purchasing nonprime loans. The no meaningful underwriting alternative, however, maximized the already perverse incentives to originate and sell fraudulent loans lacking essential documentation.

MERS’ members, therefore, had overwhelming incentives to engage in foreclosure fraud. The loans they were seeking to foreclose on often lacked essential documentation and were induced by defrauding the borrower. They had no legal right to foreclose, but that result was unacceptable to the senior officers controlling the loan servicers. They insisted on results, and did not monitor compliance with the law. The result was tens of thousands of felonies – monthly – by some of the largest financial institutions in the world. Filing false affidavits became business as usual. No one senior in the Justice Department or administration appears to be seriously upset about this. These felonies were committed by, or at the direction of, MERS “officers” – and MERS does not appear to be seriously upset about fraudulently foreclosing on the homes of tens of thousands of Americans. I study fraud by elites, and even I am stunned by the frequency and nature of the frauds and felonies and the lack of prosecutions and the overall blasé attitude by CEOs to the fraud and felonies.

Why We Are Only Fanning the Flames of the Crisis

By Erik Dean

A Reuters article Monday announced that a recent National Association for Business Economics (NABE) survey of 47 economists found that “excessive federal indebtedness” and state and local government debt constitute panelists’ first and second greatest concerns for the economy.  Without access to the full report, it’s difficult to say whether the article accurately reflects the results of the survey, but the public summary and previous NABE reports are at least suggestive. 
The tax cut extension ultimately effected in last December’s Obama-GOP deal, for instance, was ostensibly prioritized over deficit reduction by NABE economists last August.  The deal’s contribution to this year’s growth is expected to be sizeable, according to the February survey.  Given that the deal’s budgetary effects amount to nearly $900B in the red, it’s difficult not to see the majority position of the NABE panelists as implicitly predicated on certain distributional policies: government deficits and debt are only a problem once favorable tax policy for the wealthy is a done deal.
In any case, the article presents an opportune moment to discuss the fallacious argument that budget deficits imperil the solvency of the federal government (see also here and here for more thorough, and adept, discussions).  This line of reasoning is dangerous so far as it promotes, or justifies, a neglectful macroeconomic policy at the federal level, but it’s made all the more dangerous in its consequences for the very real fiscal crises in which our state and local governments currently find themselves.

The relationship of the federal government to state and local governments is similar to the former’s relationship to households in that the federal government is the issuer of the currency of which states, counties, cities, and households are users.  As users of the currency, state and local governments, just like households, cannot run budget deficits without risking credit downgrades and insolvency.  Recessions typically diminish revenues for these users of the currency at the very time that their expenditures are most needed.
Readers of this blog will be familiar with the potential, and the need, for the federal government, by virtue of its position as issuer of the currency, to promote employment, output, income, and private expenditure through public expenditure.  Households are reliant on this counter-cyclical fiscal policy to mitigate the destructive effects of economic downturns—particularly unemployment and the suffering it causes.
Households, however, are also affected by the policies of state and local governments.  We rely on state and local governments for many of the services that facilitate not only a decent life but also the future prosperity of the nation: health, security, education, employment, and a social safety net to ameliorate the vagaries of the market economy.  We also surrender the revenues by which these services are funded. 
The problem lies in the dynamic relationships between non-issuer households, non-issuer governments, and the issuer government.  In short, because state and local governments are financially constrained, their budgets tend to be pro-cyclical—expanding services and lowering taxes in booms, cutting services and raising taxes in recessions—, precisely the opposite of what households need from government.
As Prof. Wray has explained on this blog, as users of a currency they don’t issue, state and local governments, like households, must finance their spending.  Revenues can come from bond sales, intergovernmental transfers, charges on services (e.g. hospitals, universities), or taxes, but ultimately the money for the government services we rely on must come from somewhere. 
During a recession, however, these revenues typically decline and the budget crises we’re seeing today result.  Let’s consider a few options state and local governments have in this situation, and their social and economic desirability: tax increases, where possible, are not only politically unpalatable, but socially undesirable as well.  Averaged across the country, middle and low-income households pay roughly twice the state and local taxes of upper-income households.  Revenues through regressive taxation are thus likely to disproportionately burden the lower and middle classes.  It may be added that it is simply bad economics to further tax spending in a time of high unemployment and depressed spending. 
Perhaps, then, the problem can be solved in terms of the services these governments provide.  Increases, for instance, in tuition at state colleges are a plausible means of lightening the load on state coffers, and states and their university systems have generally had no problem going to this well in recent years.  But, it is doubtful that making higher education more expensive is a good long-run plan for any state; and it’s certainly not in line with January’s State of the Union address.  The same, of course, can and has been said of widespread layoffs of teachers. 
An NABE survey last August found that their economists turned to the reduction of public-sector employee benefits and pensions as well as programmatic cuts as favored solutions for state and local budget crises.  But this only advocates for the realization of the very problem we’re dealing with: the pro-cyclical nature of state and local budgets when households, and firms alike, need counter-cyclical action from government. 
Contributors to this blog have made more appropriate recommendations.  Wray argued some time ago for immediate relief of the fiscal crises of state and local governments.  Profs. Black and Carbone (here and here) have similarly argued for a revenue sharing program to offset the pro-cyclical nature of state and local budgets.  Wray continued by proposing the elimination of regressive taxation through federal incentives to states and public investment in infrastructure. 
It is worth noting that all of these are made possible by the federal government’s position as issuer of the currency; and all are made necessary by the positions of households and state and local governments as users of the currency.  It is in fact because the state and local governments on which we rely for many essential services are users of a currency they don’t issue that their budget constraints can actually exacerbate recessions.  Taking account of these facts, each of the recommendations from NEP bloggers avoids the myriad real, long-run harms of, e.g., making higher education unaffordable, laying off teachers and discouraging students from pursuing a career in teaching, cutting back vital government services, neglected much-needed infrastructure investment, and so on.
To the extent that it leads policy-makers at the federal level to cut spending, the fabricated budget crisis of the federal government can only fan the flames of the real fiscal crises of state and local governments and the long-run social and economic problems they create.  The well-known effects of sustained recessions, in terms of lost output and the myriad socials ills stemming from unemployment, are thus compounded by the efforts of state and local governments trying desperately to keep afloat: increased (regressive) taxes suppress spending and increase income inequality, social programs are cut just when they’re needed most, continued neglect of our declining public infrastructure jeopardizes our future prosperity, lay-offs and furloughs of public workers diminish essential services, employment, and spending
The Reuters article that sparked this post led with the federal, state, and local government debt and deficits as the “gravest threat[s] to the economy.”  It took care to note that these worries topped concern over high unemployment, which according to the NABE survey itself is expected to remain high.  The common run of facts suggests that the subordination of the real, and very much felt, crises of unemployment and state and local services to the federal deficit is absurd; economic theory merely confirms this.

Listen to L. Randall Wray on KUOW

Randall Wray appeared on KUOW‘s “The Conversation,” hosted by Ross Reynolds.  The topic: the largest contributors to the federal deficit–Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security, and Defense.  To listen click here.

William Black noted in IPA News Release

William Black was noted in a news release yesterday from the Institute for Public Accuracy.  The release quotes Black on the role of financial regulators in combating fraud and links to an MSNBC piece in which Black appeared with ‘Inside Job’ director Charles Ferguson.