Tag Archives: fraud

Not with a Bang, but a Whimper: Bank of America’s Death Rattle

By William K. Black

Bob Ivry, Hugh Son and Christine Harper have written anarticle that needs to be read by everyone interested in the financialcrisis.  The article (available here) is entitled: BofA Said to Split RegulatorsOver Moving Merrill Derivatives to Bank Unit. The thrust of their story is that Bank of America’s holdingcompany, BAC, has directed the transfer of a large number of troubled financialderivatives from its Merrill Lynch subsidiary to the federally insured bank Bank of America (BofA).  The story reports that the FederalReserve supported the transfer and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation(FDIC) opposed it.  Yves Smith of Naked Capitalism has written an appropriately blistering attack on this outrageous action, which puts thepublic at substantially increased risk of loss.  

I write toadd some context, point out additional areas of inappropriate actions, and adda regulatory perspective gained from dealing with analogous efforts by holdingcompanies to foist dangerous affiliate transactions on insureddepositories.  I’ll begin by adding somehistorical context to explain how B of A got into this maze of affiliateconflicts.

KenLewis’ “Scorched Earth” Campaign against B of A’s Shareholders

AcquiringCountrywide: the High Cost of CEO Adolescence

During this crisis, Ken Lewis went on a buying spreedesigned to allow him to brag that his was not simply bigger, but thebiggest.  Bank of America’s holdingcompany – BAC – became the acquirer of last resort.  Lewis began his war on BAC’s shareholders byordering an artillery salvo on BAC’s own position.  What better way was there to destroyshareholder value than purchasing the most notorious lender in the world –Countrywide.  Countrywide was in themidst of a death spiral.  The FDIC wouldsoon have been forced to pay an acquirer tens of billions of dollars to induceit to take on Countrywide’s nearly limitless contingent liabilities and toxicassets.  Even an FDIC-assistedacquisition would have been a grave mistake. Acquiring thousands of Countrywide employees whose primary mission wasto make fraudulent and toxic loans was an inelegant form of financialsuicide.  It also revealed the negligiblevalue Lewis placed on ethics and reputation.  
    
But Lewis did not wait to acquire Countrywide with FDICassistance.  He feared that a rival wouldacquire it first and win the CEO bragging contest about who had the biggest,baddest bank.  His acquisition ofCountrywide destroyed hundreds of billions of dollars of shareholder value andled to massive foreclosure fraud by what were now B of A employees. 

But there are two truly scary parts of the story of B of A’sacquisition of Countrywide that have received far too little attention.  B of A claims that it conducted extensive duediligence before acquiring Countrywide and discovered only minor problems.  If that claim is true, then B of A has beendoomed for years regardless of whether it acquired Countrywide.  The proposed acquisition of Countrywide was hugeand exceptionally controversial even within B of A.  Countrywide was notorious for its fraudulentloans.  There were numerous lawsuits andformer employees explaining how these frauds worked. 

B of A is really “Nations Bank” (formerly named NCNB).  When Nations Bank acquired B of A (the SanFrancisco based bank), the North Carolina management took completecontrol.  The North Carolina managementdecided that “Bank of America” was the better brand name, so it adopted thatname.  The key point to understand isthat Nations/NCNB was created through a large series of aggressive mergers, sothe bank had exceptional experience in conducting due diligence of targets foracquisition and it would have sent its top team to investigate Countrywidegiven its size and notoriety.  Theacquisition of Countrywide did not have to be consummated exceptionallyquickly.  Indeed, the deal had an “out”that allowed B of A to back out of the deal if conditions changed in an adversemanner (which they obviously did).  If Bof A employees conducted extensive due diligence of Countrywide and could notdiscover its obvious, endemic frauds, abuses, and subverted systems then theyare incompetent.  Indeed, that word istoo bloodless a term to describe how worthless the due diligence team wouldhave had to have been.  Given the manyacquisitions the due diligence team vetted, B of A would have been doomedbecause it would have routinely been taken to the cleaners in those earlierdeals.

That scenario, the one B of A presents, is not credible.  It is far more likely that B of A’s seniormanagement made it clear to the head of the due diligence review that the dealwas going to be done and that his or her report should support that conclusion.  This alternative explanation fits well with Bof A’s actual decision-making. Countrywide’s (and B of A’s) reportedfinancial condition fell sharply after the deal was signed.  Lewis certainly knew that B of A’s actualfinancial condition was much worse than its reported financial condition andhad every reason to believe that this difference would be even worse atCountrywide given its reputation for making fraudulent loans.  B of A could have exercised its option towithdraw from the deal and saved vast amounts of money.  Lewis, however, refused to do so.  CEOs do not care only about money.  Ego is a powerful driver of conduct, and CEOscan be obsessed with status, hierarchy, and power.  Of course, Lewis knew he could walk awaywealthy after becoming a engine of mass destruction of B of A shareholdervalue, so he could indulge his ego in a manner common to adolescent males.   


AcquiringMerrill Lynch: the Lure of Liar’s Loans

Merrill Lynch is the quintessential example of why it wascommon for the investment banks to hold in portfolio large amounts ofcollateralized debt obligations (CDOs). Some observers have jumped to the naïve assumption that this indicatesthat the senior managers thought the CDOs were safe investments.  The “recipe” for an investor maximizingreported income differs only slightly from the recipe for lenders.

  1. Grow rapidly by
  2. Holding poor quality assets that provide a premium nominal yield while
  3. Employing extreme leverage, and
  4. Providing only grossly inadequate allowances for future losses on the poor quality assets
Investment banks that followed this recipe (and most largeU.S. investment banks did), were guaranteed to report record (albeit fictional)short-term income.  That income wascertain to produce extreme compensation for the controlling officers.  The strategy was also certain to produceextensive losses in the longer term – unless the investment bank could sell itslosing position to another entity that would then bear the loss. 

The optimal means of committing this form of accountingcontrol fraud was with the AAA-rated top tranche of CDOs.  Investment banks frequently purport to basecompensation on risk-adjusted return.  Ifthey really did so investment bankers would receive far less compensation.  The art, of course, is to vastly understatethe risk one is taking and attribute short-term reported gains to the officer’s brilliance in achievingsupra-normal returns that are not attributable to increased risk(“alpha”).  Some of the authors of Guaranteed to Fail call this processmanufacturing “fake alpha.” 

The authors are largely correct about “fake alpha.”  The phrase and phenomenon are correct, butthe mechanism they hypothesize for manufacturing fake alpha has no basis inreality.  They posit honest gambles on“extreme tail” events likely to occur only in rare circumstances.  They provide no real world examples.  If risk that the top tranche of a CDO wouldsuffer a material loss of market values was, in reality, extremely rare then itwould be impossible to achieve a substantial premium yield.  The strategy would diminish alpha rather thanmaximizing false alpha.  The risk thatthe top tranche of a CDO would suffer a material loss in market value washighly probable.  It was not a tailevent, much less an “extreme tail” event. CDOs were commonly backed by liar’s loans and the incidence of fraud inliar’s loans was in the 90% range.  Thetop tranches of CDOs were virtually certain to suffer severe losses as soon asthe bubble stalled and refinancing was no longer readily available to delay thewave of defaults.  Because liar’s loanswere primarily made to borrowers who were not creditworthy and financiallyunsophisticated, the lenders had the negotiating leverage to charge premiumyields.  The officers controlling therating agencies and the investment banks were complicit in creating a corruptsystem for rating CDOs that maximized their financial interests by routinelyproviding AAA ratings to the top tranche of CDOs “backed” largely by fraudulentloans.  The combination of the fake AAArating and premium yield on the top tranche of fraudulently constructed (andsold) CDOs maximized “fake alpha” and made it the “sure thing” that is one ofthe characteristics of accounting control fraud (see Akerlof & Romer 1993;Black 2005).  This is why many of theinvestment banks (and, eventually, Fannie and Freddie) held substantial amountsof the top tranches of CDOs.  (A similardynamic existed for lower tranches, but investment banks also found it muchmore difficult to sell the lowest tranches.)  

Merrill Lynch was known for the particularly large CDOpositions it retained in portfolio. These CDO positions doomed Merrill Lynch.  B of A knew that Merrill Lynch had tremendouslosses in its derivatives positions when it chose to acquire MerrillLynch. 

Giventhis context, only the Fed, and BAC, could favor the derivatives deal

Lewis and his successor, Brian Moynihan, have destroyednearly one-half trillion dollars in BAC shareholder value.  (See my prior post on the “Divine Right ofBank Profits…”)  BAC continues todeteriorate and the credit rating agencies have been downgrading it because ofits bad assets, particularly its derivatives. BAC’s answer is to “transfer” the bad derivatives to the insured bank – transforming (alaIreland) a private debt into a public debt. 

Banking regulators have known for well over a century aboutthe acute dangers of conflicts of interest. Two related conflicts have generated special rules designed to protectthe bank and the insurance fund.  Onerestricts transactions with senior insiders and the other restrictstransactions with affiliates.  The scamis always the same when it comes to abusive deals with affiliates – theytransfer bad (or overpriced) assets or liabilities to the insured institution.  As S&L regulators, we recurrently facedthis problem.  For example, Ford MotorCompany attempted to structure an affiliate transaction that was harmful to theinsured S&L (First Nationwide).  Thebank, because of federal deposit insurance, typically has a higher creditrating than its affiliate corporations.

BAC’s request to transfer the problem derivatives to B of Awas a no brainer – unfortunately, it was apparently addressed to officials atthe Fed who meet that description.  Anycompetent regulator would have said: “No, Hell NO!”  Indeed, any competent regulator would havedeveloped two related, acute concerns immediately upon receiving therequest.  First, the holding company’scontrolling managers are a severe problem because they are seeking to exploitthe insured institution.  Second, thesenior managers of B of A acceded to the transfer, apparently without protest,even though the transfer poses a severe threat to B of A’s survival.  Their failure to act to prevent the transfercontravenes both their fiduciary duties of loyalty and care and should lead totheir resignations.

Now here’s the really bad news.  First, this transfer is a superb “naturalexperiment” that tests one of the most important questions central to thehealth of our financial system.  Does theFed represent and vigorously protect the interests of the people or thesystemically dangerous institutions (SDIs) – the largest 20 banks?  We have run a real world test.  The sad fact is that very few Americans willbe surprised that the Fed represented the interests of the SDIs even though theywere directly contrary to the interests of the nation.  The Fed’s constant demands for (andcelebration of) “independence” from democratic government, combined withslavish dependence on and service to the CEOs of the SDIs has gone beyondscandal to the point of farce.  I suggestorganized “laugh ins” whenever Fed spokespersons prate about their“independence.”

Second, I would bet large amounts of money that I do nothave that neither B of A’s CEO nor the Fed even thought about whether thetransfer was consistent with the CEO’s fiduciary duties to B of A (v.BAC).  We took depositions during theS&L debacle in which senior officials of Lincoln Savings and its affiliateswere shocked when we asked “whose interests were you representing – the S&Lor the affiliate?”  They had obviouslynever even considered their fiduciary duties or identified their actualclient.  We blocked a transaction thatwould have caused grave injury to the insured S&L by taking the holdingcompany (Pinnnacle West) off the hook for its obligations to the S&L.  That transaction would have passed routinely,but we flew to the board of directors meeting of the S&L and reminded themthat their fiduciary duty was to the S&L, that the transaction was clearlydetrimental to the S&L and to the benefit of the holding company, and thatwe would sue them and take the most vigorous possible enforcement actionsagainst them personally if they violated their fiduciary duties.  That caused them to refuse to approve thetransaction – which resulted in a $450 million payment from the holding companyto the S&L.  (I know, $450 millionsounds quaint now in light of the scale of the ongoing crisis, but back then itpaid for our salaries in perpetuity.) 

Third, reread the Bloomberg column and wrap your mind aroundthe size of Merrill Lynch’s derivatives positions.  Next, consider that Merrill is only one,shrinking player in derivatives. Finally, reread Yves’ column in NakedCapitalism where she explains (correctly) that many derivatives cannot beused safely.  Add to that my point abouthow they can be used to create a “sure thing” of record fictional profits,record compensation, and catastrophic losses. This is particularly true about credit default swaps (CDS) because ofthe grotesque accounting treatment that typically involves no allowances forfuture losses. (FASB:  you must fix thisurgently or you will allow a “perfect crime.”). It is insane that we did not pass a one sentence law repealing theCommodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000. Between the SDIs, the massive, sometimes inherently unsafe and largelyopaque financial derivatives, the appointment, retention, and promotion offailed anti-regulators, and the continuing ability of elite control frauds toloot with impunity we are inviting recurrent, intensifying crises. 

I’ll close with a suggestion and request to reporters.  Please find out who within the Fed approvedthis deal and the exact composition of the assets and liabilities that weretransferred.


To keep up with Bill’s work follow on Twitter @WilliamKBlack and @deficitowl

William K. Black: “Enforce the Laws for the 99”

This segment of yesterday’s Dylan Ratigan show features William K. Black and David DeGraw of AmpedStatus.com.  Black argues that we need, “fire Geithner, fire Holder, and demand Bernanke’s resignation, and … replace them with people who will actually enforce the laws for the 99[%].”

This meets with David DeGraw’s approval, who then enlists our favorite white-collar criminologist to serve as the Attorney General for the Occupy Wall Street movement. Watch the entire segment here.

Lenders Put the Lies in Liar’s Loans and Bear the Principal Moral Culpability

By William K. Black

A reader has asked several important questions about liar’s loans that are critical to understanding the causes of the ongoing U.S. crisis. By 2006, half of all loans called “subprime” were also liar’s loans. Roughly one-third of all home loans made in 2006 were liar’s loans. The crisis was originally called a “subprime” crisis, but it was always a liar’s loan crisis. The reader is correct to inquire about causation and moral culpability.

“Dr. Black, are liar’s loans the same as stated income loans? In either case, how do we know whether buyers or loaners put the income for the loan? If most of these reported incomes were entered by borrowers, I would think most of the blame falls on them.”

Continue reading

The Solyndra Loans as Liar’s Loans

By William K. Black
(Cross-posted from Benzinga.com)

This column comments on Joe Nocera’s September 23, 2011 column entitled: The Phony Solyndra Scandal

Nocera’s column compares the statements of Solyndra’s controlling managers to Dick Fuld’s statements to the public about Lehman’s conditions and asserts with minimal explanation that neither could have been criminal. I have testified before the House Financial Services Committee at some length as to why Lehman was a “control fraud” so I disagree with Nocera. Lehman engaged in extensive accounting and securities fraud and caused massive losses by selling endemically fraudulent liar’s loans to the secondary market. It Soyndra’s controlling managers made false disclosures analogous to those made or permitted to go uncorrected by Fuld, then they too face a serious risk of criminal prosecution – it we ever replace Attorney General Holder with a prosecutor.

I also write to explain why Nocera is wrong to absolve the White House from scandal in the Solyndra matter. Nocera argues that it is inherently highly risky for the government to lend to companies the market will not loan to because their “green” projects are extremely risky commercial projects. He concludes that it is inevitable that many such loans will fail and that such failures do not demonstrate that the federally subsidized loan program for green energy companies is flawed. He concludes by warning that China dominates solar panel manufacture and that China will be the winner if the Republicans cut funding for the green energy programs.

Nocera is correct that the subsidized program is extremely risky. He identifies two of the risks. First, the technology developed may prove unmarketable. Second, entry by competitors may be so robust that the price of the relevant products (e.g., solar panels) suffer a “stunning collapse” and cause the U.S. Treasury-financed firm to fail even if the development of improved technology is modestly successful. 

There are obvious economic arguments against Nocera’s play of the Red Menace card. China heavily subsidizes solar panel manufacturing. Other nations (including the U.S.) subsidize solar panel manufacturing. Solar panels are still a specialty application that is not cost-effective in general usage absent public subsidies. The subsidies to the purchasers are not large enough to develop a market that has kept pace with the tremendous growth of solar panel production. The result has been a glut of solar panel production and a sharp drop in solar panel prices. In sum, the Chinese government is taking the very large financial risks of developing a new technology and the financial losses that come from selling us the solar panels at a low and sharply falling price that is inadequate to defray the costs of production and the risks of new product development. Nocera states that China has provide a $30 billion subsidy to solar panel producers purchasers, which has helped produce a glut of solar panels and caused a “stunning collapse” in their “market” price. That means that the great bulk of the Chinese subsidy has flowed to purchasers of solar panels, including Americans. Even if the Chinese develop a solar panel technology that is cost effective in general residential and commercial real estate usage there is no assurance that the Chinese government or public will find the production subsidies desirable. China may lose its solar panel production lead to a lower-cost producer or a higher quality producer. Other nations’ producers may be less than vigorous in enforcing the intellectual property rights of the Chinese producers, allowing domestic competitors to skip the large risks and costs of the research and development stage.

This column, however, generally emphasizes financial regulation, and there are reasons to use the word “scandal” to describe the administration’s treatment of its regulators in the Solyndra loan. Here is Nocera’s defense of the administration’s behavior:

 “Undoubtedly, the Solyndra “scandal” will draw a little blood: there are some embarrassing e-mails showing the White House pushing to get the deal done quickly so it could tout Solyndra’s green jobs as part of the stimulus package.

But if we could just stop playing gotcha for a second, we might realize that federal loan programs — especially loans for innovative energy technologies — virtually require the government to take risks the private sector won’t take. Indeed, risk-taking is what these programs are all about. Sometimes, the risks pay off. Other times, they don’t. It’s not a taxpayer ripoff if you don’t bat 1.000; on the contrary, a zero failure rate likely means that the program is too risk-averse. Thus, the real question the Solyndra case poses is this: Are the potential successes significant enough to negate the inevitable failures?”

Nocera’s effort to minimize the administration’s misconduct and his misstatements about risk are interrelated and they reprise the mistakes that the Bush administration made in its assault on financial regulation that led to the ongoing financial crisis. Life does not reward all risks. The quintessential risk that it does not reward in lending is failing to underwrite. A lender that fails to underwrite prudently is taking a severe risk, for the failure causes “adverse selection.” Lenders that make large loans (e.g., mortgages or loans to solar panel manufacturers) under conditions of adverse selection have a “negative expected value” – they are gambling against the house. Lenders that make loans with a negative expected value will suffer severe losses.

We are still suffering from a crisis driven by CEOs of lenders who deliberately destroyed essential underwriting in order to maximize the accounting control fraud “recipe” that I have explained many times. The result was “liar’s” loans. By 2006, roughly half of loans called “subprime” were also liar’s loans. Approximately one-third of U.S. mortgage loans made in 2006 were liar’s loans and the fraud incidence in studies of liar’s loans is 90 percent. Liar’s loans caused staggering direct losses and hyper-inflated and extended the residential real estate bubble, driving the Great Recession.

So the “real question” is not the one Nocera framed. The real question is why a lender (the U.S. government in this case) would gratuitously fail to underwrite a loan properly. The fact that the type of loan was inherently extremely risky makes it imperative that the lender engage is superb underwriting. The Obama administration, and Nocera, have failed to learn the most obvious and costly lesson of the ongoing U.S. crisis – liar’s loans cause catastrophic losses and failures and are “an open invitation to fraudsters” (quoting MIRA’s 2006 report to the members of the Mortgage Bankers Association).

Nocera does not explain what is embarrassing about the Obama emails. The government’s professional loan underwriters were worried about lending to Solyndra. They were warning the administration that they had not been able to complete the professional underwriting essential to making loans prudently. The Obama administration officials did not respond by backing their professional regulators. The administration did not stress that it was essential that the loan be approved only after it passed a rigorous underwriting process. The administration responded to the efforts of its professionals to protect the government from loss by abusing the regulators and pressuring them to approve the loans without completing the underwriting. The administration thought it was fine to make a liar’s loan to Solyndra. 

The administration exposed the government to a gratuitous risk of loss of hundreds of millions of dollars in order to achieve an overarching priority – they wanted a presidential photo op. If that isn’t a scandal, if Nocera thinks it is merely business as usual, then our failure to hold Dick Fuld, President Obama, and a host of other elites to a higher standard of accountability is the scandal that will generate repeated scandal.

Bill Black is the author of The Best Way to Rob a Bank is to Own One and an associate professor of economics and law at the University of Missouri-Kansas City. He spent years working on regulatory policy and fraud prevention as Executive Director of the Institute for Fraud Prevention, Litigation Director of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and Deputy Director of the National Commission on Financial Institution Reform, Recovery and Enforcement, among other positions.


Bill writes a column for Benzinga every Monday. His other academic articles, congressional testimony, and musings about the financial crisis can be found at his Social Science Research Network author page and at the blog New Economic Perspectives.

Mark Steyn’s Ode to Criminogenic Environments

By William K. Black
(Cross-posted from Benzinga.com)

This column was prompted by listening to Mark Steyn (an ultra right writer) giving a C-SPAN talk on his new book that asserts that America has destroyed itself and will be superseded soon by China. Steyn is best known for his fear of a Muslim takeover of Europe. (During the C-SPAN talk he warned that the “Mullahs of Dearborn” had created “Michiganistan.” I grew up in Dearborn, Michigan, so perhaps I am agent of this dread conspiracy that has subjugated one of our states – and cleverly disguised its takeover by radical Islamic agents by electing conservative Republicans to run the state.)

Steyn’s contradictory concerns are that the United States government borrows too much money and spends too little on the military and too much on education. (He opines that university educations are a “waste” for “most” college students. Again, I may be an agent of this evil conspiracy to educate our kids.) He was a strong supporter of our recent invasions. He expressed his distress that the U.S. military was not leading the war in Libya. Under Steyn’s view of how financial systems work, those invasions were financed primarily by issuing large amounts of debt and were major contributors to what he terms a “debt catastrophe.” Indeed, he emphasizes his support for the massive amount of money that the U.S. spends on its military even when we are not a war – roughly the same amount as the rest of the world combined. He also claims that Western Europe is able to fund its generous social programs because they are “free riders” on the U.S. military. In other words, he argues that military spending limits U.S. growth and increases Treasury debt – and we should expand our spending and our invasions. His views are logically incoherent.

Steyn claims that he is most concerned about “wealth that is not yet created.” That is an excellent concern, one that competent economists stress. It is a concern that has virtually disappeared, however, in the context of the budget deficit games. We have roughly 25 million Americans that want to work full time but cannot do so because of the Great Recession. Their potential productivity is the quintessential example of “wealth that is not yet created” – the thing Steyn purports to find most distressing. Keeping twenty-five million Americans who want to work full time unemployed and underemployed constitutes the definition of “waste” and the gratuitous destruction of “wealth that has not yet created.” The waste and destruction of wealth are pointless – there is no benefit. The waste and damage are far broader than economic. Unemployment damages people, particularly adults, and communities. We can end all but a small residual of transitional unemployment any time we choose to do so. Doing so would shorten the Great Recession and greatly reduce its damage.

It is deficit hawks like Steyn, however, that keep us from creating the “wealth that is not yet created.” Steyn can’t understand that the primary reason that the deficit rose sharply was because of the Great Recession. Steyn is so unaware of economic theory that he wants the U.S. to adopt pro-cyclical policies that would have made the Great Recession far worse. He also thinks that governments with sovereign currencies are just like households when it comes to their debt. Worse, he thinks budget deficits are “moral” issues rather than financial issues. “It’s not a spending crisis, it’s a moral one.” “We are looting the future to bribe the present.”

There is a moral component to this crisis and “looting” is the key. George Akerlof and Paul Romer captured the component in the title of their famous 1993 article (“Looting: the Economic Underworld of Bankruptcy for Profit”). There are real looters out there, running many of our largest financial institutions. Their frauds hyper-inflated the financial bubble and drove the Great Recession. Running a deficit in a recession is not “looting.” Balancing a budget during a recession is insanely pro-cyclical. In 1937, when President Roosevelt made the grave mistake of listening to his conservative economic advisors and tried to balance the budget the policy through the U.S. back into the worst of the Great Depression.

Steyn is correct that the core of the real moral crisis is that we are “… absolving the citizenry for responsibility from their actions.” The citizens we are absolving are the perpetrators of the looting. The CEOs running the “control frauds” are not being prosecuted. They simultaneously caused catastrophic losses and profited enormously from their frauds (“bankruptcy for profit”). Steyn explicitly warns about the damage that elite frauds do to a nation, stressing “the fragility of civilization.” He claimed that the U.S. was about to become a Latin American nation entrenched in crony capitalism characterized by a wealthy, corrupt elite and vast numbers of the poor. He is correct that this crisis both represents and causes “the diversion of too much human capital into wasteful and self-indulgent activity.” The CEOs that run control frauds cause enormous, inefficient diversion of capital to the least productive investments and do so for the most self-indulgent reasons and in the most indulgent manner. They gloried in their toys, the private jets and many luxury cars. In a nation with a grave shortage of citizens with expertise in mathematics and the hard sciences we took many of our top graduates and made them financial “quants.” The quants, acting in accordance with the perverse financial incentives that the senior officers created, destroyed wealth. The full opportunity cost of diverting quantitative experts from science to aiding fraudulent finance includes the scientific research opportunities foregone. Steyn claims that college is a “waste” for “most” people who attend, but I’m one of the millions who are alive because of health research by university-trained scientists.

Steyn, however, is again a major part of the problem. He is notorious for his defense of the CEOs found guilty of running control frauds, i.e., his friend and fellow Canadian Conrad Black (no relation to me). Rather than holding these elite frauds accountable, Steyn is one of the leaders in the effort to allow them to loot with impunity. As Akerlof explained in his classic 1970 article on a market for “lemons,” fraud can create a “Gresham’s” dynamic in which markets become powerfully perverse. When frauds prosper, bad ethics drives good ethics from the marketplace. It is imperative that regulators serve as the regulatory “cops on the beat” to ensure that the frauds do not prosper and prevent economic catastrophe. Steyn is a virulent opponent of effective financial regulation. In his talk, he expressed no concern over the fraudulent elites extracting billions of dollars in wealth from creditors and shareholders. His rage was addressed to schoolteachers. Ignoring the trade-off they made between receiving lower salaries but superior pensions, Steyn focuses solely on the pensions received by public workers and claims that they are outrageous. He does not explain why his outrage is reserved for the little people, and only for the one portion of their compensation that is not sub-market.

The U.S. followed Steyn’s anti-regulatory policies for years, creating the criminogenic environment that produced our recurrent, intensifying financial crises. The three “de’s” – deregulation, desupervision, and de facto decriminalization – that led to the current crisis disappear in Steyn’s telling of the tale. Instead, he claims: “We see an unprecedented transfer of resources from the productive class to the obstructive class – to government, to regulators, to bureaucracies.” “We are redistributing liberty.” “Law has been supplanted by regulation.” Many of the regulators are “to the left of either party.” They U.S. is engaged in unprecedented, “hyper-regulatory direct rule….”

The reality is that the financial regulatory agencies, for decades, have been led overwhelmingly by conservative business people who are reflexively opposed to regulation. There are exceptions, but Steyn is correct that our financial policies are “rule[d] by a monopoly of ideas.” That monopoly is the opposite of the one Steyn fears – it is the neoclassical economics and modern finance idea that markets are efficient and automatically exclude fraud and that regulation is therefore unnecessary and harmful.

Steyn appears to assume, contrary to fact, that the CEOs of the financial firms are the “productive class.” He contrasts them to President Obama: “We entrusted a multi-trillion dollar enterprise to a guy who has never created a dime of wealth in his life and then we were surprised that for some reason it did not work out.” Let’s recall reality. We entrusted the U.S. government to President Bush. As a serial failure as an oil executive, our nation’s first MBA president destroyed wealth. He was repeatedly bailed out and ultimately made wealthy by political opportunists. As President, he destroyed staggering amounts of wealth and life. The CEOs of the nonprime lenders and investors destroyed massive amounts of wealth (roughly $10 trillion) – and were made personally wealthy because they did so.

But for the bailout by the U.S. government, the financial system would have collapsed. Steyn praised Americans as unique. Nearly all other Western nations experienced major protests demanding that the government take on the elite bankers, but in the U.S. the Tea Party protests were funded by the most conservative business factions and the protests demanded that the government adopt those factions’ anti-regulatory agenda. Steyn claimed that the Tea Party message was that they would be just fine if only the government were to do nothing in response to the crisis. That message is false as a matter of economics. Only the government was able to protect the Tea Party members from alling into a depression. Individuals cannot protect themselves effectively from a Great Depression or a Great Recession.

Steyn concluded his substantive argument with these words.
“I quote Milton Friedman: ‘don’t elect the right people to do the right things, create the conditions whereby the wrong people are forced to do the right things. There should be nothing controversial [about that statement].’”

What Steyn fails to understand is that Friedman’s point refutes Steyn’s anti-regulatory thesis. Friedman was simply making the fundamental point of economics – focus on the incentives and ensure that they are (1) powerful and (2) prevent perverse behavior. Control fraud both arises from and causes intense, perverse incentives. Fraud begets fraud. Accounting control frauds deliberately create perverse Gresham’s dynamic to spur fraud within their product line and create criminogenic environments that produce “echo” fraud epidemics in related fields. The CEOs of the lenders that specialized in making fraudulent nonprime loans, for example, used their ability to hire, fire, and compensate to create these perverse incentives among appraisers, loan brokers, loan officers, and credit rating agencies. Note that this allowed the fraudulent CEOs to suborn “controls” into their most valuable fraud allies and created deniability while making it more difficult to prove the CEO’s intent to defraud.

Once more, Steyn is a leading critic of the reforms that are essential under Steyn’s logic to prevent these crises. A Gresham’s dynamic can cause good people to do the wrong things. Vigorous financial regulators who serve as the regulatory “cops on the beat” are essential to the creation of the proper incentives so that the wrong CEOs are forced to do the right things.


Bill Black is the author of The Best Way to Rob a Bank is to Own One and an associate professor of economics and law at the University of Missouri-Kansas City. He spent years working on regulatory policy and fraud prevention as Executive Director of the Institute for Fraud Prevention, Litigation Director of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and Deputy Director of the National Commission on Financial Institution Reform, Recovery and Enforcement, among other positions.

Bill writes a column for Benzinga every Monday. His other academic articles, congressional testimony, and musings about the financial crisis can be found at his Social Science Research Network author page and at the blog New Economic Perspectives.

Mitch Daniels Uses Benefit-Cost Analysis to Teach his Daughter Ethics

By William K. Black

(Cross-posted with Benzinga.com)

This is the fourth and final article in a series of pieces discussing the claim by a Cato scholar at CIFA’s recent meeting in Monaco that formal benefit-cost tests by economists were essential to prevent regulatory excess. The second column focused on a speech in 2001 by Mitch Daniels, then President Bush’s Office of Management and Budget (OMB) director to the Competitive Enterprise Institute (CEI).

Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr., Competitive Enterprise Institute Speech, 05/22/2002

Daniels is the nation’s leading proponent of benefit-cost tests, and the purpose of his speech was to advance arguments in favor of OMB economists’ use of benefit-cost tests to block the adoption of regulations. The column discussed Daniel’s use of a “mistress metaphor” to explain why economists’ formal benefit-cost tests are vital.

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Wallison: Leader of the Financial Wrecking Crew

By William K. Black

The most theoclassical economists are often non-economists like Peter Wallison. His bio emphasizes the passion that has consumed his adult life.

From June 1981 to January 1985, he was general counsel of the United States Treasury Department, where he had a significant role in the development of the Reagan administration’s proposals for deregulation in the financial services industry….

[He] is co-director of American Enterprise Institute’s (“AEI”) program on financial market deregulation.

Wallison is back in the media because the Republican Congressional leadership appointed him to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. The Commission has four Republicans and six Democrats. Three of the Republicans were architects of the financial deregulation policies that made possible the current crisis. The fourth, Bill Thomas, was an ardent Congressional supporter of those policies that helped make those policies law. Unsurprisingly, none of the Republicans is willing to support the findings of the Commission’s staff’s investigations of the causes of the crisis because deregulation, desupervison, and de facto deregulation (the three “des”) played a decisive role in making the crisis possible. Each of the Republican members of the Commission is in the impossible position of being asked to investigate his own policies, which the Commission’s investigations have shown to have had disastrous consequences.

Even within the Republicans, however, Wallison stands out for the zeal of his efforts to blame everything on the government and working class Americans. He decided that his Republican colleagues had been too weak in condemning the staff’s findings and wrote a separate, lengthy dissent to make his case. Wallison’s actions were predictable. He was famous prior to his appointment for creating the narrative that the government’s desire to help working class Americans purchase homes twisted Fannie and Freddie into the Great Satans that caused the crisis. He believes in complete deregulation – banks deposits should not be insured by the public and banks should not be regulated.

I have critiqued Wallison’s claims about the current crisis and explained why I think he errs. I will return to this task in future columns now that he has written a lengthy dissent. In this column I will discuss a portion of a shorter, even more revealing article that he wrote that exemplifies what I will argue are the consistent defects introduced by his anti-regulatory dogma in each of his apologies for a series of financial deregulatory disasters over the last 30 years.

Wallison wrote an article in Spring 2007 (“Banking Regulation’s Illusive Quest”) criticizing a conservative law and economics scholar, Jonathan Macey, who had written an article about financial regulation. Wallison was disappointed that Macey, who typically opposes regulation, concluded that banking regulation was necessary. Wallison wrote the article to rebut Macey. I’ll discuss only the portion of Wallison’s article that seeks to defend S&L deregulation.

Wallison begins his critique of Macey by asserting:

If the business of banking is inherently unstable, it would long ago have been supplanted by a stable structure that performs the same functions without instability.

Why? That assumes that there are banking systems that are inherently stable and that the market will inherently establish such systems. There is nothing in logic or economic history that requires either conclusion. Economic theory predicts the opposite. Indeed, the paradox of stability producing instability was Hyman Minsky’s central finding.

Wallison does not support his assertion. The accuracy of the assertion is critical to Wallison’s embrace of financial deregulation. If banks are inherently stable, then financial regulation is unnecessary. He assumes that which is essential to his conclusion. His closest approach to reasoning is circular and unsupported.

In the absence of regulation or deposit insurance, one would expect to see banks hold sufficient capital for this purpose, simply because instability would result without it and instability would make it difficult for banks to acquire deposits.

So, absent regulation and deposit insurance, bank instability cannot exist because instability would make banks unstable. Banks would want to be stable, so Wallison “expects” that they would hold “sufficient capital.” His “expectation” is his conclusion. One does not prove one’s conclusions by “expect[ing]” that they are true.

Wallison cited his (then) co-director of AEI’s deregulatory program, Charles Calomiris, who argued that early U.S. banks with broad branching authority had low failure rates. The study design could not prove Wallison’s argument about private market discipline. Mr. Calomiris’ attempt to employ his theories in the real world led to the failure in 2009 of the S&L he controlled. His brother, George, tried unsuccessfully to get Charles removed from his control of the S&L:

In 2004, after the company posted large losses, George Calomiris asked the board to replace Charles Calomiris and Amos with “qualified, experienced management,” he said in a letter to the board.

That request fell on deaf ears, George Calomiris said in an interview. “Since that time, I and everyone else who protested my brother’s total incapacity to do anything in the real world have seen the truth. … It’s been a total disaster.”

He said he has lost more than $1 million he invested in the bank. “This is not sour grapes. I’m not the only guy who has lost a fortune here.”

While calling his brother an esteemed professor, George Calomiris said “he hasn’t any idea how to run a bank.”

Several local banking experts and investors shared that sentiment, but declined to go on the record.

And that really is the central point of why Wallison, Calomiris, and AEI’s financial deregulatory efforts have caused so much harm to America. AEI’s financial deregulation efforts have been immensely influential even though they were run by individuals who had a “total incapacity to do anything” successful “in the real world.” Accounting and fraud happen in the real world and they turn these anti-regulatory dogmas into “a total disaster.” Indeed, they turn them into recurrent, intensifying disasters. That is why Tom Frank’s famous book title: “The Wrecking Crew” describes Wallison so well. He has led the financial wrecking crew. As his track record of failure has increased, so has his refusal to accept personal responsibility for those failures.

The dynamic Wallison relies upon, private market discipline, cannot be “expect[ed]” to be reliable. Even if we assumed that creditor and shareholders act in accordance with the rational actor model that Wallison implicitly relies upon (and economists and psychologists have proven that assumption is unreliable) it would not follow that private market discipline would be effective to make banks stable.

Private market discipline becomes harmful – not simply ineffective – in four common circumstances even if actors are purely rational. First, if creditors and shareholders believe they can rely on the bank having “sufficient capital” then control frauds will use accounting fraud to create fictional bank capital so that they can defraud the creditors and shareholders.

Second, given the risks of accounting control fraud to creditors and shareholders, creditors and shareholders will realize that reported net worth may be a lie. That uncertainty means that the creditors and shareholders may not be willing to lend to and invest in banks that are actually solvent. Indeed, the depositors may stage a run on a healthy bank. Capital does not save banks from serious runs.

Third, when the bank is an accounting control fraud its senior officers will use their ability to hire, fire, promote, and compensate to create perverse incentives that suborn its employees and internal and external controls (the appraisers, auditors, and credit rating agencies) and turn them into fraud allies. The perverse incentives create a “Gresham’s” dynamic in which bad ethics drives good ethics out of the marketplace. This produces what white-collar criminologists refer to as “echo” epidemics of fraud.

Fourth, banks engaged in accounting control fraud can generate Gresham’s dynamics and produce “echo” epidemics of fraud in “upstream” providers of loans. Bank control frauds create pay systems for loan brokers, and loan products, i.e., “liar’s” loans, that produce such intensely perverse financial incentives that they are intensely criminogenic. This produced endemic fraud in liar’s loans obtained by loan brokers.

Note that these failures demonstrate that deposit insurance does not end private market discipline. Fraudulent CEOs systematically pervert market incentives and use their power as purchasers and their ability to massively inflate reported income and capital to exert discipline and produce perverse behavior. Indeed, they create an environment so perverse that it becomes criminogenic.

Famous economists, Akerlof & Romer 1993 (“Looting: the Economic Underworld of Bankruptcy for Profit), the National Commission on Financial Institution Reform, Recovery and Enforcement (NCFIRRE) 1993 (which investigated the causes of the S&L debacle) and many of the nation’s top white-collar criminologists, Calavita, Pontell & Tillman 1997 (Big Money Crime), and a number of my works had explained how accounting fraud worked many years before Wallison wrote this article.

Wallison relies on the same circularity when he turns explicitly to the S&L debacle.

Because they were backed by the government, the s&ls were not required to hold capital that was commensurate with the risk they were taking, and depositors and other creditors were not concerned about this risk for the same reason.

His first clause merely asserts that the S&Ls would have been required to hold more capital absent deposit insurance. His second clause is even weaker. Why do “other creditors” – uninsured creditors at risk of suffering severe losses upon the failure of the S&L – should have exercised effective market discipline against the S&Ls. They never did so. Many S&Ls had subordinated debt. Anti-regulatory proponents like Wallison assert that subordinated debt provides superb private market discipline against banks. The purchasers of sub debt are not insured, they are supposed to be financially sophisticated, and they often buy large amounts of sub debt – all factors that are supposed to optimize private market discipline. The problem is that they have consistently failed to do so in reality. Deeply insolvent S&Ls were able to issue sub debt.

Neither Macey nor Wallison address the consistent failure of uninsured S&L creditors and shareholders – a failure that destroys their underlying assumption that deposit insurance is the cause of market discipline failures. But recall that Macey and Wallison were writing well after the S&L debacle. They were writing after the failure of the Enron-era accounting control frauds – frauds at firms that had no deposit insurance. Market discipline becomes an oxymoron in the presence of accounting control fraud. As Akerlof & Romer (1993) stressed, fraud is a “sure thing.” Creditors rush to lend to uninsured non-financial firms that report record (albeit fictional) income. The control frauds loot the creditors and shareholders. Despite having seen “private market discipline” fund rather than discipline hundreds of huge frauds, Macey and Wallison simply assumed that private market discipline would succeed absent deposit insurance.

Macey writes, “Without government regulation to substitute for the market discipline typically supplied by contractual fixed claimants, disaster ensued.” True enough, but regulation was clearly the underlying cause of the problem.

Wallison’s description of S&L deregulation is remarkably selective and disingenuous.

The deregulation that occurred was an effort to compensate for the earlier regulatory mistakes, but it was too late. Many in the industry were already hopelessly insolvent.

Deregulation was an expedient that came too late to halt the slide of the s&l industry toward insolvency.

And allowing undercapitalized or insolvent s&ls to continue to function — attracting deposits through use of their government insurance — guaranteed a financial catastrophe.

Only the last assertion is sound, but Wallison misinterprets even it, for it was a product of the deregulation that his department (Treasury) imposed on the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. Relatively few S&L were “hopelessly insolvent” as a result of the interest rate increases of 1979-82. NCFIRRE’s estimate is that $25 billion (of the $150 billion in total, present value cost ($1993) of resolving the debacle) was caused by interest rate increases. Interest rates began to fall later in 1982 and generally continued to fall. The great bulk of S&L failures – and the overwhelming bulk of the cost of resolving those failures – was caused by credit losses. Accounting control fraud was a major cause of those costs.

Wallison, understandably, focuses on the most benign aspects of S&L deregulation. Federally chartered S&L were permitted to issue adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) and S&Ls were permitted to pay depositors higher interest rates. (S&L regulators had long supported both of those changes. Congress was the problem.) I quoted above from Wallison’s bio to show his emphasis on his leadership role in framing the Reagan administration’s financial deregulation.

The deregulation, desupervision, and de facto decriminalization of the S&L industry that the Reagan administration initiated (including the “competition in laxity” that federal deregulation triggered at the State level) was far broader than Wallison discusses and was a dominant contributor to the cost of resolving the debacle. The “three des” created an exceptionally criminogenic environment. Absent reregulation, which we implemented over Wallison’s virulent opposition, it would have caused catastrophic losses. Here are only the most destructive of the “three des” that the administration initiated.

• Reducing the number of Federal Home Loan Bank Board examiners and froze hiring

• Sought to prevent the agency’s decision to double the number of examiners

• Perverting the accounting rules to hide losses and cover up the industry’s mass insolvency – which created fake capital and income that made it far harder to act against the frauds. Covering up the mass insolvency of the industry was at all time the Reagan administration’s dominant S&L industry priority.

• Reducing capital requirements

• Increasing the permissible loan-to-value (LTV) and loan-to-one-borrower (LTOB) ratios to the point where a single large, bad loan could render the S&L insolvent

• Allowed acquirers to create massive fictional assets – goodwill via mergers that made real losses disappear from accounting recognition and created large, fictional income from mergers of two insolvent S&Ls

• Allowed acquirers to have intense conflicts of interest

• Allowed single acquirers, overwhelmingly real estate developers, to take complete control of S&Ls

• Ceased placing insolvent S&Ls in receivership

• Created hundreds of new S&Ls (de novos), overwhelmingly controlled by real estate developers

• Attempted to appoint (on a recess basis without the Senate’s advice and consent) two members to run our federal agency selected by Charles Keating – the most infamous S&L control fraud. The agency was run by three members, so this would have given Charles Keating effective control of the agency.

• Testified before Congress and in a deposition taken in support of a lawsuit by the owners of an S&L challenging the Carter administration’s appointment of a receiver for the S&L based on its acknowledged insolvency. A senior Reagan administration Treasury official testified that insolvency

• The OMB threatened to file a criminal referral against the head of the agency, Ed Gray, who was reregulating the industry, on the purported grounds that he was closing too many failed S&Ls

• Treasury Secretary Baker met secretly with House Speaker James Wright and struck a deal under which the administration would not re-nominate Ed Gray,

The overall effect of the “three des” was that the S&L control frauds were originally able to loot with impunity. Roughly 300 fraudulent “high fliers” grew at an average rate of 50% in 1983. Gray began reregulating the industry in 1983, roughly six months after he became Chairman. The S&L frauds were able to hyper-inflate a regional real estate bubble in the Southwest. Reregulation contained the crisis by promptly and substantially reducing the growth of the fraudulent portion of the industry. Had deregulation continued an additional three years the costs of resolving the crisis would have risen to over $1 trillion. Note that Gray reregulated over the opposition of the Reagan administration (including Wallison), a majority of the members of the House, the Speaker of the House, the “Keating Five”, the industry trade association, and (at first) the media.

Wallison consistently refuses to even discuss the failures of private market discipline caused by accounting control fraud. His lengthy Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission rebuttal, for example, mentions the word fraud once. That reference ignores the evidence before the Commission on the endemic fraud by nonprime lenders and their agents that and mentions only fraud by borrowers. Accounting control fraud is the Achilles’ heel of private market discipline. Effective private market discipline is the sole pillar underlying Wallison’s anti-regulatory policies. He is one of the principal architects of the criminogenic environments that were principal causes of the second phase of the S&L debacle, the Enron-era frauds, and the current crisis. The recurrent, intensifying crises his policies generate have left him with a full time job as apologist-in-chief for his deregulatory disasters.

Randall Wray Interviewed on KPFK’s Daily Briefing

Randall Wray was interviewed recently on the economics and politics of the banking industry.  The full program can be found here, with Professor Wray’s interview beginning at 39:00.

William Black Interviewed on Parker & Spitzer

William Black was interviewed recently on the subject of unethical banking practices for Parker and Spitzer’s blog (cnn.com).  The full interview is available here.

William Black interviewed on Portland’s KBOO Community Radio

William Black was recently interviewed on KBOO’s ‘Old Mole Variety Hour’ regarding corruption in the banking industry.