Tag Archives: The National Debt

Should America Kowtow to China?

By Marshall Auerback
First Published on New Deal 2.0.

Do the Chinese really fund our deficit? Or is this more Neo-classical money mythology?

Another Presidential junket to Asia and another one of the usual lectures from China, decrying our “profligate ways”. Today’s Wall Street Journal reports:, “China’s top banking regulator issued a sharp critique of U.S. financial management only hours before President Barack Obama commenced his first visit to the Asian giant, highlighting economic and trade tensions that threaten to overshadow the trip.”

According to Liu Mingkang, chairman of the China Banking Regulatory Commission, a weak U.S. dollar and low U.S. interest rates had led to “massive speculation” that was inflating asset bubbles around the world. It has created “unavoidable risks for the recovery of the global economy, especially emerging economies,” Mr. Liu said. The situation is “seriously impacting global asset prices and encouraging speculation in stock and property markets.”

Well, “them’s fightin’ words”, as we say over here. And of course, the President and his advisors are supposed to accept this criticism mildly because in the words of the NY Times, the US has assumed “the role of profligate spender coming to pay his respects to his banker.”

The Times actually does believe this to be true. They refer to China’s role as America’s largest “creditor” as a “stark fact”. They do not seem to understand that simply because a country issuing debt which it creates, it does not depend on bond holders to “fund” anything. Bonds are simply a savings alternative to cash offered by the monetary authorities, as we shall seek to illustrate below.

It is less clear to us whether the Chinese actually believe this guff, or simply articulate it for public consumption. China has made a choice: for a variety of reasons, it has adopted an export-oriented growth strategy, and largely achieved this through closely managing its currency, the remnimbi, against the dollar.

One can query the choice, as many would argue that it is more economically and socially desirable for China to consume its own economic output. According to Professor Bill Mitchell, for example, “once the Chinese citizens rise up and demand more access to their own resources instead of flogging them off to the rest of the world…then the game will be up. They will stop accumulating financial assets in our currencies and we will find it harder to run [current account deficits] against them.”

But there have undoubtedly been certain benefits that have accrued to the Chinese as a consequence of this strategy. The export prices obtained by Chinese manufacturers are about 10 times as high as the prices obtained in the more competitive domestic markets, and the challenge of competing in global markets has forced Chinese manufacturers to adhere to higher quality standards. This, in turn, has improved the overall quality of Chinese products. In the words of James Galbraith:

“Is there a way for the Chinese manufacturing firm to turn a profit? Yes: the alternative to selling on the domestic market is to export. And export prices, even those paid at wholesale, must be multiples of those obtained at home. But the export market, however vast, is not unlimited, and it demands standards of quality that are not easily obtained by neophyte producers and would not ordinarily be demanded by Chinese consumers. Only a small fraction of Chinese firms can actually meet the standards. These standards must be learned and acquired by practice.” (”The Predator State, Ch. 6, “There is no such thing as free trade”, pg. 84).

What about the US government? What should it do? Should it actually respond to China’s complaints by trying to “defend the dollar”?

I hear this recommendation all of the time in the chatterplace of the financial markets, but seldom do those who fret about the dollar’s declining level actually suggest a concrete strategy to achieve the objective. In fact, it is unclear to me that there is any measure the Fed or Treasury could adopt which might support the dollar’s external value.

And why should they? Given the horrendous unemployment data, and 65% capacity utilization, it is hard to view imported inflationary pressures via a weaker dollar actually becoming a serious threat.

But wait? Don’t the Chinese (and other external creditors) “fund” our deficit? And won’t they demand a higher equilibrating interest rate in order to offset the declining value of their Treasury hoard?

Again, this displays a seriously lagging understanding of how much modern money has changed since Nixon changed finance forever by closing the Gold window in 1973. Now that we’re off the gold standard, the Chinese, and other Treasury buyers, do not “fund” anything, contrary to the completely false & misguided scare stories one reads almost daily in the press.

This claim is seldom challenged, but our friend, Warren Mosler, recently gave an excellent illustration of this fact in an interview with Mike Norman. Mosler provides a hypothetical example in which China decides to sell us a billion dollars’ worth of T-shirts. We buy a billion dollars’ worth of T-shirts from China:

“And the way we pay them is somebody pays China. And the money goes into their checking account at the Federal Reserve. Now, it’s called a reserve account because it’s the Federal Reserve, and they give it a fancy name. But it’s a checking account. So we get the T-shirts, and China gets $1 billion in their checking account. And that’s just a data entry. That’s just a one and some zeroes.

Whoever bought them gets a debit. You know, it might have been Disneyland or something. So we debit Disney’s account and then we credit China’s account.

In this situation, we’ve increased our trade deficit by $1 billion. But it’s not an imbalance. China would rather have the money than the T-shirts, or they wouldn’t have sent them. It’s voluntary. We’d rather have the T-shirts than the money, or we wouldn’t have bought them. It’s voluntary. So, when you just look at the numbers and say there’s a trade deficit, and it’s an imbalance, that’s not correct. That’s imbalance. It’s markets. That’s where all market participants are happy. Markets are cleared at that price.

Okay, so now China has two choices with what they can do with the money in their checking account. They could spend it, in which case we wouldn’t have a trade deficit, or they can put it in another account at the Federal Reserve called a Treasury security, which is nothing more than a savings account. You give them money, you get it back with interest. If it’s a bank, you give them money, you get it back with interest. That’s what a savings account is.”

The example here clearly illustrates that bonds are a savings alternative which we offer to the Chinese manufacturer, not something which actually “funds” our government’s spending choices. It demonstrates that rates are exogenously determined by our central bank, not endogenously determined by the Chinese manufacturer who chooses to park his dollars in treasuries (credit demand, by contrast, is endogenous).

Here is how the mechanics actually work: government spending and lending adds reserves to the banking system because when the government spends, it electronically credits bank accounts.

By contrast, government taxing and security sales (i.e. sales of bonds) drain (subtract) reserves from the banking system. So when the government realizes a budget deficit (as is the case today), there is a net reserve add to the banking system, WHICH BRINGS RATES LOWER (not higher). That is, government deficit spending results in net credits to member bank reserves accounts. If these net credits lead to excess reserve positions, overnight interest rates will be bid down by the member banks with excess reserves to the interest rate paid on reserves by the central bank (currently .25% in the case of the US since the Fed started to pay interest on these reserves). If the central bank has a positive target for the overnight lending rate, either the central bank must pay interest on reserves or otherwise provide an interest bearing alternative to non interest bearing reserve accounts. But this is a choice determined by our central bank, not an external creditor.

Yet we are constantly being told by the financial press that the dollar’s weakness was supposed be the factor that would “force” the Fed to raise rates, since the Chinese supposedly “fund” our deficits.

So far, that thesis hasn’t been borne out. And it won’t be, because this isn’t how things operate in a post gold-standard world.

And a second and equally salient point: what would those who fret about the dollar, have the Fed do? Should they raise rates to defend it? It is unclear that this would work. The relationship between a given level of interest rates offered by the central bank and the external value of a currency is tenuous. Consider Japan as Exhibit A. The BOJ has been offering virtually free money for 15 years and yet the yen today remains a strong currency (much to the chagrin of the likes of Toyota or Sony).

Of course, higher rates can have an offsetting beneficial income impact (what Bernanke calls the “fiscal channel”), but it does not follow that a decision to raise rates would actually elevate the value of the dollar (and the benefits of higher rates from an income perspective could just as easily be achieved via lower taxation).

The reality is that private market participants could well view the move as something akin to a panicked response by the Fed, and the decision could well trigger additional capital flight, which could weaken the value of the dollar.

So it is unclear to me what the Tsy or Fed should be doing about the dollar. My view is that this is a private portfolio preference shift and I don’t think central banks should be responding to every vicissitude of changing market preferences. The US government should simply ignore the market chatter and idle threats from the Chinese and do nothing.

One To Watch

By Stephanie Kelton

So far, President Obama has shown little understanding of our domestic monetary system. His pledge to cut the deficit in half by the end of his first term, together with his assertion that the federal government is “out of money”, reveal deep flaws in his understanding of key issues related to the workings of government finance. Unless he masters the basics of double-entry bookkeeping — and fast — the nation’s job numbers will remain grim, social unrest will mount, and every one of his political challengers will adopt the same battle cry in 2012: “President Obama mishandled the economy — Vote for me if you want a better tomorrow.”

Almost none of them will have a better understanding of the issues than our current president, but one candidate will, and his name is Warren Mosler. I ran across this interview yesterday and thought it was worth sharing. He is one to watch.

Money as a Public Monopoly

By L. Randall Wray

What I want to do in this blog is to argue that the reason both theory and policy get money “wrong” is because economists and policymakers fail to recognize that money is a public monopoly*. Conventional wisdom holds that money is a private invention of some clever Robinson Crusoe who tired of the inconveniencies of bartering fish with a short shelf-life for desired coconuts hoarded by Friday. Self-seeking globules of desire continually reduced transactions costs, guided by an invisible hand that selected the commodity with the best characteristics to function as the most efficient medium of exchange. Self-regulating markets maintained a perpetually maximum state of bliss, producing an equilibrium vector of relative prices for all tradables, including the money commodity that serves as a veiling numeraire.

All was fine and dandy until the evil government interfered, first by reaping seigniorage from monopolized coinage, next by printing too much money to chase the too few goods extant, and finally by efficiency-killing regulation of private financial institutions. Especially in the US, misguided laws and regulations simultaneously led to far too many financial intermediaries but far too little financial intermediation. Chairman Volcker delivered the first blow to restore efficiency by throwing the entire Savings and Loan sector into insolvency, and then freeing thrifts to do anything they damn well pleased. Deregulation, which actually dates to the Nixon years and even before, morphed into a self-regulation movement in the 1990s on the unassailable logic that rational self-interest would restrain financial institutions from doing anything foolish. This was all codified in the Basle II agreement that spread Anglo-Saxon anything goes financial practices around the globe. The final nail in the government’s coffin would be to preserve the value of money by tying monetary policy-maker’s hands to inflation targeting, and fiscal policy-maker’s hands to balanced budgets. All of this would lead to the era of the “great moderation”, with financial stability and rising wealth to create the “ownership society” in which all worthy individuals could share in the bounty of self-regulated, small government, capitalism.

We know how that story turned out. In all important respects we managed to recreate the exact same conditions of 1929 and history repeated itself with the exact same results. Take John Kenneth Galbraith’s The Great Crash, change the dates and some of the names of the guilty and you’ve got the post mortem for our current calamity.

What is the Keynesian-institutionalist alternative? Money is not a commodity or a thing. It is an institution, perhaps the most important institution of the capitalist economy. The money of account is social, the unit in which social obligations are denominated. I won’t go into pre-history, but I trace money to the wergild tradition—that is to say, money came out of the penal system rather than from markets, which is why the words for monetary debts or liabilities are associated with transgressions against individuals and society. To conclude, money predates markets, and so does government. As Karl Polanyi argued, markets never sprang from the minds of higglers and hagglers, but rather were created by government.

The monetary system, itself, was invented to mobilize resources to serve what government perceived to be the public purpose. Of course, it is only in a democracy that the public’s purpose and the government’s purpose have much chance of alignment. In any case, the point is that we cannot imagine a separation of the economic from the political—and any attempt to separate money from politics is, itself, political. Adopting a gold standard, or a foreign currency standard (“dollarization”), or a Friedmanian money growth rule, or an inflation target is a political act that serves the interests of some privileged group. There is no “natural” separation of a government from its money. The gold standard was legislated, just as the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 legislated the separation of Treasury and Central Bank functions, and the Balanced Budget Act of 1987 legislated the ex ante matching of federal government spending and revenue over a period determined by the celestial movement of a heavenly object. Ditto the myth of the supposed independence of the modern central bank—this is but a smokescreen to protect policy-makers should they choose to operate monetary policy for the benefit of Wall Street rather than in the public interest (a charge often made and now with good reason).

So money was created to give government command over socially created resources. Skip forward ten thousand years to the present. We can think of money as the currency of taxation, with the money of account denominating one’s social liability. Often, it is the tax that monetizes an activity—that puts a money value on it for the purpose of determining the share to render unto Caesar. The sovereign government names what money-denominated thing can be delivered in redemption against one’s social obligation or duty to pay taxes. It can then issue the money thing in its own payments. That government money thing is, like all money things, a liability denominated in the state’s money of account. And like all money things, it must be redeemed, that is, accepted by its issuer. As Hyman Minsky always said, anyone can create money (things), the problem lies in getting them accepted. Only the sovereign can impose tax liabilities to ensure its money things will be accepted. But power is always a continuum and we should not imagine that acceptance of non-sovereign money things is necessarily voluntary. We are admonished to be neither a creditor nor a debtor, but try as we might all of us are always simultaneously both. Maybe that is what makes us Human—or at least Chimpanzees, who apparently keep careful mental records of liabilities, and refuse to cooperate with those who don’t pay off debts—what is called reciprocal altruism: if I help you to beat the stuffing out of Chimp A, you had better repay your debt when Chimp B attacks me.

OK I have used up two-thirds of my allotment and you all are wondering what this has to do with regulation of monopolies. The dollar is our state money of account and high powered money (HPM or coins, green paper money, and bank reserves) is our state monopolized currency. Let me make that just a bit broader because US Treasuries (bills and bonds) are just HPM that pays interest (indeed, Treasuries are effectively reserve deposits at the Fed that pay higher interest than regular reserves), so we will include HPM plus Treasuries as the government currency monopoly—and these are delivered in payment of federal taxes, which destroys currency. If government emits more in its payments than it redeems in taxes, currency is accumulated by the nongovernment sector as financial wealth. We need not go into all the reasons (rational, irrational, productive, fetishistic) that one would want to hoard currency, except to note that a lot of the nonsovereign dollar denominated liabilities are made convertible (on demand or under specified circumstances) to currency.

Since government is the only issuer of currency, like any monopoly government can set the terms on which it is willing to supply it. If you have something to sell that the government would like to have—an hour of labor, a bomb, a vote—government offers a price that you can accept or refuse. Your power to refuse, however, is not that great. When you are dying of thirst, the monopoly water supplier has substantial pricing power. The government that imposes a head tax can set the price of whatever it is you will sell to government to obtain the means of tax payment so that you can keep your head on your shoulders. Since government is the only source of the currency required to pay taxes, and at least some people do have to pay taxes, government has pricing power.

Of course, it usually does not recognize this, believing that it must pay “market determined” prices—whatever that might mean. Just as a water monopolist cannot let the market determine an equilibrium price for water, the money monopolist cannot really let the market determine the conditions on which money is supplied. Rather, the best way to operate a money monopoly is to set the “price” and let the “quantity” float—just like the water monopolist does. My favorite example is a universal employer of last resort program in which the federal government offers to pay a basic wage and benefit package (say $10 per hour plus usual benefits), and then hires all who are ready and willing to work for that compensation. The “price” (labor compensation) is fixed, and the “quantity” (number employed) floats in a countercyclical manner. With ELR, we achieve full employment (as normally defined) with greater stability of wages, and as government spending on the program moves countercyclically, we also get greater stability of income (and thus of consumption and production)—a truly great moderation.

I have said anyone can create money (things). I can issue IOUs denominated in the dollar, and perhaps I can make my IOUs acceptable by agreeing to redeem them on demand for US government currency. The conventional fear is that I will issue so much money that it will cause inflation, hence orthodox economists advocate a money growth rate rule. But it is far more likely that if I issue too many IOUs they will be presented for redemption. Soon I run out of currency and am forced to default on my promise, ruining my creditors. That is the nutshell history of most private money (things) creation.

But we have always anointed some institutions—called banks—with special public/private partnerships, allowing them to act as intermediaries between the government and the nongovernment. Most importantly, government makes and receives payments through them. Hence, when you receive your Social Security payment it takes the form of a credit to your bank account; you pay taxes through a debit to that account. Banks, in turn, clear accounts with the government and with each other using reserve accounts (currency) at the Fed, which was specifically created in 1913 to ensure such clearing at par. To strengthen that promise, we introduced deposit insurance so that for most purposes, bank money (deposits) functions like government currency.

Here’s the rub. Bank money is privately created when a bank buys an asset—which could be your mortgage IOU backed by your home, or a firm’s IOU backed by commercial real estate, or a local government’s IOU backed by prospective tax revenues. But it can also be one of those complex sliced and diced and securitized toxic waste assets you’ve been reading about. A clever and ethically challenged banker will buy completely fictitious “assets” and pay himself huge bonuses for nonexistent profits while making uncollectible “loans” to all of his deadbeat relatives. (I use a male example because I do not know of any female frauds, which is probably why the scales of justice are always held by a woman.) The bank money he creates while running the bank into the ground is as good as the government currency the Treasury creates serving the public interest. And he will happily pay outrageous prices for assets, or lend to his family, friends and fellow frauds so that they can pay outrageous prices, fueling asset price inflation. This generates nice virtuous cycles in the form of bubbles that attract more purchases until the inevitable bust. I won’t go into output price inflation except to note that asset price bubbles can fuel spending on consumption and investment goods, spilling-over into commodities prices, so on some conditions there can be a link between asset and output price inflations.

The amazing thing is that the free marketeers want to “free” the private financial institutions to licentious behavior, but advocate reigning-in government on the argument that excessive issue of money is inflationary. Yet we have effectively given banks the power to issue government money (in the form of government insured deposits), and if we do not constrain what they purchase they will fuel speculative bubbles. By removing government regulation and supervision, we invite private banks to use the public monetary system to pursue private interests. Again, we know how that story ends, and it ain’t pretty. Unfortunately, we now have what appears to be a government of Goldman, by Goldman, and for Goldman that is trying to resurrect the financial system as it existed in 2006—a self-regulated, self-rewarding, bubble-seeking, fraud-loving juggernaut.

To come to a conclusion: the primary purpose of the monetary monopoly is to mobilize resources for the public purpose. There is no reason why private, for-profit institutions cannot play a role in this endeavor. But there is also no reason to believe that self-regulated private undertakers will pursue the public purpose. Indeed, as institutionalists we probably would go farther and assert that both theory and experience tell us precisely the opposite: the best strategy for a profit-seeking firm with market power never coincides with the best policy from the public interest perspective. And in the case of money, it is even worse because private financial institutions compete with one another in a manner that is financially destabilizing: by increasing leverage, lowering underwriting standards, increasing risk, and driving asset price bubbles. Unlike my ELR example above, private spending and lending will be strongly pro-cyclical. All of that is in addition to the usual arguments about the characteristics of public goods that make it difficult for the profit-seeker to capture external benefits. For this reason, we need to analyze money and banking from the perspective of regulating a monopoly—and not just any monopoly but rather the monopoly of the most important institution of our society.

* Much confusion is generated by using the term “money” to indicate a money “thing” used to satisfy one of the functions of money. I will be careful to use the term “money” to refer to the unit of account or money as an institution, and “money thing” to refer to something denominated in the money of account—whether that is currency, a bank deposit, or other money-denominated liability

‘Monetization’ of Budget Deficits

By L. Randall Wray [via CFEPS]

It is commonly believed that government faces a budget constraint according to which its spending must be “financed” by taxes, borrowing (bond sales), or “money creation”. Since many modern economies actually prohibit direct “money creation” by the government’s treasury, it is supposed that the last option is possible only through complicity of the central bank—which could buy the government’s bonds, and hence finance deficit spending by “printing money”.

Actually, in a floating rate regime, the government that issues the currency spends by crediting bank accounts. Tax payments result in debits to bank accounts. Deficit spending by government takes the form of net credits to bank accounts. Operationally, the entities receiving net payments from government hold banking system liabilities while banks hold reserves in the form of central bank liabilities (we can ignore leakages from deposits—and reserves—into cash held by the non-bank public as a simple complication that changes nothing of substance). While many economists find the coordinating activities between the central bank and the treasury quite confusing. I want to leave those issues mostly to the side and simply proceed from the logical point that deficit spending by the treasury results in net credits to banking system reserves, and that these fiscal operations can be huge. (See Bell 2000, Bell and Wray 2003, and Wray 2003/4)


If these net credits lead to excess reserve positions, overnight interest rates will be bid down by banks offering the excess in the overnight interbank lending market. Unless the central bank is operating with a zero interest rate target, declining overnight rates trigger open market bond sales to drain excess reserves. Hence, on a day-to-day basis, the central bank intervenes to offset undesired impacts of fiscal policy on reserves when they cause the overnight rate to move away from target. The process operates in reverse if the treasury runs a surplus, which results in net debits of reserves from the banking system and puts upward pressure on overnight rates—relieved by open market purchases. If fiscal policy were biased to run deficits (or surpluses) on a sustained basis, the central bank would run out of bonds to sell (or would accumulate too many bonds, offset on its balance sheet by a treasury deposit exceeding operating limits). Hence, policy is coordinated between the central bank and the treasury to ensure that the treasury will begin to issue new securities as it runs deficits (or retire old issues in the case of a budget surplus). Again, these coordinating activities can be varied and complicated, but they are not important to our analysis here. When all is said and done, a budget deficit that creates excess reserves leads to bond sales by the central bank (open market) and the treasury (new issues) to drain all excess reserves; a budget surplus causes the reverse to take place when the banking system is short of reserves.

Bond sales (or purchases) by the treasury and central bank are, then, ultimately triggered by deviation of reserves from the position desired (or required) by the banking system, which causes the overnight rate to move away from target (if the target is above zero). Bond sales by either the central bank or the treasury are properly seen as part of monetary policy designed to allow the central bank to hit its target. This target is exogenously “administered” by the central bank. Obviously, the central bank sets its target as a result of its belief about the impact of this rate on a range of economic variables that are included in its policy objectives. In other words, setting of this rate “exogenously” does not imply that the central bank is oblivious to economic and political constraints it believes to reign (whether these constraints and relationships actually exist is a different matter).

In conclusion, the notion of a “government budget constraint” only applies ex post, as a statement of an identity that has no significance as an economic constraint. When all is said and done, it is certainly true that any increase of government spending will be matched by an increase of taxes, an increase of high powered money (reserves and cash), and/or an increase of sovereign debt held. But this does not mean that taxes or bonds actually “financed” the government spending. Government might well enact provisions that dictate relations between changes to spending and changes to taxes revenues (a balanced budget, for example); it might require that bonds are issued before deficit spending actually takes place; it might require that the treasury have “money in the bank” (deposits at the central bank) before it can cut a check; and so on. These provisions might constrain government’s ability to spend at the desired level. Belief that these provisions are “right” and “just” and even “necessary” can make them politically popular and difficult to overturn. However, economic analysis shows that they are self-imposed and are not economically necessary—although they may well be politically necessary. From the vantage point of economic analysis, government can spend by crediting accounts in private banks, creating banking system reserves. Any number of operating procedures can be adopted to allow this to occur even in a system in which responsibilities are sharply divided between a central bank and a treasury. For example, in the US, complex procedures have been adopted to ensure that treasury can spend by cutting checks; that treasury checks never “bounce”; that deficit spending by treasury leads to net credits to banking system reserves; and that excess reserves are drained through new issues by treasury and open market sales by the Fed. That this all operates exceedingly smoothly is evidenced by a relatively stable overnight interbank interest rate—even with rather wild fluctuations of the Treasury’s budget positions. If there were significant hitches in these operations, the fed funds rate would be unstable.

A Primer on Government Surpluses

What is a federal government surplus?

When the federal government’s revenue exceeds its spending over the course of a year, it is running a budget surplus and outstanding Treasury securities will be reduced by the same amount over the year. In 1999, the federal government’s surplus was $99 billion and it is projected to grow to $142 billion for fiscal year 2000. This means that US taxpayers will pay $142 billion more in taxes this year than the government spends. More concretely, taxpayers will write checks to the Internal Revenue Service in the amount of $1.914 trillion, while the US Treasury will write checks received by Americans in the amount of only $1.772 trillion—a difference of $142 billion. The only way that taxpayers can write checks to the IRS that exceed the amount of checks received from the Treasury is to surrender $142 billion of Treasury securities to the government. In other words, running a surplus necessarily means that the Treasury is reducing nominal wealth of the non-government sector. This is why federal budget surpluses reduce outstanding Treasury debt and non-government sector net nominal worth.


What is the long-term effect of running perpetual government surpluses?

On current projections, the federal government will run surpluses over this decade that will total more than $2.9 trillion, leading to an equivalent reduction of non-government sector net nominal wealth—of $2.9 trillion. This wipes out almost 80% all of the publicly-held US Treasury debt, including that now held by foreigners. No one can accurately predict how the economy will react to such an unprecedented reduction of its nominal wealth—especially when the most liquid assets will be removed from private portfolios. However, throughout our history, the US has experienced exactly six periods of substantial reduction of federal government debt, achieved through persistent budget surpluses, and each of those periods ended in one of our nation’s six depressions. Our last period of substantial surpluses occurred between 1920 and 1930, when Treasury debt was reduced by 36%; the Great Depression began in 1929. For a more recent example, Japan began to run government surpluses in 1987, which reduced non-governmental nominal wealth and generated a deep recession that has already lasted a decade. Note, however, that neither the US in the 1920s nor Japan in the late 1980s came close to draining $2.9 trillion worth of wealth from the economy, even after adjusting for higher prices today.

Doesn’t a budget surplus allow us to save for the future?

Those who believe that a surplus can be “saved” for the future, or “used” to finance tax cuts or spending increases simply do not understand the nature of a surplus. Does anyone really believe that we can “save for the future” by burning $3 trillion worth of private sector wealth? During any period, the government can always choose to spend more (or less), in which case the surplus over the period may be lower (or higher); similarly, it can increase (decrease) taxes and thereby may increase (decrease) the surplus. But, as Gertrude Stein said, “there is no there there”-a surplus exists only as a deduction from private sector income. The negative household saving that some commentators are finally noticing is merely the accountant’s flip-side to the budget surplus. A government surplus necessarily reduces private sector savings and cannot be “saved for the future”.

How do budget surpluses impact non-government sector financial balances?

There is another, less transparent, impact of government surpluses on the non-government sector. At the level of the economy as a whole, when one sector spends more than its income, another necessarily spends less for the simple reason that in the aggregate, total spending equals total income. Let us, then, disaggregate the economy into three sectors to determine the implications of government surpluses for the other sectors. First, we can consolidate all levels of government into a public (or, government) sector, and likewise consolidate households and firms into a domestic, non-government (or, private) sector. For completion, we must add a foreign (“rest-of-the-world”) sector. At the aggregate level, the spending of all three sectors combined must equal the income received by the three sectors. It is clear that if the public sector is spending less than its income—that is, it is running a surplus—this must imply that at least one other sector is spending more than its income (in other words, is running a deficit). Mathematically, the sum of the balances of the three sectors must equal zero. It is convenient for our purposes to write this as:

{Public Sector Surplus} + {Foreign Sector Surplus} = {Private Sector Deficit},

which merely moves the private sector balance to the right-hand-side and reverses the sign (in other words, writes the balance as a deficit rather than a surplus, since a negative surplus is the same thing as a deficit).

Because the US has been running a balance of payments deficit in recent years, this means that the foreign sector is in surplus (the rest-of-the-world receives more US dollars than it spends). A few years ago, our public sector ran a sufficiently large deficit to more than offset the foreign sector surplus, so that our domestic non-government sector was able to run surpluses. However, in the past two years, the US public sector’s balance has turned toward surplus. When combined with our balance of payments deficit (or foreign sector surplus), this means that the domestic private sector’s balance (that is, its savings) has turned sharply negative—toward large and growing deficits. The non-government sector deficit is now approximately equal to 5.5 percent of GDP—far and away the largest private sector deficit the US has seen in the post-war period.

Will the federal government really run surpluses for the next decade?

It is very difficult to take seriously any analyses that begin with the projection that our government will run surpluses for the next decade. Part of our skepticism comes from the inherent difficulty in making projections. More importantly, it is difficult to believe that our economy can continue to grow robustly as the government sucks disposable income and wealth from the private sector by running surpluses. When the economy slows, the surplus will eventually disappear—automatically—as unemployment compensation rises and tax revenue falls due to the slowdown. As the government spends more and taxes less, the surplus will vanish.

How to Implement True, Full Employment

By L. Randall Wray

We will briefly describe a program that would generate true, full employment, price stability, and currency stability. We will show that this program can be adopted in any nation that issues its own currency. Our presentation consists of three sections. First, we briefly examine a pilot program at the University of Missouri—Kansas City (UMKC). This provides the basis for the analysis in the second section of the functioning of a national monetary system. Finally, we show how this knowledge can be used to construct a public service program (PSE) that guarantees true, full employment with price and currency stability.

The Buckaroo Program

In the United States, there is a growing movement on college campuses to increase student involvement in their communities, particularly through what is known as “service-learning” in which students participate in community service activities organized by local community groups. It should become obvious that a modern monetary economy that adopts the full employment program described here will operate much like our community service hours program.

We have chosen to design our program as a “monetary” system, creating paper notes, “buckaroos” (after the UMKC mascot, a kangaroo), with the inscription “this note represents one hour of community service by a UMKC student”, and denominated as “one roo hour”. Each student is required to pay B25 to the UMKC “Treasury” each semester. Approved community service providers (state and local government offices, university offices, public school districts, and not-for-profit agencies) submit bids for student service hours to the Treasury, which “awards” special drawing rights (SDRs) to the providers so long as basic health, safety, and liability standards are met. The providers then draw on their SDRs as needed pay students B1 per hour worked. This is equivalent to “spending” by the UMKC treasury. Students then pay their taxes with buckaroos, retiring Treasury liabilities.

Several implications are immediately obvious. First, the UMKC treasury cannot collect any buckaroo taxes until it has spent some buckaroos. Second, the Treasury cannot collect more buckaroos in payment of taxes than it has previously spent. This means that the “best” the Treasury can hope for is a “balanced budget”. Actually, it is almost certain that the Treasury will run a deficit as some buckaroos are “lost in the wash” or hoarded for future years. While it is possible that the Treasury could run a surplus in future years, this would be limited by the quantity of previously hoarded buckaroos that could be used to pay taxes. Third, and most important, it should be obvious that the Treasury faces no “financial constraints” on its ability to spend buckaroos. Indeed, the quantity of buckaroos provided is “market demand determined”, by the students who desire to work to obtain buckaroos and by the providers who need student labor. Furthermore, it should be obvious that the Treasury’s spending doesn’t depend on its tax receipts. To drive the point home, we can assume that the Treasury always burns every buckaroo received in payment of taxes. In other words, the Treasury does not impose taxes in order to ensure that buckaroos flow into its coffers, but rather to ensure that student labor flows into community service. More generally, the Treasury’s budget balance or imbalance doesn’t provide any useful information to UMKC regarding the program’s success or failure. A Treasury deficit, surplus, or balance provides useless accounting data.

Note that each student has to obtain a sufficient number of buckaroos to meet her tax liability. Obviously, an individual might choose to earn, say, B35 in one semester, holding B10 as a hoard after paying the B25 tax for that semester. The hoards, of course, are by definition equal to the Treasury’s deficit. UMKC has decided to encourage “thrift” by selling interest-earning buckaroo “bonds”, purchased by students with excess buckaroo hoards. This is usually described as government “borrowing”, thought to be necessitated by government deficits. Note however, that the Treasury does not “need” to borrow its own buckaroos in order to deficit spend—no matter how high the deficit, the Treasury can always issue new buckaroos. Indeed, the Treasury can only “borrow” buckaroos that it has already spent, in fact, that it has “deficit spent”. Finally, note that the Treasury can pay any interest rate it wishes, because it does not “need” to “borrow” from students. For this reason, Treasury bonds should be seen as an “interest rate maintenance account” designed to keep the base rate at the Treasury’s target interest rate. Without such an account, the “natural base interest rate” is zero for buckaroo hoards created through deficit spending. Note that no matter how much the Treasury spends the base rate would never rise above zero unless the Treasury offers positive interest rates; in other words, Treasury deficits do not place any pressure on interest rates.

What determines the value of buckaroos? From the perspective of the student, the “cost” of a buckaroo is the hour of labor that must be provided; from the perspective of the community service provider, a buckaroo buys an hour of student labor. So, on average, the buckaroo is worth an hour of labor—more specifically, an hour of average student labor. Note that we can determine the value of the buckaroo without reference to the quantity of buckaroos issued by the Treasury. Whether the Treasury spends a hundred thousand buckaroos a year, or a million a year, the value is determined by what students must do to obtain them.

The Treasury’s deficit each semester is equal to the “extra” demand for buckaroos coming from students; indeed, it is the “extra” demand that determines the size of the Treasury’s deficit. We might call this “net saving” of buckaroos, and it is equal—by definition—to the Treasury’s deficit over the same period. What if the Treasury decided it did not want to run deficits, and so proposed to limit the total number of buckaroos spent in order to balance the budget? In this case, it is almost certain that some students would be unable to meet their tax liability. Unlucky, procrastinating students would find it impossible to find a community service job, thus would find themselves “unemployed” and would be forced to borrow, beg, or steal buckaroos to meet their tax liabilities. Of course, any objective analysis would find the source of the unemployment in the Treasury’s policy, and not in the characteristics of the unemployed. Unemployment at the aggregate level is caused by insufficient Treasury spending.

Some of thisanalysis applies directly to our economic system as it actually operates, while some of it would apply to the operation of our system if it were to adopt a full employment program. Let us examine the operation of a modern money system.

Modern Monetary Systems

In all modern economies, money is a creature of the State. The State defines money as that which it accepts at public pay offices (mainly, in payment of taxes). Taxes create a demand for money, and government spending provides the supply, just as our buckaroo tax creates a demand for buckaroos, while spending by the Treasury provides the supply. The government does not “need” the public’s money in order to spend; rather, the public needs the government’s money in order to pay taxes. This means that the government can buy whatever is for sale in terms of its money merely by providing it.

Because the public will normally wish to hold some extra money, the government will normally have to spend more than it taxes; in other words, the normal requirement is for a government deficit, just as the UMKC Treasury always runs a deficit. Government deficits do not require “borrowing” by the government (bond sales), rather, the government provides bonds to allow the public to hold interest-bearing alternatives to non-interest-bearing government money. Further, markets cannot dictate to government the interest rate it must pay on its debt, rather, the government determines the interest rate it will pay as an alternative to non-interest-earning government money. This stands conventional analysis on its head: fiscal policy is the primary determinant of the quantity of money issued, while monetary policy primarily has to do with maintaining positive interest rates through bond sales—at the interest rate the government chooses.

In summary, governments issue money to buy what they need; they tax to generate a demand for that money; and then they accept the same money in payment of the tax. If a deficit results, that just lets the population hoard some of the money. If the government wants to, it can let the population trade the money for interest earning bonds, but the government never needs to borrow its own money from the public.

This does not mean that the deficit cannot be too big, that is, inflationary; it can also be too small, that is deflationary. When the deficit is too small, unemployment results (just as it results at UMKC when the Treasury’s spending of buckaroos is too small). The fear, of course, is that government deficits might generate inflation before full employment can be reached. In the next section we describe a proposal that can achieve full employment while actually enhancing price stability.

Public Service Employment and Full Employment with Price and Currency Stability

Very generally, the idea behind our proposal is that the national government provides funding for a program that guarantees a job offer for anyone who is ready, willing and able to work. We call this the Public Service Employment program, or PSE. What is the PSE program? What do we want to get out of it?

1. It should offer a job to anyone who is ready, willing and able to work; regardless of race or gender, regardless of education, regardless of work experience; regardless of immigration status; regardless of the performance of the economy. Just listing those conditions makes it clear why private firms cannot possibly offer an infinitely elastic demand for labor. The government must play a role. At a minimum, the national government must provide the wages and benefits for the program, although this does not actually mean that PSE must be a government-run program.


2. We want PSE to hire off the bottom. It is an employment safety net. We do not want it to compete with the private sector or even with non-PSE employment in the public sector. It is not a program that operates by “priming the pump”, that is, by raising aggregate demand. Trying to get to full employment simply by priming the pump with military spending could generate inflation. That is because military Keynesianism hires off the top. But by definition, PSE hires off the bottom; it is a bufferstock policy—and like any bufferstock program, it must stabilize the price of the bufferstock—in this case, wages at the bottom.

3. We want full employment, but with loose labor markets. This is virtually guaranteed if PSE hires off the bottom. With PSE, labor markets are loose because there is always a pool of labor available to be hired out of PSE and into private firms. Right now, loose labor markets can only be maintained by keeping people out of work—the old reserve army of the unemployed approach.

4. We want the PSE compensation package to provide a decent standard of living even as it helps to maintain wage and price stability. We have suggested that the wage ought to be set at $6.25/hr in the USA to start. A package of benefits could include healthcare, childcare, sick leave, vacations, and contributions to Social Security so that years spent in PSE would count toward retirement.
5. We want PSE experience to prepare workers for post-PSE work—whether in the private sector or in government. Thus, PSE workers should learn useful work habits and skills. Training and retraining will be an important component of every PSE job.

6. Finally, we want PSE workers to do something useful. For the U.S.A. we have proposed that they focus on provision of public services, however, a developing nation may have much greater need for public infrastructure; for roads, public utilities, health services, education. PSE workers should do something useful, but they should not do things that are already being done, and especially should not compete with the private sector.

These six features pretty well determine what a PSE program ought to look like. This still leaves a lot of issues to be examined. Who should administer the program? Who should do the hiring and supervision of workers? Who should decide exactly what workers will do? There are different models consistent with this general framework, and different nations might take different approaches. Elsewhere (Wray 1998, 1999) I have discussed the outlines of a program designed specifically for the USA. Very briefly, I suggest that given political realities in the USA, it is best to decentralize the program as much as possible. State and local governments, school districts, and non-profit organizations would be allowed to hire as many PSE workers as they could supervise. The federal government would provide the basic wage and benefit package, while the hiring agencies would provide supervision and capital required by workers (some federal subsidy of these expenses might be allowed). All created jobs would be expected to increase employability of the PSE workers (by providing training, experience, work records); PSE employers would compete for PSE workers, helping to achieve this goal. No PSE employer would be allowed to use PSE workers to substitute for existing employees (representatives of labor should sit on all administrative boards that make hiring decisions). Payments by the federal government would be made directly to PSE workers (using, for example, Social Security numbers) to reduce potential for fraud.

Note that some countries might choose a much higher level of centralization. In other words, program decentralization is dictated purely by pragmatic and political considerations. The only essential feature is that funding must come from the national government, that is, from the issuer of the currency.

Before concluding, let us quickly address some general questions. First, many people wonder about the cost—can we afford full employment? To answer this, we must distinguish between real costs and financial expenditures. Unemployment has a real cost—the output that is lost when some of the labor force is involuntarily unemployed, the burdens placed on workers who must produce output to be consumed by the unemployed, the suffering of the unemployed, and social ills generated by unemployment and poverty. From this perspective, providing jobs for the unemployed will reduce real costs and generate net real benefits for society. Indeed, it is best to argue that society cannot afford unemployment, rather than to suppose that it cannot afford employment!

On the other hand, most people are probably concerned with the financial cost of full employment, or, more specifically, with the impact on the government’s budget. How will the government pay for the program? It will write checks just as it does for any other program. (See Wray 1998.) This is why it is so important to understand how the modern money system works. Any nation that issues its own currency can financially afford to hire the unemployed. A deficit will result only if the population desires to save in the form of government-issued money. In other words, just as in UMKC’s buckaroo program, the size of the deficit will be “market demand” determined by the population’s desired net saving.

Economists usually fear that providing jobs to people who want to work will cause inflation. Thus, it is necessary to explain how our proposed program will actually contribute to wage stability, promoting price stability. The key is that our program is designed to operate like a “buffer stock” program, in which the buffer stock commodity is sold when there is upward pressure on its price, or bought when there are deflationary pressures. Our proposal is to use labor as the buffer stock commodity, and as is the case with any buffer stock commodity, the program will stabilize the commodity’s price. The government’s spending on the program is based on a “fixed price/floating quantity” model, hence, cannot contribute to inflation.

Note that the government’s spending on the full employment program will fluctuate countercyclically. When the private sector reduces spending, it lays-off workers who then flow into the bufferstock pool, working in the full employment program. This automatically increases total government spending, but not prices because the wage paid is fixed. As the quantity of workers hired at the fixed wage rises, this results in a budget deficit. On the other hand, when the private sector expands, it pulls workers out of the bufferstock pool, shrinking government spending and thus reducing deficits. This is a powerful automatic stabilizer that operates to ensure the government’s spending is at just the right level to maintain full employment without generating inflation.

REFERENCES

Wray, L. Randall. 1998. Understanding Modern Money: the key to full employment and price stability, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

—–. 1999. “Public Service Employment—Assured Jobs Program: further considerations“, Journal of Economic Issues, Vol. 33, no. 2, pp. 483-490.

Social Security: Truth or Useful Fictions?

By L. Randall Wray [via CFEPS]

I. SOCIAL SECURITY IS AN ASSURANCE , NOT A PENSION PLAN

Social Security is an intergenerational assurance plan. Working generations agree to take care of retirees, dependents, survivors, and persons with disabilities. Currently, spouses, children, or parents of eligible workers make up more than a quarter of beneficiaries on OASDI. A large proportion will always be people without “normal” work histories who could not have made sufficient contributions to entitle them to a decent pension. Still, as a society, we have decided they should receive benefits.

Further, the program is not means tested. One need only meet statutory requirements to receive benefits. Indeed, as the Bush Commission’s Report emphasizes, the Supreme Court has twice ruled Social Security does not make intergenerational promises to the dead, but, rather, only to their survivors. The Bush Commission sees that as a weakness; I see it as a strength.

II. TRUST FUNDS DO NOT INCREASE GOVERNMENT’S ABILITY TO MEET COMMITMENTS (Advance Funding is a Fiction)

The Greenspan Commission tried to change Social Security from paygo to advance funding in 1983. But that is impossible; it just demonstrated a misunderstanding of accounting. The existence of a Trust Fund does not in any way, shape, or form enhance government’s ability to meet Social Security commitments. This point is difficult to get across.

The Social Security Trust Fund is one of Uncle Sam’s cookie jars. He also has a defense cookie jar, a corporate welfare cookie jar, etc. (See Figure 1.) We count taxes as Uncle Sam’s income, and he can pretend he stuffs the various cookie jars with those tax receipts — the payroll tax goes into the Social Security cookie jar, and he pretends it pays for Social Security spending. Maybe he pretends capital gains taxes go into the corporate welfare cookie jar. And so on. That is all internal accounting.

Figure 1: Federal Government Internal Accounts

Say Uncle Sam spends more on corporate welfare than he pretends to have in that cookie jar. But he pretends the Social Security cookie jar is overflowing with tax receipts because he runs a huge surplus there. (See Figure 2.) So Uncle Sam writes some IOUs from the corporate welfare cookie jar to the Social Security cookie jar to remind himself. Over time, the Social Security cookie jar accumulates Trillions of dollars of IOUs from Uncle Sam’s other cookie jars.

Figure 2: Trust Fund

That is just the government owing itself, and has no effect on the external accounts. (See Figure 3.) The total spent on Social Security, corporate welfare, transportation and so on equals its total spending for the year. The total it collects from taxes, including payroll taxes, capital gains taxes, gas taxes, and so on, equals its total income for the year. If government spends more than its income, that is called deficit spending. If it spends less, it runs a budget surplus. The cookie jar IOUs cannot change that in any way.

Figure 3: Federal Government External Accounts

Note I’m not saying there is anything wrong with the Treasury Securities held by the Trust Fund-Social Security can count them as an asset. But they will not in any way change the external accounting in 2017 or 2027 or 2041 — when the government’s overall spending will be less than, equal to, or greater than its overall tax receipts. (See Figure 4.) When Social Security begins to run a deficit, the existence of the Trust Fund will not reduce the amount of Treasury Securities sold to the nongovernment sector.

Indeed, comparison of Figure 4a with 4b demonstrates that the external accounts are not changed by existence of a Trust Fund-the implications for the government are the same.

Figure 4a: Social Security Runs $10 Billion Deficit, With Rest of Federal Government Budget in Balance, WITH TRUST FUND

Figure 4b: Social Security Runs $10 Billion Deficit, With Rest of Federal Government Budget in Balance, WITHOUT TRUST FUND

III. TRUST FUNDS DO NOT PROVIDE POLITICAL PROTECTION (Proof: They Fuel Privatization Scams)

Many economists realize that from the perspective of Uncle Sam, the Trust Fund is just an internal accounting construction. But I’ve had top economic advisors of both Democrats and Unions tell me while that is true, the Trust Fund provides political protection. That is clearly false. It is only because Social Security runs surpluses accumulated in a Trust Fund that we have all these privatizat ion scams. Do you really believe Wall Street fund managers would have any interest in Social Security if it ran deficits?

IV. SOCIAL SECURITY CANNOT FACE A FINANCIAL CONSTRAINT (Except One Imposed By Congress)

Social Security is unusual because unlike most other government programs, we pretend a specific tax finances it. That makes it easy to mentally match payroll tax revenues and benefit payments, and to calculate whether the 75 year actuarial balance is positive or negative. No one knows or car es whether the defense program runs actuarial deficits — because we don’t pretend that a particular tax pays for defense. In reality, Social Security benefits are paid in exactly the same way that the government spends on anything else-by crediting somebody’s bank account. Social Security cannot be any more financially constrained than any other government program. Only Congress can establish a financial constraint.

V. SOCIAL SECURITY DOES NOT APPEAR TO FACE REAL CONSTRAINTS, (America Can Afford 7% of GDP for Social Security)

Today OASDI benefits equal 4.5% of GDP; that grows to 7% over the next 75 years. Does anyone doubt that we will be able to afford to devote 7% of our nation’s output to provide a social safety net for retirees, survivors, and disabled persons? That leaves 93% of GDP for everything else. We have easily achieved larger shifts of GDP in the past without lowering living standards of the working generations. I cannot imagine a future so horrible that we won’t be able support OASDI in real terms.

VI. PRIVATIZATION IS NOT NEEDED, NOR CAN IT HELP TO PROVIDE FOR FUTURE BENEFICIARIES (Any Future Problems Are Not Financial; Financial Fixes Cannot Help)

Future beneficiaries cannot eat stocks or bonds, and we can’t dig holes today to bury Winnebagos for future retirees. Whatever beneficiaries consume in 2050 will have to be produced for the most part in 2050. Financial Fixes cannot change that. Whether the stock market outperforms Treasury bonds is irrelevant. Whether future retirees have amassed $100,000 in personal accounts is irrelevant. All that matters is future productive capacity plus a method of distributing a portion of output to the elderly in 2050.

To accomplish that, all we have to do is credit the bank accounts of the elderly in 2050, and then let the market work its wonders. I am frankly shocked that the Cato Institute refuses to trust the market, backing what amounts to tax credits for playing in equity markets.

VII. PERSONAL ACCOUNTS ARE FINE, BUT ARE NOT RELEVANT TO DISCUSSION OF SOCIAL SECURITY (A Targeted $40 Billion Give-Away is Probably a Good Idea!)

I also find it ironic that the Bush Commission wants to increase government spending by $40 billion a year to give money away to encourage the poor to save. Hey, let’s give them $80 billion a year. I’d prefer that the poor spend it, but if they want to sock it away in personal accounts, that’s fine by me. But, please, let’s provide Big Brotherly advice that they keep it out of Telecom stocks. And leave Social Security out of it!

VIII. SOCIAL SECURITY IS, ALWAYS HAS BEEN, ALWAYS WILL BE, SUBJECT TO CONGRESSIONAL GOODWILL (Maintained At the Ballot Box)

Only Congress can decide who deserves support, and what level of support. Only Congress can decide how much of GDP ought to be devoted to support of the elderly. That’s Democracy and I’m willing to live with it. The Bush Commission says this generates insecurity, but I expect the elderly will continue to use the ballot box to hold the feet of Politicians to the fire of Social Security.

IX. HONESTY IS THE BEST POLICY (Convenient Fictions About Finances Cannot Help)

In spite of all the complex financial fictions, the truth is simple. In 2041, Social Security’s beneficiaries will have to rely on the working population, just as they do today. No financial scams can change that. Trust funds, actuarial balances, privatization, and relative rates of return don’t change it. There ain’t no crisis; there ain’t no urgency. We’ve got two generations to increase our capacity to produce.

X. TOWARD A PROGRESSIVE REFORM (Stop Taxing Work!)

In 1960 it might have made some kind of twisted logic to levy a tax on payrolls and to pretend this paid for Social Security benefits. There were few benefits to be paid, but lots of payrolls to tax, so the tax rate was low. Today, and increasingly in the future, there are more benefits to pay relative to taxable payrolls. In just a few years, only 1/3 of National Income will be subject to the payroll tax- hence ever-higher payroll tax rates will be required to maintain the delusion.

Let’s stop pretending. Payroll taxes simply discourage work-which is as perverse as policy can get. We need people to work to provide all the goods and services the elderly need. Abolish the payroll tax, abolish the Trust Fund, abolish actuarial gaps, and let’s recognize that Social Security is an intergenerational assurance program.

Social Security: Another Case of Innocent Fraud?

By Warren Mosler* and Mathew Forstater**

In his recent book, The Economics of Innocent Fraud, John Kenneth Galbraith surveys a number of false beliefs that are being perpetuated among the American people about how our society operates: innocent (and sometimes not-so-innocent) frauds. There is perhaps no greater fraud being committed presently—and none in which the stakes are so high—as the fraud being perpetrated regarding government insolvency and Social Security. President Bush uses the word “bankruptcy” continuously. And the opposition agrees there is a solvency issue, questioning only what to do about it.

Fortunately, there is a powerful voice on our side that takes exception to the notion of government insolvency, and that is none other than the Chairman of the Federal Reserve. The following is from a transcript of a recent interview with Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan:

RYAN… do you believe that personal retirement accounts can help us achieve solvency for the system and make those future retiree benefits more secure?

GREENSPAN: Well, I wouldn’t say that the pay-as-you-go benefits are insecure, in the sense that there’s nothing to prevent the federal government from creating as much money as it wants and paying it to somebody. The question is, how do you set up a system which assures that the real assets are created which those benefits are employed to purchase. (emphasis added)

For a long time we have been saying there is no solvency issue (see C-FEPS Policy Note 99/02 and the other papers cited in the bibliography at the end of this report). Now with the support of the Fed Chairman, maybe we can gain some traction.

Let us briefly review, operationally, government spending and taxing. When government spends it credits member bank accounts. For example, imagine you turn on your computer, log in to your bank account, and see a balance of $1,000 while waiting for your $1,000 Social Security payment to hit. Suddenly the $1,000 changes to $2,000. What did the government do to make that payment? It did not hammer a gold coin into a wire connected to your account. It did not somehow take someone’s taxes and give them to you. All it did was change a number on a computer screen. This process is operationally independent of, and not operationally constrained by, tax collections or borrowing.

That is what Chairman Greenspan was telling us: constraints on government payment can only be self-imposed.

And what happens when government taxes? If your computer showed a $2,000 balance, and you sent a check for $1,000 to the government for your tax payment, your balance would soon change to $1,000. That is all—the government changed your number downward. It did not “get” anything from you. Nothing jumped out of the government computer into a box to be spent later. Yes, they “account” for it by putting information in an account they may call a “trust fund,” but this is “accounting”—after the fact record-keeping—and has no operational impact on government’s ability to later credit any account (i.e., spend!).

Ever wonder what happens if you pay your taxes in actual cash? The government shreds it. What if you lend to the government via buying its bonds with actual cash? Yes, the government shreds the cash. Obviously, the government doesn’t actually need your “funds” per se for further operational purpose.

Put another way, Congress ALWAYS can decide to make Social Security payments, previous taxing or spending not withstanding, and, operationally, the Fed can ALWAYS process whatever payments Congress makes. This process is not revenue constrained. Operationally, collecting taxes or borrowing has no operational connection to spending. Solvency is not an issue. Involuntary government bankruptcy has no application whatsoever! Yet “everyone” agrees—in all innocence—that there is a solvency problem, and that it is just a matter of when. Everyone, that is, except us and Chairman Greenspan, and hopefully now you, the reader, as well!

So if solvency is a non-issue, what are the issues? Inflation, for one. Perhaps future spending will drive up future prices. Fine! How much? What are the projections? No one has even attempted this exercise. Well, it is about time they did, so decisions can be made on the relevant facts.

The other issue is how much GDP we want seniors to consume. If we want them to consume more, we can award them larger checks, and vice versa. And we can do this in any year. Yes, it is that simple. It is purely a political question and not one of “finance.”

If we do want seniors to participate in the future profitability of corporate America, one option (currently not on the table) is to simply index their future Social Security checks to the stock market or any other indicator we select—such as worker productivity or inflation, whatever that might mean.

Remember, the government imposes a 30% corporate income tax, which is at least as good as owning 30% of all the equity, and has at least that same present value. If the government wants to take a larger or smaller bite from corporate profits, all it has to do is alter that tax—it has the direct pipe. After all, equity is nothing more than a share of corporate profits. Indexation would give the same results as private accounts, without all the transactional expense and disruption.

Now on to the alleged “deficit issue” of the private accounts plan. The answer first—it’s a non-issue. Note that the obligation to pay Social Security benefits is functionally very much the same as having a government bond outstanding—it is a government promise to make future payments. So when the plan is enacted the reduction of future government payments is substantially “offset” by future government payments via the new bonds issued. And the funds to buy those new bonds come (indirectly) from the reductions in the Social Security tax payments—to the penny. The process is circular. Think of it this way. You get a $100 reduction of your Social Security tax payment. You buy $100 of equities. The person who sold the equities to you has your $100 and buys the new government bonds. The government has new bonds outstanding to him or her, but reduced Social Security obligations to you with a present value of about $100. Bottom line: not much has changed. One person has used his or her $100 Social Security tax savings to buy equities and has given up about $100 worth of future Social Security benefits (some might argue how much more or less than $100 is given up, but the point remains). The other person sold the equity and used that $100 to buy the new government bonds. Again, very little has changed at the macro level. Close analysis of the “pieces” reveals this program is nothing but a “wheel spin.”

Never has so much been said by so many about a non-issue. It is a clear case of “innocent fraud.” And what has been left out? Back to Chairman Greenspan’s interview—what are we doing about increasing future output? Certainly nothing in the proposed private account plan. So if we are going to take real action, that is the area of attack. Make sure we do what we can to make the real investments necessary for tomorrow’s needs, and the first place to start for very long term real gains is education. Our kids will need the smarts when the time comes to deal with the problems at hand.

Bibliography

Galbraith, John Kenneth, 2004, The Economics of Innocent Fraud: Truth for Our Time, Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Wray, L. Randall, 1999, “Subway Tokens and Social Security,” C-FEPS Policy Note 99/02, Kansas City, MO: Center for Full Employment and Price Stability, January, (http://www.cfeps.org/pubs/pn/pn9902.html).

Wray, L. Randall, 2000, “Social Security: Long-Term Financing and Reform,” C-FEPS Working Paper No. 11, Kansas City, MO: Center for Full Employment and Price Stability, August, (http://www.cfeps.org/pubs/wp/wp11.html).

Wray, L. Randall and Stephanie Bell, 2000, “Financial Aspects of the Social Security ‘Problem’,” C-FEPS Working Paper No. 5, Kansas City, MO: Center for Full Employment and Price Stability, January, (http://www.cfeps.org/pubs/wp/wp5.html).

——————————————————————————–

[*] Associate Fellow, Cambridge University Centre for Economic and Public Policy;
Distinguished Research Associate, Center for Full Employment and Price Stability

[**] Associate Professor and Director, Center for Full Employment and Price Stability, University of Missouri-Kansas City

Subway Tokens and Social Security

There is a wide-spread belief that Social Security surpluses must be “saved” for future retirees. Most believe that this can be done by accumulating a Trust Fund and ensuring that the Treasury does not “spend” the surplus. The “saviors” of Social Security thus insist that the rest of the government’s budget must remain balanced, for otherwise the Treasury would be forced to “dip into” Social Security reserves.

Can a Trust Fund help to provide for future retirees? Suppose the New York Transit Authority (NYTA) decided to offer subway tokens as part of the retirement package provided to employees—say, 50 free tokens a month after retirement. Should the city therefore attempt to run an annual “surplus” of tokens (collecting more tokens per month than it pays out) today in order to accumulate a trust fund of tokens to be provided to tomorrow’s NYTA retirees? Of course not. When tokens are needed to pay future retirees, the City will simply issue more tokens at that time. Not only is accumulation of a hoard of tokens by the City unnecessary, it will not in any way ease the burden of providing subway rides for future retirees. Whether or not the City can meet its obligation to future retirees will depend on the ability of the transit system to carry the paying customers plus NYTA retirees.


Note, also, that the NYTA does not currently attempt to run a “balanced budget”, and, indeed, consistently runs a subway token deficit. That is, it consistently pays-out more tokens than it receives, as riders hoard tokens or lose them. Attempting to run a surplus of subway tokens would eventually result in a shortage of tokens, with customers unable to obtain them. A properly-run transit system would always run a deficit—issuing more tokens than it receives.

Accumulation of a Social Security Trust Fund is neither necessary nor useful. Just as a subway token surplus cannot help to provide subway rides for future retirees, neither can the Social Security Trust Fund help provide for babyboomer retirees. Whether the future burden of retirees will be excessive or not will depend on our society’s ability to produce real goods and services (including subway rides) at the time that they will be needed. Nor does it make any sense for our government to run a budget surplus—which simply reduces disposable income of the private sector. Just as a NYTA token surplus would generate lines of token-less people wanting rides, a federal budget surplus will generate jobless people desiring the necessities of life (including subway rides).

Financial Engineers and The Brave New World

And some people say that no one saw this crisis coming. Bright people almost 10 years ago foresaw and understood the risks and consequences of private sector indebtedness and its relation to government surpluses.

by Warren Mosler and Eileen Debold

Just as the Corps of Engineers sustains the army’s fighting ability, our financial engineers have been sustaining the US post-Cold War economic expansion. Financial engineering has effectively supported an expansion that could have long ago succumbed to the ‘financial gravity’ economists call ‘fiscal drag.’ For even with lower US tax rates, the surge in economic growth has generated federal tax revenues in excess of federal spending. This has led to both record high budget surpluses and the record low consumer savings that is, for all practical purposes, the other side of the same coin. As the accounting identity states, a government surplus is necessarily equal to the non-government deficit. The domestic consumer is the largest component of ‘non-government’ trailed by domestic corporations, and non- resident (foreign) corporations, governments, and individuals.



It is our financial engineers who have empowered American consumers with innovative forms of credit, enabling them to sustain spending far in excess of income even as their net nominal wealth (savings) declines. Financial engineering has also empowered private-sector firms to increase their debt as they finance the increased investment and production. And, with technology increasing productivity as unemployment has fallen, prices have remained acceptably stable.

Financial engineering begins deep inside the major commercial and investment banks with ‘credit scoring.’ This is typically a sophisticated analytical process whereby a loan application is thoroughly analyzed and assigned a number representing its credit quality. The process has a high degree of precision, as evidenced by low delinquencies and defaults even as credit has expanded at a torrid pace. Asset securitization, the realm of another highly specialized corps of financial engineers, then allows non-traditional investors to be part of the demand for this lending-based product. Loans are pooled together, with the resulting cash flows sliced and diced to meet the specific needs of a multitude of different investors. Additionally, the financial engineers structure securities with a careful eye to the credit criteria of the major credit rating services most investors have come to rely on. The resulting structures range from lower yielding unleveraged AAA rated senior securities to high yielding, high risk, ‘leveraged leverage’ mezzanine securities of pools of mezzanine securities.

Private sector debt growth can only exceed income growth for a limited time, even if the debt growth is also driving asset prices higher. At some point the supply of credit wanes. But not for lack of available funds (since loans create deposits), but when even our elite cadre of financial engineers exhaust the supply of creditworthy borrowers who are willing to spend. When that happens asset prices go sideways, consumer spending and retail sales soften, jobless claims trend higher, leading indicators turn south, and car sales and housing slump. There is a scramble to sell assets and not spend income in a futile attempt to replace the nominal wealth being drained by the surplus. Consequently, as unemployment bottoms and begins to increase, personal and corporate income decelerate, and government revenues soon fall short of expenditures as the economy slips into recession. The financial engineers then shift their focus to the repackaging of defaulted receivables.

Both Presidential candidates have voiced their support for maintaining the surplus to pay down the debt, overlooking the iron link between declining savings and budget surpluses. For as long as the government continues to tax more than it spends, nominal $US savings (the combined holdings of residents and non-residents) will be drained, keeping us dependent on financial engineering to sustain spending and growth in the global economy.

Mr. Mosler is the chairman of A.V.M. L.P. and director of economic analysis, III Advisors Ltd. Ms. Debold is vice president, Global Risk Management Services, The Bank of New York.

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Another interesting piece, an interview of Professor L. Randall Wray, almost 9 years old saw the current crisis coming.

Q:Based on the current economic scenario, and taking into account the recent interest rates increases, how probable is the hypothesis of a “soft-landing” for the American economy?

LRW: It is highly improbable that an economic slowdown could stop at a “soft-landing”, given economic conditions that exist today. The U.S. expansion of the past half dozen years has been driven to an unprecedented extent by private sector borrowing. Indeed, the private sector has been spending more than its income in recent years, with its deficit reaching 5.5% of GDP in 1999. In order for the economy to continue to grow, this gap between income and spending must continue to grow. My colleague at the Jerome Levy Economics Institute, Wynne Godley, has projected that the private sector’s deficit would have to climb to well over 8% of GDP by 2005 in order to keep economic growth just above 2.5%. Even that is below the current rate of growth (about 4%). A smaller private sector deficit would mean even lower growth. There are two problems with this scenario. First, our private sector has never run deficits in the past as large as those experienced in this current expansion. In the past, private sector deficits reached a maximum of about 1% of GDP and then quickly reversed toward surplus as households and firms cut back spending to bring it below income. Not only are current deficits already five times higher than anything achieved in the past, they have already lasted two or three times longer than any previous deficits. Even more importantly, the private sector has had to borrow in order to finance its deficit spending, which increases its indebtedness. Private sector debt is already at a record level relative to disposable income. As interest rates rise, this increases what are known as debt service burdens—the percent of disposable income that must go to pay interest (and to repay principal) on debt. In combination with an economic slowdown, which reduces the growth of disposable income, many firms and households will find it impossible to meet their payment commitments. Defaults and bankruptcies are already on the rise, and things will only get worse. Thus, I believe there is a real danger that an economic slowdown could degenerate into a deep recession—or even worse.

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Wray also saw it coming (see here), as he put it:

How would Minsky explain the processes that brought us to this point, and what would he think about the prospects for continued Goldilocks growth?

First, I think he would argue that consumers became ready, willing, and able to borrow, probably to a relative degree not seen since the 1920s. Credit cards became much more available; lenders expanded credit to sub-prime borrowers; bad publicity about redlining provided the stick, and the Community Reinvestment Act provided the carrot to expand the supply of loans to lower income homeowners; deregulation of financial institutions enhanced competition. All of these things made it easier for consumers to borrow. Consumers were also more willing to borrow. As Minsky used to say, as memories of the Great Depression fade, people become more willing to commit future income flows to debt service. The last general debt deflation is beyond the experience of almost the whole population. Even the last recession was almost half a generation ago. And it isn’t hard to convince oneself that since we’ve really only had one recession in nearly a generation, downside risks are small. Add on top of that the stock market’s irrational exuberance and the wealth effect, and you can pretty easily explain consumer willingness to borrow.

I would add one more point, which is that until very recently, most Americans had not regained their real 1973 incomes. Even over the course of the Clinton expansion, real wage growth has been very low. Americans are not used to living through a quarter of a century without rising living standards. Of course, the first reaction was to increase the number of earners per family—but even that has allowed only a small increase of real income. Thus, I think it isn’t surprising that consumers ran out and borrowed as soon as they became reasonably confident that the expansion would last.

The result has been consistently high growth of consumer credit…The expansion might not stall out in the coming months, but continued expansion in the face of a trade deficit and budget surplus requires that the private sector’s deficit and thus debt load continue to rise without limit…What would Minsky recommend? So long as private sector spending continues at a robust pace, he would probably recommend that we do nothing today about the budget surplus. He would oppose any policies that would tie the hands of fiscal policy to maintenance of a surplus. Rather, he would push toward recognition that tax cuts and spending increases will be needed as soon as private sector spending falters. That means it is time to begin discussion of the types of tax cuts and spending programs that will be rushed through as the recession begins. For the longer run, he would recommend relaxation of the fiscal stance so that surpluses would be achieved only at high growth rates (in excess of the full employment rate of economic growth). For the shorter run, he would oppose monetary tightening, which would increase debt service ratios and push financial structures into speculative or Ponzi positions. He would support policies aimed at reducing “irrational exuberance” of financial markets; most importantly, increased margin requirements on stock markets would be far more effective and narrowly targeted than are general interest rate hikes that have been the sole instrument of Fed policy to this point. Most importantly, Minsky would try to shift the focus of policy formation away from the belief that monetary policy, alone, can be used to “fine-tune” the economy, and from the belief that fiscal policy should be geared toward running perpetual surpluses—in Minsky’s view, this would be high risk strategy without strong theoretical foundations.